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ABSTRACT 
 
Louise Carrie Wales 
 
IN RESPONSE TO HEIDEGGER’S PLEA: 
ALĒTHEIA AND THE OPEN SPACE FOR THINKING AND FREEDOM THROUGH ART 
 
 
 This dissertation is a response to Martin Heidegger’s call to action asserted at the 
conclusion of his oft-cited essay, “The Question Concerning Technology,” in which he offers 
the realm of art as the mainspring for our emancipation from the grip of technological 
enframing. The following chapters investigate artists Martha Rosler, Christian Boltanski, 
Krzysztof Wodiczko and finally, collaborators Noor Mirza and Brad Butler, whose artworks 
offer a counterbalance to the erosion of the human capacity for thought as a particular feature 
of our Being, or Dasein, as proposed by Heidegger. Their shared characteristic lies in truth’s 
manifestation within artworks as happenings or events rather than a quest for fixed certainty 
or correspondence. Through their work, the artists catalyze a reckoning, compelling the 
viewer to question and reflect on his intersubjective ethical responsibility for the other. The 
common thread connecting them is a powerful shifting of thought — in a distinctly 
revelatory acting upon the viewer’s awareness. I will argue that, as technological aesthetic 
narratives are increasingly sophisticated and nuanced, politically conscious artists such as 
these become better able to harness their potential voices in deeply critical ways allowing 
the inter-subjective ethos of care to manifest and thrive in dialogic expressions of truth. 
   vii 
Furthermore, they begin to formulate a way of considering and using technology that not 
only resists enframing by interrogating the very essence of our relationship with it, but also 
functions as a way of engaging with the question of Being itself (which encompasses 
Heidegger’s fundamental project). In the end, this dissertation will demonstrate that Being 
comes to itself in the site of exchange as his/her awareness of responsibility grows and 
thought is returned to its poetical dwelling.  In these times of narrowed perspectives and 
technological addiction qua enframing, Heidegger’s call to action and the works responding 
to it must be brought to the fore and celebrated.  
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INTRODUCTION: 
 
“The meditative man is to experience the untrembling heart of unconcealment.” 
Martin Heidegger 
- 
 
§ I.1: A CALL TO ACTION 
This dissertation concerns the human capacity for thinking—both in its relationship to 
what Martin Heidegger terms Dasein and, ultimately, in light of our primordial 
intersubjective ethical disposition. Furthermore, it addresses human access to truth through 
the realm of art—a truth that is multiple and fluid rather than objectivist and correspondent. 
It is, more directly, an inter-textual response to Martin Heidegger’s call to action asserted at 
the conclusion of his oft-cited essay, “The Question Concerning Technology,” in which he 
offers the realm of art as the mainspring for our emancipation from the grip of technological 
enframing. Inspired by Friedrich Hölderlin’s poem, Patmos, Heidegger writes,  
Because the essence of technology is nothing technological, essential 
reflection upon technology and decisive confrontation with it must happen 
in a realm that is, on the one hand, akin to the essence of technology and, 
on the other, fundamentally different from it.  
Such a realm is art. But certainly only if reflection upon art, for its part, 
does not shut its eyes to the constellation of truth, concerning which we 
are questioning. (Krell 340 emphasis mine) 
Heidegger leaves us with these thoughts after having detailed the ultimate reduction of 
human beings to standing reserve, or, perhaps more significantly, the reduction of human 
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creativity (in technē) to modes of challenging-forth. In other words, working from the 
language of Karl Marx, he asserts an essential self-alienation arising from our relationship 
with technology. Furthermore, he establishes that this relational imprisonment assails 
Dasein’s ability to exercise its most profound capacity within the unfettered open space of 
thinking. The greatest peril, in his estimation, lies in a false sense of wellbeing that prompts 
us to overlook the danger, hence his notice of the ‘absence of emergency’—a condition of 
Being Santiago Zabala expands upon in his recent volume Why Only Art Can Save Us. It is, 
consequently, in decisive confrontation that we must actively seek emancipation within the 
same realm as that which imperils us. Thus, if our approach to artworks remains open to the 
alētheiac multiplicity inherent within them, we might reconnect with Dasein’s fundamental 
capacity for questioning, thereby accessing the constellation of truth so important to Being.  
Already, Heidegger’s thoughts present us with perplexing language in need of 
elucidation. To be clear, the enframing upon which Heidegger focuses asserts a fundamental 
crisis of Being. Heidegger’s plea reflects the preoccupations of much of his later writings 
wherein poēisis qua art is designated as Dasein’s most fundamental disposition. However, 
Dasein must wrest itself free from subjectivity understood definitionally as an object given in 
its full presence, a liberating action that parallels and informs his temporal understanding of 
truth. Furthermore, it addresses, broadly speaking, the abandonment of Being, a 
forgottenness that results in living in-authentically, thereby failing to fulfill Dasein’s creative 
potential. Heidegger holds responsible, in part, the calculative thinking of metaphysics and 
its unrelenting need for certainty. Technological enframing is, in large part, the consequence 
of metaphysical ordering and a long-standing tradition of objectifying thought. At the risk of 
over-simplifying a nuanced position, Heidegger breaks from habits of thought that assume an 
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explanatory power over objects (including, here, Nature as a whole) and that presume to offer 
the fullness of their objecthood to our explanatory power and pragmatism. Moreover, with 
the rise of the Enlightenment into the Modern age of history, he objects to the fixity of 
totalizing structures in both thought and social-political agendas (think, for example, of 
technocracy). Simon Glendinning explains such objectionable ordering as that which 
“discloses everything everywhere as measurable, calculable and orderable (under orders or at 
our command), as what Heidegger comes to call a ‘standing reserve’” (Gaut and Lopes 108). 
Rather than an objectivist approach, Heidegger proposes, quite radically, that Being comes 
into presence ‘from out of itself,’ in a self-revealing reminiscent of pre-Socratic thought. He 
acknowledges, however, that this self-revealing contains a simultaneous concealment, a 
characteristic that maintains a certain mystery or reticence on the part of Being. It is not 
surprising, given this foundational premise, that Being in general and the being of Dasein, for 
Heidegger, dwells poetically in this world, revealing and concealing itself most authentically 
through its creative expression. 
Heidegger’s decisive confrontation seems paradoxical, leaving the reader to wonder 
how freedom might come to light as a possibility of being, bearing in mind the absence of 
individualist subjectivity? What is this freedom? Most importantly, it is something we cannot 
possess as though it were our tool. Instead, freedom precedes us: we are a property of 
freedom, though we must act free in our life of Care. The first grounding of freedom is the 
self-revealing of Being. Thus, freedom is Ontological, rather than individualist. In light of 
such conceptual framing, one must therefore ask if is it even possible to move Heidegger’s 
ideas from the abstract non-objectifying into the practical or actionable, finding traces of a 
response to his plea within contemporary art practice? Moreover, how might we supplement 
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Heidegger’s re-thinking of the aesthetic project in light of his ominous diagnosis and warning 
as concerns our relationship with technology? In an effort to answer these questions, the 
following chapters investigate specific artworks by artists Martha Rosler, Christian 
Boltanski, Krzysztof Wodiczko and finally, collaborators Noor Mirza and Brad Butler, 
whose creations offer a counterbalance to the erosion of the human capacity for thought as a 
particular feature of our Being, or Dasein and Mitsein (being-with), as proposed by 
Heidegger. Their shared characteristics lie in truth’s manifestation within artworks as 
happenings or events rather than a quest for fixed certainty or correspondence. The artists 
considered herewith catalyze a reckoning, compelling the viewer to question and reflect on 
his position in relation to the work and those in his midst. The common thread connecting 
them is a powerful shifting of thought — in a distinctly revelatory acting upon the viewer’s 
awareness. In other words, the artworks manifest a questioning disposition—one that is vital 
to our access into the ‘constellation of truth’ so central to Dasein.  
More specifically, this investigation will demonstrate the ways that technē and poēisis 
intersect within the selected artworks, thereby animating the viewer’s capacity for reflection 
and thought. The marriage of the two nurtures the much-needed resistance to enframing 
while astounding (Heidegger’s term) the viewer into a contemplative state. As a result, what 
is unique to the artists, and the realm of art more generally, is the capacity for countering 
enframing, something I will establish is best done with a focus on ethico-political structures. 
We find, in this counter-intuitive move, that the saving power resides within the danger and 
the seeds for a response to Heidegger’s call to action emerges from within technē. Each of 
the chosen artists has undertaken thoughtful critiques of personal, contemporary or 
historical issues by means of material processes including light, time-based interventions, 
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space, carefully chosen artifacts and documents. Mnemonic triggers and associations are 
deployed in varying arrangements making deliberate use of the mediums of photography, 
film and installation. Current scholarship surrounding each artist has examined their 
significance primarily through analyses that focus on each artwork and its exhibition as 
existing independently from others.1 The questions I will be asking, however, are based upon 
analyzing them in ascending chronological order while addressing the statements made by 
Heidegger (et al) with regards to reclaiming creative freedom through the provocation of 
thought. As we have begun to see above, Heidegger explains, “We must think alētheia, 
unconcealment, as the clearing that first grants Being and thinking and their presencing to 
and for each other” (Krell 445). This primary granting would itself be a pre-individualist act 
of ontological freedom. It follows that the proper practice of concrete human emancipation 
has this modality as its foundation. It is therefore the artist’s task to offer the space of 
clearing, enlisting the viewer’s active participation therein. This strategy does not aim to 
anchor each artist in a particular style or visual language. Instead, it is to recognize an 
evolving attitude toward truth as a multiple unfolding event — a form of unconcealment or 
revealing through which Being is returned to itself to dwell poetically in the world. 
The chronological presentation of the artworks will expose an ongoing 
preoccupation with the ways technological expression, along with careful use and 
manipulation of both objects and archives, join in service of hermeneutic explorations of 
human existence through art. I will argue that, as technological aesthetic narratives are 
increasingly sophisticated and nuanced, politically conscious artists such as these become 
better able to harness their potential voices in deeply critical ways that allow the inter-
subjective ethos of care to grow and thrive in dialogic expressions of truth. Furthermore, 
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the artists begin to formulate a way of considering and using technology that not only resists 
enframing by interrogating the very essence of our relationship with it, but also functions as a 
means of engaging with the question of Being itself (which encompasses Heidegger’s 
fundamental project). There is a democratization of access via mechanical distribution—
something only made available in the relatively recent past, leveling the field for 
interaction with the artworks through their production and site-specific locales. While this 
negates the idea of a singular, settled authenticity of the work of art, artists now have the 
capacity to exceed mere representation, creating instead, more penetrating content that is 
able to affect our being and challenge the general submission of the mind to technology. 
How, though, do we experience the primacy of freedom through the realm of art? 
Given this brief overview of Heidegger’s position with regards to creative thinking and 
dwelling, how must we best approach the present analysis? The varied artists’ projects need 
to be considered through the particular philosophical ideas appropriate to them. While 
Heidegger’s call to action forms the through-line that anchors the question of emancipation 
within the realm of art, his ideas alone fail to provide a satisfactory response and so require 
supplementation from other notable thinkers who extend them further. As we consider 
thinking as an ethical act, we must turn, for example, to Hannah Arendt, his former pupil.2 
Arendt’s sustained study of the human condition and political theory concretized a number of 
Heidegger’s core ideas into more practical terms. Arendt brought to life some of the 
underpinnings of thinking and action, sensitively scripting the ways these must be nurtured in 
order to craft lasting global collaboration and, ultimately, peace. She injects the aesthetic 
project with cultural consequence, interpreting artworks as ‘thought things’ and carriers of 
meaning in their own right. We must also include Walter Benjamin’s voice, a longtime friend 
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of Arendt’s, who did not survive Fascism to see the celebration of his own writing, though 
his ideas, much like those expressed by Arendt, had a clear foothold in history. Benjamin 
responded in real time to the events surrounding (and ultimately, overwhelming) him. His 
politicization of art as a response to fascist tendencies accentuates the importance of intention 
with a focus on the greater societal good. We must consider Arendt and Benjamin’s ideas in 
order to both ground Heidegger’s more abstract thinking and, also, to answer the question of 
enframing through both political and historical terms. While Heidegger’s call to action lays 
the foundation work for the overall dissertation, the subsequent layers afforded by Arendt, 
Benjamin and the other thinkers are indispensable to any advancement of my argument.   
As we analyze the artworks, there are four foundational concerns we must 
foreground. The first addresses the temporal and contextual nature of being and examines the 
ways technological progress and historical events intersect. In other words, we must address 
the ways each artist belongs to a particular epoch and, as such, is shaped by environmental 
forces in play, whether past or present, particularly in light of their ethico-political concerns. 
These extrinsic influences might include acts of war, mass migrations or the Shoah, to name 
only a few. To best understand this relationship between artists and events, we will enlist 
thinkers Peter Sloterdijk, Edward Said, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Homi Bhabha, Susan 
Sontag, Jean Baudrillard and, of course, Benjamin and Arendt. We will define how Sloterdijk 
explains modernity in terms of atmo-terrorism, a conditioning force in play since the 
Germans introduced chemical warfare during WWI. Said, Spivak and Bhabha offer insights 
into the effects of colonialism and prolonged external domination. Sontag describes the 
relationship between events and the ubiquity of images. In addition, we will consider Karl 
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Marx’s economic ideas, particularly his thoughts on alienation, as we establish Heidegger’s 
call to action as an ethical demand.  
The second thematic undercurrent questions artworks as sites of exchange in which 
complex intersubjective dynamics are set into motion. It is within this exchange that meaning 
is imparted and structures of enframing can be challenged. For clarity, we turn to Benjamin’s 
essay “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” which plays a critical role 
in this investigation as it explores the implications of reproducibility as a factor in 
disseminating meaning and prompting action. Reproducibility is of particular interest as the 
notion of aura is erased in the present list of artists’ works. Aura is replaced by multiplicity 
and an access to the open dimension of questioning, though we will discover this alteration 
carries with it some costs. In addition, there is an often-overlooked ambiguity that rests in 
Benjamin’s understanding of distraction—on the one hand, a thoughtless space from which 
the viewer absorbs the work of art (most notably film) and on the other, a space holding the 
potential for political agitation and progress. To understand the layers of thought 
underpinning this transference, we must turn to Roland Barthes on reading an artwork’s 
signification, Marianne Hirsch on post-memory, Baudrillard on our virtual world, and Michel 
Foucault on archives, fearless speech and structures of power. While each of these 
philosophers adds a different dimension to the notion of exchange, their ideas speak to the 
individual artworks and will most definitely expand our understanding.  
A third, and resulting, layer analyzes the way each artist speaks to Heidegger’s call to 
action, positioning artworks as alethēiac spaces of truth, or happenings in which 
unconcealment of being is possible. What is it that translates an artwork into such an event of 
truth, a happening? Moreover, how can we experience the artwork as the site of 
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intersubjective exchange? There are a number of important thinkers who elucidate these 
questions including Miguel de Beistegui, Hans Georg Gadamer, Howard Caygill, J.F. Martel, 
Santiago Zabala and Gianni Vattimo. Each of these philosophers and theorists add much 
needed dimension and depth to Heidegger’s thoughts such that we might better understand 
the nuances of it in relation to contemporary quotidian experience. de Beistegui’s lucid 
accounting in The New Heidegger underscores the radical nature of Heidegger’s writing in a 
way that is relatable and functional, using stories to underpin his interpretations. Specifically, 
de Besteigui sheds light on nuanced concepts through the equally subtle intimate narrative of 
his own life. Gadamer, in turn, brings our focus to the hermeneutic methods of questioning 
and the role art plays in our lives. Caygill, Martel, Zabala and Vattimo advance theories that 
elucidate artworks as sites of exchange and happenings of truth, particularly extending the 
issue of resistance (in relation to enframing structures) into the domain of pluralistic 
intersubjectivity. The dialog that forms between their own expressed ideas is invaluable to 
the exploration of the artists in question.  
The fourth fundamental thematic lens looks at the intersubjective ethical 
responsibility implied in Heidegger’s plea, a point that may not sit well with all who are 
informed about Heidegger’s life and personal choices.3 That said, in order to understand the 
importance of his call to action, we must enlist thinkers such as Emmanuel Lévinas, Paul 
Ricoeur, Arendt and George Smith, each of whom explores our responsibility for the other in 
a broadly expressed ethos of care. Gadamer’s The Relevance of the Beautiful speaks to the 
inherent power and responsibility of the work of art as a vehicle for imparting meaning and 
altering perception. Time, narrative and the implied ethical responsibility for the other will 
also be traced and examined primarily through the lens of Ricoeur’s Reflections on a New 
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Ethos for Europe and Oneself as Another, and Arendt’s Banality of Evil, The Human 
Condition, Responsibility and Judgment and “Thinking and Moral Considerations: a lecture.” 
In addition, Lévinas’ Totality and Infinity, Entre Nous and their conceptions of the 
intersubjective primacy of the face will lend depth to the ethical dimension of the present 
work. I will also look at a post-Heideggerian idea of truth as variable and ever-changing, 
divorcing us and art from objective or fixed ideas to which we cling so dearly. Because the 
works in question include documents and archives, Derrida’s Archive Fever is noteworthy 
and will enhance the conversation, as well as Michel Foucault’s explorations of truth in The 
Order of Things4 and Fearless Speech.  
While the thoughts of each aforementioned thinker are not limited to any one 
thematic stream, each one has further shaped this project and has directed the ways the texts 
converse with one another from chapter to chapter. Additional resources will include history 
texts relevant to the artworks in question, articles addressing our current geo-political 
condition, and a number of critiques, reviews and other printed matter. While the list of 
thinkers under consideration may appear quite long, each artwork requires a different set of 
lenses through which it can be best understood, thereby demanding additional texts, 
particularly as technologies progressed and their effects transformed their perception and 
reception. 
The question that needs to be posed in a careful way, of course, is how? How does 
Heidegger’s call to action happen within the realm of art? In what is perhaps a forecast of 
what is to follow, while speaking of Heidegger’s essay, “The Origins of the Work of Art,” 
Gianni Vattimo identifies an important shift within the moment of exchange between an 
artwork and its percipient. He states, “This is […] the Stoss (shock) of the artwork: in 
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encountering a great artwork, the world I was accustomed to seeing becomes strange, is put 
into crisis in its totality, because the work proposes a new general reorganization of the 
world, a new historical epoch” (70). The reconfiguration of the percipient’s perspective is 
critical to the fostering of thought. If poetry qua art is lauded as the place in which 
imagination and expression dwell, the artists under consideration are able to harness the 
abstract potential of technological expression in a way that offers the viewer an opening in 
which translation and relation occur. We find, in these artists’ works, a counter to 
enframing, positive sequel to Heidegger’s fearful predictions, and, as such, a model for 
thinking that holds the keys to our freedom. What becomes most apparent is the shift from 
monological versions of truth to the polyphonic or dialogical perspectives. As we trace the 
arc of progress in the visual grammar deployed to make meaning, we will note an 
increasing awareness of intersubjectivity and the need to accept what Arendt calls the “fact 
of human plurality” along with a deliberate reciprocity between artist and percipient. In 
light of these thoughts, it would be an error for artists to hold a strict view of their own, or 
their works’, autonomy. Instead, the artwork and its experience become a site of exchange 
that as Heidegger observes ‘[gives] thought and thinking to us.’  
Before turning to a survey of the forthcoming chapters, it must be noted that the ideas 
presented herewith are deeply motivated by a personal concern with regards to the impact 
technology continues to have on creative thought—most notably, its documented costs to 
one’s development of critical thinking and intersubjective relationships. These are not the 
concerns of a luddite—quite the contrary. Unlike Heidegger’s inclination toward retreating to 
his hut the Black Forest, I am well acquainted with the devices and tools at our twenty-first 
century disposal and, therefore, keenly aware of their usefulness and potential for good. That 
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said, the epoch into which I was born has been indelibly marked by the constant possibility 
of nuclear annihilation—an issue still permeating the geo-political landscape today.5 With 
this blend of experiences in mind, the current volumes of information regarding technology’s 
impact on the human mind are endless and alarming. Diminishing attentions spans, increased 
anxiety and depression, the fundamental inability to synthesize information are but a few of 
the issues under scrutiny. Sherry Turkle wrote Alone Together, Adam Alter, Irresistible, 
Nicholas Carr, in turn, penned The Shallows, and the list goes on. To note one example, Alter 
opens his prologue by exposing the fact that “the people producing tech products were 
following the cardinal rule of drug dealing: never get high on your own supply” (2). He 
follows, “these entrepreneurs recognize that the tools they promote—engineered to be 
irresistible—will ensnare users indiscriminately,” exposing an ongoing willingness on the 
part of big tech companies to jeopardize the consumer while safeguarding themselves (4). To 
this point, in his book Reclaiming Art in the Age of Artifice, J.F. Martel explains,  
It is not the technology that adapts to our needs and desires but our needs 
and desires that must conform to the technology. In the digital age, 
spectacle morphs into something more invasive than a show to be attended 
in bovine passivity. Loyal to the emergent aesthetic ideals of 
‘interactivity’ and ‘immersion,’ we have become active participants in our 
own entrancement. We have gone from the spectacular to the spectral. 
(140).  
Our wholesale adaptation to the demands of technology, whether on a micro or macro level, 
is alarming to say the least. How does one ever hope to overcome such pervasive 
distractions? Are we even cognizant enough to initiate such an overcoming? Jocelyn K. 
Glei’s book, Manage Your Day to Day, concludes that creativity requires a kind of 
meditative silence. This belief echoes Heidegger’s assertion: “The quiet heart of the clearing 
is the place of stillness from which alone the possibility of the belonging together of Being 
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and thinking, that is, presence and apprehending, can arise at all” (Krell 445). The clearing 
(Lichtung) becomes central to Heidegger’s later essays on thinking. He concludes that the 
presencing of thought is invited to appear through a quiet space of openness. As we will see, 
the sentiment is further reinforced in his essay “What Calls for Thinking” in which he states, 
“The question What calls for thinking? asks for what wants to be thought about in the 
preeminent sense: it does not just give us something to think about, nor only itself, but it first 
gives thought and thinking to us, it entrusts thought to us as our essential destiny, and thus 
first joins and appropriates us to thought” (Krell 391). Thought then precedes us (as language 
and freedom do also) and is returned to us as a characteristic of our essential destiny. It enters 
the meditative mind in its most open state, thereby returning us to our questioning 
dispositions in Dasein. While the astute investigations found in recent volumes regarding 
technology’s impact fall outside the scope of this study, their collective messages resonate 
deeply and, to a great extent, have fueled the present work. It is important to introduce, if 
briefly, how Heidegger’s warning about the reduction of human beings to standing reserves 
anticipates the underlying themes of much of the aforementioned literature — albeit 
indirectly.  
Heidegger states, “Our answer to the question as to what the most thought-provoking 
thing might be is the assertion: most thought-provoking for our thought-provoking time is 
that we are still not thinking” (Krell 381). We are not thinking. These words have repeatedly 
struck me as prescient today in light of the digital dissemination of false statements and 
information, increasingly dividing large populations in a would-be nationalist furor.6 In 
response, I am drawing from a reading of Heidegger’s ideas and positioning his plea as an 
ethical demand — something he may well have resisted for the risk of falling into 
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normative structures.7 And yet, as one reads his thoughts, it is difficult to view them in any 
other way. He urgently explains, 
The essential unfolding of technology threatens revealing, threatens it with 
the possibility that all revealing will be consumed in ordering and that 
everything will present itself only in the unconcealment of standing-
reserve. Human activity can never directly counter this danger. Human 
achievement alone can never banish it. But human reflection can ponder 
the fact that all saving power must be of a higher essence than what is 
endangered, though at the same time kindred to it. (Krell 339) 
Heidegger reframes a Marxist paradigm, ascribing the notion of standing reserve to human 
beings under technology’s sway, thereby shifting Marx’s focus from capital to human 
potential. Human beings are reduced to a standing-reserve. In short, he who challenges-forth 
(instead of engaging with Poēisis) becomes, in turn, challenged-forth by the enframing he 
unleashes and serves. Enframing conscripts the enframers. The remedy for such a reduction, 
beyond activity and achievement, is reflection upon the higher essence of Dasein’s 
birthright of creative thought and praxis. But, as we have begun to ask, can artists still 
produce meaningful responses in the post-Heideggerian age of technological enframing? 
Again, the questions that follow address how this meaning might manifest and, as 
Heidegger indicates, can possibly reveal authentic truth as an ethical emancipatory path to 
freedom. Finally, as we come to see truth as an ever-becoming event, we ask: can artists 
ever hope to offer lasting solutions to our pervasive crisis of enframing? 
While Heidegger’s essays have been the subject of extensive study, a clear 
examination of this particular call to action through contemporary artistic production remains 
elusive. Moreover, the call to action as an ethical demand has been scarce, though with 
notable exceptions in the writings of Charles Bambach and Miguel de Beistegui. We must 
therefore ask what makes this interpretation fundamental to understanding the “Question 
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Concerning Technology?” As we will see in Chapter 1, the introduction of an ethics to his 
plea also is absolutely warranted in light of the subscript embedded in his demand for our 
salvation through the arts. It can be said that, within this imperative, lies an implied 
responsibility for the other – a being-toward, or a Mitsein that would mean a being-with the 
other, suggesting the presence of an ethical charge – though others, including Emmanuel 
Lévinas, criticize Heidegger for not reaching far enough. As noted, ascribing an ethical 
character to Heidegger’s thought is not without challenges. Bambach lays bare some of these 
difficulties in his volume, Thinking the Poetic Measure of Justice, in which he explains: 
“This reluctance to confront the underlying resonance between justice and ethics is hardly 
fortuitous […] since it bespeaks an even deeper reticence on Heidegger’s part to proffer any 
plan or order for directing human action or behavior” (107). Indeed, the whole notion of an 
ethics, in Heidegger’s view, would put into crisis the temporal, fluid nature of Being, 
becoming simply another form of enframing. Instead, as Bambach clarifies, Heidegger’s 
project is “an ethics of being—in both senses of the genitive … thus [becoming] an ethics not 
of a ‘substance,’ but of a calling to the task of dwelling in the openness of the event of being, 
an event that appropriates us through its claim (Anspruch)” (11). Thus, as we approach 
Heidegger’s Technology essay as an ethical plea, we must position its motivation as a call to 
‘dwell in the happenings of truth’ that is the work of art.  
We will discover that each of our artists has carefully balanced the numerous 
properties of technology with the primacy of technē and, in so doing, have successfully 
achieved the lofty position Heidegger afforded to poetry qua art. Visual language holds the 
potential for a more universal understanding to come forth, and meaning is imparted with 
an economy of means. If poetry, per Heidegger, is a place wherein abstract ideas dwell, 
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allowing, through a suspension of time and space and a bridging of historical time, it 
thereby becomes the piety of thinking he so valued. Arendt writes, “Poetry, whose material 
is language, is perhaps the most human and least wordly of the arts, the one in which the end 
product remains closest to the thought that inspired it” (HC 169). Certainly, Heidegger 
concurs with Arendt’s position. Bambach quotes him: “[I]n such an age … what is 
necessary is that there be poets/thinkers who ‘reach into the abyss,’ since the turn away 
from the abyss is possible only if the abyssal as such is first ‘experienced and endured’” 
(Heidegger quoted in Bambach 189). It follows, as we move through our post-human 
condition, that reflective thinking accesses and lays bare the essence of morality. That said, 
perhaps the most profound challenge to my reading of Heidegger’s position as ethicist is 
Lévinas’ objection to his lack of consideration of the other, something Lévinas held as 
primary to philosophy. While we will question the translation of his ideas on Mitsein to 
intersubjectivity and dialogic truths, Lévinas’ writing on the face of the other becomes a 
critical extension of intersubjective ethics. Indeed, particularly as regards the work of 
Boltanski and Wodiczko, the face of the other is the source of our call to thinking and 
action within the installations. As we further analyze the artworks as sites of exchange, we 
must reconfigure our bearing so as to experience the infinite call to ethical responsibility as 
it issues from the other.  
Heidegger’s life-long ontological investigation and his process of interrogating our 
relationship with ourselves in the context of our world merged with my own fascination with 
our innate capacity for creative expression — in its freest unfettered state. Moreover, 
building from past studies in human ideation and the creative process, I found that 
Heidegger’s urgent plea prompted a careful reconsideration of art’s potential as a truly 
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emancipatory force—literally returning our being to its authentic disposition. However, the 
ambiguity of his ideas compelled me to move from the abstract to the practical within the 
realm of contemporary art — particularly in the face of our current technological zeitgeist. 
Given the rapid ascent of digital technologies and their corollary addictive properties, I 
wondered, while reading Heidegger, how he could have anticipated such a drastic, 
destructive enframing? Undoubtedly, the technological advances of the mid-twentieth 
century endangered our very existence, yet his questions are even more fundamental. They 
boil down to our primordial capacity for questioning and the open space for truth and 
thought to manifest — without which we cease to exist authentically. In the prologue to The 
Human Condition, Arendt writes, “[I]t could be that we, who are earth-bound creatures and 
have begun to act as though we were dwellers of the universe, will forever be unable to 
understand, that is, to think and speak about the things which nevertheless we are able to do” 
(HC 3). It may also be said, in relation to such a premise, that without the capacity to 
question and think, solutions to such global threats will be, at best, elusive. In Heidegger’s 
estimation (and again, influenced by Hölderlin), we cease to dwell poetically. This cessation, 
for Heidegger, endangers us to our core. But what does Heidegger mean exactly when 
pointing us toward the open space of truth (Lichtung)? Furthermore, is it compulsory that 
Heidegger’s open space manifest in all artworks, regardless of their ultimate purpose? If so, 
what does it bring to artistic production if such a disposition is mandated? Is it simply a 
matter of intention, an ascription only made to those artists who express what Walter 
Benjamin would term the ‘correct tendency’? What would have to be sacrificed from the 
normative habits of today’s art market? In short, must every artist become Heideggerian? 
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§ I.2: A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
To best answer these questions, I submit that we need to revisit Heidegger’s plea 
from an intertextual standpoint, involving specifically his hermeneutic investigations of 
Dasein’s creative capacities, while simultaneously analyzing the artworks that generate a 
response to his thoughts. To this end, Chapter 1 begins with an examination of Heidegger’s 
“Question Concerning Technology,” including an elucidation of some of Heidegger’s more 
perplexing terminology. I will position the essay as an ethical call to action in light of the 
stated need for emancipation from technological enframing. In order to support this case, 
more established ethical theories will be unpacked, including the ideas of Aristotle, 
Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, Arendt and Lévinas. The overarching aim is to lay 
groundwork for subsequent chapters, while clarifying some of the more ambiguous concepts 
under consideration. The terms Dasein, enframing (ge-stell), alētheia, poēisis, technē and 
dwelling will be defined in relation to Dasein’s primordial creative impulse. Furthermore, we 
will investigate the meaning of Heidegger’s notions of Mitsein, Solicitude, Gelassenheit, (as 
an opposition to the aforementioned metaphysics of presence and its correlative in 
objectivizing reason) and Care as expressions of his ethical worries. Finally, chapter 1 will 
also acknowledge the challenges one faces when positioning Heidegger’s work as a call to 
action of any kind, given his own choices as a member of the Nazi Party and subsequent 
apparent lack of contrition. What becomes most important, and perhaps overrides his 
personal actions, is to understand the concern Heidegger expresses through “The Question 
Concerning Technology” and its implications for the survival of that which makes us 
human—our capacity for questioning and thought.  
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From this point of departure, Chapter 2 brings our focus to the writing of Walter 
Benjamin, specifically his essay “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.” 
The purpose of this focus is to understand how meaning is imparted in reproduced artworks. 
Benjamin’s writing shifts from the abstract to the practical while reiterating an ethico-
political call to action most deliberately expressed in his essay’s epilogue. I will argue that 
Benjamin advances art as a political vehicle while simultaneously acknowledging its 
potentially damaging side-effects. His work illustrates the historical nature of events and the 
importance of context when considering ideas. Through the lens of his writing, we will look 
briefly at artworks by Charlotte Salomon, Henryk Ross, John Heartfield and Hannah Hoch in 
order to understand the power of ubiquitous imagery and the potential alteration of meaning 
as expressed in politically motivated artworks. In addition, we will note the shift in 
perception with the advent of photography and film. As we begin to look for material 
manifestations of Heidegger’s ideas, Walter Benjamin’s notion of art’s loss of its aura and 
the reproduction’s ultimate perpetuation of distraction—both its negative and positive 
manifestations—in the technological age, will become especially salient.  
Carrying forward Benjamin’s notion of “Author as Producer” (as detailed in his essay 
bearing the same name), Chapter 3 examines the work of Martha Rosler whose career has 
focused on questioning power structures demanding that we think through any preconceived 
ideas regarding social exchange. Her political orientation allows for an application of theory 
to her artworks, while noting the liberation of thought Rosler manifests. I will argue that 
Rosler is able, through the use of mechanically produced imagery and staged installations, to 
cut through cultural inertia and prompt action. Her work embodies Benjamin’s emphasis on 
the correct tendency as the premise for emancipation. This chapter also seeks to demonstrate 
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the ways reproductions can function as thought-things, to use Arendt’s term, through their 
familiarity and re-presentation. Rosler’s ethico-political artistic activism fully implicates and 
activates the viewer as a participant in the exchange of meaning, drawing out the notion of 
community and intersubjective responsibility. She therefore offers a freedom that is not 
fundamentally individualistic. Her installation work and use of personal effects overlaps with 
the works of both Boltanski and Wodiczko, whose explorations of memory and trauma are 
explored in Chapter 4. Moreover, we also note in both chapters the use of archives, a locus 
of selected remains as described by Jacques Derrida. This layering creates a rich intersection 
at which the reproduced image acts as an aide-mémoire able to elicit powerful responses 
from its audience. All three artists, Rosler, Boltanski and Wodiczko, implicate the viewer 
within the exchange, either as translator or witness. The performative nature of the 
installations challenges enframing and creates the open space for thinking and reflection to 
occur.  
To what end to these various inter-subjective experiences lead us? Chapter 4 will 
assert that a more fundamental alētheiac truth is more readily accessed through constructed 
narratives and fictional elements. It will also reveal the ways technology can instigate 
thought provoking intersubjective dialogues, deepening our bonds to the lives of others. Our 
investigation will extend the archive and note memory as embodiments of narrative (both 
historical and personal). Memory will also be noted and analyzed as an access to collective 
truths. It is interesting to note how Heidegger positions memory as a “gathering of thought 
upon what everywhere demands to be thought about first of all” (Krell 376). He elaborates 
further: 
Memory is the gathering of recollection, thinking back. It safely keeps and 
keeps concealed within it that to which at any given time thought must 
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first be given in everything that essentially unfolds, appealing to us as 
what has being and has been in being. Memory, Mother of the Muses—the 
thinking back to what is to be thought—is the source and ground of poesy. 
This is why poesy is the water that at times flows backward toward the 
source, toward thinking as a thinking back, a recollection. (Krell 376) 
We must equate poesy to Heidegger’s realm of art with the capacity of a backwards flow to 
its own source. Thus, artworks have the capacity to tune into and ‘attune’ the mind, to recall 
memory and to forge an intersubjective disposition. Grasping the nature of memory and post-
memory is necessary as one experiences the therapeutic and cathartic impact Boltanski and 
Wodiczko’s multi-layered works. 
Finally, Chapter 5 reaches the apex of current technological capabilities as 
experienced in Noor Mirza and Brad Butler’s 17-minute video essay, The Unreliable 
Narrator — a powerful encapsulation of history, memory, and current events as seen through 
the horrors of the Mumbai terror attacks of 26 November 2008. A careful reading of the 
video essay is needed in order to fully experience the opening of our intersubjective ethical 
disposition within the polyphonic happening of truth. As perhaps the most multi-layered and 
dialogic of the artworks considered herewith, Mirza and Butler’s video essay exposes the 
sediments of history as it manifests in current acts of global terror. The narrative, while 
embedded in advanced technological systems of information and surveillance, puts 
enframing into crisis by undermining discourse and altering the viewer’s biases, whether 
embedded in history or a result of cultural memory. The seamless jointure of archive, CCTV 
footage, news reels and Bollywood re-enactments creates a profoundly disquieting truth, 
laying bare the effects of centuries of dominance and political oppression. The common 
thread binding each of the artists under consideration resides in the dialogic access to truth as 
event and in the resulting provocation of thought born in one’s active participation within 
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multiple planes of experience. Finally, in direct response to Heidegger’s call to action spelled 
out at the end of the “Question Concerning Technology,” each artist, in concert with thinkers 
like Arendt, Lévinas and Ricoeur, for whom the importance of inter-subjective consideration 
and dialogic relation is paramount, the post-human ethical position is brought to light. 
 
§ I.3: LOOKING AHEAD 
 
 Important questions and challenges remain. To what end does such an aesthetic 
investigation lead? What does it matter that, for Dasein, thought arises in silence, or that 
critical contemplation through the language of art might set us free to creatively think our 
way out of enframing qua alienation? Who or what exactly needs to be freed? Perhaps more 
fundamentally, what is truly at stake? In response, Heidegger asks the following: 
But what help is it to us to look into the constellation of truth? We look 
into the danger and see the growth of the saving power. 
Through this we are not yet saved. But we are thereupon summoned to 
hope in the growing light of the saving power. How can this happen? Here 
and now and in little things, that we may foster the saving power in its 
increase. This includes holding always before our eyes the extreme 
danger. (Krell 338) 
Within Heidegger’s warning we apprehend a glimmer of hope, found in the ‘here and now 
and in little things, that we may foster the saving power in its increase.’ There is a 
suggestion of awareness and living in the present authentically—both of which would 
allow for the slow growth of a reversal to the danger. As though nurturing an a priori 
disposition in its infant state, Heidegger proposes a mood of Care, fundamental to Dasein’s 
survival. He states, “The meditative man is to experience the untrembling heart of 
unconcealment” (Krell 444), thereby restoring Dasein’s returning of thought to itself. It 
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seems antithetical to suggest that the use and dissemination of mechanically reproduced 
images and artworks might have the necessary disruptive power for opening space for 
thinking and Being to emerge. The authentic singularity of art is supplanted by a 
multiplicity of images, putting in crisis the thing in itself and our experience of a work of 
art as the locus of truth.8 To this point, Heidegger rejects the proposition that the thingly 
character of an artwork carries its import. Instead, he suggests an artwork precedes its 
objecthood and opens up a world — giving itself to thinking as an antidote to enframing. 
Simon Glendinning explains, “As such a happening of truth, the essence of art, like the 
essence of modern technology, is an event of unconcealment: the opening up of a world” 
(Glendinning, § 5). Heidegger’s position that it is within the realm of art that we reinstate 
Dasein’s full potential makes clear the notion that art, as creative outside force, is able, 
through its contemplation of our enframing, to manifest a reversal by means through the 
clearing of alētheia.  
While it is sure that Heidegger affords art the potential to open thinking, the idea that 
this would occur through the technologically driven artwork remains potentially problematic; 
yet this is exactly the manner in which art allows a dwelling to occur. It is in the re-
presentation of a reproduced image, whether still or moving, that interrupts the viewer’s 
expectations — essentially astounding him out of complacency. In David Krell’s introduction 
to Heidegger’s essay The Essence of Truth, he states: 
To let unconcealment show itself: this is perhaps the most succinct 
formulation of the task of Heidegger’s thinking. At the heart of the task 
stands the question of freedom, a freedom that refers us back to the 
discussion of Dasein as transcendence. However, “freedom” and 
“transcendence” no longer mean what traditional morals and metaphysics 
take them to mean. Both refer to the mystery of the openness or “clearing” 
(Lichtung) of Being, ‘the clearing that shelters.’ Finally, the task requires 
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that we think historically. The word Wesen (“essence”) in the title of the 
essay is to be thought historically as an “essential unfolding.” (113) 
“The mystery of the openness or clearing” resides at the heart of the matter. In the case of 
each of the chosen artists, the use of technology leads to the mystery of openness that is 
alētheia, raising the content to a form of poetic expression, allowing abstract ideas to flow, 
thereby shifting human consciousness. In some ways, the artists are able to recover the aura 
of a true technē in their works – not in terms of reinstating a work’s traditional sense as a 
directive or ritual for ascertaining truth, yet still regaining the mystery inherent within a work 
that would be original (or, in Heidegger’s sense, ‘originary’) despite its technological origins.  
Having laid out the path ahead, a significant obstacle remains. We must still answer 
the larger questions of what Being is at risk and why Freedom? Christopher Yates refers to 
this as the problem of humanism and it is one with which we must reckon. Simply put, if our 
concern is about emancipation, then what ontology of subjectivity (and freedom therein) is 
being assumed? After all, Heidegger and the post-structuralists sought to destroy traditional 
liberal enlightenment individualism, so what is this person and community that is needing to 
be emancipated? What is at stake is our ability to dwell creatively, to be in the world as we 
are, practicing our questioning nature within quotidian experience. Just as Heidegger would 
resist the normative characteristics embedded within traditional conceptions of ethics, so, too, 
would he balk at the notion of a fixed self. Heidegger proposes to resolve the problem of 
fixity within subjectivity by negating our presumptions to think and act on the basis of 
individualist autonomy. I propose that, in order to overcome this problem, Dasein comes to 
be in the experiential intersubjective exchange at the site of the artwork, and it is within this 
exchange that we recover “here and now and in the little things” a measure of our authentic 
disposition. Thus, as we have begun to unpack notions of freedom as non-objectivist and 
   25 
unfettered by the calculative thinking of the past, we must also establish the nature of Dasein 
as a radical departure from Cartesian certainty. We must keep our attention on what is truly 
at risk. To advance Arendt’s understanding that “The immediate source of the artwork is the 
human capacity for thought” (HC 168), we must also understand Dasein’s authentic 
disposition within creative interrogation and thinking while considering emancipation from 
enframing as the pre-individualist act of ontological freedom.   
The interpretation of poetry qua art as a place of dwelling offers a space of 
redemption from the collective forfeiture of Dasein. The need to address this topic stems 
from the profound loss of being and the catastrophic risk that Heidegger expresses—concerns 
that are manifesting in all manner of digital addictions and attention disorders. In his essay 
“On the Essence of Truth,” Heidegger explains, “to let be—that is, to let beings be as the 
beings which they are—means to engage oneself with the open region and its openness into 
which every being comes to stand, bringing that openness, as it were, along with itself” 
(Krell 125). With this, Heidegger reintroduces his use of the Greek word alētheia in order 
to underscore its significance as un-concealment or disclosing of truth. Only by means of 
access to this place of openness, through the portal of alētheia, can we hope to know truth’s 
essence. It is also noteworthy that in its original interpretations, alētheia sheds light upon 
its subject, offering illumination and perhaps, loosely, clarification. 
In sum, the artists presented in this dissertation will show the power and potential of 
artworks to awaken us. Their impact is visceral and timeless. The memory they engage is 
collective and very much an active force of reckoning, connecting individuals with their 
intersubjective responsibility. The artworks in question are as temporal as being. None is 
created to last indefinitely within the walls of traditionally conceived art museums. Traces of 
   26 
the artworks are carried forward through videos and online accounts, making it imperative 
that we be physically within the installations—in its immediate proximity—if one is to take 
in the full measure of its potential. That said, it is still possible, in the post-digital realm, to 
experience some part of the intended meaning and take away a measure of its significance. 
We will conclude with lingering concerns. How far can ethico-political artists go in 
opening their audience to thinking and action? Have the artists considered herewith resolved 
the challenges of the ontology of selfhood in relation to our experience of the work of art? In 
light of the underpinning motivation of this dissertation, and the culminating ideas as seen in 
the artwork of Noor Mirza and Brad Butler, this dissertation concludes with Arendt’s 
understanding of plurality and self-understanding, a moral compass born from having to live 
with oneself. Arendt explains: “The new always happens against the overwhelming odds of 
statistical laws and probability … The new therefore always appears in the guise of a 
miracle” (HC 178). It is within the juxtaposition of forceful thought, philosophical inquiry 
and artistic expression that we recover our natural agency to be free, authentically living our 
Dasein. The result is a releasing of predispositions and discourse in favor of an 
intersubjective ethos of care and responsibility, thus undermining the very possibility of 
enframing.  
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CHAPTER 1: 
 
 
HEIDEGGER’S ARTICULATION OF CARE IN “THE QUESTION CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY” 
 
In what follows we shall be questioning concerning 
technology. Questioning builds a way. We would be advised, 
therefore, above all to pay heed to the way, and not to fix our 
attention on isolated sentences and topics. The way is one of 
thinking. All ways of thinking, more or less perceptibly, lead 
through language in a manner that is extraordinary. We shall be 
questioning concerning technology, and in so doing we should 
like to prepare a free relationship to it. The relationship will be 
free if it opens our human existence to the essence of 
technology. When we can respond to this essence, we shall be 
able to experience the technological within its own bounds.  
 
  —Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology   
 
- 
 
§1.1:  INTRODUCTION 
 Heidegger opens his essay entitled “The Question Concerning Technology” with an 
important statement: “In what follows we shall be questioning . . . . questioning builds a way” 
and this way is “one of thinking” (Krell 311, emphasis mine). From this position, he sets 
forth the aim of his enterprise: to assure our “free relationship” to the essence of technology 
thereby returning us to an open region of truth needed for our very survival. It is important to 
recognize in his careful choice of words a distinct focus, one which endeavors to guide us 
back to our authentic selves as demanded by Dasein. For Heidegger, our being-in-the-world 
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allows Dasein to live out its ongoing interrogation of the meaning of Being. Despite 
Heidegger’s expressed resistance to any fixed claims or moral underpinnings, these 
introductory reflections suggest a deeply felt concern for the preservation of that which he 
believes will allow us to know truth in any meaningful way. From a place of questioning, 
through a piety of thought, Heidegger seeks to ensure our ultimate freedom by means of its 
capacity for opening us to truth—a truth that is challenged by the societal forces that enframe 
us, robbing us of our innate capacities. Furthermore, the particular freedom Heidegger 
suggests demands us to remain open, in a disposition he calls Gelassenheit. It is a challenge 
that proposes to eradicate the underlying problems born in our disposition toward merging 
with others or, in Friedrich Nietzsche’s parlance, adhering to the herd, for to practice 
freedom in the relationship to truth consists in thinking and questioning, particularly as a 
matter of rivaling enframing through an encounter with the creativity of poēisis.  
These are certainly lofty goals, asserted at the beginning of an oft-read and still 
profoundly prescient essay. His intentions establish the measure of what is to come for us as 
his readers. Questioning and thinking are fundamental to Dasein, which, for Heidegger, is 
defined by our interrogation of our very relationship to being—an interrogation we implicitly 
already live, yet one needing to be practiced more overtly. He concerns himself with its 
existential structures, or otherwise stated, the structures of our ‘hermeneutic’ (as contrasted 
with ‘objectifying’) relationship to the immanent plane of life, including its projects, objects, 
and completeness. In short, if we question and think, remaining in the open region 
contemplative Gelassenheit, we are nurturing that which is essential to us and forges a space 
for freedom.  
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 The present chapter offers an examination of Heidegger’s “Question Concerning 
Technology” that focuses on how the essay is built firmly upon an ethical foundation, of 
which the explicit imperative is a call to return home to our authentic selves lest we remain 
imprisoned by our relationship to technology. His ethics is reflected in our existence as an 
ongoing process delimited only by our finitude. It must be made amply clear that Heidegger 
is not implicating technology per se, as we understand the term today. Rather, his writing 
aims to expose the illusion of control we believe ourselves to have vis à vis our relationship 
to the broader concrete lived experience. Miguel de Beistegui, in his book The New 
Heidegger, explains, “With the technological world view, man moves further and further 
away from his own essence, to which, from the very start, Heidegger was concerned to 
reawaken us” (110). This essence is not a metaphysical nor supersensible one, but one that is 
manifested in ordinary quotidian existence. As such, our ethical role is to return to the finite 
essence of Dasein. Ultimately, Heidegger’s ethics of thinking leads to an ethics of action and 
is extended further in Hannah Arendt’s project. To this end, the importance of Heidegger’s 
opening thoughts cannot be overstated. He prepares his reader for what he hopes will be a 
transforming revelation that we, as a species, are on a calamitous path of self-destruction. As 
de Beistegui further explains, “Far more extraordinary is our inability to take its full measure, 
to understand fully and reflect upon the ‘attack’ with technological means that is organized 
on the life and nature of man. In comparison, Heidegger [stated], ‘the explosion of the 
hydrogen bomb means little’ (107).1 For those who have grown up in the shadows of nuclear 
proliferation, such a statement is startling.  
 Our exploration will shed light on Heidegger’s concern for our being-in-the-world as 
an ongoing ontological process in balance and simultaneity with a cultural diagnosis. The 
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two, while distinct in nature, can co-exist and promote other thinking. Moreover, this 
balancing addresses the ethical undercurrent as a call for thinking and action in light of what 
Heidegger calls Gestell or enframing. It would be a mistake to perceive Heidegger setting 
forth normative rules to which we must adhere. Mandating behavior undermines the very 
essence of an ethics and would unsettle Heidegger’s understanding that there is no permanent 
essence nor code to which we can hold fast. And, yet, an intersubjective responsibility 
lingers. Heidegger’s ideas point us to another way of existing that he subsequently connects 
with meditative or non-objective thinking—a modality strongly suggestive of Arendt’s later 
writing and ethics of thinking. Not only are we fully responsible for actualizing ourselves 
through our temporal lives, we must also become aware of the virtue inherent in fully 
expressing the essence of Dasein. This disposition relates dynamically to the property or 
substance of freedom, noting all the while the nature of ‘possibility’ or ‘becoming’ in 
Dasein’s being-in-the-world.   
Heidegger’s consideration of the “Question Concerning Technology” is broad in its 
reach, returning us to Aristotle while simultaneously forecasting the slippage of meaning in 
post-modern culture. My study of his ethical plea will be expressed in three parts. The first 
addresses both the methodology and terminology fundamental to Heidegger’s unique 
philosophical perspective. Understanding Heidegger’s radical departure from the norms of 
philosophical inquiry will help lay the foundation for later chapters, making accessible the 
terminology deployed to describe the necessity for our disentanglement via the art’s ‘saving 
power.’ The second focus explores ethics as a long-standing philosophical tradition and will 
consider specifically the writings of Aristotle, John Stuart Mill, Immanuel Kant, Emmanuel 
Lévinas and Hannah Arendt. This brief overview is intended to shed light on some of the 
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touchstones in philosophical ethics that resonate within the currents in Heidegger’s writing as 
distinct from purely technological concerns, though these touchstones are not repeated per se. 
These ideas are presented in Appendix A and distilled herewith in order to keep a focus on 
the immediate task at hand. Moreover, as we examine artworks in forthcoming chapters, the 
conversation will draw connections from the “Question Concerning Technology” to more 
recent ethical considerations, including those of Paul Ricoeur, Jean-François Lyotard and 
others whose works carry traces of Heidegger’s ideas. Finally, I will utilize contemporary 
scholarship by (namely) Charles Bambach and Miguel de Beistegui to assist in interpreting 
Heidegger’s ideas within our current human condition. In sum, the combination of a 
genealogy of ethics and more recent philosophical thought will assist in carrying Heidegger’s 
ethics forward, exposing the steady continuum of our need for self-understanding and care 
while also undertaking a close reading of the Technology essay and its nuanced implications. 
 
§1.2:  HEIDEGGER’S THEMES + UNDERCURRENTS  
 To begin, it is important to note the methodology Heidegger chose as a philosopher. 
His phenomenological hermeneutics of fundamental ontology allowed him to radically 
challenge the long-standing metaphysical structures of thinking upon which modern 
philosophical movements were built. Heidegger believed the Cartesian interpretation of a 
divided man was a grave error, noting that we cannot help but be-in-the-world and in an 
interpretive relationship with all we encounter. His ontological vision was of a whole and 
dynamic being whose entity was always already in relation to the world. He explains, “[T]he 
expression ‘phenomenology’ signifies primarily a concept of method. It does not characterize 
the what of the objects of philosophical research in terms of their content, but the how of 
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such research” (BT 26). His use of the word ‘research’ is noteworthy as a reflection of his 
phenomenological approach. It accentuates the interpretive nature of hermeneutics and the 
possibility for openness as fluid truths emerge. Following Edmund Husserl, he continues, 
“The term ‘phenomenology’ expresses a maxim that can be formulated: ‘To the things 
themselves!’” (BT §28, 26). Conceptualizing the Greek origins of the term, he identifies the 
root of phenomenon as ‘showing itself’, “thus φαίνεσυαι means: what shows itself, the self-
showing, the manifest” (BT §28, 27). He continues by describing the ‘coming to presence’ 
that ultimately establishes his notion of truth as alētheia, something we positioned in the 
Introduction and will explore in more detail throughout this project. Heidegger follows up on 
the ‘self-showing’ by exposing the nuances of Greek language with respect to differences in 
root meanings. He shows us, in the very way he approaches language, the hermeneutic 
methodology at work, notably its interpretive nature and disclosive capabilities.  
The second underlying word related to the method of phenomenology is logos, λόγος. 
Its original translation is ‘discourse,’ a conduit by which knowledge might be shared. 
Discourse points to an open exchange of ideas that, by default, implicates thinking. It is a 
term Heidegger believes gathered divergent meanings after Plato and Aristotle, thereby 
complicating our understanding of its initial intent. He states, “The later history of the word 
λόγος, and especially the manifold and arbitrary interpretations of subsequent philosophy, 
constantly conceal the authentic meaning of discourse—which is manifest enough” (BT §32, 
30). If we combine the terms, the word phenomenology implies a revelation of discourse and 
ongoing interrogation of that which, quite simply and entirely, is.  
Heidegger shifts phenomenology to its ontological space in which hermeneutic 
investigation fosters disclosure. He elaborates, 
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Ontology and phenomenology are not two different disciplines 
which among others belong to philosophy. Both terms 
characterize philosophy itself, its object and procedure. 
Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology, taking its 
departure from the hermeneutic of Dasein, which, as an 
analysis of existence [Existenz], has fastened the end of the 
guideline of all philosophical inquiry at the point from which it 
arises and to which it returns. (BT §7, 36) 
If we come to understand phenomenology as self-showing through discourse, its 
methodology gives us license to pursue and investigate more open-ended questions without 
requiring any purported assignment of fixed ontological or epistemic ‘facts’ or final, 
definitive answers. Phenomenology maintains the fluidity of our living structures and permits 
the openness Heidegger believed so important to our nature. His method of ‘fundamental 
ontology’ (§40, 182-183), in turn, consists in a kind of recalibration of our default thinking 
that, in a way, prepares for the ethical component underpinning the Technology essay. 
This ontological exploration of the structures of Dasein yields a new approach to our 
being. It acknowledges the existential structures that drive us in our interactions. Throughout 
the first half of Being and Time, Heidegger’s investigation of these ‘existentials’ exposes the 
nature of our existence: 
Anxiety reveals in Dasein its being toward its ownmost 
potentiality of being, that is being free for the freedom of 
choosing and grasping itself. Anxiety brings Dasein before its 
being free for . . . (propensio in), the authenticity of its being as 
possibility which it always already is. But, at the same time, it 
is this being to which Dasein as being-in-the-world is 
entrusted. (BT §40,182) 
Anxiety, for Heidegger, is an ‘attunement’—a mode of knowing quite distinct from 
objectivist or subject/object modes. It is a motivating force driving much of our momentum 
in being-toward-death, defining us as finite beings. de Bestegui explains, 
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Step by step, little by little, Heidegger introduces his reader to 
the reality of nothingness, which he locates in the state of mind 
or, better said perhaps, the ‘mood’ or ‘attunement’ (Stimmung) 
we call anxiety. Unlike fear, which is always fear of 
something, anxiety is the feeling generated by the experience 
of the withdrawal and the vanishing of all things. (10) 
Anxiety manifests itself within the abyss created by notions of emptiness and void. It is 
within this open region that we might best come to encounter ourselves—this is the crux of 
what evades us in our currently enframed state. Accordingly, we will examine how 
Heidegger exposes the freedom Dasein needs to live authentically with its inherent anxiety 
and underlying ‘potentiality.’ The bracketing of certainty, of correspondence and fixity, 
fosters a constant and pressing concern leading to the possibility for living fully and 
authentically. This shift in our understanding truly requires a recalibration of thinking in 
relation to being and its inter-connectedness to the world.  
Several key Heideggerian terms must be established. The proposed definitions are 
distillations from a variety of essays, most notably “The Origins of the Work of Art” (1936), 
“On the Essence of Truth” (1943), “Poetically Man Dwells” (1951), and “The Question 
Concerning Technology” (1949-53). In all cases, I am maintaining the hermeneutic premise 
that their meaning is fluid and opens itself to the reader in context with the topic at hand, in 
much the way that truth, for Heidegger, is an ebbing and flowing of concealment and 
revelation. The first of these terms is Dasein, a word to which Heidegger attributed enormous 
value in relation to the manner in which human beings dwell in the world. In German, Da 
indicates a ‘here’ or ‘there’ while Sein is the infinitive of the verb ‘to be’.2 Combining the 
two gives us, literally, ‘being there’. Perhaps in its simplest undertones, it speaks of a 
mindfulness stated in contemporary parlance as be present, here and now, invoking not a 
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particular place as much as a state of being or involvement. It reflects Heidegger’s essential 
preoccupation with our being-in-the-world and the infinite relationships beings have with the 
all-encompassing nature of our surroundings. He makes an important distinction that moves 
away from the idea of subjectivity as previously understood: “Dasein is an entity which, in its 
very Being, comports itself understandingly towards that Being” (BT §12, 53). Our 
interrogative/hermeneutic nature is not simply a ‘property’ or ‘predicate’ of us but fully 
embodies how and who we are. He continues, “Mineness belongs to any existent Dasein, and 
belongs to it as the condition which makes authenticity and inauthenticity possible” (BT §12, 
53). In other words, Dasein thinks reflectively about its life and purpose, and yet human 
beings have a tendency to conceal it in a way that results in what he will call ‘forgottenness.’ 
In order to authentically fulfill its role, Dasein must be open to its purpose in much the way 
Aristotle would suggest being our best self. Heidegger explains, “If Dasein discovers the 
world in its own way [eigens] and brings it close, if it discloses to itself its own authentic 
Being, then this discovery of the ‘world’ and this disclosure of Dasein are always 
accompanied by a clearing-away of concealments and obscurities, as a breaking up of the 
disguises with which Dasein bars its own way” (BT §27, 125). de Beistegui elaborates:  
In being resolved, existence liberates itself from its own 
entrapment in the absorbed life of everydayness. It frees itself 
for itself, as this ability to be (or disclose) being. It turns itself 
into an ‘I’ or a proper self. As such, being resolved amounts to 
‘liberating the humanity in man, to liberating the humanity of 
man, that is, the essence of man, to letting the Dasein in him 
become essential.’ (49) 
Thus, there is a recognition that Dasein, in order to live life fully, must struggle in self-
reflection, aware of the temporal nature of being. Heidegger ultimately seeks to unconceal 
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this intrinsic mode of our being in order to reinstate the fundamental practice of Care (BT 
§42, §57 and §65).  
 Further terms used to describe our condition are Care, Thrown-ness, fallenness, 
authenticity and, as we have begun to see, being-in-the-world – nominatives denoting the 
living structures of our being at work in each moment of existence. Each of these 
descriptions opens us to understanding our intricate interconnections, not only with the 
objects in our lives but also amidst other human beings—our family, culture, historical 
moment, etc. One might here in such terms an echo of Kant’s attention to the a priori 
structures of consciousness, however with Heidegger the terms name the facets of our 
dynamic ontic-ontological situation ‘in-the-world,’ as opposed to alleged universal faculties 
of consciousness. The difference between a ‘transcendental’ study and a ‘fundamental 
ontology’ is also evident in Heidegger’s attention to Dasein’s intrinsic ‘relational’ dynamics. 
His analysis of components within our ‘being-with’ (our Mitsein, and later, Miteinandersein) 
suggests an intersubjective situation of responsibility in our comportment to others. One is 
tempted to hear in this an echo of Aristotle’s observation: “No one would choose to live 
without friends, even if he had all the other goods” (EN 141), and “the highest form of justice 
seems to be a matter of friendship” (EN 142); we will return to this association when we later 
discuss Miteinandersein, together with the critical engagements of Arendt and Lévinas. For 
the moment, we turn to a related and foundational definition—his understanding of Care or 
Sorge.  
 Care, for Heidegger, is inextricably bound in our lives as temporal, mood-affected 
beings. His nuanced understanding of Care sheds light on the ways in which we interact with 
our surroundings and those in them. Care bridges the past and the future, exposing the ways 
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in which our anxiety functions in relation to the inevitability of time. It heralds an existential 
point of view from which beings must generate their own selves – as ongoing ‘possibilities’ – 
and, in so doing, experience the anxiety that is provoked by such a responsibility. This need 
for choice motivates a darker manifestation of surrender of self-care to theyness in which we 
abandon our own thinking and allow others to act on our behalf. Care accompanies our 
intrinsic structures as an entity of lived possibility. Thus, it needs to be purposefully practiced 
as the guiding mode of our being-in-the-world, not simply an extension of it. Heidegger 
illustrates the infinite potentialities of Care in the following passage: 
Dasein's facticity is such that its Being-in-the-world has always 
dispersed itself or even split itself up into definite ways of 
Being-in. The multiplicity of these is indicated by the 
following examples: having to do with something, producing 
something, attending to something and looking after it, making 
use of something, giving something up and letting it go, 
undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, 
considering, discussing, determining. (Krell 222) 
All of these various concerns place us in relationship either with others or the equipment that 
describes our functioning. The implication of Care is that we take ownership of these 
engagements. While the various states of being as described by Care are not laden with moral 
values, remaining instead observations of our comportment, there lingers, particularly in 
solicitude (see §26 & §27 from Being and Time), a concern and responsibility for the other. 
We will consider how Lévinas’ conception of the face of the other flags shortcomings in 
Heideggerian Care, but for now note that a structure of interdependency is here at work in the 
way the self-relation happens as a self-other and self-world relation.  
 The inherent responsibility that accompanies self-care strongly forecasts the 
Existentialist movement that would espouse ultimate responsibility for our earthbound lives. 
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Michael Inwood explains, “Authenticity favors helping others to stand on their own two feet 
over reducing them to dependency” (36). This intersubjectivity is illustrated in Being and 
Time wherein Heidegger states, “The expression care for self by analogy with concern [for 
equipment, etc.] and solicitude [for others] would be a tautology” (qtd. in Inwood 36; BT 
193). Inwood examines this notion of care and solicitude further, “In Being and Time, Sorge 
seems to pertain to Dasein’s direction of its own life or ‘being’ with Heidegger later insisting 
that it is ‘solely “for the sake of beyng”, not the beyng of man, but the beyng of beings as a 
whole’” (37). For our present purposes, Heidegger’s explicit intention to address humanity as 
a whole returns us to the ethical undercurrent that is scaffolding his thoughts.  
 The notion of solicitude bridges to another term deployed in Heidegger’s writing, one 
we have noted as Mitsein or, in translation, ‘being-with.’ Its other incarnation is mitdasein, 
underscoring its immediate relationship with Dasein (BT 113–130). Heidegger explains, 
“Others are, rather, those from whom one mostly does not distinguish oneself, those among 
whom one also is” (BT 115). He continues by stating, “Being-in is being-with [Mitsein] 
others. The innerworldly being-in-itself of others is Dasein-with [Mitdasein]” (BT 115). With 
this qualification, we can move from care to the understanding of our inextricable existence 
amidst other beings, where humans find and establish structures of conduct in order for such 
coexistence to be tenable. Our interactions underscore our relational disposition. In many 
ways, we fight an ever-present anxiety by seeking the security available to us through the 
presence of the other. It must be stressed that we are by default always already in the midst 
of the other. We cannot experience life in a vacuum nor can we contemplate ourselves in 
total isolation. Although Heidegger does not go so far as Lévinas in highlighting the 
foundational ethical grounding of the intersubjective self, he does emphasize the 
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interdependency and influence we experience in everyday living and the formation of many 
of our guiding principles or ethical codes.  
Here an important tension emerges: the need to remain functionally autonomous 
while co-existing. This is an expression of care in relation to those who surround us; we keep 
intact our expression and other thinking while conducting ourselves among them. Heidegger 
is not suggesting that we isolate ourselves, as he clearly understands that Mitsein demands 
we work out our connectedness within our temporal life context. Incorporating this idea in 
association with Heidegger’s later thought, Charles Bambach explains this communion 
through the poetry of Hölderlin: 
To dwell poetically upon the earth (PF 788-89), to find therein 
one’s genuine home, Hölderlin intimates, means to recognize 
the other as essential to self-identity. The alterity of the foreign 
brings us back to ourselves if we are able to undertake the 
difficult journey of exploration outward in a spirit of openness 
toward the “distance” and “difference” of that which is fremd, 
strange or foreign. (55) 
The ‘difficult journey’ epitomizes the struggle we must overcome: that of maintaining our 
‘selves’ in the presence of the other. In addition, the need to practice our relations in an 
authentic way demands an awareness of its attributes. Heidegger presents this challenge in 
terms of theyness (das Man). Accepting our position in relation to our fellow beings implies 
knowing how to keep the agency of our thoughts intact despite the desire to merge. We have 
a duty, per Heidegger, to practice self-care, including the valuing of our capacity for 
contemplation so reminiscent of Aristotelian virtue. This practice becomes increasingly 
important as we move into the essence of technology and confront the nature of its 
enframing. If we pay no heed to our inclination to merge with others, to the surrender of 
ourselves to Nietzsche’s herd, we risk traveling through our finite existence in a 
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forgottenness that sustains inauthenticity. Speaking to the manifestation of this tension in era, 
Heidegger observes:  
Since the subject is conceived shorn as it were of this Sein-bei . 
. . , a fragmentary subject, the question about being-with-each-
other [Miteinandersein] and its essence also takes a wrong turn. 
Since both subjects are undetermined, a more elaborate 
arrangement must as it were be found than the nature of the 
case requires. The underdetermination of subjectivity causes an 
overdetermination of the relation between subjects. (Inwood 
31) 
At issue is the challenge of navigating the intersubjectivity of the self (Dasein) without 
fragmenting one’s self or other selves. Mitsein conveys how our co-existence is an inevitable 
aspect of our being and, therefore, affects our manner of living to a significant extent, but 
authenticity (and its functioning autonomy) demands a cautious awareness of these 
dynamics. While endeavoring to practice ‘care’ and ‘solicitude,’ we must bear in mind that 
“Others are not to be conceived as alien beings from whom one distinguishes oneself: the 
others are rather those from whom one mostly does not distinguish oneself, among whom 
one is too” (BT 118). The same dynamic processes apply to the event of truth in our 
everyday interactions and their disclosure to awareness. To the notion of truth as a 
multifaceted and fluid event, Heidegger introduces his reader to alētheia (see, namely, §44 of 
Being and Time and “On the Essence of Truth”).  
 Alētheia, a transliteration of the Greek term ἀλήθεια, is a significant aspect of 
Heidegger’s thinking on art and truth. It is widely understood and advanced in Greek thought 
as an illumination or revealing. de Beistegui explains that it is rooted in the Greek word 
Aletheuein, or “operations of truth of which the human soul is capable” (108). Alētheia 
initiates a process, situating truth as an ongoing event and setting forth an ever-becoming 
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revelation. Something thereby discloses itself to us and subsequently withdraws. Heidegger 
states, “The Greeks have the word alētheia for revealing. The Romans translate this with 
veritas. We say truth and usually understand it as correctness of representation” (Krell 318). 
We must hear the final comment as a critique; to Heidegger’s mind, our understanding of 
truth as something fixed cannot correspond with the essence of truth as an ongoing series of 
revelations. In the Technology essay he observes,  
The correct always fixes upon something pertinent in whatever 
is under consideration. However, in order to be correct, this 
fixing by no means needs to uncover the thing in question in its 
essence. Only at the point where such an uncovering happens 
does the true propriate. For that reason the merely correct is not 
yet the true. Only the true brings us into a free relationship with 
that which concern us from its essence. (Krell 313) 
We recognize in these thoughts a condemnation of calculable truth in favor of that which 
brings us to a ‘free relationship’ from its ‘essence.’ In its disclosing, alētheia offers freedom, 
and this signification relates likewise to ‘essence’ as that which unfolds and reveals itself. It 
exceeds the notion of correspondence in its originary nature. David Krell expresses this 
unfolding succinctly in his preface to Heidegger’s essay “On the Essence of Truth:” 
To let unconcealment show itself: this is perhaps the most 
succinct formulation of the task of Heidegger’s thinking. At the 
heart of the task stands the question of freedom . . . a freedom 
that refers us back to the discussion of Dasein as 
transcendence. However, ‘freedom’ and ‘transcendence’ no 
longer mean what traditional morals and metaphysics take 
them to mean. Both refer to the openness or ‘clearing’ 
(Lichtung) of Being, ‘the clearing that shelters.’ (113) 
 Krell underscores the shift Heidegger is making in his understanding of Essence—away 
from metaphysical notions of fixity and correspondence to a more fluid medium of openness 
and shelter while maintaining its strength and potential. “On the Essence of Truth” provides 
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the groundwork for our understanding of the later “Question Concerning Technology” and 
clarifies Heidegger’s position vis à vis unconcealment and truth as alētheia. Once again, 
Heidegger shifts essence from that which is fixed to a finite and ongoing event. It retains its 
particular characteristics yet flows unbounded with the course of history, specifically, the 
dynamism within the history of Being. Further, the connections that Heidegger makes 
between alētheia as a revelation and art making will shed light on further discussions of the 
operation of works of art in contemporary culture. (This relationship will be especially clear 
as we discuss Karen Mirza and Brad Butler’s work The Unreliable Narrator.)  
 Where does Heidegger’s vocabulary lead us? Ultimately, his terminology highlights 
the narrative quality of human existence and points us to an essential authentic presence (or 
presencing) for whose care we are acutely responsible. Attention to the ongoing moment 
brings us to the next important notion—Gelassenheit which, as noted previously, is translated 
as a release or letting be: “The word Gelassenheit [. . .] has a long history in German thought. 
It was coined by Meister Eckhart in the thirteenth century and subsequently used by a 
number of other mystics, theologians, and philosophers” (CPC xi). Earlier interpretations, 
including the later Protestant Reformation, were laden with religious undertones and 
translated the term as a yielding to God, whereas Heidegger re-appropriates the term without 
the religious connotations. He continues,  
I have followed the established consensus in translating this 
term as releasement. However, it should be kept in mind that 
the traditional and still commonly used German word conveys 
a sense of calm composure, especially and originally that 
which accompanies an existential or religious experience of 
letting-go, being-let, and letting-be. (CPC xi)  
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There is a clearly Eastern undertone suggesting a philosophy of openness. Such receptiveness 
echoes the meditative or non-objectifying thought described in the essay “What Calls for 
Thinking.” Gelassenheit works in tandem with alētheia as a potentially freeing space for 
contemplation and is “‘the spirit of disponibilité [availability] before What-Is’ which permits 
us simply to let things be in whatever may be their uncertainty and their mystery” (Scott xiii). 
This last statement highlights how Heidegger offers his readers none of the epistemic 
structure or security we crave. We will soon see that this implacable need brings us into an 
illusory relationship with technology from which we must free ourselves and highlights the 
enframing nature of theyness, as previously discussed.  
 Further parallels emerge: Alētheia is a mode of unconcealedness, Gelassenheit is a 
letting be, and now technē offers another way of bringing us nearer to the essence of Dasein 
while also accessing truth. As seen through an Aristotelian lens, technē is among the 
modalities of understanding available to the human soul. de Beistegui explains that “through 
technē . . . man discloses something, brings it into presence. Specifically, man discloses it 
through a process of production and manipulation” (108). This bringing into presence 
parallels Heidegger’s inclusion of Aristotle’s Four Causes in the context of the “Question 
Concerning Technology.” For Aristotle, the causes offer a basis for explaining change in our 
world, thus demonstrating both process and event concretely. Although operating within a 
different metaphysical and epistemic framework, what is remarkably similar to Heidegger’s 
hermeneutics is the interpretive nature of Aristotle’s presentation. Rather than offering fixed 
definitions of how the material or natural worlds come to be, Aristotle focuses on explaining 
movement as an ongoing exchange. Technē is the intersection of the causes in the act of 
bringing something into presence. Similarly, Heidegger states, “Technology is a mode of 
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revealing. Technology comes to presence in the realm where revealing and unconcealment 
take place, where alētheia, truth, happens” (Krell 319). This happening of truth and openness 
are directly correspondent to Dasein’s modes of thinking and being as dispositions and 
practices. In addition, it is reflective of truth in art as a revealing, thus closely linking to the 
dispositions represented by Dasein. Technē, after all, enables our modes of creation and 
expression. Heidegger further explains, “Technē belongs to bringing-forth, to poiēsis; it is 
something poetic” (Krell 318). This positioning is crucial to our understanding of the cure 
from enframing qua alienation—poēisis as the necessary salvation of Dasein. What technē 
and poēisis share is an access to truth as alētheia or as ‘modes of revealing’ (Krell 319). 
Heidegger explains that, in its essence, “technology is a mode of revealing. Technology 
comes to presence in the realm where revealing and unconcealment take place, where 
alētheia, truth, happens” (Krell 319). But how can Heidegger’s concerns impact us today? 
The critical piece in understanding our current predicament in relation to technology is to 
recognize the shift from an act of revelation to what he calls a challenging-forth—a 
reappropriation of resources as standing reserves. Current technologies and our relationships 
therewith are deeply corrupted versions of technē, reducing us to far less than our potentiality 
would properly allow.  
What can we surmise from our analysis of methods and terms thus far? Through 
Heidegger’s lens, we come to know ourselves as questioning beings, embedded in our world, 
inextricably bound to those around us. Adding the movement of time and the anxiety 
inherent in being-toward-death, truth as disclosed through our daily practices manifests itself 
as an ebbing and flowing event with a derivative of implicit change. This disposition requires 
new understandings to emerge from continued practice of other thinking. Counter to this 
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potentiality, Heidegger warns that the supreme danger lies in Gestell and the manner in 
which it disables Gelassenheit and blocks our path to alētheia. This circumstance—in which 
we experience an imprisonment of thinking—is pervasive and has reached an acute stage of 
evolution in today’s digital society. In a troubling deployment of ‘care,’ we are living out the 
ways Gestell deeply affects the condition of our culture as a whole. Speaking of his own era, 
Heidegger observes: 
Everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology, 
whether we passionately affirm or deny it. But we are delivered 
over to it in the worst possible way when we regard it as 
something neutral; for this conception of it, to which today we 
particularly like to pay homage, makes us utterly blind to the 
essence of technology. (Krell 311-312) 
The blindness to the danger is symptomatic of both its power and its essence. We carry forth 
our traditional conceptions of technology without questioning its meaning. Our surrender to 
its forces, while believing in its neutrality, is our most profound error. We become embedded 
in a technological apparatus reminiscent of Structuralism’s version of the problematics of 
Theyness and Mitsein. Embodied within the Gestell problem is the notion that it artificially 
delimits the Clearing that our Care helps us to be and upon which events of Truth depend. 
 Ultimately, Heidegger asserts that our salvation resides within (as we have begun to 
see) poēisis, another living structure of our being that engenders other thinking or meditative, 
open interpretation of ideas. The relationship of open thinking to Care should also be noted 
as the latter demands an opening for self-reflection and resoluteness. Heidegger clarifies, 
“Poetry does not fly above and surmount the earth in order to escape it and hover over it. 
Poetry is what first brings man onto the earth, making him belong to it, and thus brings him 
into dwelling” (PLT 216). Heidegger continues by quoting Hölderlin: “Full of merit, yet 
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poetically, man / Dwells on this earth.” Heidegger understands poēisis as a bringing forth 
and partners it with alētheia and technē to demonstrate their proximity while examining their 
essences: “Not only handicraft manufacture, not only artistic and poetical bringing into 
appearance and concrete imagery, is a bringing-forth, poiēsis” (Krell 317). Heidegger returns 
us to Plato and observes, “Every occasion for whatever passes beyond the nonpresent and 
goes forward into presencing is poiēsis, bringing forth [Her-vor-bringen]” (Krell 317). In 
addition, Poēisis implicates Aristotle’s Four Causes while also allowing us to dwell in 
meditative thinking. Poēisis manifests a questioning disposition and builds its potentiality. It 
is the embodiment of our freedom and holds the key to our creative liberation from Gestell.  
§1.3: ETHICAL FOUNDATIONS IN THE “QUESTION CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY”  
It is tempting to read Heidegger’s Technology essay as a singular study of the ontic 
conditions that have befallen Dasein’s existential modes of being-in-the-world amid the 
upsurge of industry and bureaucracy in the mid-twentieth century. Certainly, the matter of 
technē is at the center of his study, and if we read carefully we will hear a related elaboration 
of the inauthenticity problem – one I believe to be charged with an ethical undercurrent that 
accentuates the call to responsibility previously evoked under the names of Mitsein, care and 
solicitude. But to hear this we need to first account for how Heidegger’s thought is uniquely 
situated in relationship to other watershed discourses in the tradition of moral philosophy. 
Otherwise our ability to fully appreciate the ethical ethos of his case concerning 
technological enframing and the emancipatory potential of artistic poēisis is hindered from 
the start. I have undertaken this preparatory work in Appendix A: “A Genealogy of Ethics on 
the Threshold of Heidegger’s “The Question Concerning Technology,” to which I refer the 
reader. Here is a brief summary of the genealogy’s main concerns. 
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The first point of reference is the Aristotelian conception of an association between 
virtue and the contemplative life, particularly as his departure from the Platonic appeal to the 
form of the good, self-control, and harmony in the soul and city enables him to elaborate an 
ethics of ‘excellence’ and ‘happiness,’ or Eudaimonia, grounded and realized on the 
immanent plane of human existence. The specific nature of Eudaimonia as an ‘activity’ as 
opposed to ‘essence’ is constituted as something beyond mere pleasure, tethered holistically 
to the good of the community, and dependent upon a praxis of ‘friendship.’ Though 
Heidegger does not fully subscribe to these discrete terms, there are Aristotelian resonances 
in his overarching departure from categorical essences and formal truths, his framing 
conception of our existential Care-structure, the problem of Theyness and Gestell within the 
dynamics of Mitsein, and the charge to live a life of thinking/questioning rooted in 
contemplative and aesthetic modes of bringing-forth.  
 The second touchstone is Immanuel Kant’s stress upon realizing – through the proper 
coordination of will and reason – the practice of duty and the good will through the self-
assigned force of the Categorical Imperative. Insofar as human reason is, he holds, 
constituted by a practical (as ‘moral’) and not simply epistemic course, living a life of 
subjective duty requires that the will seek goodness on the individual plane and a ‘kingdom 
of ends’ on the social level of our shared humanity. Importantly, Kant does not secure these 
possibilities on the basis of religious or metaphysical dogma, but deduces them from the 
inherent potential of reason alone; but this elision at the same time involves him in a 
formalist stratagem that proceeds to the intersubjective by way of the subjective and its 
universally a priori faculties. Heidegger’s diagnosis of technological enframing and call to 
emancipation will bear traces of this concern to temper desire and to seek the dignity 
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ascribed to the kingdom of ends, but his conceptions of thinking, praxis, dwelling, and 
making will reveal how a hermeneutic view of being-in-the-world yields a different species 
of moral formation and an imperative poēisis that the Categorical imperative could not 
imagine.  
Third, there is John Stuart Mill’s philosophy of Utilitarianism and its appeal to a 
moral calculus of coordinating the greatest good for the greatest number of people. Mill 
advances a case for converting the pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain into a resource 
and rubric for realizing personal and social morality. Though Heidegger could conceivably 
accommodate the spirit of intersubjective responsibility and the psychological insight 
regarding pleasure/pain into his analytic of Dasein’s Care-structure, the clinical nature of the 
happiness principle and the lack of self-criticism in the apparatus of utility would appear to 
be a better resource for the ‘theyness’ of technological enframing than for its overcoming. 
And though Heidegger might countenance Mill’s resistance to transcendent norms and/or the 
pure agency of reason, his critique of what is termed ‘challenging-forth’ and its 
commensurate ‘standing reserve’ seems more closely aligned with Karl Marx’s conception of 
alienation within utilitarian capitalism. The course of poēisis, moreover, will highlight a 
feature of human praxis irreducible to the pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain.  
Fourth, what one finds in the philosophy of Hannah Arendt is a stress on the way an 
ethics of thinking and acting can, in concert, displace the oppressively enframing momentum 
of totalitarian power, the ‘banality of evil,’ and the corruptions of the ontological birthrights 
that are human thought and freedom. Selectively drawing together insights from Aristotle, 
Kant, Marx, and Heidegger (among others), her concretization of the vocation of mind and 
action within the harrowing drift of our political Mitsein leverages a call to moral self-
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regulation, self-reflection, honest culpability, and collective responsibility that is meant to 
intervene in specific iterations of Heideggerian theyness, forgotteness, and the modern 
Gestell. Her conception of ethical practice serves, as we will see, not only to elucidate the 
intertextual situation between Heidegger’s ethical itinerary and that of his forebears, but also 
to nuance the terms on which we may see Heidegger’s emancipatory plea answered in the 
arts.   
Finally, although famously one of Heidegger’s most pointed critics, Emmanuel 
Lévinas helps train our attention on the ethical undercurrent of Heidegger’s Technology essay 
by virtue of his phenomenological radicalization of ontological hermeneutics – notably, his 
contention that it is through one’s encounter with the Face of the Other that subjectivity is 
brought forth along a compass of infinite moral responsibility. This constitutive 
‘asymmetrical’ relationship is, like Arendt’s notion of human singularity, a point marking the 
birth of justice on the plane of intersubjective becoming. The Lévinasian case is in many 
ways an extension of the existential elements of care and solicitude that color Heidegger’s 
diagnosis of technological challenging-forth. Responsibility, not consciousness, is the 
ordering principle of self and society. Uniqueness, not reason or the happiness principle, is 
the distinguishing feature of the self. And intentionality, not judgment or enlightenment, is 
the hermeneutic leaning through which the essence of meaning is found and made. Lévinas 
does unsettle the security of Heidegger’s sometimes Dasein-centric ontological formula, but 
his thought shows a deepening of the Mitsein motif and, by extension, a revealing activation 
of the Gelassenheit operation within the scope of technē’s appropriate bringing-forth.  
Taken together, these points of reference improve our position as we turn in earnest to 
Heidegger’s discourse in the Technology essay. They flag for us how, as items of response 
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and also anticipation, points of ethics are interwoven with matters of ontology, critical 
philosophy, political thought, and phenomenology. And they help attune us to how 
Heidegger’s emerging case for an aesthetic intervention in the technological theyness of the 
twentieth century is certainly singular in its surface terrain but is at the same time quietly and 
steadily engaged with the topos of what must properly be called moral concerns.  
Where and how, then, is the fundamentally ethical tenor of Heidegger’s “The 
Question Concerning Technology”? Through his hermeneutic investigation of Gestell and the 
ever-devolving marriage we have with technology, he notes: “So long as we do not allow 
ourselves to go into these questions, causality, and with it, instrumentality, and with this the 
accepted definitions of technology, remain obscure and groundless” (Krell 314). Thus, it will 
not be in deploying ethical philosophies—which, though well intentioned, are in and of 
themselves ‘instrumental’ via normative systems—that we will become inherently free. 
Instead, and per Heidegger, we must move beyond such restrictive norms. By this, Heidegger 
opens us to an awareness of the dangers presented by enframing in contradistinction to the 
openness and freedom afforded by access to truth revealed through alētheia. This calls 
forward definitions detailed in section 1.2, in which we saw the threat of Gestell expressed in 
different ways. Ultimately, our forgottenness in relation to being-in-the-world leads us to 
self-betrayal and inauthenticity. Heidegger’s aim is to liberate us in order that we may 
encounter ourselves fully, while also remaining open, in a poetic way, to the unconcealment 
of truth. Rather than offer a normative ethics, Heidegger points us toward what he considers 
our ‘home’ — to live out the essence of Dasein to dwell authentically in the world. Recall 
Bambach’s statement quoted previously, in which “dwelling poetically on the earth is 
equated to finding one’s genuine home” (55). Care becomes the ongoing responsibility with 
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regards to Dasein even as experience and being change within each historical epoch. In 
addition, our disposition toward Gelassenheit and Clearing provide the space for authenticity 
to emerge. Heidegger’s worry is an ontological one vis à vis Being and its inherently social 
modalities.  
What we must tease out as we shift to an examination of ethics in the Technology 
essay begins with recognizing the explicit warning Heidegger issues. He opens his 
questioning from the source of our paralysis, identifying enframing as the supreme danger, as 
previously noted. This exposure of our dangerous denial of ourselves and of our complicit 
acceptance of a condition that hobbles our fundamental capacities shapes much of his 
argument for our emancipation. Heidegger is offering a means of attaining an authentic self 
in relation to our world in which care is concretized as an active letting be or Gelassenheit.3 
This opening cedes control and fosters a creative qua artistic space in which meaning can 
reveal itself. The challenge, as diagnosed by Heidegger, is the frantic need for structure and 
certainty that induces us toward calculative thinking and measure. He states, “[T]the will to 
mastery becomes all the more urgent the more technology threatens to slip from human 
control” (Krell 313). He is suggesting that the less we believe we can order our world, the 
more tightly we endeavor to systematize it. The tighter grip, in turn, accentuates the vortex 
that keeps us hobbled. The warning magnifies enframing’s incapacitating force and implies 
that even well-intended codes of moral conduct can exacerbate the problem.  
 A proficient student of Aristotle and admirer of the holistic approach to life espoused 
by ancient Greek thought, Heidegger understands Dasein as indivisible from the world. He 
borrows from the Greeks the notion that achievement is “the highest possibility of existence, 
the mode of being in which a person satisfies to the highest degree the proper human 
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potentiality for being, in which a person genuinely is” (Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy 
230). In order to achieve our potentiality, however, we must understand where we are within 
the relational nature of our being and disentangle ourselves from the structures of thinking 
that have led us to be enframed. We must also detach from established mores, which no 
longer relate to our real plight. Much like Aristotle on Vice and Virtue, the key to our 
ultimate freedom lies in how we might actively shape our character through responsibility 
and self-care.  
While Heidegger’s philosophical undertones are not ethical systems as traditionally 
conceived, he does address the choices we have as human beings in light of care and 
safeguarding of the essence of our being. He shifts our attention from normative structures to 
an ontological concern, thereby introducing a new platform from which to preserve the 
potential for freedom and truth. He warns,  
Today there is a growing danger that the scientific-
technological manner of thinking will spread to all realms of 
life. And this magnifies the deceptive appearance that makes 
all thinking and speaking seem objectifying. The thesis that 
asserts this dogmatically and without foundation promotes and 
supports for its part a portentious tendency: to represent 
everything henceforth only technologically-scientifically as an 
object of possible control and manipulation. (Pathmarks 60) 
The limits imposed upon our thinking blind us to the transformation Being has suffered, as 
we become mere standing reserves to the advancing technological means of production. 
Freedom and truth, both important conditions mentioned in the opening remarks of the 
Technology essay (and whose fundamental meaning has shifted since Kant and Mill; see 
Appendix A) are only attainable by means of our awakening, contemplation and letting go of 
the impulse toward fixity. The constant regulation and domination of our environment and 
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production condemns us to more of the same. Freedom and truth imply a liberation and, as 
Heidegger seems to believe, are a saving benefit to all of humanity, not simply those capable 
of thinking freedom. For Heidegger, non-objectifying thinking is a meditative thinking, the 
kind that leaves us open to disclosure in the open space of truth. Meditative thinking, as such, 
is a way of being and an ethics of thinking per se. If that is the case then, despite the 
desperate condition that the essence of technology has created, salvation is possible. 
Heidegger, recall, concludes the Technology essay by stating, “The closer we come to the 
danger, the more brightly do the ways into the saving power begin to shine and the more 
questioning we become. For questioning is the piety of thought” (Krell 341). This conclusion 
discloses his ethical plea in explicit terms: he seeks us to rescue Being from its ongoing 
imprisonment and suggests a path forward that mirrors an Aristotelian holistic existence 
required to achieve a flourishing soul, while avoiding its rootedness in Eudaimonia (see 
Appendix A). The ontological concern is a formulation of care for the other and a 
prescription that we be the best that we can be, particularly if the awakening shakes us out of 
our stupor and allows our salvation to manifest. Much the way Aristotle believes our best 
selves are inextricably intertwined with the overall wellbeing of civilization, Heidegger sets 
forth the salvation of the whole by means of personal self-care and authenticity. 
 But how do questioning and thinking relate to freedom? Heidegger builds his case for 
our freedom by directing his reader step by step toward an awakening. To be clear, this 
freedom is not a freedom from, not even from moral constraints. It is a freedom for letting-be 
(Gelassenheit) and bringing-forth. He begins by simply questioning, because, to reiterate, 
questioning builds a way. He puts into action his hermeneutic methodology as a means of 
describing the process of unconcealment. The way, he hopes, will assure a free relationship 
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to the essence of technology, thereby liberating Dasein from its grip. The words are carefully 
chosen. Questioning demands thinking; thinking offers a path to what is true through 
language and ultimately sheds light on our dire condition. We already know that the true is 
not a correspondent fact or calculable outcome. Rather, it is that which has access to the 
essence of Being in its mystery and clearing. Arendt describes thinking as “a means to 
examine and to question; it always involves that shattering of idols of which Nietzsche was 
so fond” (RJ 103). Daring to shatter idols and thus departing from the accepted norms and 
the well-established patterns of habitual conduct, is often, if not always, an uncomfortable 
endeavor. Heidegger expresses the immense threat we face in the following significant 
passage: 
Yet when destining reigns in the mode of enframing, it is the 
supreme danger. This danger attests itself to us in two ways. As 
soon as what is unconcealed no longer concerns man even as 
object, but exclusively as standing reserve, and man in the 
midst of objectlessness is nothing but the orderer of the 
standing-reserve, then he comes to the very brink of a 
precipitous fall; that is, he comes to the point where he himself 
will have to be taken as standing reserve. Meanwhile, man, 
precisely as the one so threatened, exalts himself and postures 
as lord of the earth. In this way the illusion comes to prevail 
that everything man encounters exists only insofar as it is his 
construct. This illusion gives rise in turn to one final delusion: 
it seems as though man everywhere and always encounters 
only himself. . . . In truth, however, precisely nowhere does 
man today any longer encounter himself, i.e., his essence. 
(Krell 332) 
This passage makes several references clear. Marx’s understanding of standing reserve is 
deployed in relation to man’s ultimate freedom. The traces of Aristotle’s expectation of 
virtue as an act of self-actualization is negated by a blind participation in the environmental 
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forces of technology, dragging its participants thoughtlessly into its current. There is the 
suggestion that calculability and mechanized systems are largely responsible for the arresting 
of thought and imprisonment of minds. Mill’s utilitarian premise of the greatest happiness for 
the greatest number may well be responsible for the forgottenness of Dasein and its 
constituent dispositions (see Appendix A).4 Heidegger, then, implicates every participant for 
his inability to exercise all that is born in him—his capacity for openness and unconcealment. 
And, yet, in the face of such a grave danger, Heidegger offers a glimmer of hope by 
suggesting that our salvation exists alongside the essence of technology in a realm much like 
itself, the realm of art.  
Heidegger draws his inspiration from the poet Hölderlin,  
Near and 
Hard to grasp, the god. 
Yet where the danger lies, 
Grows that which saves.5 
Heidegger elaborates, “[B]ecause the essence of technology is nothing technological, 
essential reflection upon technology and decisive confrontation with it must happen in a 
realm that is, on the one hand akin to the essence of technology and, on the other, 
fundamentally different from it. Such a realm is art” (Krell 340). Of course, this begs an 
important question: In what way is the realm of art so immensely potent as to reverse the 
‘supreme danger’ befallen us? Furthermore, how might this interconnection between 
technology and art manifest our freedom? That the essence of technology is akin to its 
counterpart is an interesting suggestion. If we consider the meaning imparted to technē, 
alētheia and poēisis, we note their parallel functions in moving an event of truth forward into 
unconcealment, effectively making their manner of operation similar. This glimmer of light 
at the end of a damning cultural critique reminds us once again of Heidegger’s concern for 
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the restitution of both Mitsein and Dasein and, in the wake of this, the emancipation of our 
civilization. He echoes Aristotle’s notion that virtue is achieved by means of self-directed 
action and inner harmony resulting in the overall good of the collective—though Heidegger 
carefully avoids prescriptive rules (see Appendix A).  
 Let us take a moment to unpack these thoughts further. Heidegger begins by bringing 
our attention to the supreme danger originating his ethical plea. As we know, he believes the 
threat in question dwarfs the possibility of nuclear annihilation. In other words, if we remain 
unaware and blind to the circumstances we have created, we will no longer ‘encounter 
ourselves’ which, as he indicates, imperils existence itself. This is reminiscent of Plato’s 
Allegory of the Cave, in which the unenlightened masses live existences of delusion, content 
to remain in the dark in a world of self-deception—though Heidegger turns to Gelassenheit 
and alētheia for the possibility of transient illuminations, maintaining that these modalities 
are dynamic, ongoing events. This notion is distinct from Plato’s understanding of Essences 
and the realm of Forms. In Heidegger’s narrative, human beings become entrenched in the 
reductive system of production. Man ‘comes to the very brink of a precipitous fall’ quite the 
same way the men in Plato’s cave are duped by their insufficient understanding. We risk 
condemning ourselves in this thoughtless state, no longer able to liberate our thinking and 
potential to know freedom.  
The malady that Heidegger has diagnosed is the result of long-standing traditions of 
calculation and measure that have created the false premises on which we have constructed 
our perceptions: “Meanwhile man, precisely as the one so threatened, exalts himself and 
postures as lord of the earth” (Krell 332). We believe that we control the world around us, 
along with all of its mechanized systems. Heidegger points out the dichotomy that results 
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from such a practice by asking, “What does it mean to objectify? To make an object of 
something, to posit it as object and represent it only as such” (Pathmarks 57). He is flagging 
the ongoing problem of subject/object thinking and its related modes of social organization. 
The split born of this attitude is counter to Dasein in its totality as always embedded in the 
context of the world swept up by the movement of time.  
 The delusion is two-pronged: it first involves our blind subscription to technological 
means, thereby becoming a blind participant in our own servitude. It then reappears in our 
mistaken belief that we are in control of our world when, in fact, we have been appropriated 
within technology’s apparatus. We become standing reserve, delivering goods and outcomes 
as appendages in a greater mechanical system of ordering and production. The craftsman, 
such as the silversmith described in his exploration of Aristotle’s Four Causes, was a 
gatherer, creating the chalice by orchestrating its coming into presence (Krell 315). 
Heidegger is careful to bring our focus to the mystery inherent in the gathering up of the 
causes in their indivisible totality of being, acknowledging the original impulse that brought 
forth the chalice. In contrast, the logger’s work subsists as merely a material means for the 
lumber yard to fulfill its orders. The logger has lost his connection with the earth and is 
therefore alienated from himself. Marx similarly asserted that factory-style production and 
labor moved the worker away from his essential role as a maker. Heidegger writes,  
The forester who measures the felled timber in the woods and 
who to all appearances walks the forest path in the same way 
his grandfather did is today ordered by the industry that 
produces commercial woods, whether he knows it or not. He is 
made subordinate to the orderability of cellulose, which for its 
part is challenged forth by the need for paper, which is then 
delivered to newspapers and illustrated magazines. The latter, 
in their turn, set public opinion to swallowing what is printed, 
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so that a set configuration of opinion becomes available on 
demand. (Krell 323)  
In short, the forester is a mere cog in the wheels of technology and commerce, unable to step 
out of his entrapment and lacks the awareness that he is caught there in the first place. He is 
brought into the greater equation and, wearing blinders, participates in the systematic loss of 
his innate disposition. As noted within Appendix A, this theory aligns with Marx’s 
understanding of how alienation leads to a fundamental malaise and dissatisfaction with 
one’s diminished role within the structures of society. In Marx’s immiseration theory, the 
proletariat inevitably succumbs to the forces of capitalism, which have deliberately cut him 
from his essence. Marx explains, 
Within the capitalist system all methods for raising the social 
productivity of labour are put into effect at the cost of the 
individual worker [. . . .] All means for the development of 
production undergo a dialectical inversion so that they become 
a means of domination and exploitation of the producers; they 
distort the worker into a fragment of a man, they degrade him 
to the level of an appendage of a machine, they destroy the 
actual content of his labour by turning it into a torment, they 
alienate from him the intellectual potentialities of the labour 
process [. . .], they transform his life into working-time, and his 
wife and child beneath the wheels of the juggernaut of capital. 
But all methods of the production of surplus-value are at the 
same time methods of accumulation, and every extension of 
accumulation becomes, conversely, a means for the 
development of these methods. It follows therefore that in 
proportion as capital accumulates, the situation of the worker, 
be his payment high or low, must grow worse. (Kapital 799) 
Marx is describing the reductive force capital exercises over the worker. He makes clear the 
exacerbation of socio-economic divisions that result from the practices imposed by the 
bourgeois class. In all of this, we see traces of Heidegger’s enframing and the reductive 
forces technology exerts upon man.  
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Moving from the time of Marx’s writing to today’s globalized and automated 
manufacturing systems, the worker now is radically distanced from his work, replaced 
altogether, obsolete. It could be said that we are thereby bound more tightly with the essence 
of technology and have become increasingly enframed. It could also be said that Mill’s 
premise of the greatest happiness, in so far as it removes human beings from their natural 
inclination to be productive, falls apart in practice. The farther we remove ourselves from 
what is our essential disposition, the deeper into alienation we fall. Enframing determines our 
contemporary condition. The world is rapidly moving away from what Heidegger considered 
the essence of Dasein, thereby reducing human beings to mere means of production and 
surplus. What is then decimated by enframing is much like a Greek polis or the relational 
possibilities therein (which Heidegger will subsequently replace with Dwelling). Thus, as 
concerns the lived social conditions for the possibility of ethics—in this case of Gelassenheit 
and everything having to do with the ‘open’—is polluted and concealed.  
As evidence of this concealment, Heidegger’s ideas are evident throughout our 
current climate. In a New York Times editorial, “Trumpism After Trump,” written during the 
debacle of the 2016 elections, Roger Cohen wrote,  
I was talking the other day with a Silicon Valley venture 
capitalist who said to me with a kind of deadpan resignation: 
“You know we are designing a world that is not fit for people.” 
Perhaps that admission comes closest to capturing the disquiet 
and dread on which Trump has thrived, along with other 
demagogues in Europe. (Cohen)  
In much the same manner by which the bourgeois class drove industry forward, there is a 
powerful driving pride in the disruption factor, when designers of today’s economies 
produce cost-saving mechanisms that push costs down and render humans obsolete. These 
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disruptive technologies are ones that shift paradigms and alter behaviors as a result of 
“advancements,” such as artificial intelligence and automated processes. They are the same 
forces shifting man away from his essence. Adding to this, in The Inhuman, Jean-François 
Lyotard observes, “Not to be contemplative is a sort of implicit commandment, 
contemplation is perceived as a devalorized passivity” (118). The days of Aristotle’s virtue in 
contemplation appear to be long over.  
Another important part of Heidegger’s passage regarding the logger is the sheer 
grandiosity of our belief in total control and our need to achieve a sense of permanence. It is 
a reflection of the erroneous positioning of human beings above all else when, in Heidegger’s 
view, all participants in the world community exist together, interdependently. This 
perspective harks back to the corruptive force of theyness and the loss of independent 
thinking so important to Dasein’s expression. Our inherent grandiosity speaks to the illusion 
of man’s centrality in the greater schema of life. It also reveals the insufficiency of prior 
ethical structures in holding up against enframing, making Heidegger’s modes of resistance 
all the more imminent and necessary. He explains, “[T]hus it might be that our unpoetic 
dwelling, its incapacity to take the measure, derives from a curious excess of frantic 
measuring and calculating” (PLT 226). This is perhaps where man has forgotten Being the 
most.  
The need for objectification, for fixed truths and calculations, has transformed the 
very manner in which we encounter our world and ourselves, as well as traditional notions of 
Duty, Happiness and the Greatest Good. We have forgotten the mystery of Dasein and no 
longer seek a virtuous life of contemplation. For Heidegger, it is the absence or forgottenness 
of poēisis that we must urgently redress, properly speaking, a negative version of 
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concealment distinct from that found in the ebb and flow of truth. He clarifies, “But human 
reflection can ponder the fact that all saving power must be of a higher essence than what is 
endangered, though at the same time kindred to it” (Krell 339). There is an ongoing concern 
for the authenticity of the expression of Being to break us free from the banality fostered in 
theyness, a corruption we have already seen can lead to manifestations of unimaginable evil. 
Heidegger’s articulation of his worry originates in Being and Time and continues well into 
his later writing. 
 This worry begs an important question, one that challenges the essence of truth as an 
unfolding event: how can we salvage both Mitsein and Dasein through art if there are no 
permanent or concrete actions? In short, how can we ultimately measure the good if we 
possess no permanent essence? It seems we must continually struggle to join the flow of 
living and resist the desire to drop anchor into permanence. To this point, Heidegger quotes 
Nietzsche from The Will to Power, “The means of expression in language cannot be used to 
express becoming; to posit continually a more crude world of what is permanent, of things 
etc. [i.e. of objects] is part of our irredeemable need for preservation” (qtd. in Pathmarks 57, 
Will to Power, aphorism no. 715). Once again, we encounter the mechanics that have us 
tightening our grip rather than letting be. In this case, we have the struggle against death and 
impermanence. 
 Art as salvation is a place of opening and truth, or alētheia. In the essay “The Origin 
of the Work of Art,” Heidegger discusses the mystery that unfolds each time we experience a 
significant work. He asks,  
What happens here? What is at work in the work? Van Gogh’s 
painting is the disclosure of what the equipment, the pair of 
peasant shoes, is in truth. This being emerges into the 
unconcealment of its Being. The Greeks called the 
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unconcealment of beings alētheia. We say ‘truth’ and think 
little enough in using this world. (Krell 161) 
Alētheia as the unconcealment of beings becomes possible through the work of art and the 
true emerges as a result. This enables freedom, allowing an open relationship with 
technology that is presently unavailable to us. The caveat remains that it is up to the 
individual to actively engage and question through language. According to Heidegger,  
Truth establishes itself as strife within a being that is to be 
brought forth only in such a way that the strife opens up in this 
being; that is, this being is itself brought into the rift. The rift is 
the drawing together into a unity, of sketch and basic design, 
breach and outline. Truth establishes itself in a being in such a 
way, indeed, that this being itself takes possession of the open 
region of truth. (Krell 188) 
Truth is an actively sought event discoverable through contemplation. If we recall, “All ways 
of thinking, more or less perceptibly, lead through language in a manner that is 
extraordinary” (Krell 311). Language is the essence of poēisis, and, as such, originates the 
happening of truth. We must keep Heidegger’s understanding of the possibility of freedom in 
language and poēisis foregrounded as we continue with this chapter’s work while asking 
where Heidegger’s suggestions will lead? 
The good, the virtue of thinking, the open region of truth and potentiality opens us to 
what Heidegger believes will save us. It becomes clear in much of his later work that 
nowhere is this more accessible than through poetic expression. He details these ideas in later 
essays, especially in “Poetry, Language and Thought,” moving forward his notion that the 
realm of art is our saving grace. Poetry is the essence of all art making. As we previously 
noted, poēisis encompasses the arts in its overarching capacity for revelation. Both poetry 
and art offer a moving window into truth as an ongoing ontological event. Heidegger 
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explains, “The Poet calls, in the sights of the sky, that which in its very self-disclosure causes 
the appearance of that which conceals itself, and indeed as that which conceals itself. In the 
familiar appearances, the poet calls the alien as that to which the invisible imparts itself in 
order to remain what it is—unknown” (PLT 223). Heidegger contemplates poetry as 
Clearing, and then places it in terms of Dwelling, where the standing reserve is returned to a 
letting-be or standing-open. Poēisis thus becomes a rooting practice, in addition to events of 
Care and Truth. Poetry enables an access to abstract, mysterious spaces in which we 
occasion the essence of truth only if we allow ourselves to release objectifying thinking in 
favor of the meditative. Heidegger elaborates, “Poetic thinking is being in the presence of … 
and for the god. Presence means: simple willingness that wills nothing, counts on no 
successful outcome. Being in the presence of . . .  purely letting the god’s presence be said” 
(Pathmarks 61). Willing nothing (either in coercive or autonomous ways) and accepting the 
mystery of Being demand that we relinquish objectifying thought and the actions that happen 
on this basis. Presence confronts us with the void of existence and the incessant movement 
toward death that ultimately delimits us. Allowing presence to simply ‘be’ is a struggle 
between the temporality of our being and Dasein’s ever-becoming nature rubbing against the 
locking mechanisms in technology, which pretend to offer certitude.  
To reiterate, Poēisis, for Heidegger, embodies art and rivals the challenging-forth 
seen in the essence of modern technology. He finds within its qualities the potential for 
disclosure of truth. It is through this orientation toward art that Heidegger makes a subtle 
gesture away from more normative ethics. He expresses this repositioning most directly in 
the “Origin of the Work of Art:” 
Truth, as the clearing and concealing of beings, happens in 
being composed. All art, as the letting happen of the advent of 
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the truth of beings, is as such, in essence, poetry. The essence 
of art, on which both the artwork and the artist depend, is the 
setting-itself-into-work of truth. It is due to art’s poetic essence 
that, in the midst of beings, art breaks open an open place, in 
whose openness everything is other than usual. (Krell 197) 
The ‘other than usual’ brings us back to ‘other thinking’ that unleashes Dasein’s potential. In 
the poetic, man finds his freedom of thought and expression. If the realm of salvation is art, it 
goes without saying that this realm is of the poetic. What then happens if we dare to 
relinquish our grip on certainty? Would this allow an immediate movement toward full 
immersion in our potentiality, finding the measure of ourselves in abstract regions of 
meditative thought? Perhaps more broadly, how are we to understand a move from the 
technological landscape to the poetic one while setting it forth to operate on an ethical path? 
Certainly, turning from normative structures to poetic expression would foster a freedom of 
mind and an open contemplation of the true.   
Heidegger further clarifies his ideas on how thought may come into presence in a 
discussion regarding the essence of a Greek temple: 
It is the temple-work that first joins together and 
simultaneously gathers around itself the unity of those paths 
and relations in which birth and death, disaster and blessing, 
victory and disgrace, endurance and decline obtain the form of 
destiny for human being. . . . The temple first gives to things 
their look and to humanity their outlook on themselves. (PLT 
42–3) 
While perhaps only fleetingly, art offers human beings a glimpse of themselves, a way of 
knowing that stands in contrast to calculation and predictability. As with the temple in 
Heidegger’s discussion, we encounter the entirety of our being in the work’s countenance. 
Van Gogh’s Peasant Shoes, by the same token, are the constellation of existence as lived by 
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their owner. This knowledge demands an openness and mental freedom, resulting in the 
letting be that is Gelassenheit. Art, poetry, and the truth they unveil to us, promote a dwelling 
in the world fundamental to Dasein.  
In a short book entitled Reclaiming Art in the Age of Artifice, J.F. Martel underscores 
Heidegger’s ideas on our experience of an artwork. He states:  
Far from distracting us from the strange and uncanny in life, 
the astonishment evoked by great artistic works puts them 
square in our sights. The work demands that we feel and think 
the mystery of our passage through this body, on this earth, in 
this universe” […] We realize afterward that the world is not 
what we thought it was: something hidden, impossible to 
communicate though clearly expressed in the work has risen 
into the light of awareness, and the share of the Real to which 
we are privy is proportionately expanded. (17)  
The world is therefore interpreted through the eyes of the artist and poet, often lending clarity 
to an otherwise dimmed view. As Bambach reiterates, “Always the poet lies in the middle, 
the hermeneutic mediator who strives to interpret the overarching scheme of divine order for 
a humanity that has forgotten how to read the signs of the times” (28). And, indeed, we have 
become inured to enframing as an existential threat, choosing to disregard the signs Bambach 
so accurately mentions: “The poet, then, as the prophet who makes known to other members 
of the community that which is hidden, stands in the middle, or at the threshold, of darkness 
and light” (Bambach 28). Here, the poet carries the very seeds of counter-bracketing. He 
helps to enframe the enframing and thereby deconstruct and subvert it. In the end, through 
listening, questioning and dwelling in the open region of thought, we come to recognize 
technology’s grasp. In subsequent chapters, other more contemporary thinkers will continue 
to sound this alarm—all of whom see the crisis of Dasein as being far from resolved.  
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If, as a representation of our current situation, we shift the ‘essence’ of technology 
and its consequence of enframing to a new ideological premise, Martel observes a profound 
resistance to change as a result. He explains, “The more ideologically entrenched a society, 
the more it perceives the New as a threat. Since society requires ideology to maintain itself, 
and since prophecy consists precisely in the dissolution of ideology in its every form, the best 
a prophet can hope for is a tenuous and ultimately doomed alliance with the status quo” 
(110). Arendt might also suggest that defying what is accepted by those around us, rejecting 
the manifestation of theyness, creates the conditions needed for evil to exist. It is seen in an 
entrenchment into what is already in place without consideration of what simply is needed.  
Yet, even in such terrain, ‘other thinking’ can be birthed through individual 
expression. Arendt explains this fragile and timely process of germination: 
Totalitarian domination, like tyranny, bears the germs of its 
own destruction . . . . Its danger is that it threatens to ravage the 
world as we know it—a world which everywhere seems to 
have come to an end—before a new beginning rising from this 
end has had time to assert itself. (OoT 616) 
It is to the new beginning that we must train our outlook while seeking out the virtuous life 
embodied in contemplation and ‘other thinking.’ The care that Heidegger assigns to Dasein 
extends to a care of self and other. It is thus together, collectively, that we must act to enable 
salvation to come forth. To this point, Martel states,  
Either we submit ourselves fully to the leveling process and 
become standing reserve, or we seize the situation and its 
inherent potential as an opportunity to actualize our 
fundamental essence, which lies in poiēsis or creation. So the 
fight for the emancipation of humanity must go beyond a 
purely practical quest for justice, peace, equality, and 
ecological responsibility. A deeper struggle must take place 
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against spectrality itself, that is, against the motive force of the 
contemporary social order. (148) 
These words echo Heidegger’s understanding of enframing and the grave danger it poses for 
Dasein. It emphasizes the fundamental nature of the diagnosis—that we are hobbled so long 
as we cannot open ourselves to the question of our relationship with technology. Martel 
continues, “Only the imaginal mind can lead us out of the maze, with art providing the 
symbols that mark the way to the elusive essence that truly defines us” (153). Spectrality 
itself embodies the disappearance of affect and disconnection from authentic care so 
worrying to Heidegger.  
Perhaps, as Martel later wonders, “[W]e are in need of a new faith” (154). This faith 
would not necessarily play out within religious thought, though there is some indirect 
reference to this prospect. Interestingly, Heidegger refers to God in his writing about 
Hölderlin’s poetry but not in his other investigations. He explores the boundaries separating 
God and the human in the expression of our virtue. He does this by means of an analysis of 
specific verses of poetry, asserting in Bambach’s words that “the poet must always know 
how to honor the boundaries between speaking in the name of a god and striving to become 
as a god, between interpreting god’s will and imposing his own will” (Bambach 28). In 
“Poetry, Language and Thought,” Heidegger pays close attention to the notion of kindness in 
Hölderlin’s late poetry work:  
. . . As long as Kindness, 
The Pure, still stays with his heart, man 
Not unhappily measures himself 
Against the Godhead . . . . (verses 26-29) 
Heidegger briefly explicates Hölderlin’s choice of words: “Kindness—what is it? A harmless 
word, but described by Hölderlin with the capitalized epithet the Pure. Kindness—this word, 
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if we take it literally, is Hölderlin’s magnificent translation for the Greek word charis. In his 
Ajax, Sophocles says of charis (verse 522): For Kindness it is, that ever calls forth kindness” 
(PLT 226). This inclusion of kindness is surprising. Kindness as a virtue by which we 
measure ourselves against the ‘godhead’ is even more so. Perhaps it is better understood 
through Heidegger’s position on Care which, for him, is not explicitly measured in our 
generosity of spirit, as kindness might suggest, but in our self-care and authentic dwelling 
during this temporal life. In addition, Sophocles’ sentiment that kindness forever calls forth 
kindness suggests a longing for a better world in which care forecasts compassion. Heidegger 
continues, 
As long as this arrival of kindness endures, so long does man 
succeed in measuring himself not unhappily against the 
godhead. When this measuring appropriately comes to light, 
man creates poetry from the very nature of the poetic. When 
the poetic appropriately comes to light, then man dwells 
humanly on this earth and then—as Hölderlin says in his last 
poem—‘the life of man’ is a ‘dwelling life.’ (PLT 227) 
Heidegger is, once again, implicating our dwelling in our authentic involvement necessary 
for being-in-the-world to actualize Dasein. Martel, quoting Leonard Cohen, explains, “A 
heart that catches rain is one that has regained the ability to connect with this world that the 
haze of artifice separates us from” (148). This openness implies an awakening—perhaps the 
same awakening Heidegger would have us experience through a close reading of the 
“Question Concerning Technology” but that he himself was unable to achieve.  
 
§1.4: THINKING VS. ACTION + HEIDEGGER’S INVOLVEMENT WITH NAZISM  
 We have worked through the ways Heidegger’s ideas present a dynamic opening for 
an ethical disposition to emerge and develop. We have traced his preoccupation with the dire 
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implications of human beings as standing reserves, having forgone their essential creative 
potential in Dasein. With the Technology essay placing us on alert and demanding both 
thought and action, it would seem Heidegger might also live by the very disposition he 
describes as fundamental to our being. Ironically, Heidegger’s thoughts on kindness, as 
detailed above, in which he espouses a compassionate demeanor, belies his life’s reality. In 
light of my argument for Heidegger’s ethical undertones begging a conscious retrieval of 
ourselves vis à vis enframing, it bears noting some of what is most controversial about his 
conduct. I am, of course, referring to his participation as a member of the National Socialist 
Party. We must treat this well-known obstacle openly and recognize it as the abhorrent 
behavior that it is, and yet also maintain that it does not, properly speaking, devalue his ideas.  
According to contemporary writer, David Brooks, “Moral communities are fragile 
things, hard to build and easy to destroy. . . . When we think about very large communities 
such as nations, the challenge is extraordinary and the threat of moral entropy is intense” 
(Brooks). This sentiment has perhaps never been more accurate than in post WWI Germany 
when a young Adolf Hitler overtook the stage, inculcating large numbers of the citizenry into 
his master plan known as the Final Solution. The socioeconomic climate was ripe for his 
message to take root, and what ensued continues to shock us to this day. Arendt was able to 
clarify with the hindsight the historical circumstances that made such a sinister, shameful 
epoch possible. She explains,  
The masses’ escape from reality is a verdict against the world 
in which they are forced to live and in which they cannot exist, 
since coincidence has become its supreme master and human 
beings need the constant transformation of chaotic and 
accidental conditions into a man-made pattern of relative 
consistency… Totalitarian propaganda can outrageously insult 
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common sense only where common sense has lost its validity. 
(OoT 463) 
Technology played a large part in Hitler’s program; it was deployed in every conceivable 
way to mobilize and educate the populous. The insult to common sense to which Arendt so 
insightfully refers lingers in all post-WWII historical considerations, leaving one asking: 
How could this have happened? Another valid question to ask oneself is whether Heidegger’s 
active participation as a member of the National Socialist Party discredits his expression of 
concern for the expression of our highest selves?  
 To answer this concern we must first return to Heidegger’s fascination with the 
perceived integrity of ancient Greek civilizations as it may assist our understanding of his 
mindset. He demonstrated, through both his writing and teaching, a level of respect for Greek 
thought and the essential purity it embodies. Taking our brief exploration of Aristotle into 
account (see Appendix A), it becomes obvious that a life of contemplation is greatly valued, 
and this foundational principle is advanced in Heidegger’s meditative thinking, and further 
translated into an ontological necessity of Dasein. Heidegger wistfully speaks of Greek 
civilization through his discussion of art: 
What was art—perhaps only for that brief but magnificent age? 
Why did art bear the modest name technē? Because it was a 
revealing that brought forth and made present, and therefore 
belonged within poēisis. It was finally that revealing which 
holds complete sway in all the fine arts, in poetry, and in 
everything poetical that obtained poēisis as its proper name. 
(Krell 339) 
His point of view is inspired by a balance of technē and poēisis as agents of truth and 
ongoing revelation. I bring this to bear at this stage in relation to Heidegger’s membership 
and his missteps during the Nazi dominance of Germany. His mere participation is 
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antithetical to an ethical philosophy. Certainly, anyone setting forth such an argument would 
have a valid case. Heidegger utterly failed to achieve the ethics of action that Arendt so 
valued and from which societies benefit. Peter Gordon, in a review of the Black Notebooks, 
writes, “An elegant defense . . . was developed by Hannah Arendt, his erstwhile student, 
whose essay ‘Martin Heidegger at Eighty’ compared Heidegger to Thales, the ancient 
philosopher who grew so absorbed in contemplating the heavens that he stumbled into the 
well at his feet” (Gordon).6  
It is hard to reconcile Heidegger the thinker and Heidegger the man, whose actions so 
severely contradicted his preoccupation with the essence of that which allows us wholeness 
and freedom. Gelassenheit as a letting be can hardly be equated with Hitler’s Final Solution. 
As we have discussed, Heidegger’s ethical plea demands that we return to art as a means of 
recuperating all of humanity, not at the exclusion of entire races or populations. He set forth 
a program of meditative thinking that opens us to the essential characteristics of our Being, 
not in order that we annihilate millions of undesirable others. Rather, he would espouse a 
redress of our relationship to technology in order that we might understand who we truly are. 
And yet, there is ample written material, largely found in Heidegger’s recently published 
Black Notebooks, that belies this passionate demand to honor that which lies at the essence of 
our being, implicating dispositions of ‘care’ for self and the other. Heidegger appears to have 
succumbed to an ideological enframing that fully escaped his own self-reflective thinking. 
Gordon surmises, “In his zeal to prosecute a war on the critical intellect he ignored all of the 
differences that matter to us as inhabitants of a common world, and he ended in a place of 
abstraction no less fantastical than the enemy he wished to defeat” (“Heidegger in Black”). 
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That said, the fact that Heidegger’s personal choices undermine any sign of ethical 
conduct ought not tarnish his philosophy. On the contrary, his fall from grace highlights the 
importance of these ideas even more by underscoring the subversive force enframing exerts 
on all human beings. To this point, Martel describes the internal dichotomy between personal 
conduct and higher expression in outlining the case for Flaubert and Dostoyevsky as artists. 
He explains, “If people still read these two authors today, it is because their work exceeds 
their finite perspectives—infinitely” (Martel 119). In a review of the Black Notebooks 
entitled “The King is Dead,” Gregory Fried writes, 
One reason to take the Notebooks seriously, therefore, is to 
understand how a figure who inspired such a wide following 
could have held such views — and what this might mean for 
his legacy. This is a question of intellectual history and 
influence. While it is important, there remains an even deeper 
one: whether there is anything left for us to think about in 
reading Heidegger; whether in the Notebooks or the rest of a 
body of work that will amount to over 100 volumes, there was 
something other than Nazism and anti-Semitism at work. 
(Fried 2) 
It seems plausible that Heidegger had a mistaken judgment that National Socialism might 
return Germany to the supposed integrity embodied in ancient Greek civilizations and their 
philosophical practices. Recall Plato’s determination that an aristocracy carries a stronger 
chance of being just than a democracy, a notion that Heidegger seemed to support in some of 
his writings. His overwhelming belief in the potential of the German people to carry forth the 
deliberate reversal of 2,500 years of metaphysics is further elaborated by Fried: 
The Notebooks demonstrate how ardently, even desperately, he 
hoped for “an other inception,” especially during those early 
years of the 1930s, when he had thought that National 
Socialism might be the catalyst for a “crossing-over” to a new 
history. “What will come, knows no one,” he wrote; no one 
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knows, because it will not be “the” other inception, or even 
“another” . . . inception, as if it were a definite cyclical 
occurrence, but rather an entirely “other” inception that cannot 
be predicted or measured by the standards of the first one. All 
he knows is that it will require the complete transformation of 
what it means to be human, away from the self-deifying 
subjectivism of modernity. (Fried 4) 
Beyond this seemingly obsessive preoccupation with reinstating the Greeks’ past glories 
through German philosophical expression, Heidegger sought to explain himself to those 
closest to him. There exist letters exchanged with both Karl Jaspers and Hannah Arendt that 
hint at Heidegger’s private views vis à vis his position as a member of the Nazi party. In a 
2009 issue of Existenz, Babette Babich summarizes Heidegger’s position as stated to Jaspers 
with the following synopsis: 
Heidegger [. . .] emphasize[d] Nietzsche's epistemology, 
parsing Nietzsche's will to power, contra Nazi readings, as the 
metaphysical culmination of the domination of the West by 
scientism and technologism. It is in this sense that Heidegger 
argues that German Nazism is “in essence” the same as Soviet 
Bolshevism and American capitalism. (Existenz) 
In sum, according to Jaspers and Babich, Heidegger determined his teaching of Nietzsche to 
have been a point of resistance in the face of Nazism. Babich quotes a letter written to 
Jaspers in which Heidegger laments, “I was then struck all the harder by what was 
undertaken against me in 1945-48 and, actually, to this hour” (Biemel HJC 189). Babich 
adds, “In correspondence with Jaspers, again, Heidegger invokes his Nietzsche courses, 
noting that he had, at times, a Nazi spy in his lectures” (2). This is an argument Heidegger 
asserted on multiple occasions. He wrote, “I do not write this in order to claim that I 
accomplished anything although everyone who could hear clearly in the years 1935-1944 
could have known that, at this university, no one dared to do what I did” (Existenz).7 The 
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discussion, which Jaspers undertook over the course of several communications, led to what 
he believed was an apology, as Babich details. She quotes, “In that letter of March 5, 1950, 
Heidegger relates his ‘shame’ and impotence or sense of ‘powerlessness’ and ‘failure’ (HJC 
185; qtd. in Existenz) at ‘having here and there, directly and indirectly, contributed’ to the 
‘viciousness’ of Nazism, and of the ‘persecution of Jews’” (HJC 187-9; qtd. in Existenz).  
Heidegger’s defense to Arendt expressed a different mood and concern. The tone of 
his letter, written during the winter of 1932–1933, is irritable and defensive. Arendt’s 
questioning touched a nerve. He begins, “[T]he rumors that are upsetting you are slanders 
that are perfect matches for other experiences I have endured over the last few years” (Letters 
52).  He then proceeds to list the many Jews with whom he has customarily worked in his 
capacity of professor and university official:  
The man who comes anyway and urgently wants to write a 
dissertation is a Jew. The man who comes to see me every 
month to report on a large work in progress (neither a 
dissertation nor a habilitation project) is also a Jew. The man 
who sent me a substantial text for urgent reading a few weeks 
ago is a Jew. (Letters 52)  
The letter continues in this manner, maintaining in its short and definitive tenor that 
Heidegger did not view himself as discriminating against anyone, least of all Arendt herself. 
He closes “and above all it cannot touch my relationship to you” (Letters 53). There is an 
arrogance implicit in Heidegger’s writing and refusal to express any contrition publicly. 
Certainly, an admission of the error of his ways would have done much to restore the faith of 
his readers. Yet, the very same sense of importance that permitted him to save his notebooks 
for later publication and consumption is evidence of a confidence in his beliefs and their 
longstanding importance within their historical context. His dichotomous life, demonstrated 
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in the schism between thought and action, is an illustration of the nature of our will and its 
potentially problematic and unwieldy nature. Our will often disrupts the path to moral 
correctness, even in a world where normative structures are shifting. While Heidegger’s ideas 
are most certainly influenced by the resonant voices of ethical philosophies, he seemed able 
to compartmentalize personal codes of conduct, believing himself perhaps beyond reproach 
for his choices. In any case, his choices and views, however misguided, do not, in my 
estimation, diminish the importance of his ideas, nor do they negate the dire warning issued 
in “The Question Concerning Technology.” 
 
§1.5: SUMMARY + CONCLUSION 
It is my hope, as we look back at this chapter’s epigraph, reading once again 
Heidegger’s intentions of bringing us into the light of truth in relation to the essence of 
technology, that we will better understand “The Question Concerning Technology” as an 
ethical project aimed at saving humankind from the potentially irretrievable loss of Dasein by 
means of our creative potential through the realm of art. As we have noted, the danger 
Heidegger exposes persists and has worsened in recent times, reaching an acute stage as 
digital technologies rapidly accelerate and propagate online addictions and a broad 
shallowing of thought. If we do not heed the call to action expressed in the Technology essay, 
we risk losing the most fundamental of our dispositions and, ultimately, our freedom.  
The ongoing worry of enframing has been present in ethical thought in a myriad of 
ways. We have noted the correlations of Heidegger’s ideas to the broader ethical tradition—
including Aristotle, Kant and Arendt’s works—while also noting the deviations in language 
and expression (see Appendix A). The mixture of Aristotelian virtue born in a contemplative 
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life with the singularity of responsibility and Care, along with the letting be or Gelassenheit 
that situated truth as an event in alētheia, has the potential to lead us to a place of ultimate 
freedom. There is a resonance that carries forward past systems without embedding directly 
within them. Arendt would express this in the responsibility we have toward choice and 
action, asserting thinking and action as separate yet intertwined events of grave consequence. 
This ultimate existential crisis confronts us today. The essence of technology, and its 
concomitant condition of enframing, endure, leaving human beings as standing reserves 
rather than singular creators as Dasein should demand. 
The structures that create enframing require conscious questioning and open 
examination in order that we come to see them for what they are: imprisoning forces 
hobbling creative thought. Heidegger’s pointed directive emerges later in the works of many 
postmodern thinkers, including Theodor Adorno, Giorgio Agamben and Jean-François 
Lyotard, whose ideas will be explored in the forthcoming chapters. As we will demonstrate, 
the realm of art, with its other-thinking and boundary-breaking potential, continues to be the 
region capable of opening us to truth and freedom. Artists must be seen as agents of 
Heidegger’s authentic disposition and structures of care, and art itself as the solution vital to 
dismantling enframing as an entrenched human condition.  
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CHAPTER 2:  
 
WALTER BENJAMIN AND THE DISRUPTIVE REPRODUCTION 
 
Even the most perfect reproduction of a work of art is lacking 
in one element: its presence in time and space, its unique 
existence at the place where it happens to be. This unique 
existence of the work of art determined the history to which it 
was subject throughout the time of its existence.  
— Walter Benjamin, IL 220 
 
Thus, their [artworks’] durability is of a higher order than that 
which all things need in order to exist at all; it can attain 
permanence throughout the ages. In this permanence, the very 
stability of the human artifice, which, being inhabited and used 
by mortals, can never be absolute, achieves a representation of its 
own. Nowhere else does the sheer durability of the world of 
things appear in such purity and clarity, nowhere else therefore 
does this thing-world reveal itself so spectacularly as the non-
mortal home for mortal beings.  
  — Hannah Arendt, HC 168  
- 
§2.1: INTRODUCTION 
 As we have seen in Chapter One, in “The Question Concerning Technology,” 
Heidegger demands that we seek emancipation through the realm of art. But at the heart of 
this call is a paradox. Heidegger emphasizes a saving power similar to that described by 
Hölderlin:  
Yet where the danger lies,  
Grows that which saves.  
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These words place the realm of art in the same fundamental space as the Modern essence of 
technology, which tends to cripple our Dasein. Heidegger envisions the space of enframing 
transforming into one of poēisis—as a clearing (Lichtung). But how can that which expresses 
the most authentic characteristics of our creative Being exist on the same plane as that which 
hobbles it? In responding to this question, we must study the material correlations and 
differences between machinery and art along with a number of concrete issues pertaining to 
their exchange. To this end, we turn to critical theory, incorporating not only its theoretical 
content but also its methodologies, particularly those offered by Walter Benjamin, Karl Marx 
and Hannah Arendt. Ultimately, the task at hand requires us to look at ways mechanically 
manufactured artworks manifest our freedom in both thought and action. The task also 
demands we take a closer look at the intimate relationship between society and art, or the 
substructures that animate a shift in the superstructures. Furthermore, it necessitates a look at 
new perceptual experiences in light of advancing technologies and their structural-cultural 
configurations, and an investigation of the negative and positive effects of resulting shifts in 
apperception.  
Heidegger’s fundamental conception of alētheia will remain a framing consideration 
for this shift of attention – where alētheia is understood as an event of unconcealment 
ascertained within and as the clearing, through which Dasein experiences freedom in both 
thoughts and actions. The point is sharply reiterated in Heidegger’s late essay “The End of 
Philosophy and the Task for Thinking.” Quoting Parmenides, Heidegger elaborates upon the 
primacy of alētheia as generative of truth: 
… but you should learn all: 
The untrembling heart of unconcealment, well rounded, 
And also the opinions of mortals 
Who lack the ability to trust what is unconcealed. (Krell 444)  
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Heidegger explains: “We must think alētheia, unconcealment, as the clearing that first grants 
Being and thinking and their presencing to and for each other” (Krell 445). The clearing is 
thus a meditative space of granting and presencing. Heidegger ends the essay by asking, “But 
where does the clearing come from and how is it given? What speaks in the ‘there is / it 
gives?’” (Krell 449). The answer, as we have seen, lies in the restoration of this marriage of 
technē and poiēsis, with a focus on praxis as action (or interaction). Ultimately, the gathering 
of the essence of truth with the essence of creating should yield emancipation and freedom.  
Walter Benjamin wrote specifically about this material and praxis-oriented 
relationship between artworks and technology in his well-known essay “The Work of Art in 
the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” (hereafter referred to as the Artwork essay), in which 
he addresses the impact of technology’s reproductive advances on the work of art and its 
percipient. It is important to note that, while this is Benjamin’s most widely read essay, much 
of its original intent has been lost to an overall editing of its message prior to publication in 
1936. Howard Caygill and Esther Leslie both discuss the extent to which Benjamin’s essay 
was altered by his colleagues at the Frankfurt School and its original editor. Its final form 
does not fully reflect the political undercurrents Benjamin had originally included, thereby 
making the fullness of the essay’s meaning difficult to capture. According to Leslie, 
“Benjamin argued that all the omissions, forced upon the text by the executive at the Institut 
der Sozialforschung, had rendered the text incomprehensible” (131). Add to these omissions 
an inclination to straddle different sentiments regarding technological advances—most 
notably in “The Storyteller” and “Unpacking My Library”—and Benjamin’s intended 
message becomes somewhat obtuse. That said, the strong inclination toward freedom through 
the revolutionary potential and democratization of the reproduction is most pronounced and 
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clear. While this chapter’s content will focus on the theories underlying Benjamin’s essay 
and the theoretical responses thereto, its broader aim is to lay the groundwork for our 
subsequent analyses of artworks, particularly as related to technological mediums and the 
ways meaning is imparted and created.  
Benjamin’s Artwork essay precedes Heidegger’s “Question Concerning Technology” 
by more than a decade. While it ultimately differs in both its underlying premises and 
proposed solutions, it shares the fundamental preoccupation with emancipation and freedom 
and accentuates the matter in the direction of concrete sociopolitical circumstances. 
Benjamin’s concern to transfer freedom from its conceptual basis to praxis animates the 
ethical basis for creativity and artistic production. In its broadest terms, the essay proposes a 
move from the space of alienation to one of (political) resistance and (human) renewal. 
Benjamin describes his intentions: “The concepts which are introduced into the theory of art 
in what follows differ from the more familiar terms in that they are completely useless for the 
purposes of Fascism. They are, on the other hand, useful for the formulation of revolutionary 
demands in the politics of art” (IL 281). Benjamin thereby prescribes a different kind of 
freedom through reproducibility—one that relieves us, art’s percipients, from the shadows of 
elitist bourgeois tendencies.  
This shift from Heidegger’s abstract understanding of technology’s effects to 
Benjamin’s more concrete concerns moves our focus from ontological implications to more 
measurable social structures brought about by capitalism, and a Marxist view of fascism with 
a more hopeful perspective on the ways the ‘saving power’ can originate from within the 
core of larger technological forces. Intertextually speaking, one might equate this move as a 
deeper concretization of the ontological-ontic focal phenomenon in Heidegger. Benjamin 
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analyses the practical matters of human experience and ultimately endeavors to give 
substance to the ways freedom is manifested. Furthermore, while I am not suggesting a 
concurrence between Benjamin and Heidegger, it can also be said that the former is 
exploring praxis as an adjunct to poēisis, thereby recognizing their interdependency and the 
plurality of truth possible through their balance.  
Working with Benjamin’s seminal essay, this chapter will explore the boundaries 
between loss and preservation, alienation and durability, along with the shifts in reception 
and perception as they correspond to enframing as a reductive force. While it may be true 
that Benjamin recognized and touted the revolutionary power of the reproduction and its 
many ancillary manifestations, I will argue that he simultaneously notes its detrimental 
effects on human perception and thought, revealing a sharp shift in the way artworks are 
received and apprehended. There is an underlying cautionary tale: while the reproduction 
offers a democratization of art and information, it can have a correlative, unintended effect of 
arresting thinking and conscious, meditative contemplation. This particular disintegration 
aligns with the phenomenon Heidegger terms forgottenness, resulting in the masses’ 
unsuspecting entrapment within the very mechanisms that create enframing (alienation). In 
addition, the reproduction signals a potential loss of authenticity as we distance ourselves 
from original works and might, as a result, forego the experience of art and truth as an 
ongoing, reflective event. Benjamin’s commitment to technological progress is, at times, 
hesitant, as we will see in our examination of the “Storyteller,” “Unpacking My Library” and 
the Artwork essay. I will argue that his underlying caution, though apt, still reveals a measure 
of naïveté regarding technology’s impact on human thought and glosses over its more 
nefarious effects. That said, this mindful attention to the dangers abiding in what is otherwise 
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hopeful is reflected not only in the language he chooses to diagnose and define the loss of 
aura but also in his extension of Marx’s understanding of alienation as a detriment to the 
foundation and nature of our humanity. Likewise, despite his reliance on Marx’s ideas, 
Benjamin falls short in making the desired connection between distraction and Marx’s 
concept of leisure wherein contemplation and creative thought are offered as counterpoints to 
labor. The result is that Benjamin has a tendency to overlook the ill effects of mechanically 
reproduced artworks in deference to historical advancements and democratization of access.  
These nuanced ideas regarding tensions between reproduction, thought, and the 
enduring cultural characteristics of artworks will be explored in tandem with the writing of 
Karl Marx, Theodor Adorno, Howard Caygill, Hannah Arendt and Jean Baudrillard. We will 
analyze the artwork as both a manifestation and provocation of thinking in terms of Arendt’s 
notion of art objects as thought-things. Arendt carefully demonstrates the importance of 
thought as the source of action and ethical conduct. To this point, it bears noting the 
connection between Marx’s notion of leisure and the premise of Heidegger’s essay “What 
Calls for Thinking”—both celebrate the power of contemplation and anticipate Arendt’s 
theory of action as the continuation of individual thought. Viewed through this lens, 
subjectivity for Arendt translates to a mixture of Dasein’s fundamental disposition with 
human agency and citizenship. These connections underscore the porous nature of 
Benjamin’s writing, making the identification of clear, linear ideas challenging to say the 
least. Arendt’s voice carries forward distinct aspects of Marx, Benjamin and Heidegger, 
adding her unique understanding of art’s importance to the historic narrative. Arendt further 
provides a way to overcome distraction through thinking as an ethical practice. At the end of 
this chapter, we will turn to artists whose works embody the marriage of technology and 
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artistic expression, providing avenues for the re-emergence of an ethics of thinking and 
action.  
 
§2.2: BUILDING ON MARXIST FOUNDATIONS   
Benjamin opens the Artwork essay with a brief yet important reference to Marx’s 
prognosis of immiseration—a societal condition directly resulting from modes of production 
and their alienating force upon man’s essence. This reference assumes knowledge of Marx’s 
foundational ideas, particularly with respect to human nature1 and the historical dialectic that 
moves revolutionary ideas forward. Benjamin lauds Marx’s assertion concerning the coming 
end of capitalism through the inevitable leveling of societal structures: “He went back to the 
basic conditions underlying capitalist production and through his presentation showed what 
could be expected of capitalism in the future” (IL 217). What impresses Benjamin is Marx’s 
ability to forecast the movement of history and its socioeconomic manifestations through his 
application of the historical dialectic. This historical qua material exchange is summarized in 
the following statement:  
Communism … is the genuine resolution of the antagonism 
between man and nature and between man and man; it is the true 
resolution of the conflict between existence and essence, 
objectification and self-affirmation, freedom and necessity, 
individual and species. It is the riddle of history solved and 
knows itself as this solution. (McLellan 89) 
Each binary represents a dialectical struggle native to history’s path toward freedom. Marx 
and Benjamin seek the materialization of this freedom as a resistance to economic class 
domination and control. The immiseration point thus indicates that Benjamin is centering his 
inquiry on the Marxist conversation between modes of production and changes in culture and 
its particularly imperiled moment of historical intersection.  
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Several Marxian tenets are especially formative for Benjamin and thus crucial to our 
reading of him. First, Marx’s perspective on the fundamental significance of human 
creativity must be acknowledged as we come to understand that the loss of this characteristic 
due to industrialization is, in large part, the cause of man’s alienation from himself. In his 
book The Structure of Marx’s World View, John McMurtry summarizes Marx’s long-term 
attention to the need for creativity: 
This need is suggested one way or another from Marx’s earliest 
to his latest writings. Hence we find such phrases as man’s “need 
for his own realization” (EPM 112) or “need for universality” 
(PoP 125) scattered throughout his work; and similarly, 
statements indicating that men are driven to liberate themselves 
from oppressive social conditions by a “definite need” to achieve 
the freedom for material self-realization (GID 331). When this 
emancipated social situation is secured, [Marx] makes clear on 
several occasions, then creative work will be allowed its proper 
status as “life’s prime want” (GP 17), and the untrammeled 
realization of “what lies within” will incite men as “an end in 
itself” (Pre-C 85). (32)2   
Over time, Marx makes direct allusions to the species character earning human beings the 
title of Homo Faber. His insistence on the ‘need’ to create—and the capacity for the human 
mind to conceive ideas and then realize them—is of paramount importance to our 
understanding of Benjamin’s ideas.  
A second tenet is the difference between the substructure and superstructures caught 
in the tension of transformation. The base, or substructure, is the web of working 
relationships—those that determine basic survival or fulfill human needs. In its simplest 
terms, the base is comprised of the labor relationships that exist between the capitalist and his 
workers, the specializations of skills, and the other forces of production. Benjamin is 
interested in the correlation of progressive socio-political change moving from the 
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substructure through the superstructure—a transformation resulting from emerging 
technologies and contextual forces. The shift first occurs within the base, or substructure, as 
embodied in the means of production and technological advances. These changes eventually 
disrupt and shift the superstructure, namely culture, politics and the realm of art. But 
Benjamin notes a delay as the superstructure struggles to align itself with the preceding 
contextual changes. Entering this moment of alignment, the reproduction becomes an 
instrument of revolution, a tool facilitating a more egalitarian exchange. He underscores the 
dialectical relationship exerted by these changes: “The transformation of the superstructure, 
which takes place far more slowly than that of the substructure, has taken more than half a 
century to manifest in all areas of culture the change in the conditions of production” (IL 
218). In other words, a delayed manifestation of change infiltrates culture (and man’s species 
essence) over a period of time as its impact manifests upward into the superstructure (i.e. 
institutions, purveyors of knowledge, politics, etc.). Thus, the mechanical nature of 
technological progress alters not only what human beings creatively produce but also how 
the products of such creative manufacture are apprehended.  
For Marx, the historically changing substructure in the period of industrialization 
negatively affects human nature. Marx states, “At a certain stage of their development, the 
material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of 
production, or—what is but a legal expression of the same thing—with property relations 
within which they have been at work hitherto. From forms of development of the productive 
forces these relations turn into their fetters” (McLellan 389). We must not overlook the fact 
that this conflict on the plane of production is, for Marx, right away a problem on the plane 
of human nature’s creative vocation. There is a forced transference of change imposed on 
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man’s nature from the very devices he creates in the service of technological progress; the 
point recalls Heidegger’s understanding of enframing as the greatest threat to our humanity. 
McMurtry explains: “In other words, the economic laws of capitalism entail, for Marx, the 
systemic de-humanization of society’s process of production and circulation” (91). The 
manifestation of change within the nature of human beings indicates an alterable core, 
profoundly affected by broader extrinsic events. The tension between finitude and change as 
reflected in this dialectical exchange is instructive. While Heidegger will propose that 
essences are finite and ever changing, actively participating in the project of existence, 
Benjamin might suggest that change occurs upward in a one-way relationship from the 
substructure. While the momentum of history is the critical force altering culture, it demands 
a constant alteration in apperceptive faculties.    
An important third tenet is found within this conception of the interplay of sub- and 
superstructure: Marx avers that our very freedom relies on an authentic, unburdened 
connection to our inherent nature. He asserts that “[t]he whole character of a species—its 
species character—is contained in the character of its life-activity; and free, conscious 
activity is man’s species character. Life itself appears only as a means to life” (EPM 75). The 
existence of a free, conscious activity inherent to man’s nature is paramount and reflects 
Marx’s belief in freedom as our creative state. He continues, “It is not the consciousness of 
men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their 
consciousness” (McLellan 389).  It is therefore within socio-economic relationships that 
man’s estrangement from himself is born. Marx states, 
We must bear in mind the above-stated proposition that man’s 
relation to himself only becomes objective and real for him 
through his relation to the other man. Thus, if the product of his 
labour, his labour objectified, is for him an alien, hostile, 
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powerful object independent of him, then his position toward it is 
such that someone else is master of this object, someone who is 
alien, hostile, powerful and independent of him. If his own 
activity is to him an unfree activity, then he is treating it as 
activity performed in the service, under the dominion, the 
coercion and the yoke of another man. (EPM 79) 
Marx invokes Hegel’s master/slave dialectic in his assessment of man’s objectification and 
what he determines as an unfree activity under the yoke of another man. The alienation of his 
own labor is an estrangement from one’s species character as creator, and the continued 
abstraction of value accelerates this alienation. This allusion to objectification forms a strong 
(albeit indirect) connection with Heidegger’s notion of our alienation from Dasein—
specifically, as we noted in chapter one, within the enframed they-structure of our 
worldhood. Since the relations of production comprising the substructure can be human or 
technological, there is also an important connection to how, for Heidegger, the reversal of 
our relationship with technology cripples the existential Care-structure of Dasein’s being-in-
the-world (cf. Being and Time).   
Within these matters of alienation and species character stands Marx’s observation of 
a similar reversal in relation to the essence of being. For him, it is this very conscious life-
activity that determines the essence of man. He explains, “Only because of that is his activity 
a free activity. Estranged labor reverses this relationship, so that it is just because man is a 
conscious being that he makes his life-activity, his essential being, a mere means to his 
existence” (EPM 75). The reversal is one that impedes freedom, shifting homo faber to a 
condition of enslavement. The base modes of production to which Marx refers are those 
established and accelerated by the Industrial Revolution; assembly line manufacturing and 
the separation of man from his own labor and production has an ultimately reductive impact. 
Marx’s underlying concern regards the impact such mechanized production has on the 
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productive nature of human beings—the need to imagine and create. In his essay “On James 
Mill,” Marx states, “[I]t is evident that economics establishes an alienated form of social 
intercourse as the essential, original and natural form” (McLellan 116). Cecilia Sjöholm 
echoes this sentiment in her book Doing Aesthetics with Arendt: “When machines take over 
the task of making objects, the human body becomes instrumentalized” (39). The 
mindlessness and numbing impact of detached work defies the core needs and drives 
expressed in man’s creative impulses.   
A fourth and related tenet issues from within this intersection of freedom, essence, 
and the problematic production-creativity relationship. For Marx, freedom would be a state 
of unfettered creative thought and labor. He values the open space for contemplation and its 
expression in our ‘projective consciousness,’ predicting, in notable ways, how for Heidegger 
thinking is the authentic hermeneutic disposition of our being. McMurtry points out “To call 
something ‘inhuman’ presumes, of necessity, an idea of what is ‘human,’ and this move is 
evident in Marx’s tendency to employ such terms whenever he sees external circumstances 
as having robbed men of the exercise of their creative intelligence” (31). In much the way 
Heidegger warns of the ‘life struggle’ brought about with enframing, Marx exposes the 
profound dangers created in our denial of human essence. Marx further explains,    
The more the worker exerts himself, the more powerful becomes 
the alien, objective world which he fashions against himself, the 
poorer he and his inner world become, the less there is that 
belongs to him. . . . The worker puts his life into the object and 
this means it no longer belongs to him but to the object. . . . The 
externalization of the worker in his project means not only that 
his work becomes an object, an external existence, but also that it 
exists outside him, independently, alien, an autonomous power, 
opposed to him. The life he has given to the object confronts him 
as hostile and alien. (McLellan 78-79) 
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Given Marx’s understanding of human creative potential, the labor of the worker is entitled 
to creativity and artistry. It is the loss of this intrinsic connection that alienates species-
character from product and corrupts one’s ability to remain authentic.  
We must not overlook the positive anticipation here stowed within Marx’s critical 
diagnosis of the guiding sub- and superstructure relationship, one that in turn anticipates any 
parallels we may posit between Heidegger and Benjamin. In the third volume of Das Kapital, 
Marx expands upon the necessity of creative potential as the primary vehicle to freedom. 
Departing from an elaboration of ‘necessities’ or ‘wants’, Marx states, “Beyond it begins that 
development of human energy as an end in itself, the true realm of freedom, which, however, 
can blossom forth only with this realm of necessity as its basis” (quoted in McMurty 227). 
The world in which man is removed from himself and coerced into a life at the whim and 
service of another affects the superstructure—the institutions, political structures, laws and 
codes that determine social hierarchies and class positions. These are the webs of 
relationships that Heidegger will call ‘Worldhood’ – the frameworks and social interactions 
in which Dasein goes about its existence. Whereas for Heidegger we lose our particular 
agency under the influence of our relationship with technology, Marx diagnoses this loss in 
our material, working life. In the same way technology authors human agency, we see the 
hijacking of agency in relations of labor and production. If we are to draw out this analogy 
further, it could be said that Heidegger’s Earth and World 3 dialectic is akin to the interaction 
between sub and superstructures. For Marx, Benjamin and later Heidegger, the superstructure 
falls into enframing—no longer free to transact meaning through its open framework of 
exchange. Marx’s understanding of man’s creative potential anticipates Heidegger’s poēisis, 
albeit indirectly, with a particular emphasis on concretizing human imagination. Alienation, 
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however, severely impedes this potential and shares the forgottenness that befalls beings in 
relation to Dasein. One can imagine Marx and Benjamin agreeing with Heidegger but asking: 
how has capitalism, as the wellspring of alienation and forgottenness, affected this structural 
imprisonment of our creative force? Marx observes that “[m]oney is the universal, self-
constituted value of all things. Hence it has robbed the whole world, the human world as well 
as nature, of its proper value. Money, as a mode of abstraction away from labor power, is the 
alienated essence of man’s labour and life, and this alien essence dominates him as he 
worships it” (McLellan 60). For Marx, our species character resides in our personal 
production and social exchange. We see again an understanding of authenticity relying on 
being ‘true to our fundamental nature’ in the way we conduct ourselves within larger society.  
As evidenced in the Artwork essay, Benjamin’s own integration of diagnostic critique 
and positive anticipation broadens our understanding of alienation with respect to artistic 
production and, in turn, envisions specified modes of subverting such ‘forgottenness.’ Here 
our analysis can begin to pass more explicitly from the identification of Marxian tenets to 
Benjamin’s distinct deployment of them; the interplay of sub- and superstructure is 
particularly important to bear in mind. Most notably, he extends to the traditional reception 
of artworks the same ill effects that Marx ascribes to currency as a means of social exchange. 
Embedded in this exchange are oppressive values brought upon the lower classes by those in 
power. Benjamin’s adherence to Marx’s revolution is driven by an ardent belief in the 
ultimate leveling of economic inequities and an overcoming of alienation. The freedom from 
fascist tendencies (namely National Socialism) is, in essence, an emancipation from 
tradition—or from the limiting and exclusive domain of art as a reflection of the high culture 
superstructure. And yet, whereas Benjamin aspires to the positive movement forward toward 
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such a liberation, it comes at the potential cost of further alienation of the artist from his 
work. This matter is often a source of confusion for Benjamin’s readers. To be clear, the 
tension lies in the disconnect between estrangement and social transformations only 
accessible through technology’s revolutionary potential. With respect to estrangement within 
film, Benjamin quotes Pirandello,  
What matters is that the part is acted not for an audience but for a 
mechanical contrivance—in the case of the sound film, for two of 
them. “The film actor,” wrote Pirandello, “feels as if in exile—
exiled not only from the stage but also from himself. With a 
vague sense of discomfort he feels inexplicable emptiness: his 
body loses its corporeality, it evaporates, it is deprived of reality, 
life, voice, and the noises caused by his moving about, in order to 
be changed into a mute image, flickering an instant on the screen, 
then vanishing into silence. . . . The projector will play with his 
shadow before the public, and he himself must be content to play 
before the camera.’ (IL 229) 
This passage acknowledges a distancing from human presence and active contribution to 
productive work—in this case, the making of the film. The actor is alienated from himself as 
he is removed from his social, intersubjective role. Benjamin continues: “[F]or the first 
time—and this is the effect of the film—man has to operate with his whole living person yet 
foregoing its aura. For aura is tied to presence; there can be no replica of it” (IL 229). Much 
the same way Marx believed our conditions of labor reduces us to an objectified status, the 
film actor is relegated to a distanced place in which he feels a disconnection from his 
humanity.  
If we recognize that, deep down, our relationship to meaning occurs through our 
collaboration with objects through daily interactions, we can see how the removal of such a 
web of exchanges reduces our human agency to an enframed state; the advance on the score 
of creative potential harbors a risk Marx may not have anticipated, even as his ideas inform 
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Benjamin’s ability to flag the predicament. Benjamin observes that, in the making of a film, 
the actor “has as little contact with it as any article made in a factory. This may contribute to 
that oppression, that new anxiety which, according to Pirandello, grips the actor before the 
camera” (IL 231). A contradiction emerges: while Benjamin asserts the value of rejecting 
past tradition and practice, he recognizes the ill-effects imposed on the artist or stage actor 
who no longer ‘feels’ a connection with his craft. This distinction forms a significant portion 
of his caution—the alienation of man from himself that occurs in the relationship to 
technology (and as a result of the exchange of money)—and connects with Marx’s 
understanding of alienation as a primary cause of immiseration. But does Benjamin maintain 
his caution and see it through, or does he stow this concern within an abiding confidence in 
Marx’s revolutionary humanism? The matter is difficult to decide but can be elaborated 
through a study of Benjamin’s treatment of authenticity.  
Authenticity is at once a leading theme for our overall project as well as a discrete 
matter in Benjamin. As we have seen, it is a key word that recalls ideas expressed in the 
second half of Heidegger’s Being and Time in relationship to the ‘care’ of Dasein. Again, our 
forgottenness has led us to dwell inauthentically, overlooking the practice of Sorge, or self-
care. While authenticity literally means an adherence to facts or truth, it has been ascribed, in 
Heidegger’s work, a broader, more abstract significance that calls us to dwell authentically in 
the world. In Benjamin’s writing, however, authenticity leans toward notions of originality, 
uniqueness and a particular attributable historical moment. For Benjamin, what is unique 
therefore equates with the authentic. The extent to which he is being critical or merely 
descriptive is a tension that parallels that which we saw above in relation to art’s 
technological emancipation and the seemingly unfinished caution regarding further alienation 
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(as specified in the case of film). It bears noting that the theme of authenticity is somewhat 
precarious as it might be taken to imply an anthropocentric subjectivism lingering in 
Heidegger.4 We can trace, however, the ways Benjamin is able to subvert this challenge by 
means of Marx’s class issues as intersubjective. Ultimately both Heidegger and Benjamin’s 
understanding of authenticity offer emancipation through truth, though the paths taken to 
achieve this end diverge.  
In chapter 1, we came to understand truth as an event through our interpretation of 
alētheia, moving in and out of concealment. Authenticity, understood as originary, is also 
subject to the slippage in meaning that our understanding of truth might undergo. Benjamin’s 
use of the term denotes an object property more than an existential state of being, but he is at 
the same time reluctant to accredit the signification in full. Benjamin states, “The presence of 
the original is the prerequisite to the concept of authenticity” (IL 220). Howard Caygill 
explains: “The authentic element of a work is not reproducible, but the loss of the non-
reproducible may be offset by the gains of reproduction. Indeed, the concept ‘authenticity’, 
[Benjamin] suggests in a footnote, is itself of dubious authenticity” (WB 101). While 
working between human characteristics and those of the artwork, Caygill demonstrates the 
fluid nature of such attributions and acknowledges the shifting meaning at the core of the 
issue. The issue matters for our larger concern with the question of whether dwelling 
authentically might thwart alienation qua enframing, and it matters specifically in this 
instance for our understanding of how Benjamin regards the tension within art’s 
emancipatory promise. If authenticity embodies a disposition from which we might 
experience our freedom, how might mechanically reproduced artworks enhance or detract 
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from this potential? And, at the same time, can we use the term to imply a positive aim while 
also remaining mindful of how it signifies a shifting phenomenon in relation to artworks? 
A photograph, for example, may be subject to a valuation of its authenticity. While 
the medium falls into the arena of reproducibility, it is also widely said to capture ‘truth’ in a 
mechanistic, factual way. And, yet, the medium of photography is as capable of deception as 
any other—perhaps even more so due to the public’s expectation of its veracity. While the 
original work, in Benjamin’s parlance, is that which is auratic, some photographs might also 
lay claim to this peculiar presence as it relates to a percipient. What we find, then, is a 
somewhat complicated connection between authenticity and Benjamin’s positioning of aura, 
the term he introduced in his Little History of Photography, written in 1931. In this short text, 
Benjamin describes aura as “[a] strange weave of space and time: the unique semblance of 
distance, no matter how close the object may be” (SW, vol. 2, part 2, 518). His brief 
description seems to express a favorable stance with regards to the power of the photograph 
and its ability to encapsulate a moment in history regardless of the position from which it is 
viewed. But the proximity between aura and deception parallels the aforementioned tension 
between emancipation and distraction in the case of cinematic art.  
Howard Caygill clarifies this notion by adding, “[T]his particular weave is 
monumental, conjoining ‘uniqueness and duration’. . . . Yet the monumental condition of the 
auratic work of art is deceptive since every work of art undergoes change as a condition of its 
existence” (94). One of the changes that Caygill’s comment underscores is the mere 
alteration of purpose from cult to exhibition as our perception of works of art adjusts to new 
circumstances. With regards to the cultic or auratic value of artworks, John Russon writes, 
“Artworks in this context are inherently singular items, inseparable from their spatial and 
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temporal environments, that facilitate the opening of the perspective of the individuals 
engaging them onto a shared world” (Costello and Carlson 6). The shift in modernity is 
underpinned by a shift in the manner of reception—one that, per Benjamin, denies our 
collective enjoyment and appreciation. For Benjamin, this ‘shared experience’ is far more 
important than the singular, exalted appreciation of a work of art. Not only does photography 
challenge aura in its existence as a multiple, it offers the possibility of broad public access, 
thereby magnifying its social import. In this case we may say that the shift from artistic 
authenticity on the basis of aura to positive singularity on the basis of shared experience is a 
loss on one hand (a loss levied by modernity’s forces of alienation) but is on balance a gain 
for authenticity understood as an emancipated intersubjective being-in-the-world. But for the 
‘gain’ to in fact be good news we must recognize and come to terms with a mixed field of 
shifts in the specific terrain of perceptual experience.    
Departing from the photograph and returning to the substructure, we can see how 
changes in technological reproductions ultimately impact the way such objects are perceived. 
Caygill quotes Benjamin: “Within broad historical epochs the mode of sense perception (die 
Art und Weise ihrer Sinneswahrnehmung) [in the first version ihre Wahrnehmung, 
‘perception’] changes with the overall mode of being in the world (Daseinweise) of the 
historical collective” (1939a, 224;104). The point reminds us of the constant Marxist 
undercurrent carried forth with history’s unending momentum. It also points to the 
unraveling of communal, public absorption of artworks. As Russon explains, “Thinking … or 
worshipping, in the case of the ritual participant, is not a matter of retreating into a private, 
inner space, but is a matter of being drawn outside oneself into a shared reality” (Costello 
and Carlson 8). The important connection, as we will see, is that historical narrative 
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manifests itself in our art objects and, ultimately, within culture, underscoring again the 
transfer of change from the base to the superstructure as defined by Marx. The manifestation 
of democratization and truth as embodied in photographs illustrates how the shift challenges 
past notions of singularity while holding on to a work’s identity as an object. The shift from 
aura-based authenticity to perceptual experience in the mode of shared reality, though 
unhinging one paradigm of cultic individual transformation, nevertheless prepares the way 
for a social-political praxis of freedom by means of an aesthetic interruption in the modern 
sub- and superstructure dynamic. Benjamin opts to work positively with the shift and, in turn, 
invest in the benefits that may come even as new cycles of alienation in aesthetic experience 
may well arise.  
As we continue to trace the evolution of artworks in light of technological advances, 
noting the dissolution of cult-value qua aura, it is important to acknowledge some of the 
history of reproductions. Here we see how a specific a shift occurs in our understanding of 
the original or authentic. The opposite of an authentic work, as Benjamin explains, is a 
‘forgery,’ as would be the case if a work is either manually or technologically reproduced. 
This is not a new practice, as demonstrated by Benjamin’s references to Greek stamped coins 
among numerous other historical examples. Benjamin does observe, however, that new 
methods of replication are constantly under development and such methods are accelerating 
access to images. This developmental focus suggests that he is not concerned so much with 
the evaluative criteria suggested in the binary of original-forgery. He states: “Around 1900 
technical reproduction had reached a standard that not only permitted it to reproduce all 
transmitted works of art and thus to cause the most profound change in their impact upon the 
public; it also had captured a place of its own among the artistic processes” (IL 220). This 
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place within artistic practice is of great interest as reproductions create new forms of 
expression based on their transformation as embodiments of modernity. Concurrently, 
sophisticated methods were developed for verification of a work’s integrity as an object from 
the past—methods that have been used frequently to authenticate the origins in question.  
The financial value of a singular work is predicated upon its authorship and position 
within the historical continuum of artistic production. Benjamin goes further and asserts, 
“The uniqueness of a work of art is inseparable from its being embedded in the fabric of 
tradition” (IL 223). This point will be of paramount importance as we explore the fabric of 
cultural objects as transhistorical carriers of meaning; Benjamin is shifting the meaning of 
‘value’ from a strictly financial designation, just as he has traced the shift in the meaning of 
authenticity from a strictly auratic designation. It is by means of a reproduction that we 
achieve a democratization of art, extending its presence to an individual’s and community’s 
particular space or place, thereby reactivating its presence in a new light. He states, “And in 
permitting the reproduction to meet the beholder or listener in his own particular situation, it 
reactivates the object produced. These two processes lead to a tremendous shattering of 
tradition which is the obverse of the contemporary crisis and renewal of mankind” (IL 221). 
This obverse is the requisite for forward momentum, since without the shattering of past 
structures, there can be no progress in the emancipation of all men. So then, in a certain sense 
‘authenticity’ underlies aura while aura connects with traditions that are imbued with cult 
rituals. In another sense, ‘authenticity’ conceived as shared experience and aesthetic 
reactivation sheds the weight of past practices with respect to artworks, making these both 
collective and democratic. Traditions infer rigid power structures and can therefore enable or 
reflect fascist tendencies, preventing the political expression needed to level society as 
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demanded by Marx’s prognosis of revolution as an equalizing force. It is as though Benjamin 
beholds his own historical moment as one in which, owing to the collapse of aura, cultic 
value may either be replaced by a broader emancipatory aesthetic availability or else 
reasserted in the ‘forgery’ of mounting totalitarianism. 
Freedom, for Benjamin, thus arrives only by means of an eradication of long-held 
traditions—much the way revolution brings about class reorganization for Marx.5 With this 
condition, a paradox emerges: we must negotiate the loss of aura—or the object’s intrinsic 
value resulting from its unique position in history—with the new function of the reproduction 
as a level ground on which artistic creation can reach the masses in a collectivist way. Thus, 
the saving power emerges from within the danger. One might say Benjamin is rehabilitating 
poēisis from not just technē’s challenging-forth, but further in relation to reforming the sub 
and super-structures of society. All the while, the Marxist perspective on alienation and its 
counterpart in revolution informs this transference. Benjamin explains the value of such an 
undressing of art. In a critique, he suggests, “The peeling away of the object’s shell, the 
destruction of the aura, is the signature of a perception whose sense for the sameness of 
things has grown to the point where even the singular, the unique, is divested of its 
uniqueness—by means of its reproduction” (SW, vol. 2, part 2, 591). In other words, he 
seeks to accomplish what Adorno praised as “the liquidation of bourgeois tendencies from 
the work of art” (Aesthetics and Politics 120-126). To disrobe an artwork’s uniqueness (but 
not, that is, its effective singularity) is to alter the basis for its inherent import. The class 
infused paradigm would shift with the liberation from embedded significance. What is at 
issue is not the value of the original artwork as a testament to history but rather its corrupted 
value as an object of status—its function as a self-aggrandizing tool for elitism and class 
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divisions. The accepted traditions (superstructures) are, for Benjamin, unable to recognize the 
self-serving ideological frames through which artworks are valued and apprehended. If we 
return to the dialectic formed between the base and superstructures, it seems Benjamin holds 
industrialization and capitalism responsible for the misplaced value attributed to artworks; 
they have become ‘cultic’ on the terms set by capitalist ritual. The situation, extended to 
Heidegger’s terms, is one that in which the value of art needs to be understood through a new 
configuration of poiēsis and praxis.  
 As we can now clearly see, traces of Marx’s thoughts underpin the Artwork essay. 
The momentum of the Industrial Age has a double edge: it raises difficult class hierarchies 
(manifesting in alienation and inauthenticity), and it deeply alters the essence of the artwork 
itself. The ruling classes (the bourgeoisie, the political leaders, or members of an aristocratic 
elite) use high culture as a symbol of status and position, profoundly corrupting any aesthetic 
value or purpose the work might otherwise have.6 These tendencies fail to honor the better 
possibilities inherent in mechanical reproduction’s post-auratic milieu. Given the 
misappropriation of art’s fundamental (though not altogether unproblematic) purpose as a 
manifestation of our best selves, exploring ways to emancipate from these restrictions has 
merit. The revolution toward which culture is moving will, in Benjamin’s estimation, offer 
emancipation from the bonds of capitalist enframing qua alienation. Though tempered to 
some degree, he believes that reproductions, in particular film (an issue we return to later in 
this chapter), can act as agents advancing this dialectic toward a more even social 
environment. Despite the merit of these ideas, Marx’s celebration of the creative imagination 
of homo faber returns to pose a challenge to the reproduction as a tool of freedom. The 
   100 
contradiction presented between Marx’s celebration of man’s creative impulse and 
Benjamin’s celebration of the reproduction needs further analysis.    
 
§2.3: CULT VALUE VERSUS DURABILITY: SHIFTING THE PATH TO FREEDOM  
How, specifically, does the artwork fit into the shifting superstructure and all that 
these modern pressures imply? To answer this question, we need to understand in full 
measure how Benjamin applies the historical dialectic and its expression within the 
reproduction as a means of emancipation from oppressive forces. If, per Benjamin, an 
artwork’s capacity to generate freedom is its ultimate purpose, ascribing to the reproduction 
this powerful revolutionary potential is a tall order indeed. Where in the last section we 
established a conceptual map for Benjamin’s configuration and deployment of Marxian 
critique, the goal of this section is to explore in a more evaluative way Benjamin’s claims 
with regards to the reproduced artwork as an instrument of modernity. We will also examine 
in more detail a central tension underpinning the Artwork essay, the negotiation between the 
loss of an original and the gain of mass consumption; we will further expose an ambivalence 
that makes a definitive reading difficult. Recall that, as though prefacing the ethical 
undertones in Heidegger’s Technology essay, Benjamin asserts that the reproduction, 
including photography and film, serve to eliminate control from dominant social structures.7 
By looking at the available forms such as photography and film, he sought to trace the 
changes such mediums created in both culture and its mass reception, while simultaneously 
endorsing the loss of cult value or capitalist tendencies. Several thinkers would contest 
Benjamin’s largely positive prognosis of mechanical reproductions—Adorno and Arendt 
among them. Though the philosophies are highly compatible in their accounts of mass 
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culture and freedom, there are tensions around the matters of (a) ‘originality’ in the 
mechanical paradigm, and (b) human creativity itself as a revolutionary act. As we have 
begun to see, and will now investigate more pointedly, Benjamin places his emphasis on the 
reception of artworks as a factor of our experience, rather than overtly acknowledging the act 
of making as a necessary condition of our authentic human expression.  
To achieve these goals, we return to Marx’s influential undercurrents and how the 
breadth of his estimation of man as maker has a rhizomatic effect, spreading forward into 
many subsequent aesthetic considerations. To prepare to return to Benjamin we must 
elucidate how, as is well known, the artwork and man’s inclination toward its creation has a 
long-standing history of ‘interconnected aesthetic effects’ (as Adorno states)8—one that 
reflects a certain endurance and intrinsic historical value. As a baseline, there is the constant 
human drive toward creative manufacture. The balance of praxis and poēisis liberate both the 
maker and percipient. As McMurtry rightly summarizes, Marx’s view of human nature 
demands that we ‘make artworks’ as a manifestation of our best and freest selves: “Marx 
construes the nature of man as characterized not only by an essential capacity to construct a 
project and erect it in reality, but by a corresponding, essential need to do so.” Creative 
realization and self-realization go hand in hand, but of course the ‘essential need’ requires an 
emancipated social-political context – one that in fact will “‘be worthy of human nature’ 
(CIII 821)” (31-32). Building on his previously noted ‘species character’ point, the principle 
of man as maker is, for Marx, fundamental to how authentic expression can and must 
become a way to secure freedom. At issue is the relation between making and nature: 
“Labour is, first of all, a process between man and nature, a process by which man, through 
his own actions, mediates, regulates and controls the metabolism between himself and 
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nature” (Kapital 283). He continues, “He sets in motion the natural forces which belong to 
his own body, his arms, legs, head and hands, in order to appropriate the materials of nature 
in a form adapted to his own needs” (Kapital 283). This need is embedded in the millennia of 
artworks available to us, many of which testify to the past and the enduring drive human 
beings have to make such objects. Additionally, they serve to concretize imagined ideas and 
thoughts. If that is the case, then it would seem problematic for critical theory to stress our 
experience of art so much that the side of its making is overlooked. Marx calls human beings 
and social systems to recognize their species character – creativity – without which we are 
reduced to becoming objects ourselves—enframed, inauthentic and estranged. The failure to 
recognize and preserve the agency of species character is like the failure, on Heidegger’s 
terms, of preserving the character of dwelling creatively and freely in language. Alienation in 
relation to capitalist production, and alienation in relation to reductive modes of thinking and 
challenging-forth, alike evidence a betrayal of essential creative action. What is curious, and 
often overlooked, is that Benjamin appears to take for granted the value of human creative 
impulses, placing more emphasis on the revolutionary nature of modern reproductions over 
Marx’s significant support of an integrated man as homo faber. This blind spot reflects a 
concentrated preoccupation with what technology has to offer with respect to mass 
consumption and entertainment, and understandably so in light of Benjamin’s sense of 
political urgency. But the failure to explicitly address and invest in the principle of creative 
species character means that a valuable resource is overlooked. Moreover, and importantly, 
the blind spot actually leaves Benjamin in a position of being less discerning about the 
potentially reductive nature of mechanical practices. 
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With this tension in mind let us return in greater detail to Benjamin’s case. We recall 
that the first of his foci, historical progression, is based upon a Neo-Marxist historical 
materialism. As Adorno observes, he wants to bring our attention to the “liquidation of art of 
its Bourgeois tendencies” (Taylor 121) and call for political agency in the manufacture of art 
that is able to withstand the forces of fascism. This is a sentiment echoed “The Author as 
Producer,” where he ascribes a radical responsibility to creators as proponents of political 
change. With technological advances and embedded structural norms, authors and artists 
have a duty to challenge and disrupt. Caygill explains, “It can serve here to anticipate the 
often-overlooked point that for Benjamin the ‘fate of art’ is symptomatic of a fundamental 
change in the structure of experience which may be traced back to broader political and 
technical developments” (WB 98). Caygill points to the dialectical relationship between 
technology and its impact, noting the time stamp of Benjamin’s work.9 He notes the subtle 
layers to which Benjamin refers—the ongoing exchange between base and superstructure, as 
previously discussed. Given the pervasive mood of fascism overtaking Europe at the time of 
his writing, it is not surprising to see a focus on art in the mode of experience as a purveyor 
of freedom. The call to freedom through the politicization of art becomes the essential 
authentic gesture, overriding the Marxian stress on one’s need for creative expression. 
Benjamin states, “[I]t would therefore be wrong to underestimate the value of such theses as 
a weapon,” (IL 218) referring to the relationship of art for the masses and the available 
means of reproduction. The forward momentum offers a release from “outmoded concepts 
such as creativity and genius, eternal value and mystery—concepts whose uncontrolled (and 
at present almost uncontrollable) application would lead to a processing of data in the Fascist 
sense” (IL 218). Benjamin notes the seemingly irrepressible function art has within 
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hierarchical social structures. Though art has fallen prey to delinquent structures that only 
appreciate works as carriers of exchange value and as status symbols, in order for the artwork 
to provide the ‘liquidation of bourgeois tendencies,’ it must be, first and foremost, 
emancipated of its traditional position. Benjamin’s first premise is therefore political in 
nature, asserting that new art forms can hold powerful sway over the masses.  
But it is difficult to imagine the reproduction as an intermediary to freedom, and 
Benjamin is careful to note certain losses in the forward momentum created by 
reproducibility; the placement within historical time is among these diminished 
characteristics. He states, “Even the most perfect reproduction of a work of art is lacking in 
one element: its presence in time and space, its unique existence at the place where it 
happens to be. This unique existence of the work of art determined the history to which it 
was subject throughout the time of its existence” (IL 220). But there is an ambivalence 
inscribed in this idea, one (as we have begun to see) regarding the absence of aura and the 
need to reconcile ourselves with the current technological conditions responsible for this loss. 
Benjamin explores the shifts establishing an artwork’s purpose, moving from the ‘elk 
portrayed by the man of the stone age’ through the renaissance Madonna to current practices 
espousing ‘art for art’s sake’ and the related exhibition value and market transactions. He 
notes the alteration of purpose from magic and ritual, through cult and mystification, to a 
space of exhibition value and monetary status. He explains, “With the different methods of 
technical reproduction of a work of art, its fitness for exhibition increased to such an extent 
that the quantitative shift between its two poles turned into a qualitative transformation of its 
nature” (IL 225). Again, we see his preoccupation with history’s impact on art’s ongoing 
narrative. His words describe the shift from unique objects and their effect to multiples, 
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noting the ‘qualitative transformation’ such a move creates. With an eye on mitigating the 
difficult loss of its aura, Benjamin looks forward to the best and highest purpose for the new: 
resistance and overcoming of fascist domination while preserving and enacting the positive 
opportunities this loss creates. But how can such positive faith in progress align with such a 
pointed critique of art’s increasingly transactional character? The question returns us to 
Benjamin’s account of a work’s own historicity. 
Building on his notion of aura from prior writings, notably his Short History of 
Photography published in 1931, Benjamin distinguishes the original from its reproduction by 
diagnosing its greatest loss in the face of reproducibility—its unique position in time and 
place. It may at first seem as though such loss is met with regret. He states, “One might 
subsume the eliminated element in the term ‘aura’ and go on to say: that which withers in the 
age of mechanical reproduction is the aura of the work of art” (IL 221). This is perhaps the 
idea most often associated with the Artwork essay, and while it provides the ground for 
declaring autonomous art an ‘object of the past,’ it also indicates a particular zeitgeist. 
Caygill reminds us that “Benjamin insists that the ‘decay of aura’ is symptomatic of broader 
cultural change, stating plainly (but vainly) that: ‘This is a symptomatic process whose 
significance points beyond the realm of art’” (103). Historical change is a matter of course 
for Benjamin’s Marxism; it bears evaluation but also bears the promise of progress. If we 
recall that his broader concern lies with envisioning the freedom from oppressive structures, 
we understand his willingness to invest in how the loss of aura (or cult-value) is important in 
as much as it emphasizes the forward movement of technological practices in art making.  
But how does this forward momentum manifest its emancipatory potential? In the 
notes to the Artwork essay, Benjamin explains the intersection of circumstances leading to 
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dialectical change in technological forms of expression. He cites three particular advances in 
technological devices. First, we see the constant push toward newer developments. In other 
words, “technology works toward a certain form of art” (IL 249). Second, he notes how 
“traditional art forms in certain phases of their development strenuously work toward effects 
which later are effortlessly attained by the new ones” (IL 249). Finally, the less dramatic, 
slower advent of receptivity to new cultural norms appears within culture. This receptivity 
benefits progress by its acceptance and assimilation of change. He mentions the 
Kaiserpanorama as a precursor to motion pictures and details how Thomas Edison 
implemented this apparatus before projection was known (IL 250). With each new era, 
emerging technologies pressed forward the vocabulary at our disposal. In other words, for 
Benjamin, each era’s new developments lead to constant transitions in the way we absorb 
images and will continue to change with historical progress. He states, “One of the foremost 
tasks of art has always been the creation of a demand which could be fully satisfied only 
later. The history of every art form shows critical epochs in which a certain art form aspires 
to effects which could be fully obtained with a changed technical standard, that is to say, in a 
new art form” (237). The very basis of progress, even within the arena of artistic language, 
benefits from technological advances. Benjamin admires this momentum, noting its 
inevitability and asserting its profound influence. Moreover, he lauds the reproduction’s 
reach and influence: “One might generalize by saying: the technique of reproduction 
detaches the reproduced object from the domain of tradition. By making many reproductions 
it substitutes a plurality of copies for a unique existence” (221). The multiple nature of 
technologically reproduced art democratizes access and evens out the field for its 
appreciation. Yet, as Arendt will show, this democratization comes at a significant price. On 
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one hand Benjamin does seem aware of this risk. Despite his arguments against tradition and 
its class-based structures, he, too, celebrates cultural artifacts. In his essay “Unpacking My 
Library: A Talk about Book Collecting,” he describes, in minute detail, each volume’s 
significance, not only as a carrier of history and knowledge, but as an embodiment of the 
memory of its acquisition. His evident reverence of each book in his vast personal collection 
underscores his attachment to the value of art objects, whether they be paintings or 
collectible manuscripts.10 Where, then, does Benjamin find cause for celebration when faced 
with the eradication of an original artwork’s singular uniqueness? 
Again, he jettisons concerns about the degradation of artworks, consents to endorse 
the necessary loss of aura, and wagers on the progress promised by increased access and 
changing apperception. Arendt seems to interrupt this move by elaborating on Benjamin’s 
own critique of the transactional shift in artistic value. She explains, “When books or pictures 
in reproduction are thrown on the market cheaply and attain huge sales, this does not affect 
the nature of the objects in question. But their nature is affected when these objects 
themselves are changed—rewritten, condensed, digested, reduced to kitsch in reproduction, 
or in preparation for the movies” (Arendt, PF 207). This phenomenon heralds the difficulty 
of maintaining the integrity of artworks, while making them palatable for mass consumption. 
It also marks the difference between creations that endure and those which are consumed 
either for entertainment or social exchange value. Likewise, for Adorno, the maintenance of 
autonomous artworks is necessary for the preservation of culture (as opposed to merely the 
‘abolition of fear’), which, for him, is the true purpose of the revolutionary spirit. We have to 
be careful not to simply “escape the old taboos by entering into new ones—‘tests’, so to 
speak” (Taylor 120). He continues with a defense of an intellectual class:  
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It is not bourgeois idealism if, in full knowledge and without 
mental prohibitions, we maintain our solidarity with the 
proletariat instead of making of our own necessity a virtue of the 
proletariat, as we are always tempted to do—the proletariat which 
itself experiences the same necessity and needs us for knowledge 
as much as we need the proletariat to make the revolution. 
(Harrison and Wood 529)  
In other words, the bourgeois class, or its cultural elite, serve a function in the education of 
the proletariat as much as the latter supports the efforts to liquidate fascist tendencies. For 
Adorno, the synergistic relationship between the two is essential, although necessitating the 
preservation of an elitist class.  
In any case, the essence qua aura of the artwork is lost when abridged and degraded. 
Benjamin clearly acknowledges that the artwork loses its aura and mystical value. 
Furthermore, the reproduction and its ancillary iterations also offer ideological propaganda a 
wider reach, thus potentially transforming localized networks into larger, more insidious 
campaigns. Certainly, Adolf Hitler’s media blitz (orchestrated by his minister of propaganda, 
Josef Goebbels) used all available forms of technological reproduction to assail mass society 
with their ideological message—a message of which Benjamin was acutely aware and 
addresses directly in the Artwork essay’s epilogue. It goes without saying that 
democratization of information is not always aimed at the greater revolutionary good, 
certainly not the emancipation of thought that Benjamin would necessitate. In fact, its aim, 
under many circumstances, seems directed at those whose ability to process information and 
contemplate its significance is severely underdeveloped. The reproduction and its vast reach 
have the capacity to alter and control beliefs, undermining any revolutionary potential it may 
have otherwise had. Benjamin does not appear to see this tension through.  
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In contrast to Benjamin’s understanding of the dialectic, Hitler declared, “Art can in 
no way be a fashion” (Harrison and Wood 440). Instead, Hitler proposed art should mirror 
the integrity of the German people, foregoing all other modern movements as degenerate and 
impure. He vehemently opposes any creation of modern artworks and asserts, “I want to 
forbid these pitiful misfortunates who quite obviously suffer from an eye disease, to try 
vehemently to foist these products of their misinterpretation upon the age we live in, or even 
to wish to present them as ‘Art.’” (Harrison and Wood 441). The cleansing in question denies 
the historical movements of the modern age and refutes, irrevocably and based on ideological 
intent, any notion that broader technological and mechanistic shifts affect the way cultural 
objects are produced. It bears noting at this stage that Hitler’s purification campaign relied 
heavily on posters, flyers and other mechanically reproduced artifacts. This rampant use of 
the reproduction in its every form begs an important question of Benjamin’s argument: What 
is to become of the mechanically produced artwork when appropriated into fascist aims? 
Furthermore, what is the risk to our ability to discern emancipation from enframing? Add to 
this basic human need Arendt’s understanding of art as the carrier of our thoughts—thought-
things in her parlance—and the risk of losing these characteristics to the copy becomes 
acutely significant. She explains, “From this viewpoint, the things of the world have the 
function of stabilizing human life, and their objectivity lies in the fact that—in contradiction 
to the Heraclitean saying that the same man can never enter the same stream—men, their 
ever-changing nature notwithstanding, can retrieve their sameness, that is, their identity, by 
being related to the same chair and the same table” (HC 137). Without reclaiming the ground 
of aura per se, Arendt celebrates the artwork’s durability in the face of time and this very 
endurance embodies humanity’s collective identity. As though responding to Benjamin’s 
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celebration of tradition’s defeat, she states, “Even if the historical origin of art were of an 
exclusively religious or mythological character, the fact is that art has survived gloriously its 
severance from religion, magic, and myth” (HC 167).  
The point returns us to aforementioned Marxian stress on how such identity is 
emblematic of man as maker – creativity as species character. And for Heidegger, man as 
maker is the vehicle that might negotiate our enframed condition through art’s ability to 
astound us back into a meditative openness of thought. Arendt sees artworks as the potential 
to carry forward human thought itself, manifested in the products of our making. Again, we 
need to hear this point as an interruption in Benjamin’s quick and seemingly categorical pivot 
from ‘loss’ to ‘hope.’ The durability of artworks, for Arendt, can secure our place in history 
concretely. She explains, 
Thus, their durability is of a higher order than that which all 
things need in order to exist at all; it can attain permanence 
throughout the ages. In this permanence, the very stability of the 
human artifice, which, being inhabited and used by mortals, can 
never be absolute, achieves a representation of its own. Nowhere 
else does the sheer durability of the world of things appear in 
such purity and clarity, nowhere else therefore does this thing-
world reveal itself so spectacularly as the non-mortal home for 
mortal beings. (HC 168) 
This notion of durability highlights the gap in Benjamin’s celebration of aura’s demise, as 
well as one consequence of his failure to take up the homo faber principle. Just as Benjamin 
appreciates and, in fact, treasures his book collection for its enduring value, Arendt 
demonstrates the importance of art’s embodiment of thinking and history. The first sentiment 
is actually a personal instance of knowing the second. But the point is not to assume 
durability, or a revolutionary aesthetic, depends on an either/or view of aura. The aura 
paradigm can of course amount to an illusion of durability. As Caygill explains: “The auratic 
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work of art which pretends to be immune to the passage of time is in truth only a particular 
way of negotiating finitude, that is, by denying it” (WB 94). Durability, by contrast, 
embraces finitude but transfigures the world into a site of dwelling and thinking. In fact, we 
could say that durability names a situation in which what art works ‘make’ is, more than just 
objects, a recovery of the impetus from which they ‘spring’: creative, contemplative thought. 
For Arendt, “The immediate source of the art work is the human capacity for thought” (HC 
168). We are reminded of Marx and the notion of freedom as a condition of open, unfettered 
thought and Heidegger’s “What Calls for Thinking,” celebrating the meditative 
contemplation connecting us to authentic existence. While Arendt is not a Marxist per se, she 
certainly carries traces of Marx’s assertion of our species character within homo faber and 
the necessity of leisure as unfettered time for contemplation and creative thought. Consider 
again how, for Marx, our species-character is expressed in the objects of our making. He 
asserts, “Yet the productive life is the life of the species. It is life-engendering life. The 
whole character of a species—its species character—is contained in the character of its life-
activity; and free, conscious activity is man’s species character. Life itself appears only as a 
means to life” (EPM 75).  
The point must not be lost when the issue of aura’s eclipse governs the scene of how 
we think about aesthetic possibilities. Nor should we think that what enables ‘permanence’ 
and what is ‘life-engendering’ – art-works, thought-works, species-work – is invulnerable. It 
would seem, from Marx’s position and Arendt’s assessment, that the loss of durability would 
be overwhelmingly detrimental to our ongoing self-understanding as a species. By extension, 
the whole enterprise of durability needs to be rendered on the basis of poiēsis as praxis, as 
Heidegger would assert. Arendt observes: “The objective status of the cultural world, which, 
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insofar as it contains tangible things—books and paintings, statues, buildings and music—
comprehends and gives testimony to, the entire recorded past of countries, nations and 
ultimately mankind” (MDT 202). She is not saying durability depends on, or happens as, 
‘aura.’ She is observing that we know our collective histories through the objects that remain 
in museums, public spaces and other cultural institutions. Art holds value as an inscription in 
the ‘built’ facets of a culture’s creative engagement with its historical moment, and as an 
ongoing ‘work’ of thinking. Martel’s account adds an accent to this sense of value: “The 
work of art is perpetually new; it demands reinterpretation with each era, each generation, 
each percipient. Great works of art are like inexhaustible springs originating from a place 
beyond our ‘little world of man.’ They reconnect us with a reality too vast for the rational 
mind to comprehend” (Martel 130). Ceding this point does not require a reclaiming of aura. 
Our collective devotion to the preservation and presentation of works testifies to our desire 
for a perpetual return and appreciation of such thought-things. If Benjamin’s foundation is 
indeed Marx’s determined emancipation through revolutionary means, and if reproduction 
promises a means to do so, how is such a breach with human nature fulfilling this role? 
What I am suggesting is that Arendt’s philosophy of aesthetic praxis can and should 
be inserted into the space of the Benjaminian ambivalence (in the sense of an oversight, a 
hesitation) regarding the embrace of post-aura aesthetic reproduction and the neglect of the 
‘making’ side of our species character). We can see this point if we turn for a moment to a 
different discourse and a specific example of the artistic drive at work in a revolutionary way. 
As though illustrating Marx’s understanding of human creative nature and Arendt’s 
celebration of durability, Jacqueline Rose explores artistic drive and production in the face of 
profound adversity – one that is not specifically a matter of class alienation but of the 
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enframing’s presence in a culture’s ‘unconscious’ forces of alienation, in what Jacques Lacan 
referred to as the ‘symbolic realm’ of ‘language’ in a given socio-historical moment. In her 
book Women in Dark Times, Rose writes about Jewish artist Charlotte Salomon, offering a 
spectacular example of the human drive toward the manufacture of artistic narrative created 
under the most oppressive of historical circumstances. Salomon’s journey and artistic 
expression occurred during the World War II and serve as witness to the incredible 
endurance of the human spirit. Rose appreciates her as “first and foremost a painter” who, in 
her works, “makes [a] major bid for freedom” (77). Rose continues, “[P]ainting brings 
Salomon to the brink of conscious and unconscious life” (78). Her work flows as might a 
stream of consciousness, representing dream-like expressions of her plight. This associative 
imagery is the representation of freedom of thought, the singular human condition irreducible 
by fascism, the remaining shard of independence in a world otherwise under political control. 
Rose explains, “As if strangely, the fascist injunction against independent critical thought 
leads thought, in defiance, to its deepest and most complex reckoning with itself (thinking as 
‘another mode of moving in the world in freedom’ in Hannah Arendt’s phrase)” (79). The 
point echoes what Benjamin may have wanted of art but is not foremost coupled to 
mechanical reproduction as its means. 
What remains of Salomon’s work is preserved in the Netherlands, kept in carefully 
climate-controlled conditions to mitigate its fragility and impermanence (see figure 2.1). 
Almost as a metaphor for the life Salomon lost, the work is testimony to not only her 
personal experience (some of it devastating in its content), but her ultimate demise; the works 
show ‘durability’ in this way. Writing for the New Yorker, Toni Bentley describes the 
objects: 
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Many of Salomon’s early images contain multiple scenes on a 
page, like a comic book or a movie storyboard—Salomon was 
well versed in the Weimar Republic’s cinema—depicting 
sequential actions with an off-kilter wit. In the later paintings, 
one can see the shift in Salomon’s work from the petite, jaunty, 
and joyful, as the images become sparser, darker, bolder, the style 
more modern and urgent; the early detail gives way to depth as 
innocence turns to truth. (“The Obsessive Art and Great 
Confession of Charlotte Salomon”) 
 
Figure 2.1: Charlotte Salomon, 1940-1943, Multiple 
scenes from her artworks, Gouache and text overlays 
on transparency film, Jewish Historical Museum, 
Amsterdam. 
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The objects that remain reveal aspects of her personal life and the greater collective struggle 
of her time. There is no pretension to the cultic assurances of aura, but neither is there an 
abstraction away from the identity of the maker (of Salomon’s species charter at work); it 
does not denounce the potential of reproducibility, but it does in its own uniqueness advance 
the kind of emancipatory course one would expect Benjamin to endorse. Her praxis of 
resistance is made through a personal engagement with her own family’s complex 
relationships and the mark these made. These objects are, in turn, paramount to our 
apprehending of the past and the responsibilities to the past; their emancipatory affect is 
wrought by way of taking on the personalized workings of tradition rather than simply 
looking beyond tradition to the future. Salomon’s practice work carried her through the 
‘darkest of times’ while fulfilling her purpose, both intrinsic and extrinsic. She certainly 
challenged the odds of deprivation and social alienation while continuing to produce 
powerfully prescient artworks. In her own writing, Salomon credits her production with her 
having maintained her sanity in the face of such adversity. It is within the flow of a 
meditative practice that Salomon found some measure of freedom and peace.  
Could Benjamin’s position appreciate this phenomenon? Despite such examples of 
freedom found in individual artistic expression, he argues for mass liberation through the 
reproduction’s democratized ubiquity. His focus is on the medium and mobilization character 
of art’s expressive operation but neglects the emancipatory operations (and the support these 
ould bring to his case) already and enduring in play in the character of homo faber. His views 
could be clarified, and his cause could be helped, by drawing in these further points from 
Marx and Arendt. That said, what Marx, Benjmanin, and Arendt would still have to answer 
to is the way the material dialect has, in more recent times, seen new mechanizing 
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technologies that in effect coerce revolutionary expression and species character into further 
modes of alienation.  Benjamin himself knew that then current available systems of 
production would cede to even faster ones in a seemingly endless cycle of invention. And 
Marx likewise saw how, with new technologies, we manufacture new needs and these needs 
move us increasingly away from our species character. Arendt’s case for the durability of 
aesthetic thought-things was, in one sense, a way to traverse these challenges. But the recent 
and contemporary materialization of our social consciousness and unconsciousness is a scene 
in which what Jean Baudrillard terms the hyperreality of a simulacrum world conscripts the 
very instruments of aesthetic emancipation into a new species of anesthetization.11 The 
techno-aesthetic catalyst for social emancipation may well be, but the terms of the historical 
moment seem to have redoubled the problematic manner in which perceptual experience is 
curated by the ascending ‘aura’ of our consumer-media worldhood. One wonders what 
thoughts Benjamin would have had in response to today’s digital advances and their 
profound impact on every facet of human existence and culture. As we continue to move 
through Benjamin’s ideas and their roots in Marx’s foretelling of the proletariat revolution, 
we need to navigate his limitations in relation to man as maker and art objects as thought-
things while at the same time affirming his own case for art’s saving power.  
 
§2.4: FILM AS DISTRACTION OF THE MASSES AS DISTINCT FROM MARXIST LEISURE  
The work we have undertaken thus far has highlighted the urgency with which 
Benjamin welcomed new means of disseminating ideas. His determination to neutralize 
traditions of control and subjugation is clear. Nonetheless, the difficult negotiation between 
the demise of cult value qua aura and the need for durable cultural works continues to linger 
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in the Artwork essay. His approach to the question of ‘distraction’ distills these tensions, for 
he regards it as both positive and negative and is not altogether clear or decisive on the 
difference. We have begun to see that he equates modernity’s zeitgeist most directly with the 
medium of film, while drawing connections (albeit indirectly) from its distracting influence 
through mass consumption to Marx’s offering of leisure as a locus for contemplation, thought 
and creative production. It is in this state of collective repose, taking in cinematic imagery, 
that Benjamin conceives of distraction as leisure—for him, a positive force benefitting the 
masses. In my estimation, Benjamin’s reading of distraction is a shortcoming diagnosed not 
only by Adorno and Arendt, but also one Marx would likely not support. Therefore, the 
purpose of this section is to detail this issue of distraction in relation to film with a focus on 
the contradictions Adorno identifies. Forming a clear understanding of new technological 
forms of expression and their impact on human perceptual faculties will help clarify their 
possible emancipatory characteristics. Not only will this additional investigation clarify the 
ambiguities of Benjamin’s writing, it will provide foundational material that will prove 
useful, particularly in chapter 5.  
Returning to a close reading of the Artwork essay, we see a gap emerging between the 
promise of a Marxist version of leisure and the pitfalls of Benjamin’s understanding of 
distraction. Distraction (as a byproduct of cinema) has the potential to fall easily into a state 
of enframing and alienation rather than one of contemplation and meditative thought. 
Benjamin overlooks this possibility, though in his dramatic epilogue he acknowledges the 
potential for corruption.We will draw distinctions between the medium of film and an 
artwork’s capacity to foster thinking and contemplation as outlined previously. In order to 
best understand the tensions that haunt the artwork essay, I will rely on Adorno’s 
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contemporaneous critique, Arendt’s understanding of artworks as thought-objects and 
Caygill’s astute analysis detailed in his book The Colour of Experience. 
How, for Benjamin, is film the aesthetic medium that simultaneously provides a 
platform for communal enjoyment while also producing fundamental changes in 
apperception? He equates film’s timely arrival with the need to confront and assess the 
‘dangers threatening man’ and the pervasive nature of such states of oppression. He explains,  
The film is the art form that is in keeping with the increased 
threat to his life which modern man has to face. Man’s need to 
expose himself to shock effects is his adjustment to the dangers 
threatening him. The film corresponds to profound changes in the 
apperceptive apparatus—changes that are experienced on an 
individual scale by the man in the street in big-city traffic, on a 
historical scale by every present-day citizen. (IL 250)  
Benjamin acknowledges the more global substructures driving change in the quotidian needs 
of present-day global human beings. The correspondence of changes both in technological 
advances and subsequently in the recipient of such apparatuses converge in the way film 
provides an emancipatory function. As we have seen, the price of freedom per this 
assessment is the liquidation of traditional values, particularly as they affect the artwork. 
History’s inevitable momentum makes this premise a default condition of technological 
progress, one with which we must reckon. Benjamin determines, “To demonstrate the 
identity of the artistic and scientific uses of photography which heretofore usually were 
separated will be one of the revolutionary functions of the film” (IL 236). This pragmatic 
merger between art and science moves the percipient closer to an unfolding of truth as an 
experienced event rather than a phenomenon delivered via tradition. The event of truth is 
presented by means of film’s surgical precision and ability to expose multiple perspectives 
simultaneously. Benjamin acknowledges the mind’s inability to keep pace with moving 
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images wherein the condition of viewing demands a suspension of contemplation. He quotes 
Duhamel’s protest: “I can no longer think what I want to think. My thoughts have been 
replaced by moving images” (IL 238). But the condition has its reasons and, ultimately, its 
resources. Benjamin holds that “[t]he manner in which human sense perception is organized, 
the medium in which it is accomplished, is determined not only by nature but by historical 
circumstances as well” (IL 222). In this case the circumstances are, to be sure, comprised 
increasingly by technological media; but this is a shift in quantity, not no much in kind. Says 
Caygill of Benjamin’s view, “In a sense, all experience for Benjamin is technological, since 
the term technology designates the artificial organization of perception; as such, experience 
changes with the development of technology” (96). The idea in this statement is deterministic 
yet at the same time informed by a mode of hope. It is not lost on Benjamin that the 
development of film is concurrent with atmospheric warfare, with openly practiced genocide 
and other world-threatening technological ‘advances.’ But as a marked extension of the 
circumstances of technological perception, cinema, for Benjamin, can be a particular place of 
catharsis, a safe environment in which human beings gather to process their lives. As Adorno 
is quick to determine, however, within the illusion of safety, the absent-minded absorption 
introduces a thoughtless state wherein the recipient is no longer applying critical analysis of 
the moving images washing over him.  
 Regardless, the bases for Benjamin’s optimism arise as he details the ways film 
penetrates consciousness through the lenses of contemplation and distraction. This separation 
increases the distance between film as a medium of distraction and the artwork as a form of 
contemplation. He begins by telling us, “The camera introduces us to unconscious optics as 
does psychoanalysis to unconscious impulses” (IL 237). Film acts upon us in abstract, 
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impactful ways, bringing us closer to the purity of our ideas. ‘Simultaneous collective 
experience’ lays the ground for a larger scale event—something that, in his estimation, 
paintings fail to do. Benjamin writes, “Painting simply is in no position to present an object 
for simultaneous collective experience, as it was possible for architecture at all times, for the 
epic poem in the past, and for the movie today” (IL 235). Arguably, these art forms’ 
intentions and functions are fundamentally different.  
Arendt would certainly stress the discrepancy between thought-objects and the 
entertainment industry; she would ultimately decide they were incompatible. In contrast with 
Benjamin’s point, she assails consumer absorption of mass media over the thought-provoking 
artworks defining culture. In an effort to describe the dangers of blind consumption, Arendt 
asserts, 
Mass society, on the contrary, wants not culture but 
entertainment, and the wares offered by the entertainment 
industry are indeed consumed by society just like any other 
consumer goods. The products needed for entertainment serve [. . 
. .] to while away time, and the vacant time which is whiled away 
is not leisure time, strictly speaking—time, that is, in which we 
are free from all cares and activities necessitated by the life 
process and therefore free for the world and its culture—it is 
rather left-over time, which still is biological in nature, left over 
after labor and sleep have received their due. Vacant time which 
entertainment is supposed to fill is a hiatus in the biologically 
conditioned cycle of labor—in the ‘metabolism of man with 
nature,’ as Marx used to say. (PF 205) 
Arendt raises an important distinction that does not seem fully apparent to Benjamin—the 
separation between distraction by entertainment and leisure as a space for thinking and 
contemplation. She connects more deeply with Marx’s leisure than Benjamin’s ideas do. If, 
as we noted previously, “the immediate source of the art work is the human capacity for 
thought,” (HC 168) it is this essential function of the human mind that suffers the greatest 
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loss. It would seem that Marx’s favor of leisure time creates the space for the activity of 
thought to occur. Marx’s idea echoes Heidegger’s recommendation in “What Calls for 
Thinking” to a letting be of free thought that in essence allows thoughts to manifest in 
unfettered freedom. In addition, we see a parallel within Heidegger’s observation that art 
‘astounds’ us, noted in the end of the “Question Concerning Technology.” Ultimately, there 
is an important distinction between leisure time and left-over time. And, as we will see 
shortly, I assert that this distinction separates contemplation (or meditative thought) from 
absent-minded distraction.  
 Benjamin is loath to cede on this ground. Despite his acknowledgement of film as 
potentially alienating in the Artwork essay’s epilogue, he describes film as a confluence of art 
and science, defending its egalitarian effects: 
Thus, for contemporary man the representation of reality by the 
film is incomparably more significant than that of the painter, 
since it offers, precisely because of the thoroughgoing 
permeation of reality with mechanical equipment, an aspect of 
reality which is free of all equipment. And that is what one is 
entitled to ask from a work of art. (IL 234) 
The political agency inherent in art, for Benjamin, necessitates its having a purpose bigger 
than its merely autonomous existence. The effective origins of this purpose are found in the 
dimension of vision—both sensory and metaphorical—and film thereby gives man access to 
greater freedom of understanding. Benjamin explains, “By close-ups of the things around us, 
by focusing on hidden details of familiar objects, by exploring commonplace milieus under 
the ingenious guidance of the camera, the film, on the one hand, extends our comprehension 
of the necessities which rule our lives; on the other hand, it manages to assure us of an 
immense and unexpected field of action” (IL 236). The expansion of our perspective and the 
enhancement of our ‘field of action’ support his understanding of film’s revolutionary 
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potential. He continues, “With close-ups, space expands; with slow motion, movement is 
extended. The enlargement of a snapshot does not simply render more precise what in any 
case was visible, though unclear: it reveals entirely new structural formations of the subject” 
(IL 236). The purpose and potential of film, therefore, is to make us ‘see’ more clearly the 
circumstances of our daily existence, thereby offering a larger perspective; film provides a 
place of communal reception and engenders an understanding of life’s smallest details 
unencumbered by aura.  
As noted above, Benjamin makes another significant yet ambiguous assertion 
distinguishing between the film as a means of distraction and an autonomous artwork as a 
medium for contemplation. In this case he claims that distraction, a condition of 
mindlessness, is a positive state. He explains, 
Distraction and concentration form polar opposites which may be 
stated as follows: A man who concentrates before a work of art is 
absorbed by it. He enters into this work of art the way legend tells 
of the Chinese painter when he viewed his finished painting. In 
contrast, the distracted mass absorbs the work of art. This is most 
obvious with regard to buildings. Architecture has always 
represented the prototype of a work of art the reception of which 
is consummated by a collectivity in a state of distraction. The 
laws of its reception are most instructive. (IL 239) 
The analogy to architecture is important. In essence, we absorb how it means without having 
to objectify it as we experience it. We encounter the built environment as a de facto element 
of our existence, and as Heidegger would remind us, it is only if something in this 
relationship shifts that we take notice of its presence. According to Benjamin, we experience 
a reiteration of this by other means in film. Yes, what we can learn from the ways we 
‘absorb’ architecture or film are indeed instructive. But do we not also absorb a training in 
passivity set by the terms of mass entertainment, and thus a loss of the provocation of 
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thinking necessary to achieve any meaningful iteration of freedom?12 The collective nature of 
film’s absorption by the masses can create a mindless experience wherein carefully 
choreographed messages are easily imparted. Even Benjamin acknowledges the somewhat 
‘mindless’ nature of taking in a film when he describes the audience as ‘absent-minded’. 
What are we to make of the following statement?  
Reception in a state of distraction, which is increasing noticeably 
in all fields of art and is symptomatic of profound changes in 
apperception, find in the film its true means of exercise. The film 
with its shock effect meets this mode of reception halfway. The 
film makes the cult value recede into the background not only by 
putting the public in the position of the critic, but also by the fact 
that at the movies this position requires no attention. The public 
is an examiner, but an absent-minded one. (emphasis added, IL 
240-241) 
Benjamin explicitly notes the viewer’s absorption of the film. In addition, he describes him 
as an ‘absent-minded’ percipient as he participates in mass consumption of entertainment. 
Here Adorno asks whether we can have distraction in the positive light if it appears to 
abstract us so – for are we not after all moving from one taboo practice to another?  
Adorno scolds Benjamin with regards to distracting the masses in the cinema. As 
opposed to a favorable view of mindless participation as a form of leisure, perhaps mistaking 
distraction for a Marxian understanding of freedom of mind, Adorno berates this 
phenomenon as simply another form of the same fascist subjugation: 
The laughter of the audience at a cinema . . . is anything but good 
and revolutionary; instead, it is full of the worst bourgeois 
sadism. I very much doubt the expertise of the newspaper boys 
who discuss sports; and despite its shock-like seduction I do not 
find your theory of distraction convincing — if only for the 
simple reason that in a communist society work will be organized 
in such a way that people will no longer be so tired and so 
stultified that they need distraction. (Taylor 121)13 
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Adorno recognizes the challenge of balancing mass entertainment with the necessity for 
knowledge and thought. Once again, he emphasizes the need for some measure of intellect to 
educate the proletariat. The power inherent in intelligence serves his emancipation every bit 
as much as the revolutionary impulse.  
Let us consider for a moment how the absent-mindedness of cinema has fared more 
recently. Film feeds ideas—cut, spliced and readied for consumption by mass audiences—to 
its viewer. Says Martel, “In the resulting state of passive receptivity, we perceive these ideas 
as given when they are really oversimplifications of highly complex truths—as many realize 
when the spell eventually fizzles out” (29). Films, he continues, “furnish us with readymade 
opinions, judgments, and conclusions. The viewer’s sensibility, her distinctiveness as a 
singular consciousness, is brushed aside to make way for the abstract generalizations that the 
filmmakers have chosen to impart by aesthetic rather than discursive means” (29). One can 
imagine Adorno bristling at this loss of ‘thought.’ Likewise, Arendt’s broader complaint 
centers on the fact that the entertainment industry is not offering humanity any durable 
expression of our highest selves. Instead, she states,  
The commodities the entertainment industry offers are not 
‘things,’ cultural objects, whose excellence is measured by their 
ability to withstand the life process and become permanent 
appurtenances of the world, and they should not be judged 
according to these standards; nor are they values which exist to 
be used and exchanged; they are consumer goods, destined to be 
used up, just like any other consumer goods. (PF 206)  
Arendt is correct not only in her assessment that the commodities of the entertainment 
industry are not ‘things’ per se, but also in her understanding of consumer goods as material 
for consumption. As we have seen in her notion of durability, she believes consumer goods 
operate as replacements for thought-things. All told, the promise of ‘distraction’ seems 
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increasingly unable to withstand the perils that attend it. Benjamin’s stress on ‘vision’ suffers 
a similar fate as it is subsumed within the course of consumerism’s broader saturation. In 
recognizing the reduction of human cultural production, it is significant that Benjamin quotes 
Paul Valéry early in the Artwork essay: “Just as water, gas, and electricity are brought into 
our houses from far off to satisfy our needs in response to minimal effort, so we shall be 
supplied with visual or auditory images, which will appear and disappear at a simple 
movement of the hand, hardly more than a sign” (219). Valéry’s words are prophetic. We are 
witness to the automation of even the simplest of tasks, ultimately rendering human 
production and participation obsolete. Technological advances serve to make humanity’s life 
seamless, but of course ‘absent’ the mind in a troubling way. Benjamin understands that 
progress sets the scene for new conduct, and yet he falls short of recognizing the perils which 
befall us as a result. Martel, faced with our current digital environment, explains, “It is not 
the technology that adapts to our needs and desires but our needs and desires that must 
conform to the technology” (139).14 Distraction, then, tends to hinder our fundamental 
capacity for thought — something that seems contrary to Benjamin’s vision of emancipation 
and freedom through mechanically reproduced artworks.  
Admittedly we have an advantage over Benjamin since we have seen the broader 
course of film’s complicity with more strategic means of alienation. His view of distraction 
may have been plausible on the terms of his historical moment, but a problematic state of 
distraction magnifies as film and screen-based mediums emerge over the course of the 20th 
century. Perhaps we could say that Benjamin regards distraction as, in Heidegger’s terms, a 
‘danger’ that also has seeds of a ‘saving’ power; but in this case Benjamin seems to start with 
the ‘saving’ character then try to accommodate the ‘danger’ therein. But it is the very 
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‘danger’ that, we must admit, is winning the contest for power today. “In the digital age,” 
says Martel, “spectacle morphs into something more invasive than a show to be attended in 
bovine passivity. Loyal to the emergent aesthetic ideals of ‘interactivity’ and ‘immersion,’ 
we have become active participants in our own entrancement. We have gone from the 
spectacular to the spectral” (Martel 140). Put in the terms we are using, advances in digital 
media show how ‘distraction’ has, in effect, lost its supposed emancipatory potential and 
morphed into a state of technological addiction and thoughtlessness that preys upon the 
vulnerabilities of, specifically, vision.  
It should be evident that the critical evaluation of Benjamin’s position regarding film 
has begun to help us turn more toward a critical diagnosis of our contemporary scene, the 
failures of which stand out especially on account of their incongruence with what Benjamin 
hoped. We see that human agency is replaced and authored for us in a technological society. 
The superstructure falls into enframing — unable to recognize its predicament while 
harboring an illusion of control. The conditions determining the digital world are dictated by 
an ever-evolving infrastructure of machines, in which case distraction sinks into an ever-
deeper reduction until the human capacity for thought is compromised altogether. It needs to 
be said that I am not accusing Benjamin of being naïve, full stop, nor at all faulting him for 
these developments; after all, the very ability to critique the contemporary scene owes much 
to criteria Benjamin nuanced, and shares his goal of emancipation. As for the critical 
exposition, we have traced the intended links between Benjamin’s understanding of 
distraction in cinema and its desired relationship to Marx’s notion of leisure as an 
indispensable, open space for contemplation and creative thought to emerge. The dangers of 
distraction lie in their very limitation of thinking and denial of artworks as durable thought-
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things, per Arendt’s assessment. And as Adorno is careful to observe, we need artworks and 
the contemplation they demand as provocations of intellectual inquiry and an understanding 
of our cultural positions. In recognizing a connection between distraction and leisure and 
acknowledging the limitations of the former, the shortfall of Benjamin’s interpretation 
becomes clear: distraction as offered by mechanically reproduced artworks has the potential 
for mass ‘numbing’ in the absent-minded absorption of such works. Benjamin is certainly 
right that we need to be cautious in our strategies of resisting the fascist tendencies that hold 
fast to ongoing destructive structures. And he is not altogether wrong in his view that film 
(and the pictorial arts more broadly) can create a positive mass apperceptive experience. Yet, 
in light of the way technological advance can so easily promote an aesthetics of 
thoughtlessness, it will take a very careful praxis of poiēsis by artist-philosophers to assure 
the authentic durability of art’s saving power. 
 
§2.5: THE PERSISTENCE OF FASCIST TENDENCIES: FIAT ARS, PEREAT MUNDUS 15  
Having looked at Benjamin’s reliance on Marx along with the tensions forming 
between durability, thought-things and the potential for distraction to fall into enframing, we 
now return to the larger scope and the question of how an artwork might concretely manifest 
freedom. The pervasive nature of technological enframing, as asserted by Heidegger, leaves 
no one immune. What then are the concrete options available to us today in the face of such 
challenges? Furthermore, what are the markers distinguishing contemplation and meditative 
thought from distraction qua alienation? In the epilogue to the Artwork essay, Benjamin’s 
ideas do take an abrupt turn, fully recognizing the perils preventing ultimate emancipation.16 
He concludes with a disquieting proclamation: All aestheticization on the part of fascism will 
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terminate in war. This is an important acknowledgment, highlighting his acute awareness of 
the power of capitalist-technological structures.  
Benjamin moved the conversation from an art-oriented aesthetic focus in relation to 
the emancipation project, to a violence-oriented aesthetic per the counter-emancipation 
reality. In describing violence’s hold on society, he states, “Only war makes it possible to 
mobilize all of today’s technical resources while maintaining the property system” (IL 241). 
The property system, as well as its many derivative effects on society, is protected at all costs 
under fascist tendencies—hence Benjamin’s wish to see its demise. The persistence of 
fascism, however, thwarts the reproduction as liberating force. Perhaps this inevitable 
outcome must serve as a warning should the total liquidation of traditional oppressive norms 
fail. Benjamin’s belief in the natural progression of history sheds light on a secondary aspect 
of this dialectic: If it is blocked by ‘unnatural’ forces, its outcome will be fundamentally 
corrupted. This section will analyze the epilogue’s intent with an eye on Benjamin’s 
proposed solution; the politicization of art as a means of emancipation and freedom. As we 
move through Benjamin’s turning point to his proposed solution, we will also look to artists 
whose works embody Marx’s human creative impulse and the making of durable, cultural 
objects. Ultimately, we will come to recognize Benjamin’s epilogue as his ultimate caution, 
his warning against blind adherence to dominating fascist structures.  
Wary of an overly simplistic interpretation of Benjamin’s intentions, Caygill 
observes, “Benjamin’s argument is far more subtle and carefully developed than his 
concluding slogan suggests, and rests upon an alignment between fascist monumental self-
presentation, aura and aestheticism” (93). Indeed, Benjamin determines, “The destructiveness 
of war furnishes proof that society has not been mature enough to incorporate technology as 
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its organ, that technology has not been sufficiently developed to cope with the elemental 
forces of society” (IL 242). This declaration is perhaps the most potent intersection with 
Heidegger’s enframing, and the illusion of control under which man lives out his existence. 
The lack of maturity leads to absence of understanding and it may also initiate the destructive 
cycle of forgottenness, as Heidegger would insist. The denial of insight drives societies to the 
brink of self-annihilation. Certainly, Benjamin’s warning acknowledges a fear of total 
destruction, as a fascist society will stop at nothing in order to glorify its own end. Although 
his awareness contradicts his faith in the emancipatory potential of technology, his point 
reminds the reader of the severity of the threat of total annihilation and confirms the 
underlying caution we have been tracking throughout this chapter.    
Nowhere is man’s corrupt relationship with technology more evident than in global 
acts of war—or the ultimate aestheticization of human strife. This is a phenomenon we will 
see clearly in chapter 5 as we explore the work of Noor Mirza and Brad Butler. To Benjamin, 
the forecast is clear: “If the natural utilization of productive forces is impeded by the property 
system, the increase in technical devices, in speed, and in the sources of energy will press for 
an unnatural utilization, and this is found in war” (IL 242). The ideas he expresses recall 
those written by Ernst Jünger in Total Mobilization, in which the author unapologetically 
writes, “The process by which the growing conversion of life into energy, the increasingly 
fleeting content of all binding ties in deference to mobility, gives an ever-more radical 
character to the act of mobilisation.” He adds, “Following the wars of knights, kings, and 
citizens, we now have wars of workers” (128). There is no question Benjamin’s turn toward 
such matters of violence and war in his ‘Epilogue’ is laudable, even prophetic. But such a 
focus would seem to require him to revisit his other tenets regarding the constructive political 
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power of aesthetics. It is somewhat contradictory to assume that the reproduction, with film 
as its central revolutionary agent, can mitigate the progression of violence in its collaboration 
with aestheticization.  
The issue of violence adds increasing weight to our concern that, as much as 
technological advances in the life of artworks afford a communal platform for appreciation, 
they offer an opposing and effective means of controlling mass consciousness and thought. 
Here again Benjamin could have followed the path of his own cautions more thoroughly, for 
though artistic reproductions have important agency, this agency can whither under the 
pressure of how enframing can outperform political art, subverting freedom in a more 
insidious and nuanced way. If one adds up the characteristics of alienation and distraction, 
along with the implosion of culture and traditions as described throughout this chapter, it 
becomes clear that this rootlessness has the power to cripple homo faber, reducing him, as 
Heidegger asserts, to mere standing reserve.  
Returning to the matter of war, in her chapter entitled “The Work of Art in the Age of 
Unbearable Capitulation,” Esther Leslie explains, “In Nazi Germany technology is embraced 
in order to expand the productive base” (135). She continues, “War is a diversion, a means to 
quash the material reality of class struggle by summoning supra-class goals. It is the only 
way that people can be mobilized not as classes but as masses, and the only way the advance 
of modern Technik can be contained without endangering property relations” (135). 
Underlying Benjamin’s work is the understanding that this ‘discrepant’ relationship has no 
other outlet than total destruction. He writes, “Its self-alienation has reached such a degree 
that it can experience its own destruction as an aesthetic pleasure of the first order” (IL 242). 
Benjamin suggests that society has created an exchange value for violence, which leads to an 
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accelerated avenue to our demise. Therefore, war, as a mobilizing force, gives meaning to 
existence, a meaning that destroys the life force of Dasein. We know that Benjamin thus calls 
for the politicization of art. His suggestion represents a need for releasing the hold capitalists 
have on the use and misuse of art, as well as the resistance to change exhibited in keeping 
art’s traditional categories intact. Leslie writes “The political evaluation of the relationship 
between classes and film cannot be possible before film has released itself from the chains of 
its capitalist exploitation” (136). In essence, we are caught in the fascist structures preventing 
the natural evolution of history and further alienating man from himself with the only 
solution being the provocation of thinking that artworks can enable. For Marx (and, as we 
will soon see, Baudrillard), technology creates unprecedented needs, in turn creating signs 
and status, thereby creating an infinite cycle of production and consumption that diverts 
human beings away from their ‘species character.’ The result is further alienation and the 
sensation of being ‘out of one’s own body,’ as with the actors performing for cameras, as 
posited by Pirandello. Despite the unassailable quality embodied in fascist means of 
expression, Benjamin embeds his hopes in the politicization of art.  
How, then, might this type of artwork manifest? In its earliest forms, the reproduction 
democratized access, while also changing perceptive faculties. These initial changes occurred 
as the substructure provided increasing means of production. But if mechanically produced 
artworks failed to overcome fascist tendencies and the peril of self-annihilation during 
Benjamin’s life and time, what becomes of the reproduction as the historical dialectic, to 
which he subscribed so faithfully, continues its forward momentum? 
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§2.6: POLITICIZATION OF ART 
The reproduction has matured. In a world oversaturated with images, media 
campaigns are taken for granted and absorbed, assuring a devastating ‘absentmindedness.’ 
We have shown that Benjamin’s project of emancipation is falling short of its revolutionary 
potential, while simultaneously recognizing the powerful impact reproductions have on their 
percipients. As Arendt assessed, “They [have] lost the faculty which is originally peculiar to 
all cultural things, the faculty of arresting our attention and moving us” (PF 204). As we 
began to see in Rose’s account case of Charlotte Salomon’s work, we will now address the 
visual language of specific artworks in relation to the reproduction as a potential force of 
dialectical advance. We will look at the works of Hannah Höch and Henryk Ross whose 
creative wills underscore Marx’s and Arendt’s important ideas regarding man as maker and 
art’s cultural durability. The examination will show that the politicization of art, required for 
our emancipation per Benjamin, demands the reproduction be returned to its status of an 
original creative initiative, thereby manifesting a transformational return of its aura – an aura 
that need not be defined by the cultic paradigm. This return re-presents the artwork as a 
thought-thing or durable, cultural object by shifting its basis in consumption. In other words, 
we will look at the reproduction as a carrier of meaning in its own right—through its status 
and signification as a democratized consumable object, mindful of the effect it has when re-
presented within an original creation.  
But this very possibility requires us to also consider the contemporary form of a 
‘dangerous power’ that makes such an adaptation of the reproduction paradigm so difficult 
and rare. Here we will examine what has become of the reproduction in today’s cultural 
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exchange with an eye on Baudrillard’s ideas regarding their consumption. Autonomous 
artworks, celebrated for their unique, cult value, are replicated and distributed as fetish 
objects, disposable mementos of a momentary glance. Baudrillard’s assessment of the sign 
value of objects—with their superficial class status—can be felt with each new manufactured 
consumer item. This phenomenon is seen in most cultural centers where iconic works are 
embedded in impermanent items created for amusement. Postcards, keychains, mugs and 
umbrellas are adorned with the most revered cultural icons, utterly removing the mystery, 
astonishment, and contemplation experienced in their immediate presence. Similarly, today’s 
reproductions advertise, convince, shape and manipulate their recipients in a constant effort 
to sway social conduct. The effect is not simply a shift of apperceptive apparatuses; 
reproductions and their messages have the power to alter fundamental collective behavior. 
We have noted, for example, the Nazi annexation of such methods in their campaigns to 
cleanse and control. Furthermore, we can acknowledge that the reproduction has rapidly 
evolved, and yet through the connotative value ascribed to the reproduction, artists are also 
able to shift meaning toward political aims by critiquing the fascist structures that cling to 
existing power norms. Benjamin’s point—that there is a revolutionary potential embedded in 
the signification of reproductions—holds but it needs a further amendment in terms of 
recognizing the use artists may make of all available materials and the manner in which such 
practices can adapt to the shifting base of production. To be more specific, Benjamin’s 
argument seems to overlook the foundational connection human beings have with art objects 
and the impulse for artists to deploy printed matter as an element of new artworks. As noted, 
to speak of the revolutionary capacity of the reproduction must not neglect the species 
character noted by Marx and Arendt, and the authentic drive to create that defines homo 
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faber. While he recognizes the overwhelming power of fascist tendencies to restrict any 
progress at the risk of total destruction, Benjamin omits this important human need. We do 
well to remember what McMurtry points out about Marx’s understanding of human nature. 
He states, 
This special human capacity of ‘projective consciousness’ 
achieves its ‘truly human’ expression for Marx in the activity of 
creative art. For it is in ‘composition’ that he sees the inventive 
and implementive aspects of this natural capacity most freely and 
integrally expressed (G 611). In such creative art (Marx’s 
example is the ‘composition’ of the writer), both the project and 
its execution are unconstrained by extrinsic dictate and united in 
the same productive agent, unlike the ‘antagonistic’ and ‘unfree’ 
forms of almost all historical production. . . . For Marx, then, 
Man the Producer is, in the end, Man the Artist. (McMurtry 26) 
The capacity for free thinking in the act of creation, as realized specifically in a reclaiming of 
human agency from instrumentalist Techniks, concretizes the necessary state of mind valued 
by Arendt et al. As Sjöholm reiterates, artworks according to Arendt “condition the way in 
which thought appears. [They] allows for thought to present itself. Artworks are the 
‘worldliest of things.’” (38). Let us make this issue more materially specific. When printed 
matter or film is embedded in the language of artmaking, the connotations of its previous 
incarnation are carried forward. Pages from a newspaper, of which the primary function is to 
be consumed and to inform, now create tonality and texture within visual compositions. Text 
and photographs are merged, meaning is revised, and new artworks come into being. These 
re-presentations of reproductions restore their status as thought-things per Arendt’s definition 
and represent their capacity as carriers of meaning. Sjöholm explains, 
Works of art, like human labor and services, can be 
commodified. But art cannot be degraded into its use-value only, 
or reduced to nothing but a commodity. Indeed, a work of art 
may well present more resilience against commodification than 
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human labor; this is Arendt’s modernist idealization of art. An 
artwork is not simply a dead thing, or an object. It is a thought-
thing, irreducible in terms of a dialectic duality between object 
and subject. Art cannot be exhausted in its objecthood, in relation 
to a subject. It belongs to the field of plurality, situated in a field 
of shared perspectives, usages, and impacts. The ontological 
conception of plurality, together with its phenomenological 
implications, serves to rethink political categories in aesthetic 
terms. The humanist focus on human agency and human actions 
is displaced and renegotiated toward phenomena, things and 
objects that condition the political. (33) 
These words parallel Benjamin’s historical dialectic, though their intentions are quite 
different. For Arendt, artworks are breathing participants in history’s ongoing narrative, 
literally thought-things that carry ideas forward across generations in a ‘durable’ way.  
As print circulated in the early part of the 20th century, artists seized upon the 
materials as enhancements to their artworks. Hannah Höch, a German born Dada artist 
known for originating photomontage, created numerous enduring artworks in protest of class 
corruption and social ills (figure 2.2). Printed matter was literally cut from its distribution and 
re-presented as an original work. By weaving in text and newspaper imagery, Höch produced 
and expanded visual vocabulary, harnessing the technological reproduction as a new 
communication medium. The photomontages served to elevate reproductions above the 
commonplace, returning them, once more, to the status of thought-things admired by Arendt. 
Höch’s work explored daring subject matter: gender power, androgyny and political 
corruption. She dove headlong into derogatory characterizations of those in power, both past 
and present, in addition to the elite who followed blindly in their tracks. Her 1919 work Cut 
with the Kitchen Knife Dada through the Last Weimar Beer-Belly Cultural Epoch of 
Germany summarizes her preoccupations well (figure 2.3). The title alone unleashes sarcasm 
and critique. The photomontage and collage of pasted papers with watercolor, which 
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measures 114 x 90 cm, is larger than most of her works; these dimensions help magnify its 
content.  
Figure 2.2:  
Hannah Höch 
left: Equilibre 
Photomontage on paper with painting 
30.5x20.3cm / 1925 
Artstor database: UCSD collection 
 
right: Dada Dance 
Collage work on paper 
32x23cm / 1922 
Artstor database: UCSD collection 
 
Figure 2.3:  
Cut with the Kitchen Knife Dada 
through the Last Weimar Beer-Belly 
Cultural Epoch of Germany 
Collage work on paper 
1919 
Artstor database: UCSD collection 
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 Höch’s message is multilayered and thought provoking. By cutting from press pages 
and fashion magazines, she assembles a web of interconnected relationships that illustrate the 
complexities and chaos of her time. The frame is swirling with dismembered and re-imagined 
bodies, machinery and text. While seemingly fragmented, the composition adheres to a 
particular logic that separates politicians from Dadaists and communists from Bourgeois. At 
the center of the bedlam, Höch has placed a small portrait of Käthe Kollwitz and given her 
the body of dancer Niddi Impekoven, creating a symbolic epicenter of feminine power. In 
addition, she has, in lieu of her signature, inserted a tiny image of herself in the lower right 
quadrant, which is pasted atop a map of Europe, indicating which countries had given women 
the right to vote. Indeed, Höch’s work is filled with references to marginalized female artists, 
male castration, political infantilism, and generally scathing assessments of men’s impulses. 
The title also underscores this message with its connotation of kitchen knives, implicating the 
power of the feminine once again.  
 Höch’s work is polyphonic, lending the viewer simultaneous perspectives while 
shedding a harsh light on governmental breakdown. Its modernity is undeniable in its use of 
reproduction, text and photomontage. That said, there are undeniable connections with the 
paintings of Hieronymus Bosch and Pieter Bruegel the Elder, in which quotidian existence is 
displayed in such ways as to emphasize organized chaos. Much like Bosch, Höch comments 
on rampant corruption, mocking those in power and deriding bourgeois sensibilities. Some of 
the most scathing juxtapositions include the head of General Hindenberg set on top of the 
body of exotic dancer Sent M’ahesa; Kaiser Wilhelm II’s moustache, which has been 
replaced with two men wrestling; and the head of critic Theodore Däubler attached to the 
body of an oversized baby. There are many other references, all of which are imbued with 
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sarcasm and reversals in power roles. Her own colleagues within the Dada movement do not 
escape her notice. Georg Grosz, John Heartfield and Raoul Hausmann are all depicted in 
compromised positions. Some—Karl Marx, Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxembourg— do 
merit elevated status. All representatives of the communist movement, they are depicted with 
some measure of integrity and honor. At the upper left, Einstein seems to look on, forlorn.17  
Hoch’s oeuvre is an example of consumer goods overturned and given renewed status 
as politicized commentary with shock value. Their intrinsic power resides in interrupting the 
moment of problematic distraction in the face of reproduced imagery and compelling the 
viewer to think. We must not overlook the singular way in which Hoch’s work defies print as 
a purely consumable product. The work is a combination of disdain, satire and social 
commentary. Displayed at the first international Dada fair, its message was received by a 
like-minded audience and thus outlasted the treacherous political climate. Despite their 
inherent fragility (works on paper do not generally have the same longevity as paintings on 
canvas), many of Hoch’s works have survived the decades since their manufacture. As with 
other important autonomous artworks, they serve to illuminate the shadows of past thought.  
Arendt presciently describes the enduring value of Hoch’s oeuvre: “It is as though 
worldly stability had become transparent in the permanence of art, so that a premonition of 
immortality, not the immortality of the soul or of life but of something immortal achieved by 
mortal hands, has become tangibly present, to shine and to be seen, to sound and to be heard, 
to speak and to be read” (HC 168). In other words, the magnitude of the work lies in it ability 
to transcend the commonplace, challenging absentminded distraction. Höch’s uses 
technologically-produced imagery, taking images with consumer value whose prevalence 
reduced any precious qualities and returning them to autonomy and originality of thought. 
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Such an aesthetic feat shows that originality can obtain on terms of deconstructive and 
reconstructive reproducibility; singular uniqueness need not be jettisoned with the historical 
overcoming of aura. Her artwork now claims a permanent place in the National Gallery of 
Berlin. Their placement validates Arendt’s understanding of durability wherein “[t]he man-
made world of things, the human artifice erected by homo faber, becomes a home for mortal 
men, whose stability will endure and outlast the ever-changing movement of their lives and 
actions, only insomuch as it transcends both the sheer functionalism of things produced for 
consumption and the sheer utility of objects produced for use” (HC 173). The frenetic 
movement of the early twentieth century, particularly in the period between world wars, 
comes back into full view when confronted with Höch’s powerful artwork. While not 
reproduction in Benjamin’s strict application, nor an ‘original’ in the hierarchical sense of a 
cultic ritualistic aesthetic, it pushes beyond the mechanical by re-inserting the artist’s creative 
intervention; it literally becomes a thought thing, astounding us into reflection.  
Other artists also turned to printed materials. Pablo Picasso and Georges Braque used 
newspaper text in their collage work, deconstructing meaning and adding dimension to their 
artworks. Matisse did much the same with his paper “cut-outs,” lending them a freshness and 
contemporaneity that broke with traditional expression. Print became a staple supply for 
creative expression in much the same way as paint, charcoal or marble. Similarly, 
photography was popular as a means of personal expression, both for its technical capacities 
and ubiquity. Photographic images began tapping into subconscious activity and surrealist 
concerns. Caygill reminds us, “Benjamin sees in photography the possibility of creating an 
openness to the future which he describes in terms of an ‘optical unconscious’, and in which 
‘a space informed by human consciousness gives way to a space informed by the 
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unconscious’ (Short History of Photography 243, WB 94). We recall that Benjamin’s 
understanding of film was that the power of the medium lies in the ‘surgical’ nature of 
cutting and representing scenes in intimate detail, achievable only through this careful editing 
process. However, as previously noted, the medium challenges the capacity for unfettered 
thought. But aesthetic advances have shown that, no longer a mere instrument of recorded 
fact, photographic images were transformed into singular artworks by Alfred Stieglitz and 
the Pictorialists, and concurrent modernists such as Dada artist Man Ray and others.  
In addition, the simple mechanical reproduction of the surrounding physical world 
became a commonplace preoccupation of normal citizens. The medium achieved a level of 
ubiquity through inventions such as the Kodak Brownie and scores of other devices. Though 
I have been arguing for an extension beyond the compass of his aesthetic philosophy, 
Benjamin was right to recognize this urge to make images when he observed “the desire of 
contemporary masses to bring things ‘closer’ spatially and humanly, which is just as ardent 
as their bent toward overcoming the uniqueness of every reality by accepting its 
reproduction” (IL 223). He continues,  
No matter how artful the photographer, no matter how carefully 
posed his subject, the beholder feels an irresistible urge to search 
such a picture for the tiny spark of contingency, of the Here and 
Now, with which reality has so to speak seared the subject, to 
find the inconspicuous spot where in the immediacy of that long-
forgotten moment the future subsists so eloquently that we, 
looking back, may rediscover it. (SW 510) 
Indeed, Benjamin observes a human inclination to hold onto and preserve our experiences in 
the face of the fleeting nature of time. We look back at images as testimonies of our 
temporality. This need for preservation encapsulates photography’s fundamental essence. 
Captured images hold enormous sway, able to reassure their beholder of the permanence of 
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recorded moments. They bear witness to moments of great triumph and those of unthinkable 
tragedy. In the latter category are Henryk Ross’s images of the Lodz Ghetto, a recent 
exhibition entitled Memory Unearthed.18 His story is powerfully compelling. Ross survived 
the evacuation of Lodz. He straddled the delicate border between his official role as chosen 
propaganda photographer and his own choice to chronicle daily suffering inside the ghetto. 
The images that remain do so only as a result of his having buried them, believing in his 
immanent death. Of the 6,000 frames he captured, only half remain, bringing back to full 
view the horrors Jews endured during this period.  
Here we can particularly consider how mechanical reproduction served two distinct 
needs: On the one hand, Ross’s work responded to the bureaucratic requirements of the 
oppressive fascist regime, while, on the other, it simultaneously defied such oppression in a 
political form of resistance. He states, “Having an official camera, I was able to capture all 
the tragic period in the Lodz Ghetto. I was anticipating the total destruction of Polish Jewry. . 
. . I did it knowing that if I were caught my family and I would be tortured and killed. . . . I 
wanted to leave an historical record of our martyrdom” (Ross, http://agolodzghetto.com). 
Ross made the choice to record his personal narrative in order for truth to survive. He knew 
his testimony through daily photographic capture would irrefutably bear witness to his 
experience and that of countless others living and dying at the hands of the Nazis.  
The value of his testimony is limitless. Arendt expresses this social need as an 
intersubjective necessity: “Nobody, as Marx rightly insisted, seen ‘in his isolation produces 
values,’ and nobody, he could have added, in his isolation cares about them; things or ideas 
or moral ideals ‘become values only in their social relationships’” (HC 165). Through his 
active recording of life around him, Ross was able to survive when others perished. Today 
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the work, preserved and exhibited in art institutions, serves as a testament, keeps alive the 
reality the outside world wanted to ignore. The value now ascribed to these photographs 
demonstrates the enduring value manifested in such artworks and confirms what I have been 
saying about art’s dynamic originality and the creative drive of homo faber within the milieu 
of mechanical reproduction and within the violent historical moment Benjamin challenged. 
Lauren Hansen, in a review entitled “The Jewish Photographer who Bore Witness to the 
Unbearable,” writes, “By taking viewers through the early joviality of the Jewish police force 
to packed trains bound for Auschwitz, the show bears witness to the methodical erosion of 
humanity and the slow obliteration of life. The effect is profound” (“The Jewish 
Photographer who Bore Witness to the Unbearable” The Week). Ross’ ability to bridge two 
worlds, one propagandistic and the other truthful, lent him, for a time, the sense of purpose 
through making that imbues artworks with cultural significance. Here again we see how 
Arendtian aesthetics provide a necessary and warranted supplement to Benjamin’s. Arendt 
explains, “It is this durability which gives the things of the world their relative independence 
from men who produced and used them, their ‘objectivity’ which makes them withstand, 
‘stand against’ and endure, at least for a time, the voracious needs and wants of their living 
makers and users” (HC 137). Thus, Ross’ remains, in the form of thousands of preserved 
negatives, stand against time and oppression, eventually rising to the surface as a more 
fundamentally honest appraisal of historical events. Arendt stresses the political value of his 
objects of resistance, highlighting the contribution these thought-things make to our 
understanding of ourselves, both culturally and collectively. Their very endurance is a 
political act of thinking against overwhelming inertia.  
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One particular image records the mass deportation of women and children to the 
camps, taken toward the end of the war in 1944 (figure 2.4). The negative bears the 
destructive marks of moisture and soil, but this damage magnifies the narrative, as though 
acting metaphorically. The men in the frame wear uniforms, while also bearing star-clad 
armbands defining them as Jews. The lives of each subject are immortalized in one final 
image and remain therein as haunting evidence of the many lives lost. The image literally 
stood against the grain and creates an enduring testimony to the past to which it bears 
witness.  
 Ross knew his work was significant, far more so than just a means for his immediate 
survival. He was compelled to record and bear witness, and he did so at great peril to himself 
Figure 2.4:  
Henryk Ross 
Ghetto Police escorting  
residents for deportation 
Photographic negative 
35mm / 1944 
Art Gallery of Ontario, Canada 
http://www.agolodzghetto.com 
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and those around him. Marx understands this impulse, attributing to it the strength of all 
human creation: “But man in the working up of the objective world . . . duplicates himself 
not only, as in consciousness, intellectually but also actively, in reality, and therefore 
contemplates himself in a world that he has created” (EPM 75-76; McMurtry 29). It is this 
ability to imagine, create and subsequently contemplate that offers fundamental, authentic 
human satisfaction. In a short yet powerful narrative titled Man’s Search for Meaning, Viktor 
Frankl explained that even while living in concentration camps during the Holocaust, 
stripped of all artifice and surface construct, the essence and purpose of man survives in his 
experience and his having been. Freedom exists in the open space of one’s mind, the only 
unassailable refuge to which those who survive must cling. Holding fast to the 
accomplishments of the past, and their potential to define the intrinsic value of their life 
potential, those incarcerated in the camps could recall their purpose and worth. This having 
been could not be altered or stolen by any force. It was, and is, an indelible function of one’s 
being. While Ross understood the value of photographic images as a mode of witness to 
unbearable inhumanity, it is likely he would not have anticipated their eventual exhibition 
within the confines of an art institution more than seventy years later.  
 How do works such as those created by Höch and Ross connect with Benjamin’s 
hope for radical emancipation? In response, we must recall Arendt’s philosophy of thought, 
upon which we touched in the previous chapter, and her understanding of action as an ethical 
responsibility. The independence of thought demonstrated in Höch’s and Ross’s works 
illustrates a conscious reversal of the banality of evil and a defiance of fascist domination. 
Both artists dared to think beyond the structures confining them and risked mortal danger in 
so doing. As a result, the artworks they produced continue to arrest their viewers even 
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decades later as separate durable objects, fostering continued contemplation. The ultimate 
challenge in our age of mechanically reproduced images is distraction, the very phenomenon 
Benjamin broached as the absentminded state of reception induced by film (and, arguably, by 
screen-based media as a whole) but did not evaluate sufficiently.  
The cautionary tale with which we opened this chapter is patently evident in our 
illusions of control and in the mindless way we interact with technologies in contemporary 
society. This reality harkens back to Benjamin’s darker conclusion; he prophetically calls out 
technology’s power and potentially nefarious force when it is used to coerce art into new 
politically auratic guises. No sooner had reproductions reached mass proportions, they were 
harnessed as a means of control and domination. Certainly, the Nazi media blitz is a stark 
example. In early 2017, the United Nations headquarters in New York City exhibited a wide 
variety of campaign materials deployed by Goebbels explicitly to orchestrate mass support 
for the anti-Semitic governmental mission. While their messages seem transparent to today’s 
audience, as a new visual form of coercion, their impact was immense. Suffice it to say that 
reproductions have the capacity to challenge such avenues or create them. The intent of the 
creator and the receiving mind of the percipient matters most. Arendt would certainly 
demand individual thought on both fronts.  
 
§2.7: CONCLUSION 
In a March 27, 2017 New York Times opinion piece, Costica Bradatan notes 
particular delusions under which we in the West have been operating; he reveals cultural 
assumptions and blind adherence to vague enlightenment premises. To this point, he quotes 
Dostoevsky: 
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‘I, for example,’ says the nameless narrator in Fyodor 
Dostoevsky’s ‘Notes From Underground (1864),’ ‘would not be 
the least bit surprised if suddenly, out of the blue, amid the 
universal future reasonableness, some gentleman of ignoble or, 
better, of retrograde and jeering physiognomy, should emerge, set 
his arms akimbo, and say to us all: ‘Well, gentlemen, why don’t 
we reduce all this reasonableness to dust with one good kick, for 
the sole purpose of sending all these logarithms to the devil and 
living once more according to our own stupid will!’ That would 
still be nothing, but what is offensive is that he’d be sure to find 
followers: that’s how man is arranged.’(“Our Delight in 
Destruction”) 
The non-reflecting being described in Dostoevsky’s text extends the capacity for Arendt’s 
banality of evil and repression of human agency. He is the figure capable of aestheticizing 
destruction, as Benjamin details in his epilogue. He denies the natural progression of history 
and its equalizing effects. Bradatan elaborates, 
[W]e’ve come to assume that history is a progression toward 
more inclusion, mutual understanding and respect, tolerance and 
acceptance and that bigotry, xenophobia, intolerance and racism 
are doomed to disappear as a matter of historical necessity. For 
history, Hegel has taught us (and we’ve rarely challenged this 
teacher), is nothing but the gradual unfolding of rationality in the 
world. (“Our Delight in Destruction” (“Our Delight in 
Destruction”)  
The blind adherence Bradatan is observing is the ultimate refusal of questioning and thought, 
which ultimately allow fascist positions to permeate the superstructure. As a student and 
follower of Marx, Benjamin subscribed to the same belief in history’s progressive forward 
momentum and in technology’s largely positive advances. As we have seen, however, both 
Marx and Benjamin inject their assessments of historical progress with explicit cautions, 
bringing them into line with Heidegger’s ethical undercurrents. The fault lines endanger the 
fundamental capacity for thinking that fosters freedom.  
   147 
Despite the Artwork essay being relatively concise, it covers enormous ground, 
serving largely as a provocation rather than a conclusion of particular arguments.19 Though I 
have made a case for ways in which this provocation needs some amendment and correction, 
the balance of evaluation rests on a shared and compelling ground between the thinkers and 
ideas I have covered. Benjamin’s ideas help to illuminate the impact technological advances 
made on art in the early twentieth century, both in its creation and manufacture of meaning. 
These ideas anticipate points of connection and tension with Heidegger’s later assessment of 
our forgottenness and loss of Care (as previously discussed). Benjamin’s adherence to the 
historical dialectic mirrors a Marxist methodology and demands the natural progression of 
relations as established therein. As we have seen, the suppression of human essence as homo 
faber, per Marx, exacerbates alienation and deepens the malaise of the Industrial Age. 
Heidegger’s preoccupation is more ontological than political on the surface, but despite the 
difference in methodology and focus Heidegger’s understanding of forgottenness qua 
alienation leading to estrangement from Dasein mirrors Marx’s alienation of man from 
himself. The reduction of homo faber to standing reserve underscores the common ground 
shared by Marx, Benjamin and later Heidegger. Furthermore, for each of these thinkers the 
ultimate aspiration to freedom requires emancipation from a profoundly corrupted 
relationship with Technik, dispelling any illusion of control over it we may have.  
Benjamin’s strongest language emerges in his epilogue, explicitly exposing that lack 
of maturity which would create an aestheticization of human destruction. His thought 
parallels Heidegger’s warning of certain annihilation should we blindly stay enframed by our 
relationship with technology (as expressed in Gelassenheit, where he states, “[T]he explosion 
of the hydrogen bomb means little” in comparison).20 Both Heidegger and Benjamin ask us 
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to think and look beyond the structures and back into the emancipatory wonder of art. Care 
and other-thinking emerge as ethical obligations, foretelling once again Arendt’s philosophy 
of thinking and action. I have specified these issues in terms of art’s visual and textual 
materiality, but we do well to also, and relatedly, recall how Heidegger refers us to poetry as 
the medium most capable of offering freedom. Arendt concurs, “Poetry, whose material is 
language, is perhaps the most human and least worldly of the arts, the one in which the end 
product remains closest to the thought that inspired it” (HC 169). Heidegger’s position is that 
we live in language. The immediacy of poetry thereby captures human artistic essence. 
Thought, lauded as our innate freedom, offers the capacity to act productively and for the 
greater good. Leisure is offered as the space for thought and contemplation to emerge 
whereas distraction merely provides absentminded conditions potentially that can open 
individuals to mass thinking. A herd mentality leads to Arendt’s banality of evil, with its 
concomitant absentminded state of distraction. As we move away from our essence, the 
exchange value of violence is the unintended consequence of our lack of thought and 
meditative thinking. 
 The inclusion of mechanically reproduced images in twentieth century art making 
practice has continued to surge. The necessary loss of aura has been replaced, as Benjamin 
noted so articulately, with ubiquity. The connotation of printed matter, and its representation 
both in popular culture and within countless artworks, has radically altered the meaning 
artists are able to communicate. In a steady progression, artists have incorporated and 
returned the copy to a place of authentic originality, thus underscoring Marx’s understanding 
of human beings as a species of creative makers. The four artists21 comprising this larger 
study are no exception to this practice. Each made specific and deliberate use of the 
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reproduction for its connotative value and its sociopolitical commentary, while also 
extending what constitutes an artwork in current creative practice. As we will see in the 
coming chapters, works such as these provoke thought in the face of distraction and 
enframing thereby bringing Heidegger’s ethical plea to the fore. While fulfilling both the 
artistic impulse and a greater ethical intersubjective role, these artists actively demonstrate 
Arendt’s challenge to think independently. Their lens—of viewing our obligation as social 
beings—spurs us to face our collective responsibility for the preservation of hope and 
creative intention. Reflecting Benjamin’s notion of historical progress (though without the 
full scope of his teleological faith),22 the artists will be analyzed in ascending chronological 
order, so as to highlight the increasing sophistication of their use of technology. From simple 
collage to complex video edits, the progress of visual expression will be noted. Ultimately, 
the turn to art necessitated by alienation qua enframing, will expose the polyphonic event of 
truth as revealed in the creative realm. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
MARTHA ROSLER: BRINGING THE WAR HOME 
ETHICO-POLITICAL COLLABORATIVE ART PRACTICE 
 
It is impossible to glance through any newspaper, no matter what the day, 
the month or the year, without finding on every line the most frightful 
traces of human perversity . . . every newspaper, from the first line to the 
last, is nothing but a tissue of horrors. Wars, crimes, thefts, lecheries, 
tortures, the evil deeds of princes, of nations, of private individuals; an 
orgy of universal atrocity. And it is with this loathsome appetizer that 
civilized man daily washes down his morning repast.  
Charles Baudelaire, Intimate Journals1 
- 
 
§ 3.1: INTRODUCTION 
There is a prescience to Charles Baudelaire’s description of the relentless feed of 
news stories—the everyday tissues of horror. The ceaseless narrative fixes audience attention 
and shapes public conduct, altering our beliefs as we engage with the world around us. 
Forming part of a greater technological system, the omnipresent force of news cycles shapes, 
distorts and marks our existence. Baudelaire’s lament could easily have been written in 
response to the grip that the digital dissemination of information has on its recipients today, 
and the attendant fears about the deteriorating effect on the human condition. In a substantial 
way, the reproduced images of the news cycle reinforce narratives distributed by those in 
control of such information, as noted in Walter Benjamin’s epilogue to Artwork essay. In the 
worst of cases the spread of totalitarian ideas results in propagating negative tendencies: “Its 
   151 
self-alienation has reached such a degree that it can experience its own destruction as an 
aesthetic pleasure of the first order” (IL 242). Baudelaire, much like Benjamin, recognized 
the effect of such a daily repast on man’s disposition and the profound disruption of any 
aspirations for community and intersubjective responsibility. As we advance with the ideas 
underpinning this project, Baudelaire’s words are especially noteworthy for they underscore 
the accelerating spread of information across digital apparatuses and the enframing nature of 
this calcified condition.  
As discussed in the first two chapters, Martin Heidegger and Walter Benjamin 
expressed fundamental concerns for artistic human emancipation from technological 
enframing. Heidegger’s plea at the end of “The Question Concerning Technology” is an 
ethical one. By extending the ideas articulated by these two important thinkers into the 
conversations of Karl Marx and Hannah Arendt, with significant input from Theodor 
Adorno, Jean Baudrillard, Howard Caygill, and J.F. Martel, we have come to recognize the 
basic differences separating Heidegger from Benjamin, while simultaneously noting their 
commonalities, including their belief in the goals of ultimate freedom and emancipation as 
thinking individuals. The freedom in question, as specifically related to thinking and praxis, 
opens us to our “ownmost potential in Dasein,”2 reinforcing a receptive and questioning 
disposition. Looking in more detail to the realm of art so important to Heidegger’s proposed 
solution to our enframing and alienation, we will now focus our attention on specific 
artworks whose disruptive potential responds, in large measure, to the ethico-political 
demands of Heidegger, Benjamin and Arendt. The artworks in question will also support the 
increasing relevance of Adorno’s ongoing concerns regarding the decline of culture as 
necessitating durability, while simultaneously at risk of being co-opted into corrupt power 
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structures. Alienation, literally a negation of freedom, is increasingly operative in 
technological progress and deployed by the culture industry, thus complicating our ability to 
apprehend its nefarious effects. As we move forward, we will track the ways the warnings 
issued by both Heidegger and Benjamin are acted upon—providing a framework within 
which the artwork might articulate its response.   
Our primary focus will be on the work of Brooklyn-based artist Martha Rosler and 
the distinct makeup of her commitment to awakening broader cultural reflection and 
assessing our guiding values as a society. Rosler’s career has spanned decades during which 
she has witnessed the repetitious rhythms of time and history; essentially, she has lived out 
Benjamin’s historical dialectic and informed the language and tenor of her epoch. As 
Rosler’s work has matured, her spirit of activism and the urgency of her messages have only 
grown. We will be discussing three particular bodies of work, notably her parallel series 
House Beautiful: Bringing the War Home, the first dating from 1972 and its sequel from 
2004, as well as her Garage Sale series, which began in 1973 and culminated in its most 
recent twenty-first century iteration at MoMA in 2012, Meta-Monumental Garage Sale. The 
work of artists Hannah Höch and John Heartfield will also add to our ability to situate and 
properly interpret Rosler’s uniquely political and poēisis-laden aesthetic. I will structure our 
discussion by means of the following criteria. The first will consider immediate contextual 
forces shaping ideas and their relationship to other twentieth century events. Working from 
Benjamin’s notion of distraction and mass media, we will examine an artwork’s potential 
when reconfigured and reinterpreted from ubiquitous news imagery. The second will 
examine how meaning is imparted and questioned, foregrounding the visual currencies used 
to disseminate ideas for better or worse. Finally, we will ask if politicized art maintains its 
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status as a durable art object or carrier of cultural value by examining the artist’s role as an 
artist-producer. The combination of each line of thinking will enhance our reading of artistic 
practice and its emancipatory potential. Throughout, our inquiry will continue exploring what 
constitutes truth in an artwork and how might this truth offer clues to our ultimate 
emancipation qua thought.  
I will argue that Rosler’s re-presentation of mechanically reproduced media imagery 
and her performative interrogation of social norms directly confront cultural inertia and 
engender critical introspection on the part of her audience—the kind of self-questioning that 
brings Dasein into authentic alignment with its capacity for thought. Rosler’s work in turn 
fulfills an ethical role, animating imagination and informing such thinking through the open 
space of technē (Gelanssenheit) that Heidegger favors. To support this case, I will analyze 
Rosler’s work through the lenses of Heidegger’s plea, Benjamin’s attention to authorship and 
the reproduced image, and Hannah Arendt’s insistence on the fundamentally ethical gesture 
of thinking. In addition, and to help meet the criteria noted above, we will intertextualize the 
issues with Susan Sontag’s commentary Regarding the Pain of Others; Roland Barthes’ 
insightful explication of myth, lexia, codes, and the reader; Adorno’s Culture Industry; and, 
Peter Sloterdijk’s understanding of Atmo-Terrorism. Throughout, we will account for the 
constitutive elements of Rosler’s constant preoccupation with intersubjectivity and the 
disruption of embedded discourse. The reader will note that I proceed by way of substantial 
conceptual and contextual work in order to argue that Rosler serves as a living embodiment 
of Benjamin’s “Author as Producer,” demonstrating works that show the kind of correct 
political tendency demanded in his Artwork essay. My organization is not so much 
‘preparatory’ to a reading of the works as it is crucial to elaborating the artist-as-author side 
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of the author-producer dynamic. How then will we confirm Rosler as an ‘artist-producer’? 
We will see that she directly addresses the paradox underpinning Benjamin’s reflections on 
visual forms and she pushes beyond the boundaries of exhibition value and commodity 
fetish. These qualities, appreciated through our theorists’ ideas, confirms that Rosler’s works 
are emancipatory vehicles of thought that change culture’s problematic ‘tissues’ animate and 
materialize the philosophical ideas, and profoundly bring the viewer into the open space of 
questioning.  
 
conceptual terminology pertaining to rosler’s artistic production 
We will proceed by alternating between philosophical ideas and the application of 
these to our reading of Rosler’s artworks. The terms particular to this chapter address notions 
of authorship (and its conjoined reader, myth, codes, and lexia) and revisit aura and 
distraction in relation to Rosler’s work. We will also incorporate Heidegger’s understanding 
of Mitsein, or being-with, as it concerns our intersubjective being in the presence of others 
and our sense-making in the ‘world.’3 Mitsein correspondingly alludes to Dasein’s 
“becoming what one can be in being free for ones ownmost possibilities (project)— an 
‘accomplishment’ of ‘care,’” (BT §42 192). Further, we will draw connections between ideas 
expressed by Benjamin and Barthes with Adorno’s objection to the effects of the culture 
industry as a constant and alienating force manipulating human beings into a state of 
submission and thoughtlessness. I am aware that this kind of intertextualizing work on the 
side of thinkers, and in turn between their ideas and the properly aesthetic works of Rosler as 
an artist-philosopher, runs the risk of being simply ‘associative’, or even ‘forced.’ We will 
avoid such pitfalls by working carefully according to specific interpretive opportunities and 
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tensions while also testing our conclusions along the way.   
 As we learned in chapter 2, Benjamin’s careful study of the role of the reproduction 
reveals several persistent tensions. First, he expresses ambivalence about the aura of an 
original, the consequence of the unique presence of a work in relation to its cultish or 
authentic nature. A work’s aura lends gravitas, both in terms of its ascription to history and 
its bourgeois monetary value. Aura is essentially that which is not reproducible and, 
therefore, is endangered in the age of technological reproduction. On one level, Benjamin 
mourns the loss of the original and its inherent value as a unique object of reverence. On 
another, Benjamin celebrates the possibility for emancipation from the cultish ritual and 
bourgeois preoccupations associated with an object’s aura-centric aesthetic experience. 
Copies, therefore, devalue while simultaneously offering a more democratic access. On this 
score, we note that Rosler opted for lo-fi reproduction and distribution of her artworks. The 
implied loss of ‘gravitas’ is regained through her political practice and gesture, which, it can 
be argued, re-inscribes a measure of non-cultish or bourgeois aura in her output.4 Her work 
invites contemplation rather than distraction such that the viewer may turn inward in 
reflective questioning and outward in a disposition of social awareness and action, an aura of 
‘predicament.’ These elements, per Benjamin’s assessment, are vulnerable in the 
reproduction. Yet, Rosler’s intention to prompt freedom of thought and critical analysis 
undermines one element of the premise inherent in the death of aura.  
 Incorporating a related lesson from chapter 2, we must analyze, along with Benjamin, 
the shift in our faculties of perception in light of technological progress. The viewer is moved 
from a state of contemplation in the face of the original, to an absorption by the reproduced 
work. This phenomenon reflects the warning issued by Heidegger with regards to enframing, 
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while also suggesting that the technologies offering new means of communicating are 
simultaneously altering our reception in ways that can enhance freedom. This tension centers 
on the qualitative nature of contemplation versus absorption: Does contemplation yield more 
productive thinking and action than its counterparts in absorption and distraction? 
Benjamin’s observation that reproduced works, including motion pictures, alter the 
fundamental way the viewer perceives—moving him/her from contemplation as a thinking 
and reverent state to one of distraction—underscores a condition that has magnified as 
technologies have accelerated. This state of distraction is important to this study both in its 
positive and negative manifestations. As a third extension of issues developed in chapter 2, 
then, in Rosler’s work, distraction will be understood negatively in terms of the reduction of 
thinking. Distraction is a symptom of Adorno’s crippling culture industry, in which a mass 
pacification reduces human beings to a submissive, non-questioning state. Adorno’s chief 
protest lies in the fact that the totalitarian apparatus, theoretically feeding the impatient 
consumption of the masses, creates false needs while denying what is authentically human: 
the fundamental necessity of love, community, creativity and thought. In response to this 
ethos, the emancipatory capacity of aestheticized political activism is part and parcel of 
Rosler’s attempts to jolt her viewer out of a state of pacification and return him to a condition 
of engagement. In this way her work connects directly to Heidegger, Benjamin and Arendt’s 
insistence that thinking is a requisite foundation for action.  
Approached through these three lenses, we will see how Rosler’s work addresses the 
political and ethical position of her viewer; it purposefully conflates disparate visual 
vocabularies into powerful indictments of our time. My subtle yet central argument on this 
score is that she both reinscribes the status of an original (though avoiding the cultish nature 
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of aura) while also deploying the imagery in service of social progress. Rosler follows 
Benjamin’s call to ‘[rescue]’ consumable artistic creations from their bourgeois ‘modishness’ 
and “[confer] upon [them] a revolutionary use value” (UB 95). In her own words she aims to 
rupture the “distancing effect” implied by “naturalism,” and advance, by contrast, an 
“emotional recognition” and “intellectual understanding” or how a work’s “systematic 
meaning” is tethered to common issues (Beshty 119).  In other words, Rosler seeks to 
awaken. By interrupting the emotional identification human beings feel with any particular 
image or scene, she achieves a more critical, reflective response. To be ‘systematic’ in this 
way means making use of signs and myths. Rosler works in a language the viewer can 
recognize and interpret, a language speaking to and from one’s ontic and ontological position 
in the world. Much like Heidegger’s attention to the structural promise of being-with 
(Mitsein) as opposed to the pitfalls of ‘theyness,’ Rosler insists we recognize our 
relationships or involvements with others and seek a “clarification of vision [as] a first step 
toward reasonably and humanely changing the world” (Beshty 119). We need to carefully see 
how the broad scope of this ethical reconfiguration and ‘plea’ is secured through the details 
of her works. Particular gestures, such as that seen in her Bowery series, for example, call 
into question accepted practice and hold the art world accountable for its part in perpetuating 
discourse.  
 
§ 3.2: CONTEXTUAL CONDITIONS SHAPING ROSLER’S IDEAS AND ARTWORKS 
 To understand Rosler’s work we must first examine the external forces informing its 
creation. We must highlight events and cultural developments that have shaped her approach, 
namely the global conflicts and ongoing technologically driven warfare that have permeated 
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modernity. In addition to an exploration of the decades preceding her career, our path will 
move through the zeitgeist of her generation into more current philosophical positions vis-à-
vis ongoing events. The dialectical relationship between such epochs or, in Rosler’s words, 
the historical transactions, can be seen in the ideas she expresses. Rosler belongs to the era 
of ‘cultural heresies’ of the sixties and the ethical direction in her thoughts and actions 
derives from that era. A dedication to social justice and enlightenment (in Adorno’s sense) is 
unmistakable in her work. With the return to collage—a medium originating in the early 
twentieth century with artists such as John Heartfield and Hannah Höch as a form of social 
protest—Rosler rededicates herself to honoring the other; she transforms her artworks into 
historical thought-objects and purposeful political interventions (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2).  
 
Figure 3.1. John Heartfield,  
Adolf, the Superman, Swallows Gold and Spouts Tin. 1932 
Photomontage, / 1930 
Artstor database: University of California, San Diego Collection 
 
Figure 3.2. Hannah Höch, Cut with the Kitchen Knife Dada through the Last 
Weimar Beer-Belly Cultural Epoch of Germany 
Photomontage, 114x90cm / 1919 
Artstor database: Art History Survey Collection 
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 Recall that Baudelaire’s epigraph laments the endless supply of horrific news with 
which beings begin their day. His words anticipate the immense destruction wrought over the 
twentieth century and its unforgiving displays of man’s inhumanity to man. Note that Rosler 
expresses a fascination with newspapers and magazines, describing, in her Paris Photo 
interview, the piles of publications padding her studio. This habit reflects her compulsive 
need to gather news and editorial images from which she sources her ideas. She feels the 
need “to constantly question our ability to become passive consumers of images rather than 
intelligent receivers and producers of images . . . to always look to the margins and see what 
is in the frame, as well as all that is outside and behind it” (Schwartz). She continues, “We 
need to know an image’s origins . . . we need to question in which discourse it was originally 
inserted and how it got into the discourse in which it is now inserted” (Schwartz). In short, 
context is important to an understanding of Rosler’s production and to undertaking an 
examination of her artworks as acts of political emancipation; here we may note how the 
same is true in its own way in the ideas expressed by Heidegger, Benjamin and Adorno with 
regards to our political and creative freedom.   
 The cultural critiques of twentieth century atrocities raised fundamental questions 
regarding the capacity for human beings to exercise any form of ethical conduct. The 
clashing of the Neo-Marxist ideas of thinkers such as Adorno, Barthes and Debord spread to 
students and workers, and the subsequent May 1968 demonstrations in both France and the 
United States. These protests left indelible marks on both nations—both in university and 
political life. In academia, a fundamental questioning of ethical responses to global wars and 
human conditions propelled a new wave of thinking with regards to cultural output. Adorno’s 
oft-cited commentary on poetry after Auschwitz is a case in point: “I have no wish to soften 
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the saying that to write lyric poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric” (Harrison and Wood 779). 
Artists and writers simply lacked the language appropriate to the depth of horror the world 
had experienced. These factors prompted violent clashes between the younger generation and 
established forms of government. Images of the Vietnam war spread across the globe raising 
questions and prompting protests. And yet, as Rosler keenly knows, the progression of 
history demonstrates that human beings forget the lessons of the past. How is this possible 
amid the proliferation of visual and written evidence? In a letter penned to Artforum, artist 
Leon Golub writes, 
The anger and repugnance which may eventually force an American 
withdrawal from Vietnam might work with diminishing returns in future 
interventions. Those arts that began with the modernist dream of human 
freedom may find they serve technological masters and the American 
empire. Art will then serve the consumption habits of a triumphant 
managerial class, a cyberneticized elite civilization protected from the 
outside by the fantastic weapons and control agents of the future. Is this 
fantastic speculation? The final word will not be in for some time. (qtd. in 
Merjian 54) 
His pessimistic undercurrent reflects Heidegger’s diagnosis of enframing and the inability to 
even recognize the cultural forces suppressing critical thought. Similarly, according to 
Sontag, “By presenting us with a limitless number of non-stop stories, the narratives that the 
media relate—the consumption of which has so dramatically cut into the time the educated 
public once devoted to reading—offer a lesson in amorality and detachment that is 
antithetical to the one embodied by the enterprise of the novel [or artwork]” (At the Same 
Time 225). Ironically, even as the volume of media depicts scenes of horror, culture is 
increasingly absorbed into a device-driven consumer system that dulls human sensibility. 
According to Sontag and Golub, we are numbed by the at-handedness of an increasingly 
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technological environment and self-reflexive questioning grows difficult, scarce. Moreover, 
the daily distribution of digital images can embody an unsavory opportunism with regards to 
its subject matter—whether war victims or the disenfranchised at home. Echoing Arendt’s 
account of banality and Benjamin and Adorno’s accounts of ‘distraction’ and ‘culture 
industry,’ Sontag observes that “passivity dulls feeling” (102) – a kind of paralysis besets not 
just thinking, but also the kind of sensitivity that should otherwise sound a call to reflection.  
 These concerns are evident as Rosler’s work highlights the ubiquitous nature of 
photographs and makes a strong case against the unscrupulous nature of social 
documentation. She makes explicit the nature of her work as re-representation, urging her 
viewer to negotiate the impact of circulating imagery. Her work thus acts as an antidote to 
enframing by exposing the underlying discourses through simple acts of reconfiguration. 
What is often overlooked is how she shifts her intention from being audience-focused to 
being action-based in a way that ensures a level of critical analysis necessary for the 
individual thinking that would, in Heideggerian parlance, overcome an inauthentic 
thrownness. As established in chapter 1, there is a complexity inherent in this task as it asks 
that we simultaneously think and release our attachment with regard to our involvement with 
technologies. More than mere devices or media transmissions, at issue are ideological 
apparatuses that foster unimaginable behavior. Arendt faced this in the technē of National 
Socialism. In her essay, “Thinking and Moral Considerations,” she explains:  
Inability to think is not stupidity; it can be found in highly intelligent 
people, and wickedness is hardly its cause, if only because thoughtlessness 
as well as stupidity are much more frequent phenomena than wickedness. 
The trouble is precisely that no wicked heart, a relatively rare phenomena, 
is necessary to cause great evil. (RJ 164)  
In this vein, the absence of thinking as a moral issue has the potential of becoming the root of 
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great evil, leaving anyone open to its fierce corruptive forces. By ‘stupidity,’ Arendt implies 
an inability to think for oneself – a dull passivity – that leaves one’s search for belonging 
vulnerable to the pull of authority. Indeed, Arendt attributes many of the great fascist crimes 
to a pervasive sense of loneliness, for which the cure is a polyphonic community structure in 
which individuals explore each other’s points of view and reach peaceful, intelligent 
consensus. The same is true of Rosler’s moment and indeed our own.  
 As an agent for change, Rosler consistently demonstrates her active thinking and 
participation in ethico-political circumstances. Despite heavy criticism, she chose to speak 
out against both the Vietnam and Iraq wars, repeating the first impulse decades later: “[W]ho 
is being stupid? It’s the country that’s doing exactly the same thing it was doing then.” 
Rosler continues, “It’s a quagmire. One we are stuck in forever without the possibility of 
winning … whatever winning might be” (Schwartz interview). And the ‘feeling’ of this 
quagmire – the very feeling that ought to inspire a thinking-morality – is far more intense 
than puzzlement, worry, or regret. It holds a terrific urgency of that kind that, as Roger 
Cohen explains in a 2015 New York Times editorial entitled “World War III,” has to 
deconstruct and mortify the blithe American naiveté that says “history will never repeat 
itself” because we can now enjoy “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness” (Cohen 2015).     
In her ‘quagmire,’ Rosler sounds a Benjaminian alarm that still pulses across 
contemporary events as we witness global atrocities in tandem with the apparent collective 
resignation that nothing can be done to thwart their advances. Sontag aptly remarks: 
“Wherever people feel safe . . . they will be indifferent” (100). But, as we have seen (chapter 
1), the modern essence of technology operates paradoxically as a threat to illusions of safety 
and control, but then also strategically reinforces a technological faith that would deliver us 
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from danger. By reminding her viewer of the collective potential of demonstrations and 
group interactions, Rosler undermines isolation and creates an investigation in which the 
audience must participate actively. Her flyers, performances, and carefully crafted 
commentaries establish ground rules that demand engagement. By considering the challenges 
to such engagement we may appreciate the singular drive and effect of her work. Three 
overall matters show important points of connection between Rosler’s action-based aesthetic 
and recent cultural interventions on the side of theory. 
The first is the mode of technological enframing at work in the way a paradigm of 
‘terror’ blurs the warfare/non-warfare distinction. Her position vis-à-vis war is built upon her 
awareness of history’s tragic events and their profound implications to global populations. 
Rosler grew up in the shadows of chemical warfare and nuclear proliferation. In his 
insightful essay, Terror from the Air, Peter Sloterdijk attaches the beginning of modernity to 
one specific day, April 22, 1915, when chlorine gas was first used as a weapon—an act of 
power that removed the illusion of control we so desire. Sloterdijk demonstrates the insidious 
result of this fateful moment in technological “progress.” The notion of the enemy shifts, 
mirroring the absence of any particular author who might be held accountable. War and its 
in-between periods of non-war are now tainted with the implicit understanding that the very 
air we breathe has been turned against us (Sloterdijk 16). He explains,  
Terrorism, from an environmental perspective, voids the distinction 
between violence against people and violence against things: it comprises 
a form of violence against the very human-ambient “things” without 
which people cannot remain people. By using violence against the very air 
that groups breathe, the human being’s immediate atmospheric envelope is 
transformed into something whose intactness or non-intactness is 
henceforth a question. (25) 
Attacking the environment thus supplants direct assaults on the body. Terrorism is “a child of 
   164 
modernity, insofar as its exact definition was forged only after the principle of attacking an 
organism’s, or a life form’s, environment and immune defenses was shown in its perfect 
technological explication” (29). His point addresses a shift in attitudes reflected in an 
uncertainty with regards to our relationship with the world in which we dwell. Rosler’s 
dedication to political action and anti-war demonstrations highlights her awareness of these 
underlying geo-political issues and her attention to possible solutions.  
The shift in attitudes and the dedication to aesthetic political action are related to, 
second, the atmospheric phenomena of fear and silence, and in these the perils of a 
distraction that eclipses collective choice or awareness; breathing the ‘air’ of violence here 
links with losing the practice of ‘story.’ In his essay “The Storyteller,” Benjamin observed,  
Never has experience been contradicted more thoroughly than strategic 
experience by tactical warfare, economic experience by inflation, bodily 
experience by mechanical warfare, moral experience by those in power. A 
generation that had gone to school on a horse-drawn streetcar now stood 
under the open sky in a countryside in which nothing remained unchanged 
but the clouds, and beneath these clouds, in a field of force of destructive 
torrents and explosions, was the tiny, fragile human body. (Illuminations 
84) 
Human beings are radically reduced in stature when confronted with the pervasive tools of 
war. Benjamin foregrounds the effects such warfare has on violence as perpetrated against 
culture, as well as on the production of meaning in art. With the incomprehension brought 
about by these new methods of annihilation, the ability to confront and express the modern 
narrative diminished. Storytelling was profoundly and irretrievably altered; man and reason 
were silenced by the confrontation with the incomprehensible. Benjamin asks: “Was it not 
noticeable at the end of the war that men returned from the battlefield grown silent—not 
richer, but poorer in communicable experience?” (Illuminations 84). Silence reveals how 
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humans were further alienated from the way their natural, authentic selves dwelled in oral 
traditions and the communal exchange of ideas. Experience grows less communicable as it 
grows more prone to annhiliation. Sloterdijk traces the connection between the atmo-
terrorism practiced during WWI and the gas chambers in which 6 million Jews were 
murdered; German scientific research leads to the use of hydrogen cyanide. He states, “It 
would be a matter of mere months before it became obvious that the atmotechnic form of 
organism extermination was also going to be applied to human matter” (36). The specter of 
terror transforms over time and undermines the more optimistic belief in a Hegelian 
ascension, through the strife of dialectical confrontation, to a world of unity and cohesion. 
Where story on the side of real people stands overwhelmed by catastrophe, a storied 
metanarrative of progress loses its viability. It would at first seem unlikely, even absurd, to 
believe that artistic production could face the catastrophic with a drive toward political 
collaboration and peace. In its own way Rosler’s art bore traces of Adorno’s collapse of faith 
in Hegelian humanism: “After the catastrophes that have happened, and in view of the 
catastrophes to come, it would be cynical to say that a plan for a better world is manifest in 
history and unites it” (ND, 320). In his Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning, Jay Winter 
observes that the extermination of European Jews was “an act with affinities to earlier mass 
atrocities, but which transcended them in method, character and scale. Both of these 
catastrophes raised the possibility that the limits of language had been reached; perhaps there 
was no way adequately to express the hideousness and scale of the cruelties of the 1939-1945 
war” (Winter 43, my emphasis). It is into Adorno’s sense of the ‘catastrophic’ and Winter’s 
recognition of this unsteady ‘perhaps’ that what I have been calling Rosler’s action-oriented 
aesthetic enters as an enterprise in ‘saving’ amid the lingering ‘danger.’ As we have seen, not 
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only does the technology of war become woven into the very fabric of our existence – the air 
we breathe, water we drink, and narratives we seek – the media fascination with the imagery 
it generates is equally troubling. But Rosler resolves to chart a course out of political apathy. 
Her work offers a point of resistance within what Sontag identifies in terms of how, we 
scarcely question our state of being in the world, allowing the progressive grip of 
technology’s essence to encapsulate us.  
To the atmospherics of terror and catastrophe in the air, fear, and silencing of a 
staggered social ‘reserve,’ we may add, third, the specific contextual matter of imagery and 
illusion. Notice that the atmospherics of technological enframing gain more and more 
aesthetic traction. As the action of trauma and silence rupture story, the action of media 
images and voyeurism rupture critical vision. Sontag asserts: “New demands are made on 
reality in the era of cameras. The real thing may not be fearsome enough, and therefore needs 
to be enhanced; or reenacted more convincingly” (63). Such an ‘enhancement’ would also 
intervene in how the numbing effect of Sloterdijk’s atmo-terrorism is accepted with a 
voyeuristic stance on paramount issues, a peeking through the keyhole at ubiquitous, 
traumatizing imagery. Human beings create illusions of control, of a superficial desire to 
know and to see, but lack the means for such knowing. Recalling the case of Winter’s 
‘perhaps,’ Sontag rightly explains, “The nightmare of suicidally lethal military engagement 
from which the warring countries were unable to extricate themselves—above all, the daily 
slaughter in the trenches on the Western Front—seemed to many to have exceeded the 
capacity for words to describe” (25). From the abject characteristics of war, images seek to 
bear witness but their effect numbs one’s very ability to critically consider the events they 
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depict. Rosler’s work addresses this ubiquity particularly in its re-use of the reproduced 
materials targeted in these discussions.  
But why choose the very medium that entraps us into thoughtlessness? How could the 
re-presentation and re-contextualization of numbing images astound us? The problem is one 
of pitting aesthetic action against a larger anesthetizing, aesthetic force. Consider first, with 
Roland Barthes, the sign-function of the image: “What the Photograph reproduces to infinity 
has occurred only once: the photograph mechanically repeats what could never be repeated 
existentially” (CL 3). Yet, in its frozen moment, a photograph provides pictorial evidence of 
an event’s having been. In relation to man’s insatiable need for such images and news, 
Benjamin explains that “the editorial offices have long ago learned to exploit the fact that 
nothing binds the reader to his newspaper so much as this impatience, which demands fresh 
nourishments every day; they exploit it by continually throwing open new columns for 
readers’ questions, opinions and protests” (UB 89). This produces the kind of news cycle 
Baudelaire so vehemently lamented and leaves its percipient stripped of the tools necessary 
for critical analysis. Consider, further, Adorno’s prophetic insight that “interested parties like 
to explain the culture industry in technological terms. Its millions of participants, they argue, 
demand reproduction processes which inevitably lead to the use of standard products to meet 
the same needs at countless locations” (95). He continues, “The standardized forms, it is 
claimed, were originally derived from the needs of the consumers: that is why they are 
accepted with so little resistance. In reality, a cycle of manipulation and retroactive need is 
unifying the system ever more tightly” (95). The substructure provides the means of 
anaesthetizing its recipients through a standardization of output and information. If this is 
true then Rosler’s decision to work with media is ambitious, to say the least. The sheer 
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uniformity and mass-production of film, radio and television stands together as a quelling 
force, distracting and entertaining large populations of citizens whose every thought is fed by 
a larger apparatus. With the availability and proliferation of reproductions, the notion of the 
authentic (in relation to perception) was and is put into crisis. On one hand, for Benjamin, 
“art will tackle the most difficult and most important [tasks] where it is able to mobilize the 
masses. It does so currently in film” (The Work of Art and Other Writings 40). But, as 
Benjamin explains, film creates a multilayered alteration of perception with rapid fire 
successions of images successfully distracting the viewer and reducing thought. The scale of 
the tension, and the stakes for art in navigating it, grows. Sontag observes, “[N]ewer 
technology provides a non-stop feed: as many images of disaster and atrocity as we can take 
time to look at …” (108). To speak of Rosler’s distinct choice for aesthetic action we must 
also be aware with Benjamin of how pain so often risks commodification in the way images 
stylize human suffering, making them palatable to the consumer. Regarding the distance 
created in photography, he explains, “What do we see? It has become more and more subtle, 
more and more modern, and the result is that it is not capable of photographing a tenement or 
a rubbish-heap without transfiguring it [. . .] in front of these, photography can only say, 
‘How beautiful’” (UB 94-95). Benjamin critiques the whitewashing of human suffering and 
hardship; he laments the replacement of these states with images suitable for comfortable 
consumption. How, then, can we unseat the immunity we have collectively developed to all 
that these images infer and the distraction or thoughtlessness they invite and sustain? 
Rosler herself struggles to answer these questions, though she clearly agrees with 
Benjamin’s position. In her series The Bowery in two inadequate descriptive systems (figure 
3.3), she purposefully omits the homeless men whom the work represents, thereby avoiding 
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the type of commodification objected to above. This body of work is as much about what is 
kept inside the picture frame as what is excluded. As a critique of photographic history, 
particularly the genre of social documentation described above, Rosler is able to sidestep the 
consumer impulse to which other photographers have fallen prey.  
What this specific move achieves is evident, in part, in how it deconstructs what 
Sontag noted regarding how “the excruciations of war, thanks to television, have devolved 
into a nightly banality” (108). Her statement reflects the term ascribed to the conflict in 
Figure 3.3: Martha Rosler, The Bowery in two inadequate descriptive systems. 
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Vietnam as the first living room war, with images from afar filtered into American homes. 
The choice of the word ‘banality’ is striking, immediately bringing to mind Arendt’s 
understanding of the evil perpetrated during WWII and the ethical duty individuals have to 
think beyond mere concessions to voices of authority. Otherwise, Sontag continues, “we 
[lose] our capacity to react” (RPO 108). And “[t]elevision (with its illusion of immediacy) 
distances—immures us in our own indifference” (AST 224). Rosler’s affect in the above 
presents a discrete case of evoking and challenging ongoing modes indifference and blind 
adherence to what Arendt had identified as “the heedless recklessness or hopeless confusion 
or complacent repetition of ‘truths’ which have become trivial or empty” (HC 5). The 
suggestion is that an aesthetic action may provoke, and may indeed already be, the ethical 
action inscribed in critical questioning and thought.  
 This point about the possibilities of an ethico-aesthetic action that could ‘think’ and 
‘engage’ the increasingly aestheticized forces enframing our air, our stories, and our sight, 
marks the fulcrum from which Rosler’s political intention and artistic action must be 
understood. She asks: “How does one address these banally profound issues of everyday life, 
thereby revealing the public and political in the personal? It seems reasonable to me to use 
forms that suggest and refer to mass-cultural forms without simply mimicking them” (Beshty 
118 emphasis mine). She speaks directly to Heidegger’s understanding that it is precisely 
within the danger that we will find the solutions to Dasein’s enframing. Rosler’s intervention 
in the problems that Sloterdijk, Benjamin, Adorno, Arendt, and Sontag have helped us 
elucidate is specifically borne out in her intervention in the conventional material of the 
photographic image. In choosing photomontage, Rosler connects to its rich history as a 
medium of political activism as embodied in Dada and Expressionism, notably in the 
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collages of Hannah Höch, John Heartfield, Raul Hausmann, et al. Her intervention literally 
reverses the inclination, noted by Benjamin, for images to make the plight of those in need 
consumable goods. In so doing, she challenges the separate categories of news and 
advertising lexicon, thus opening up new possibilities from within the predicaments 
described variously by Winter and Barthes. The results of such a poēisis recuperate meaning 
and refuel the elements of shock needed to elicit an awakening from the viewer, thereby 
interrupting the state of distraction with a space for the kind of reflection and thought that 
allowing the viewer to interpret the visible narrative.  
 As we move into the specific details of her materially based practice, we need to 
appreciate how Rosler’s first interventions cut through a well-established repression of coded 
messages not only on the side of (a) the aestheticization of violence, but also (b) the pitfalls 
of shifting art-institutional practices and priorities. There were the contextual forces of an art 
world in flux, and thus the question of how to promote radical, indeed political, changes 
within forms of visual expression. A silence pervading creative expression after World War 
II constrained social and political activism. Significant content was seemingly banished from 
the museums and galleries and artists appeared to support a post-war cultural amnesia, 
focusing solely on materiality and form. There is ample evidence of the abolition of content 
from any discussion of Modernist art, shifting the focus instead on a Neo-Kantian 
preoccupation with the visible form and ostensibly atemporal experiences of originality. At 
the same time artists began to exploit the commercialization of the time period, as seen in 
Warhol’s Soup Cans, Lichtenstein’s comic strips and numerous other Pop Art examples. But 
Rosler disavows the Aestheticism of Modernism—especially its strict assertion of art’s 
autonomy—and the opportunism of Pop Art by vigorously affirming the role of art as 
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interpreter of the zeitgeist. Some counter-currents were emerging within the politics-art 
interchange. Rosler notes,  
After the cultural heresies of the sixties, the neutralist cultural monolith 
began to crumble, and art with a conscious political orientation could enter 
the breach. Theories of culture (as opposed to simple ideologies and 
journalistic promotion) that began to gain currency in that period have 
proved useful to the development of an informed art practice. (Beshty 61) 
Concurrent with the intellectual and revolutionary climate of the sixties, Rosler originally 
chose to comment on our cultural blind spots, particularly regarding the Vietnam War, when 
she created her first series of collaged media images in House Beautiful to reveal the banality 
of the detached, consumerist life most Americans enjoyed from the safety of their homes. 
This preoccupation set the course for the way her action-oriented aesthetic would contest the 
myopic visions of a technological society. Rosler explains, “[T]here are fundamental 
theoretical issues that deserve airing before a mass audience; even to demonstrate how 
ideology is rooted in social relations is to advance a theory of culture” (Beshty 62). She 
clearly intended to start a counter-banality conversation—to stop her viewer in the normal 
course of life and force reflection about the war. “For Rosler, montage required a dialectical 
synthesis where new meaning could be produced—one imbued with a sharp political 
critique” (Zegher 80). She later repeated the impulse to create photomontage protests when 
the war in Iraq broke out in 2003—two years after 9/11. She believed the United States was 
perpetuating its past mistakes, involving troops in foreign conflicts based on misinformation 
and myth. Thus, in both cases of conflict Rosler broke from unthinking positions, interrupted 
the space of consumerist frivolity and created an indictment of the times.  
We must not regard these choices as merely the output of a reactionary aesthetic. Her 
action shows traces of Benjamin’s account of the relationship between the terms distraction 
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and destruction, “as the subjective and objective sides, respectively, of one and the same 
process” (The Work of Art and Other Writings 56). Rosler felt this process to be the case in, 
for example, the way the Iraq War began on the manufactured premise of the existence of 
weapons of mass destruction, a presumed fact widely disseminated via news outlets and 
media platforms, underscoring the capacity and power to sway wide audiences. Benjamin’s 
dramatic epilogue anticipated this distracting/destructive misuse of information by describing 
the ultimate fascist aestheticization of mass destruction. The studied tenor of his warning 
echoes in the studied technique of Rosler’s work, engaging critically in the way shifts in the 
cultural substructure directly impact the superstructure’s cultural production. Rosler’s art 
self-consciously takes on the thoughtless acceptance of the information machine and its 
strategic preservation of structural norms. Within the dialectical struggle between emerging 
activist voices and adherents to the sameness manufactured in the media, Rosler found her 
artistic voice as an artist-activist committed to collective responsibility. We now move 
forward with a clearer picture of the ways images function as perpetrators of myth, and with 
an understanding of Rosler’s position as an ‘artist-author’ vis-à-vis the politics of her epoch 
and the choices she made.  
 
§ 3.3: ROSLER AS ARTIST-PRODUCER + THE DECIPHERING OF MEANING IN REPRODUCTIONS 
To effectively read Rosler’s artworks we need to consider how her aspirations to 
address cultural conditions and political entanglements stand with Benjamin’s notion of 
Author as Producer. We have already begun to see, in broad terms, a strident ‘tendency’ at 
work in her relation to the enframing atmospherics of her day. The details of her material 
production, as much as the arguments she voices, furnish such tendency in a way that absorbs 
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yet also empowers viewers. We have introduced how her Bringing the War Home series, for 
example, was accomplished through what may have seemed like crude appropriations of lo-fi 
publications. But why attempt an incisive message by what seems like a modest means? She 
explains: “[A]ll of my work is meant to look completely off so that you, as the viewer, could 
have your own point of view on what you were seeing rather than be impressed by any level 
of technical achievement” (Rear Window). She later elaborates: “I am a rationalist, and if you 
will, a Brechtian. I prefer to move back from excess expression in favor of a kind of quieter 
presentation” (Schwartz interview). These comments connect her directly with Benjamin’s 
assertion that in order for creative work to be relevant and of high quality, “it must be 
inserted into the context of living social relations” that are “determined by production 
relations” (UB 87). Rosler’s execution of this dual necessity in fact sense of necessity helps 
resolve Benjamin’s unsettled tension between aesthetic ‘distraction’ as a vulnerable 
absorption into the work and also a potentially powerful political device. Distraction’s 
positive character consists in how “a new kind of learning” results from a collision of 
“educational value and consumer value” (57).5 Rosler invests in this possibility without 
simply asserting it, for the works animate the need for thoughtful responses to the exchange 
between art and its percipient.  
‘Tendency’ is also evident in her stylistic priorities. Rather than follow in the path of 
establishment artists and related styles of expression, she made a conscious choice to 
question her surroundings and demand of her audience both thought and active participation. 
Her work and the positions it sets forth straddle the contextual forces and the theory 
emerging from such an epoch. As Karen Moss summarizes in her essay “Matha Rosler’s 
Photomontages and Garage Sales,” her “modus operandi is both dialectical and interstitial: 
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she works between the actual and the metaphorical, or the real and the symbolic, and 
explores the spaces between private and public, personal and social, everyday life and the art 
world” (686). In this way her body of work calls to mind Benjamin’s politicization of art in 
the face of fascist norms and the matter of the ultimate aestheticization of destruction. In her 
own words, “[I] realized war was an exigent problem affecting my entire generation” and it 
would be irresponsible “to not comment” on such events (Rear Window). But art critic Jerry 
Salz interprets the work differently, descrying its arc as a shallow repetition of Rosler’s 
‘glory days’:  
Four decades later, Rosler turns out not to have changed the look of her 
own work at all. In “Great Power,” her current skin-deep effort at 
Mitchell-Innes & Nash, Rosler tries to turn back the clock to her glory 
days, essentially remaking the Vietnam series. Only now she’s inserting 
images of models into pictures of the Iraq War. Clearly, there are parallels 
between the two wars, and activist art is valid. But Rosler lapses into 
simplistic nostalgia and undermines her older work while basically 
making pretty war porn. The only thing her work says is that fashion 
designers and women who like to shop caused two wars. (“Welcome to the 
Sixties”) 
If Saltz is right then the author-producer superlative would not fit. But Salz fails to 
understand the conceptual significance of using reproduced imagery and the gesture of 
redirecting meaning through repetition, and he overlooks the performative drive built into 
Rosler’s methods of distribution and its fundamentally democratic ethos. In response to Salz, 
Rosler points to the senseless repetition of unfounded conflicts that send young soldiers into 
wars without end. She asks, “[W]ho is stupid?” (Schwartz interview). She elaborates in a 
New York Times interview: “The downside was that people could say, ‘She’s revisiting 
something she did 30 years ago,’ . . . But I thought that actually was a plus, because I wanted 
to make the point that with all the differences, this is exactly the same scenario. We haven’t 
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advanced at all in the way we go to war” (“Glossy Idealism on the Front Lines”). What 
Rosler sought was “to crystalize popular sentiment” and “create more action against the war” 
through a thinly veiled propagandistic campaign (Schwartz). Such an author-producer ideal is 
applied practically in, for example, how she left her artworks unsigned and undated, vastly 
reducing the potential monetary value of ‘authorship’ then understood.  
Benjamin’s aesthetic paradigm calls for the careful, self-aware coordination of an 
artist’s voice, position, and of course works. The coordination is particularly difficult when 
the aesthetic and political stakes are at a high cultural pitch. As the keynote speaker at the 
Creative Time Summit, Rosler acknowledged the ongoing “neo-liberal devastation” that has 
defined her life and career, while admitting her oeuvre is a directly related examination of the 
resulting class issues (Creative Time). The self-awareness shows discernment on two fronts 
and accords with how Benjamin envisions a radical, active spirit. He underscores the need for 
authors not only to have the potential for expressing the correct tendency (one in support of 
the proletariat) but to foster a deepened understanding of modern consciousness, recognizing 
all the while the impact of technological advances on society. The mission of the author/artist 
“is not to report but to fight; not to assume the spectator’s role but to intervene actively” (UB 
88). The two-sided call to promote thinking and embody action comes, in an interesting way 
for Benjamin, from ideas connecting his Artwork and ‘Author as Producer’ texts. Both 
underscore Benjamin’s insistence on the struggle against corrupted power structures through 
literature and art. How does Rosler evidence a similar insistence? As noted, she lends a 
strong voice to this conversation in her avoidance of traditional exhibition strategies in favor 
of direct contact with her audience through lo-fi distribution and performative works. She 
critically subverts power structures and questions their role within cultural exchange, and she 
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positively maintains a strong sense of responsibility for the ways her artworks are received. 
She states: “I particularly think that producers need to be aware perhaps not in the moment of 
making, but certainly in the moment of distribution—of exhibition—of their work, of what is 
its consequence in exchange with the public, as we are agreeing . . . that it’s a transaction. 
There’s always a transaction” (Schwartz interview). This discernment regarding the 
‘transactional’ nature of an aesthetic enterprise evidences her resolve to manage the 
coordination (of voice, position, and works) in a way that pushes the boundaries of creative 
purpose and expression.  
But can such a practice satisfy the author-producer criteria in a way that embodies, in 
a more contemporary sense, an emancipation from enframing? For Benjamin, the “author as 
producer” stands within the modes of production of the epoch, working from within the tools 
of modernity driving progress. Again, we see a parallel with Heidegger’s concept that the 
saving power coexists within the dangers of alienation. In addition, the mode of production, 
the means of distribution and reproduction also democratize access to writing, offering the 
possibility for active participation in the creation of ideas. This specific connection to modes 
of production highlights an artist’s use of a particular medium as a means of reaching a 
broader audience. Until writing or creative output become fully accessible, the separation of 
the intellectual, cultured class remains embedded in bourgeois tendency. The stakes are great 
because the line between a propagandistic work devoid of quality or truthfulness and work 
that emerges from an authentic consideration of one’s place within the structures of society 
and production can be hard to navigate. For Benjamin, the writer literally joins rank with 
class struggle and must feel the struggle’s aims intrinsically. Rosler’s use of reproduction 
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further underscores Benjamin’s assertions as it foregrounds a democratized medium as a 
carrier of disruptive thought.  
This progressive, technologically driven intention can be understood in a preparatory 
way through the photomontages of Höch, Heartfield, et al., whose creations Benjamin 
applauds for their resistance to fascist norms and their promotion of revolutionary 
engagement. The effect was achieved through a combination of word and image, using 
reproductions and re-presention to awaken the viewer. This method works similarly to the 
surgical approach to film as a montage of clips and differing viewpoints. Rosler’s interest in 
this medium is well known, thus connecting to Benjamin’s vision of the author-producer not 
just in principle, but through a genealogy of practice. In a presentation at the European 
Graduate School, she explains: 
The origins of photomontage as an aesthetic-political technique are not 
certain, but the Dadaists used it to disrupt the smooth, seamless surface of 
quotidian urban existence. Before them, Soviet constructivists used them 
to suggest the nearness of the just society and the complexity of social 
relations. Drawing in some respects upon their example, the German 
photomontagist John Heartfield still provides an unsurpassed example of 
political photomontage. In the 1930s, Heartfield, employing painstaking 
techniques and a sizable staff, produced photomontages with integral texts 
for the left-wing mass-circulation magazine Arbeiter-Illustrierte 
Zeitung (Worker Illustrated Journal), or AIZ. In every photomontage was 
the implicit message that photography alone cannot ‘tell the truth’ and also 
the reminder that fact itself is a social construction. This is not meant to 
deny that photographs provide some sort of evidence, only to suggest that 
the truth-value of photography is often overrated or mislocated. (Rosler, 
“Image Simulations, Computer Manipulations: Some Considerations”) 
John Heartfield’s 1930 rotogravure titled Those Who Read Bourgeois Newspapers Become 
Deaf and Dumb illustrates Rosler’s point (figure 3.4). Created for the magazine AIZ (Arbeiter 
Illustrierte Zeitung, or Workers Illustrated News), it quite sparingly demonstrates the 
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potential effect of propagandist news. The figure in the frame is faceless, his features 
concealed by sheets of printed news. The less-than-subtle reference to the term ‘cabbage 
head’ infers that the news reduces its readers to stupidity. Heartfield used mechanically 
reproduced images and news, reconfigured in response to the context in which he worked. 
Like the mantle Rosler would pick up decades later, Heartfield uses his medium to expose 
disquieting truths. Hannah Höch delivers a similarly trenchant critique in her feminist-rooted 
political collage work, as seen previously in Cut with the Kitchen Knife Dada through the 
Last Weimar Beer-Belly Cultural Epoch of Germany, described in chapter 2 (Figure 2.2).  
 
As artists of ‘tendency,’ both Heartfield and Höch stood by their political convictions 
and need to expose corruption. Their impact resonates when Benjamin quotes Lichtenberg: 
Figure 3.4: 
John Heartfield 
Those Who Read Bourgeois 
Newspapers Become Blind and Deaf. 
Photomontage: 38.1x28cm / 1930 
Arstor database: UCSD collection 
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“It is not what a man is convinced of that matters, but what his convictions make of him’” 
(UB 98). In other words, “The best opinion is of no use if it does not make something useful 
of those who hold it” (UB 98). Thinking, therefore, serves little purpose if it fails to manifest 
action. This statement reflects Arendt’s ideas connecting thinking with action – the exchange 
between vita contemplative and vita activa, Similarly for Benjamin, “The writer can only 
prescribe such an attitude in the place where he is active—that is to say, in his writing” (UB 
98). Rosler fulfills this creative political role. She shows that a stinging indictment of our 
culture and its myths can be conveyed by means of appropriation, re-presentation and a bare 
minimum of signs. In her own words, she sought to “[m]ake art about the commonplace, art 
that illuminates social life. I want to enlist art to question the mythical explanations of 
everyday life that take shape as an optimistic rationalism and to explore the relationships 
between individual consciousness, family life, and the culture of monopoly capitalism” 
(Rosler, EGS interview, emphasis added). Rosler’s intentions bind her to Benjamin’s 
characterization of an author with a correct tendency, and the way her work questions 
extrinsic forces lends it a sharp, political focus that marks the difference between merely 
supplying a production apparatus and fundamentally changing it.  
 There is a distinctly ethical directive and means at play in how Rosler’s work 
specifically applies these intentions. Her choice of the word ‘mythical’ (above) is significant 
and resonates with Barthes’ dissection of myth. Here the ethic of the aesthetic consists in how 
it understands what must be deconstructed. A system or society that is waging war, and 
therefore sending young men and women to the battlefields abroad, needs to be accountable 
for its widespread oblivion. In addition, the system must confront its constant consumption of 
imagery without giving thought to content. Here the ethic of the aesthetic in turn consists in 
   181 
how it performs the deconstruction. Within both editions of House Beautiful: Bringing the 
War Home, through the simple act of cutting and reconfiguring mass media images, Rosler 
makes a statement that simultaneously illustrates the horrors of our foreign invasions while 
turning the mirror toward her audience – the U.S. citizens whose superficial consumer lives 
were largely unaffected by the carnage overseas. Her imagery consists of appropriated mass 
media images—an incongruous combination of news photographs and lifestyle spreads—
blending the “glossy-aesthetic Architectural Digest interiors with war photography from Life 
Magazine taken during the Vietnam War, pointing out the extreme discrepancy between 
happy consumerist society and its ugly political side” (Rumas “Pull Up Those PIIGS”). The 
simple yet powerful gesture accords with what Benjamin appreciated about the way 
“montage interrupts the context into which it is inserted,” making its impact all the more 
powerful (UB 99). For Rosler, social insertion in the mode of interruption not only to 
implicates but also enlists the viewer as activist. She, like Hannah Höch, takes the very 
images that saturate the social experience and reconfigures their context to critical effect. 
One literally recognizes the source material, but then enters into startled self-reflection rather 
than habitual absorption. The strategy at the same time deconstructs ‘myths’ on the side of 
the art world. Her initial impulse to distribute these images as photocopies in publications 
aimed at anti-war groups further undercuts the traditional value works have as art. Catherine 
de Zegher explains: 
Of course, this perspective is fundamentally at odds with one of the art 
world’s central myths, the axiom that rather than determining content, art 
discourse is a secondary reading of the subject matter resident within the 
work. Indeed, this level of importance attributed to discourse in the 
construction of meaning has led her to see her art making as inextricably 
linked to her activities as a writer, teacher, and public speaker. (Zegher 
103) 
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Speaking at once to the broad terrain of social myths and back to the specific terrain of art-
critical myths, Rosler’s production and exhibition choices support her desire to be 
‘instrumental’ and remain on an ethical plane. 
 To ask about the works’ ethical character is also to inquire as to an awakening of 
thought assists in shifting an intersubjective responsibility. Such shifting must carefully 
navigate Benjamin’s understanding of the tension between distraction and destruction. 
Distraction, derived from the term Zerstreuung, can also mean entertainment, and Benjamin 
elsewhere states that “the work of art undertakes to produce entertainment in a responsible 
manner” (The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility, and Other 
Writings on Media, 57, emphasis added). The term exposes both sides of the potential 
outcome of mass-produced media. To hope for responsibility in the way new art forms are 
disseminated is to expect the kind of thinking demanded throughout Arendt’s writing; it is to 
presume the author has the ethical foundation needed to conduct herself in the interest of a 
larger population. This ethical foundation permeates the artworks of Heartfield, Höch and 
other artist-producers seeking to bring truth into light in a Heideggerian unconcealment or 
alētheia. So too Rosler says of her process: 
There is another critical issue to consider: the choosing or seeking of an 
audience. I feel that the art world does not suffice, and I try to make my 
work accessible to as many people outside the art audience as I can 
effectively reach. Cultural products can never bring about substantive 
change in society, yet they are indispensable to any movement that is 
working to bring about such changes. The clarification of vision is a first 
step toward reasonably and humanely changing the world. (Rosler, DD 8) 
Rosler reached her audience by means of “agit-prop, distributed to anti-war organizations 
and groups reproduced as Xerox copies.” She incorporated “no slogans” within the picture 
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frame — just images (Meister MoMA). She consciously sought to provoke shock and 
recognition in the viewer by means of “social judgments as abstract attachment of thought” 
(Meister).  
 As noted, repeating the series in 2004 put Rosler under fire in a world where originality 
and newness are celebrated. Yet, we were, as a nation, repeating similar offenses, and 
reasserting the content a generation later simply underscores this fact; aesthetic repetition is 
warranted where societal repetition shows a harrowing forgetfulness of the past. Showing 
and troubling this ongoing cycle, when well-executed, makes for a consistent statement and 
contribution to social activism. Rosler’s collages echo anti-war sentiments and the U.S. 
predilection for extending its reach beyond its appropriate scope. Her collages also highlight 
the consumeristic narcissism pervasive in our culture.  
 One might argue that I have been blurring the line between ‘author’ and ‘artist’ in order 
to align Rosler with Benjamin’s vision for the author-producer. That concern would show an 
overly narrow conception of what he means by ‘authorship.’ But the concern also gives us an 
opportunity to press now in more detail into how Rosler’s use of visual language models an 
artist-producer affect. We will first address the relationship between author qua artist and her 
audience in terms of how meaning is imparted with a focus on the reciprocity of the 
exchange. Rosler’s disavowal of modernist aestheticism remains important on this score, for 
it will enhance our understanding of the more structural elaboration of how images function. 
It is noteworthy that Both Benjamin and Barthes examine the functions of both author and 
reader within the interpretive process, though approaching the topic from vastly diverging 
angles.  
 Turning first to Benjamin’s conception of the functions of author and reader in the 
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interpretive process, it is helpful to draw on Angela Mitropoulos, who notes: “Few of those 
situated it as long ago as Walter Benjamin did, not only in relation to labor, but in terms of 
the changing economic patterns and technologies that served to redefine both authorship and 
labor and, for that matter, any distinctions between them. This, in brief, is Benjamin’s 
singular contribution to a discussion about authorship” (Mitropoulos). In other words, for 
Benjamin the author belongs to a specific class of avant-garde creators of meaning, while 
still permitting the reader of their works the open space for thinking and interpretation. While 
discussing the qualitative superiority of epic theatre, for example, he says, it “discovers 
[situations]. This discovery is accomplished by means of the interruption of sequences . . . . it 
arrests the action in its course, and thereby compels the listener to adopt an attitude vis-à-vis 
the process, the actor vis-à-vis his role” (UB 95). The interruption allows the interpretive 
faculty of the listener or reader to remain active and engaged; by means of a caesura, the 
listener’s attention is more acutely focused. The point recalls Heidegger’s attention to the 
phenomenon of bringing-forth—an ‘unconcealing of Dasein’s ownmost potentiality’ that 
enables creative capacities to subvert the prevailing modes of ‘challenging-forth’ that 
otherwise reduce being to a ‘standing reserve.’ A similar correlation is found in Benjamin’s 
demand that the author thinks: “You may have noticed that the reflections [. . .] make only 
one demand on the writer: the demand to think, to reflect upon his position in the production 
process” (UB 101). The demand calls for the ‘tendency’ we have discussed and accredited to 
Rosler. More than just ‘thinking’ on the level of intent, says Benjamin, “the right tendency 
must, of necessity, show every quality as well” (UB 86, emphasis added). Like Heidegger’s 
insistence on a careful Gelassenheit in technē, Benjamin’s position insists on an author’s 
responsibility for the other and an awareness of one’s aesthetic impact in the production of 
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meaning. But while he elaborates on the ideal role of an author-producer as one who 
advances class struggle, he does not detail the ways such momentum and progress can be 
achieved.  
 To complete the picture, we must turn to Barthes. The methods of imparting meaning 
are foregrounded in his analysis of the structures of language, both written and visual, which 
serve to drive underlying messages into the minds of their recipients. This second mechanism 
operates more structurally than Benjamin’s more politically motivated propositions. 
Moreover, Barthes stresses the role of the reader in the way narrative is translated. Each 
reader will approach a work of art or text with innate sets of codes and experiences. An 
understanding of the content will depend on the reader’s particular intellectual background or 
experience. In essence, the author becomes an obsolete concept for Barthes as meaning is 
altered with each individual reading of a text or image. Does this place our rendering of 
author-producer as artist-producer at cross-purposes? There remains important room for 
Benjamin’s author in this exchange. As though directly agreeing with Barthes’ position, 
Benjamin injects, “This apparatus will be the better, the more consumers it brings in contact 
with the production process—in short, the more readers or spectators it turns into 
collaborators” (UB 98). No longer passive recipients of externally imposed texts, the reader, 
in essence, joins the author as co-creator in a common struggle for emancipation. Rosler, as 
noted, insists on audience participation, making her viewer a collaborator. We do not need to 
jettison authorship altogether but do need to supplement Benjamin’s position with the way 
Barthes’ stress on how the reader enhances the work-character of the aesthetic experience in 
terms of activating a reflection on the ideological forces at play.  
 Still, we need to examine how Rosler will purposefully reverse the way in which myths 
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are apprehended, turning them on themselves and undermining their coercive power. Myth, 
for Barthes, is a secondary signification in which the sign is returned to the status of signifier. 
The meaning in myth is deliberately created in service of a broader, often negative, 
ideological function. Hence myth has the potential to repress interpretation and instead 
conceal meaning, keeping its motives and distortions undetected. For evidence, Barthes 
offers detailed analyses of a Paris Match cover (Figure 3.5) and an advertisement for 
Panzani Pasta (Figure 3.5) in both Myth Today and Rhetoric of the Image, both with content 
that reinforces political agendas. Barthes’ understanding of the function of myth stands as a 
caution for anyone confronted with widely disseminated imagery.6 In the case of the Panzani 
Pasta advertisement (a brand he considers quintessentially Italian), Barthes addresses the 
ways content is delivered to an audience (Barthes, IMT 32-52) (Figure 3.4).7 Here he finds 
modes of anchorage and relay, terms coined in response to the presence of text 
accompanying the advertisement. Text leads the reader to specific messages, leveraging the 
symbolic power of words and guiding the outcome of their relationship with image. This 
teaming extends the potential of visual syntax further. For Barthes, the content of an image – 
as it communicates meaning – can be dissected by means of its codes and lexia, or units of 
reading, and the layers of denotation and connotation therein. Multiple interpretations can in 
turn occur. Again, the viewer (as much a producer as a consumer) must have an active role in 
deciphering imagery.  
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 The tools Barthes offers for decoding meaning are useful in today’s geopolitical 
climate with its myths that incentivize consumerism, and also help us appreciate the ability of 
artworks to operate as sites in which ‘readers’ can reconfigure those narratives that uphold 
and advertise institutions of power. For Rosler, the very presence of myth motivates her 
interventions in the grammar of imagery, once again revealing her role as author qua artist-
producer. While Benjamin lays the emphasis on a work’s proper political tendency, Barthes 
ultimately attends to the vocabulary needed for deciphering images, sharing the task of 
understanding with the author himself. Both foci demand that aesthetic works require a depth 
of engagement and participation in order to convert a quotidian state of distraction8 into the 
action of ethical thinking.  
 
Figures 3.4 + 3.5 
The Panzani advertisement and Paris Match cover so critical to Barthes analysis. Artstor database: Getty Collection 
   188 
§ 3.4: AN ETHICO-POLITICAL READING OF ROSLER’S VISUAL WORK 
 We have begun to consider how Rosler’s work finds its place within the overarching 
ethical response to Heidegger’s plea, providing an opening for thinking capable of producing 
self-reflection and inspiring fundamental change. In response to Benjamin’s concerns and in 
the absence of an original work with which to interact, the ultimate gesture of authenticity 
lies in the provocation of thought, stirring the viewer out of complacency and distraction and 
into the open region for free thought (Gelassenheit). Her action-oriented aesthetic functions 
instrumentally, solidifying her role as an artist-producer who concretizes the convergence of 
ethical obligation with emancipatory modes of poēisis and alētheia. Her work, properly 
understood, stresses the agency inherent in each of us as percipients of artworks. Two works 
in particular will help us better understand the systematic reversal of myth that Rosler 
achieves through her reconfigurations of media-produced compositions. Here we will look 
for her material configuration of three specific concerns detailed above: the persistent 
relationship between enframing qua alienation, the prevalence of myth and violence, and the 
systematic dumbing down of the viewer’s mind as a consequence of consumerism and 
rampant, technologically driven imagery. Doing so will help us further examine our 
investigation into art’s potential to draw us into authentic participation in the praxis of 
‘saving’ powers.  
 The first artwork, Balloons (Figure 3.6), is from the initial series House Beautiful: 
Bringing the War Home and dates back to 1972. The second artwork Photo Op (Figure 3.7) 
was created in response to the Iraq War begun in the spring of 2003 during the George W. 
Bush administration. The ability of both series to transcend their historicity is striking and 
establishes them as what Arendt would term durable thought-things. They overcome 
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Agamben’s concern that, paraphrasing Benjamin, “ the historical index contained in the 
images of the past indicates that these images may achieve legibility only in a determined 
moment of their history” (WA 53-54). Forty years separate the two artistic gestures, and, in 
Rosler’s words, “the visual landscape in the magazines is somewhat different” (Rear Window 
interview). But while the magazines from which she appropriated her images show the 
imprint of a particular epoch, the power of the resulting message has not diminished.  
 
Figure 3.6: Balloons, collage created in 1972 as part of the first House Beautiful Series in response to Vietnam. 
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Figure 3.7: Photo Op, collage created in 2003 as part of the second House Beautiful Series in response to the Iraq war. 
  
 The signs Rosler produced reside in the interstice separating time and place and, in so 
doing, create an enduring message. She describes both series as “collisions in space [and 
time] about the war” (Meister) and continues by explaining:,  
I began making agitational works ‘about’ the Vietnam War, collaging 
magazine images of the casualties and combatants of the war—usually by 
noted war photographers in mass market magazines—with magazine 
images that defined an idealized middle-class life at home. I was trying to 
show that the ‘here’ and the ‘there’ of our world picture, defined by our 
naturalized accounts as separate or even opposite, were one. (355) 
This unification of our domestic world with the endless ‘tissues of horror’ documented by 
war photographers brings to bear intersubjective responsibility and the ethical position of an 
artist-producer. It is also important to understand that the mechanics operating within an 
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artwork facilitate an urgent disruption of norms. It is not enough to know Rosler’s work is 
revolutionary per Benjamin’s prescription; one must also understand how the work functions 
structurally.  
 Returning to Barthes’ ascription of interpretive power to the reader/viewer, I recognize 
that the lush interiors and Vera Wang fashions Rosler has chosen belong to the privileged 
‘one percent’ or Western society. One must understand that she has purposefully chosen to 
include these in order to prompt in viewers a personal recognition of the objects and 
environments she is in the act of critically reconfiguring. Rosler’s structuring of meaning 
relies on these visual semiotic triggers, or connotative values, in Barthes’ parlance, in which 
case his unveiling of ideological codes (though since disputed by scholars) is still salient to 
this conversation. Because Rosler layers her images with disparate magazine spreads, 
ranging from fashion and home goods to photojournalistic depictions of war, the 
connotations are removed from their original mythological context and remixed. This affect 
recalls the previous definition of myth, in which the signified is returned to the status of sign, 
creating secondary layers of meaning. Our collective reading, therefore, depends on the 
audience’s visual literacy and the acuity of the artist in applying conventionally legible signs.  
 Not all content is universal, however, as Barthes elaborates in both Rhetoric of the 
Image and The Pleasure of the Text. He expands upon the artwork’s plurality of meaning that 
is dependent entirely on its reader’s background and emotional life, or his or her idiolect, and 
proposes that once a reading is made, the content is unpacked and interpreted by all that the 
viewer has lived and known. Images connect to intimate interior texts. Mimetic associations 
speak to a broader audience and meaning can be imparted if an artist consciously selects 
signs that can be similarly decoded by a larger population.  As though illustrating Barthes’ 
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analysis of structure, Rosler’s constructions affect a convergence of iconic imagery, mixed 
together with a devastating plot twist, thereby turning the tables on both the media and the 
complicit population at large. The content crosses the bounds of Marxism, Feminism and 
notions of media and mass production.  
 Balloons illustrates of this blending of ideas (Figure 3.6). The image speaks to the 
televised presence of war inside American homes. It blends the photojournalistic images of 
the devastation of war that were published in Life Magazine with the self-indulgent home 
décor found in the pages of House Beautiful or Architectural Digest. Rosler aimed to create 
believable interior spaces in which two disparate scenes would collide, simultaneously 
drawing the viewer in and striking him with an unexpected reflexive force. She referred to 
these as tableaux in stasis9 (Meister). How does the strategy succeed? The composition is 
divided by a sleek wall, delineating an affluent, modern architectural space. The left side of 
the picture plane is bright, with floor to ceiling windows illuminating what can be interpreted 
as a living room. The right side of the frame is darker, creating a more closed environment, 
held between a dividing wall and the suggestion of another structural level. It is within this 
darkened container that the narrative disjuncture occurs. Rosler invites the viewer to become 
an active participant in the unfolding scene, placing him at the top of the stairs, in close 
proximity to two foreground figures, a visibly distraught Vietnamese woman carrying a 
wounded or dying child in her arms. A strong story line is unfolding, laden with unsettling 
and contradictory signs. All formal elements converge, shifting meaning and awakening 
collective accountability within the work’s narrative.  
 Our position vis-à-vis the picture is crucial to its impact; we are, in effect, placed at the 
top of the stairs, as though greeting intruders. In Rosler’s words, the viewer is caught 
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“identifying with while simultaneously refusing to” participate in the scene (Meister). The 
collision brings to bear our ethical position toward the other. Our internal dialogue might 
continue, “No that isn’t me, that is the other”—a response that allows for a separation from 
the content. And yet, the exchange begs the question: “Where do you stand in relationship to 
that which is depicted?” (Meister). There is an exchange happening between artist and 
viewer, in essence forcing an engaged reading, and it is within this insistent gesture that we 
see, once again, Rosler’s expression of author-producer. The encounter prompts us to 
consider our relationship—our Being-toward—that exists a priori to the contemplation of the 
work. The shared space created within the frame is crucial for us to feel the responsibility 
that befalls us. Rosler is “giving the viewer a place to stand” and compelling our instinctive 
response. She specifically invites the viewer to “stand in the work and have a point of view 
on it” (Schwartz interview). As a place of thought and action, the position is a subtle but 
powerful shift from what Heidegger termed the ‘standing reserve.’ From within this 
reconfigured space we are permitted to examine and question—in essence, deconstructing the 
operating myths enframing us and thus undermining distraction as a negative force.  
 The image contains details such as a well-appointed porch with a wicker swing chair, 
high ceilings and neatly arranged furnishings appropriate to the interior design aesthetic of 
the late sixties. In the far corner of the living room sits a deflated bouquet of balloons, 
indicating a celebration—perhaps a birthday party for a child. Rosler is consciously “judging 
social status through the various levels of appearance” (Meister). This ascription of meaning 
is derived from the connotative value of the piece that relies on the viewer’s internal 
language and experience. The reading forces an engagement, not because the denoted space 
is of particular interest, but rather through the jarring juxtaposition of the human figures in 
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the foreground whose mere presence forces a questioning. As Moss observes, the work is a 
“biting critique of domestic complacency, US militarism, and the inundation of violent 
imagery via television, film and print media during the Vietnam War era” (Moss 690). Rosler 
is making clear “social judgments” without attaching either text or slogan to the task. Her 
meaning is all the stronger for this omission. The woman placed in the foreground is foreign 
and positioned in such a way as to appear frantically climbing the stairs of this otherwise 
tranquil home. The power of this image is embodied in her facial expression, a fleeting 
moment captured in time, in a faraway land, as a war is waging. In the same manner as she 
allows us to read Benjamin with enhancements from Barthes’ conception of layered 
meanings, her work animates Sontag and Sloterdijk. The elements in this photomontage force 
an encounter with Sloterdijk’s atmo-terrorism; the child’s bodily wounds might be 
attributable to Agent Orange, an herbicide and defoliant used during the Vietnam War, which 
caused environmental destruction and severe health problems. As Sloterdijk astutely notes, 
“Terrorism, [. . . ] comprises a form of violence against the very human-ambient ‘things’ 
without which people cannot remain people” (25) and transforms our “immediate 
atmospheric envelope” (25). Rosler’s tiny, scalded child, whose tensed body and elevated 
knee indicate extreme pain, encapsulates an entire history of chemical warfare. The image 
resonates with (and reinvigorates) the belief that children should never be the victims of war 
nor should our environment be transformed into a weapon of war. 10  
 Rosler succeeds in making visual deeply held convictions about the wars in Vietnam 
and Iraq, and our subsequent forays into Afghanistan. This is not a matter of polite inquiry, 
or what Barthes would call studium. The visual disconnect between all that occupies the 
frame speaks simply and articulately of an alarming and growing cultural narcissism. While 
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pointed and critical, these visual elements reveal a truth regarding the current human 
condition and the troubling emotional distance we afford ourselves from devastation 
overseas. The need for awakening underscores the dangers of enframing qua alienation and 
of the banal distraction that conceals it or copes with it. The visual language Rosler chooses 
is significant. Looking at this image, or assemblage of media imagery, the viewer can 
interpret it as a document, a statement of time and place, or an archive that challenges us to 
reconstruct the layers of our history. Rosler is curating the elements present in the tableau, 
thereby guiding the viewer’s response and allowing the interpreting faculties of her viewer 
full engagement in the ultimate production of meaning. Much the way Derrida acknowledges 
the absence that is felt in the archive, an absence experienced in omission, what the image 
frame contains simultaneously creates exclusion. The limits of both photography and media 
output are felt deeply. The images are cropped, cut, reassembled and purposefully blended to 
sharpen her message. The overlapping of disparate signs changes the point of view and 
points directly at us, the audience, highlighting the detachment that results from our 
consumption of both objects and media—something Benjamin, Adorno and Arendt would 
support. Rosler penetrates our perspectives by way of this contradiction. Moving forward to 
2004, she finds the United States once again involved in foreign conflicts that are initiated 
under false pretexts with no endgame in sight. Rosler felt compelled to engage in another 
political critique, especially of the advance of distraction wrought by our addiction to 
technological devices and other superficial concerns.  
 We have seen that Balloons allows us to negotiate the multiple planes upon which 
Rosler operates. It provides evidence underscoring her visual strategy, creating a startling 
overturning of myth and returning to the reproduction its ability to prompt thought. Within 
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the frame one finds economic disparities and moments of dissonance, along with an alarming 
notation of ongoing acts of atmo-terrorism. Photo Op brings us closer to contemporary visual 
triggers and signs (Figure 3.7). A Barbie-like double of a model holds a cell phone in the air 
adoringly with a visibly animated expression. Her repetition underscores a world of 
simulacra in which the original is lost. It also speaks to the uniformity that permeates our 
society.  
 Rosler adds complexity to this scene by including the black-and-white image of a 
soldier’s face in each tiny cell phone screen, demonstrating the frivolous idolatry the woman 
exhibits toward the simulacra of men at war. Not only is the woman portrayed as shallow and 
self-absorbed, she is the one turning her back on the horrors unfolding in the imagery behind 
her. The message is brutally confrontational; women are represented as sexual, superficial 
beings, thoughtless and preoccupied with material consumerism—cell phones, shoes, 
handbags, makeup. There is certainly a reciprocity here between the kind of interiors 
FIGURE 3.7: 
Photo Op, collage created in 2003 as 
part of the second House Beautiful 
Series in response to the Iraq war. 
Collage on paper: 2004 
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represented in the earlier work and the kind of image chosen for the women here; they are 
both of the ‘ideal’ kind, the aspirational (superficial), not exactly the ‘everyday’ in the sense 
of common lived experience. They represent what the media and marketers propose as 
desirable through the myths that they actively produce. Rosler’s choices are intentional and 
reveal Adorno’s culture industry at work.  
 Viewing Photo Op, we realize the children placed in the modernist chairs are dead, 
clearly resulting from the violence depicted in the background. Rosler is altering our notion 
of news images by overlapping disparate pieces of information in a way that makes us deeply 
uncomfortable. While soldiers are dying in aimless, unprovoked wars, young model-like 
Barbie-women adhere to simulacra. With dead children draped on modern, opulent furniture, 
she rubs our noses in the complacency that marks our culture. Rosler uses a constructed 
image that could not result in a more cutting, poignant document. The further we delve into 
the image the more horrific its content – children have been murdered and war continues in 
full swing. Danger looms large outside the vast, modern picture window, outside the so-
called sanctuary of the American family home. The soldiers in the background bring the 
viewer back to the Barbie girls whose screens contain their images, as though cycling us 
from background to foreground, thereby magnifying the effect.  
 The double figure in the front right presumes a representation of reality. Rosler counts 
on our media exposure and understanding of the visual vocabulary she deploys to predict the 
viewer’s reactions, and in this way her work translates into “an emotional recognition 
coupled with a critical intellectual understanding of the systematic meaning of the work, its 
meaning in relation to common issues” (Beshty 119). The internal conflicts arise when we 
view fashion alongside war, children and death, home and explosions, consumerism and 
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violence, and so forth. In sum, she cleverly crafts complex collage scenes in which the 
viewer is complicit. Connotations morph and the message is transformed. The lexia of 
advertising photography set against the language deployed by news media creates a subset 
that evades the normal pitfalls of mythmaking. Rosler manipulates the ideological undertones 
of both genres of imagery.  
 We must not overlook the fact that the use of photographs is a symbolically potent 
choice. It builds on a relatively short yet intense period of production and a rapidly changing 
means of dissemination. The medium has also developed an enduring reputation as a device 
for truth-telling, recording indisputable material facts and safeguarding them as evidence of 
an event. Sontag describes the phenomenon of photography as compared to television:  
Nonstop imagery (television, steaming video, movies) is our surround, but 
when it comes to remembering, the photograph has a deeper bite. Memory 
freeze-frames; its basic unit is the single image. In an era of information 
overload, the photograph provides a quick way of apprehending something 
and a compact form for memorizing it. (RPO 22) 
Wars are documented, crime scenes recorded, and the tiny moments of human life are 
chronicled in an attempt to freeze and preserve time. But when a photojournalist alters an 
image, their credibility as a voice of truth is eroded, even if the alteration did not affect the 
material content of the moment in question. Nonetheless, photography is still accepted as a 
form of archival evidence—despite its long history as a manufacturer of myth. The 
photographer’s role is to wield his equipment and document what unfolds. Yet, what is 
recorded is but a tiny fractional moment, frozen, edited and quite narrow in its visual field of 
reference. Photographic imagery, by its very nature, cannot access truth as a multifaceted, 
unfolding event. As we have seen, artist John Heartfield agreed with this premise, building a 
career upon re-presenting truth by means of a caesura. The nature of truth alters with the re-
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combination of elements. This is particularly applicable to images taken in times of war or 
strife. Bringing the war home by means of images safely disconnects the viewer from the 
unfolding horror. Salz implicated a frivolous fashion industry in the perpetuation of war. 
That said, it is in the deeper, cutting gestures of the work that Rosler shifts consciousness. By 
using disparate imagery and conjoining opposing narratives, she exaggerates the violence of 
our cultural blindness. Such aesthetic action returns us to the matter of how artworks manage 
to interrupt distraction and provoke thought. 
 In regards to photojournalistic shock imagery, Barthes writes,  
[N]one of these photographs, all too skillful, touches us. This is because, 
as we look at them, we are in each case dispossessed of our judgment: 
someone has shuddered for us, reflected for us, judged for us; the 
photographer has left us nothing—except a simple right to intellectual 
acquiescence: we are linked to these images only by technical interest; 
over indicated by the artists himself, for us they have no history, we can 
no longer invent our own reception of this synthetic nourishment, already 
perfectly assimilated by its creator. (154)  
Barthes is speaking of straight photography with its direct mechanical capture and 
expectation of truth-telling. For him, the photographer is processing the arrested moment and 
delivering it comfortably to the viewer. The creation of the image, in an event of violence, 
transforms and thus becomes a representation that distances the viewer from the encounter. 
Sontag likewise spoke of the connection between safety and indifference. Yet, Barthes, in 
Camera Lucida, describes how the photograph has the ability to conjure an emotional 
response, a punctum, unique to the interchange between an individual and his connection to a 
specific subject. He holds that “the photograph is literally an emanation of the referent,” or, 
perhaps better, a “certificate of presence” (Barthes, CL 80). In broader terms, the ordinary 
image, vernacular and void of pretense, is evidence that something occurred, a visual 
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validation that events were, on some level, real. And yet, reality may be nothing more than 
an illusion, created by the fluidity of memory and its connections to our intangible 
experiences. Images can thereby supersede reality and create an altered system of beliefs, 
bringing into view a new deciphering of the purposefully sequenced story. Another 
interesting deviation from the veracity of photographs is their equal capacity to create great 
fallacies. Certainly, this underlying premise — of the dubious nature of photographic images 
— goes hand in hand with their potential for political subversion, as Benjamin establishes in 
the epilogue to the “Work of Art” essay. It bears noting how Barthes sheds light on the 
mechanics of such potentiality as we examine the operation of Rosler’s works.  
 Another noteworthy layer to the operations embedded within photographs is the one 
that speaks directly to memory as a trigger for thought. Barthes’ own connection to snapshots 
of his mother recalls the way images create associations, stimulating emotions and tapping 
into feelings surrounding an event or person depicted. Marjorie Perloff expresses this well in 
relation to Barthes’ account of a childhood incident and his “assumption that the souvenir 
d’enfance has meaning; that memory can invoke the past, revive the fear, panic and sense of 
release the boy felt when his mother rescued him. However painful the memory the little 
filmic narrative implies, it relates past to present and creates Barthes’ sense of identity” 
(Rabaté 47). The phrase ‘filmic narrative’ speaks also of a photograph’s ability to play a 
scene for us over and over as we examine its contents. We may not even remember the event, 
but the image creates a sense of its flavor while reinforcing its having occurred. This 
mnemonic quality satisfies the need to resolve the substance of our present lives, bringing 
“our past into the present” (Rabaté 47). Certainly, the fact that a photograph fixes a moment 
in time offers us the privilege of holding onto it, whatever memory, or sense of security, it 
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conjures. 
 Materially, the disjunction between Rosler’s work and pure photographic 
representation creates an analytical problem. While the House Beautiful series is regularly 
categorized within the photographic medium, is it in fact ‘a photograph’? It poses the 
question concerning the appropriated and twice-removed imagery contained herein—once a 
photograph, then a magazine spread, then repurposed into a new ‘photography’ or 
photomontage. What is it then? Mass-produced and reincarnated, it becomes a 
technologically created artwork re-presented for consumption. Do we, as a society, see that 
the commentary is sharply turned on us, her audience, who so casually consume these media 
signs? Is the work turned on the media itself, the originary disseminator of destructive 
information?  
 In the works the lingering elements of the war imagery, layered with the visual 
language of interior design and fashion, alters the way images function both as triggers for 
our memory and as traces of evidence of what ‘has been.’ We witness, on the one hand, the 
vilification of an entire population while showing our soldiers’ suffering, and on the other, 
the ever present ‘life is good’ motto ingested by American audiences as we adore the latest 
consumer devices and fashion trends. The clashing myths are perplexing—thus attracting our 
focus and provoking thought. So then, Rosler challenges the veracity of the image while 
accessing a deeper layer of truth—one that challenges our thinking about our own 
relationship to all that unfolds out of our reach. We will see, in the coming chapters, how 
documents and archives can be blended in service of deeper meaning, transferring thinking 
from surface layers to a clearer understanding of reality. This move proves to be increasingly 
powerful as the culture industry tightens its grip on a citizenry unable to see the impact of 
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these effects. Understanding how to read Rosler’s work helps us dissect the ways she imparts 
meaning to her viewer. Noting the structural basis of such meaning, through Barthes’ notions 
of both denotation and connotation, underscores her value as artist-producer, furthering her 
ethical undertones.  
 
§ 3.5: ROSLER’S GARAGE SALES: CLASS PERFORMANCE AND PARTICIPATION 
 Rosler’s resistance to well-established political structures heralds a new approach to 
imaginative artistic production and its function as a vehicle for ethical conduct. Her 
underlying intention aims for emancipation through social responsibility, a calling to Mitsein 
in its best possible manifestation in intersubjective accountability. We have begun to see how 
the works ‘transact’ meaning quietly, allowing the viewer the space to process Rosler’s 
Figure 3.8: Martha Rosler, Garage Sales Series, (early iteration) at the New Museum in New York City. 
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tendency, perhaps privately. How might Rosler motivate her audience further? What 
circumstances might she create in order to amplify her voice as artist-producer? Magnifying 
her message beyond photographic and media-based artworks, Rosler also engages her 
audience in a number of staged performances.  
 While performances mark much of her oeuvre, this tendency toward physical human 
interaction is particularly strong in her Garage Sale Series, which debuted in 1973 while 
Rosler was still in graduate school at the University of California San Diego (UCSD) (Figure 
3.8).  The series created a forum in which nuanced ideas of value, social exchange, personae, 
culture and rigid consumer ethos merged into a timely political critique, moving her intended 
conversation to an intersubjective plane. We will see how the Garage Sale Series is 
implicitly founded on the ideas of Marx, Adorno, Benjamin and Arendt, and reaffirms 
Rosler’s quest to awaken thought and steer participants toward greater freedom. Connections 
will be drawn to notions of consumerism, commodity fetishism and class divisions, along 
with a continued look at alienation qua enframing and the status anxiety driving human 
beings further from their authentic needs. 
 Upon arriving in a San Diego suburb in 1967, Rosler (a native New Yorker) puzzled 
over the community ritual of the garage sale (what she calls a ‘real American ritual’), 
wherein all personal artifacts are offered for monetary exchange. Her observation reconnects 
her with Adorno’s scorn for consumerism and its societal effects. In several conversations 
and interviews,11 she reflects on her discomfort having come from a city where old items are 
either donated to charity or left on the curb for collection in an invisible social exchange that 
leaves scant trace of an item’s provenance or evidence of the ‘ghosts of the people who had 
just used them.’ Rosler explains her fascination with this type of reveal as an “undesired tear 
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the fabric of secrecy” hitherto surrounding the private lives of individuals and families. She 
asks herself, “[W]hy there is no shame in putting out the things they no longer want?” as 
their owners then haggled over arbitrary values and participated in the drama of consumer 
exchange. Moreover there is the fact that garage sales are largely orchestrated by women 
who, at a time of relative domesticity, stepped into another more economic role, temporarily 
donning the mask of merchant. She describes the garage sales as the “liminal space in which 
the domestic enters the commercial” (Creative Time Summit) realm. Women’s identities and 
roles shifted dramatically.  
 The Garage Sales have been described alternatively as a “portrait of suburban life” or 
as an ‘old growth tree’ whose concentric rings lead inward toward its most intimate spaces. 
[FIGURE 3:9] And as we are beginning to see, the series embodies a contemporary response to 
Adorno’s critique of the culture industry. Rosler is enacting a type of suburban reproduction, 
flagging concerns about the very context in which it is taking place, and thereby awakening 
imagination and thought. Items were purposefully arranged and included such things as a car 
(“a sleek vintage diesel Mercedes-Benz station wagon,” MoMA), furniture, kitchen wares, 
clothing and framed ‘artworks’, to letters, scrapbooks and photos of past lovers. According to 
Lydia Goehr, “One worked through concentric rings of the artist’s soul. The innermost ring 
was pretty intimate. One could buy pieces of her underwear, and even—I think—
photographs of her lovers” (Herwitz & Kelly 75-76). The most immediately desirable items 
were placed in the foreground, forcing participants to ‘dig deeper’ in order to ‘pull back the 
fabric of secrecy’ enshrouding more private moments.  
 The original event, comprised largely of Rosler’s gathered personal effects, took place 
in a university’s gallery; it drew sharp criticism from Herbert Marcuse and his followers, 
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most notably Sandy Dykstra. Their principal objection resided in the fact that the items 
lacked “a sufficiently transcendental aspect to count as art” (Dawsey 89, 155).12 Rosler’s 
personal belongings and memorabilia were deemed to be a mere ‘repetition of reality’ 
without the needed mediation to transform consumable objects into artworks. In a first-hand 
account of the exchange, Lydia Goehr recalls how Marcuse, “despised it, believing that it 
celebrated rather than criticized bourgeois values” (Herwitz and Kelly 75). The root question 
asks whether, in fact, the ‘work’ can be considered art at all, whether it deserves to belong in 
the hallowed halls of an exhibition space. In defense of her work, Rosler counters, “[T]he 
garage sales were part of that impulse to take the clothing of ‘just yesterday,’ with the ghosts 
of people still in them, and to denaturalize them in some way so that they told a social story 
rather than an individual [one]” (de Zegher, 47). Thus, the Garage Sales are an examination 
of broader social issues, including community rituals, class divisions, role play and the 
disposable nature of consumerism.  
 The shift to a polyphonic collaboration through Rosler’s Garage Sales Series is 
significant to this project’s original goals (as discussed in chapter 1): to examine the nature of 
ethics in Heidegger’s call to action and the solution to the perils of enframing crippling 
Dasein. Furthermore, in support of Benjamin’s quest for emancipation (as discussed in 
chapter 2), Rosler’s impulse succeeded in democratizing artworks to a far greater degree than 
mere reproductions by inviting members of the larger community to contribute items of their 
own, a trend that became especially pronounced in the MoMA sale held 40 years after the 
UCSD event. Recalling Barthes and Benjamin on the question of authorship, we see here 
how the author and reader’s roles are ultimately collaborative. The performances additionally 
share ownership with a wider, anonymous group, resulting in an inclusivity and political 
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agency that make of every participant, regardless of class, a revolutionary in the upper 
echelons of the art world. 
 In an interview with James Eischen, Rosler points out, “we are back in a moment 
where artists can more effectively take on politics or commerce” (Eischen). By combining 
the actions of gathering, sorting, staging and inviting her audience into the narrative, Rosler 
alters the fundamental tenets surrounding the constitution of an artwork and its standing 
within culture. (Though these actions may seem commonplace to us within current art 
practice, Rosler’s performance was shockingly new in 1973.) If confronted by the 
performative nature of the Garage Sales, Benjamin would point toward historical movement 
and the inevitability of change, namely “the idea that we are in the midst of a vast process in 
which literary [qua art] forms are being melted down, a process in which many of the 
contrasts in terms of which we have been accustomed to think may lose their relevance” 
(AaP 89). At the same time, Rosler shows how new forms can solidify sound tendency by 
way of the relation between production details and aesthetic affect.  
 Using the Penny Saver as the vehicle for communicating details regarding the events 
guaranteed the audience would come predominantly from ordinary walks of life. This 
particular use of lo-fi reproductions reinforces Benjamin’s understanding of its application 
toward political ends, though in the case of the Garage Sales Series it only plays a limited 
role in Rosler’s overall performance. The viewers and participants become members of both 
the local communities for whom this is a common ritual and the ‘art world’ for whom this is 
a novelty and source of perplexed curiosity. Karen Moss writes, “From their inception, the 
garage sales have been inclusive, inviting participation by all, not just exclusive, art-aware 
audiences, as they debunked the modernist ideology of aesthetic autonomy that artistic value 
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exists independently from social, economic, and political conditions” (717). This statement 
reaffirms the role of artist-producer.  
 Moreover, Rosler’s use of a dedicated art space shifted the consideration of what 
museums and galleries could potentially house, thereby becoming instrumental in moving 
art’s narrative into post-modernist ideas. Moss explains, 
Early iterations of the sales challenged the boundaries of what could be 
considered art as they interrogated the value of art, art spaces, and art 
audiences. In their twenty-first-century versions, the garage sales cannot 
be extricated from a reality where the trustees of art institutions 
increasingly overlap with the boards of corporations and financial 
institutions, and where commerce is omnipresent in arts organizations with 
cafes, gift shops, and other revenue generators disrupting the aura of the 
clean, white cube and shrine for culture. (716) 
It has become a sign of social achievement in twenty-first century parlance to hold a position 
on the board of any cultural institution, thus guiding its future and shaping its social 
conditions. The repetitive, serial nature of the events and the art world’s intriguing demand to 
repeat the gestures seem to result from an “increasing fascination with shopping,” as 
described by Rosler. She goes on to explain, “Shopping had seized the imagination of the art 
world who saw it move right into its center” (Creative Time Summit). Performing the act of 
exchange within art museums—wherein “the temple walls themselves are made of money” 
(Creative Time Summit), according to Rosler—highlights economic disparity and its resulting 
tensions. She adds, “This is part of the regularization of the art, and art-historical item as a 
commodity form. More broadly, galleries and curators have joined in a concentrated effort to 
sell social critique. Thus, critique has in many cases become a gesture perhaps more than 
serious criticism” (Eischen). She observed the division between ‘cash strapped families’ and 
the upper reaches of art was evident within some of the reactions from both the press and 
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active participants (Creative Time Summit). Notice how Rosler has, in a concrete way, 
interrupted the space of the ‘danger’ with a potentially ‘saving power.’ 
 At the MoMA event, as with others prior, buyers could sit for a portrait with Rosler and 
their new-found treasures, memorializing the act of acquisition for future audiences and 
sales—a simple gesture connecting us back to the compulsion for photographic mementos. 
Unique to the MoMA event, however, was the creation of a newspaper, The Garage Sale 
Standard, which Rosler used to amplify her message via essays and critiques, all of which 
made explicit the underlying critiques embedded within the event. (Moss 716) (figure 3.10). 
Moss explains,  
These copious texts and programs create a dialectic between the 
serious/theoretical and the humorous/satirical to reveal different and quite 
diffuse discourses about garage sales, making the project accessible to 
members of the public and scholars alike. Through them, Rosler reinforces 
the ‘high’ and ‘low’ dichotomy of the project and her desire to produce 
work for multiple publics, including global audiences. (716) 
FIGURE 3.10: 
Martha Rosler Garage Sales Series 
2012 © MoMA, New York City.  
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Another significant point of difference in the 2012 NYC event is the fact that MoMA 
problematized the interaction when introducing a steep entry fee to the project. The audience 
therefore changed and the performance was affected adversely for its exclusivity. For Rosler, 
this shifted the audience away from those whose lives the sales embody.  
 
FIGURE 3.9 
Martha Rosler 
Garage Sales Series 
MoMA, New York City.  
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  All of Rosler’s efforts in the Monumental Garage Sales lead one to ask to what 
extent does the message she imparts force a reckoning with our underling beliefs and 
actions? Her message clearly insists upon addressing the enframing that underpins economic 
exchange. There is a mirroring of the greater effects of thoughtlessness, whether in the face 
of consumerist tendencies or contextual violence. Both force an encounter with enframing, 
though from different angles. For Rosler, the community ritual of garage sales activates 
questions of value systems and bears the imprints of Marx’s (and the Frankfurt School’s) 
underlying premise regarding commodities. This preoccupation suggests with Marx that, as 
she quotes in her speech, the “social character of people appeared to them as stamped upon 
the object or product of that labor,” thus underscoring the “value that converts every product 
into a social hieroglyphic” (Kapital 167) and the culture industry’s overall push toward the 
kind of homogeneity consumer fetishism affords. Rosler’s work echoes Marx’s belief that the 
value of such commodities is an arbitrary construction. In Das Kapital Marx expands upon 
the capricious nature of constructed value: 
By equating their different products to each other in exchange as values, 
they equate their different kinds of labour as human labour. They do this 
without being aware of it. Value, therefore, does not have its description 
branded on its forehead; it rather transforms every product of labour into a 
social hieroglyphic. Later on, men try to decipher the hieroglyphic, to get 
behind the secret of their own social product: for the characteristic which 
objects of utility have of being values is as much men’s social product as 
is their language. (Kapital 167) 
Marx recognizes the arbitrary creation of an object’s social value as a consequence of its 
basis in social exchange. The attribution and acceptance of value is then masked and 
establishes as a cohesive system that persists without question. The social nature of 
production and exchange means people are categorized within structures beyond their 
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immediate control. These structures are the confines from which Benjamin asks the author-
producer to seek emancipation from the fascist tendencies perpetuating oppression. 
 It is within the ethics of action in light of such relations that Rosler takes action. By 
implicating personal possessions, she reveals explicitly the consumer cycle created by 
material acquisitions, allowing each item to carry with it a history—the “ghosts of their 
recent lives.” As we have seen, consumers identify with objects of consumption to establish 
an inauthentic social persona. And, as we know, this repositioning of goods and their power 
to define one’s class serves to reinforce restrictive structural norms. As concerns our 
relationship with commodities, Marx elaborates,  
The mysterious character of the commodity-form consists therefore simply 
in the fact that the commodity reflects the social characteristics of men’s 
own labour as objective characteristics of the products of labour 
themselves, as the socio-natural properties of these things. Hence it also 
reflects the social relation between objects, a relation which exists apart 
from and outside the producers. (164-165) 
In a related vein, Rosler explains that the garage sale work “examines the centrality of the 
commodity in everyday life” (Creative Time Summit). She questions the roles (or ‘character 
masks’) we bear in our social relations. Marx observes, 
When we leave this sphere of simple circulation or the exchange of 
commodities, which provides the ‘free-trader vulgaris’ with his views, his 
concepts and the standard by which he judges the society of capital and 
wage-labour, a certain change takes place, or so it appears, in the 
physiognomy of our dramatis personae. He who was previously the 
money-owner now strides out in front as a capitalist; the possessor of 
labour-power follows as his worker. The one smirks self-importantly and 
is intent on business; the other is timid and holds back, like someone who 
has brought his own hide to market and now has nothing else to expect 
but—a tanning. (Kapital, vol. 1, 280) 
Marx draws his analogy for the creation of personas from theatrical origins, noting changes 
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that occur in capitalist social exchange and going so far as to attribute shifts in personal 
characteristics to one’s social class. Just as Benjamin noted a shift in perception in light of 
mechanically reproduced artworks, Marx is noting a shift in self-perception as one 
internalizes societal roles.  
 This shift is implied in each of Rosler’s performative artworks. She is therefore 
investigating and revealing the commodity fetishism Marx had diagnosed over a century 
prior and, applying this to contemporary banality’s appropriation of enframing. Rosler states, 
“I was for a critique that was contiguous with the rest of life” and a “meditation on value, 
community and friendship” (CT). With her expression of Marx’s ideas concretized within her 
performative artwork, Rosler extends Heidegger’s understanding of our relationship with the 
object-world, adding to his thoughts a more disruptive qua revolutionary disposition. In an 
essay entitled “The Dialectics of Everyday Life: Martha Rosler and the Strategy of the 
Decoy,” Alexander Alberro explains: “Rosler saw her role as an artist as open, and she 
sought to produce works ‘able to move consciousness forward, or to move people 
forward . . . the idea of political action’” (de Zegher 85). The inclination to move ‘people 
forward,’ or to shed light where necessary, further cements her position as Benjamin’s artist-
producer. In the garage sales, her questioning manifests in a succession of well-positioned 
messages—on tape, blackboards, and video screens. Alberro describes fragments of her 
strategy: 
A tape recorder at mid-installation played a meditation in the first person 
about the suburbia-cash nexus. In its repeated use of the first-person 
pronoun “I,” the monologue evoked the notion of the construction of the 
self as a social actor and spoke of a social process in which economic 
relations substitute for human relations. (de Zegher 85). 
Thus, Rosler creates her own version of a character mask, a persona or role play, whose work 
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it is to sell items purportedly belonging to her despite, the ‘variance in sizes and sheer 
quantity of objects.’  
 This side of her aesthetic action bears specific mention because, in addition to aligning 
her author-producer ‘tendency’ with the concerns of critical theory, it shows an embodiment 
of how Benjamin might have configured his authorship emphasis in fuller concert with what 
had otherwise, in the Reproduction essay, been a stress on ‘product’ at the expense of the 
possibilities inherent in the species character of man. Rosler initially adopted the role of 
‘hippie, cash-strapped single mother,’ acting the part as she undertook the dispossession of 
her items. Silvia Eiblmayr writes, “Her strategy recalls Brecht’s (Marx influenced) 
suggestion for a dramaturgy of ‘realism’: ‘Creep inside your man and get comfortable 
there. . . . Try out his intestinal system and see what his heart can bear. . . . Eat with him, 
applaud his little thoughts, look outside through his eyes” (de Zegher 155). Physically 
inserting herself into the very act of exchange within an all-American community ritual 
embeds Rosler in the center of social structures. From within the very mechanisms of 
economic exchange, she is able to plant the seeds for revolutionary social change. During a 
garage sale, Alberro explains, “Typically, every family tries to encapsulate itself into an 
economic unit and reconvert its assets into cash, in order to be able to continue the cycle of 
consumption” (de Zegher 81). In essence, objects are sold so that newer ones can simply take 
their place in the home. Rosler’s ‘tendency’ tackles this cycle of consumption head on, and it 
confirms for us how the Marxian body of concerns can, in a contemporary context, link with 
the Heideggerian critique of modern technology’s enframing essence.  
 Still, we must further consider the motivations that inspire this attempt at a ‘saving 
power’ in and for man’s ‘species character’, as well as ask whether the intersubjective nature 
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of her artworks can indeed free us from the consumer industry’s powerful sway. What 
motivates her tendency in the works also presents their greatest obstacle, for Adorno would 
remind us that the superstructure’s creation of artificial wants renders leisure time toxic and 
(in a negative dialectics) perpetuates the culture industry and its need to foster a state of 
mindlessness among its recipients. The culture industry manufactures and ultimately sells a 
condition Alain de Botton calls ‘status anxiety,’ which creates increased alienation and a 
profound loss of authenticity. For Adorno, these effects leave us unable to cut through the 
jargon to more authentic needs. He states: 
Every phenomenon is by now so thoroughly imprinted by the schema that 
nothing can occur that does not bear in advance the trace of the jargon, 
that is not seen at first glance to be approved. But the true masters, as both 
producers and reproducers, are those who speak the jargon with the same 
free-and-easy relish as if it were the language it has long since silenced. 
Such is the industry’s ideal of naturalness. It asserts itself more 
imperiously the more the perfected technology reduces the tension 
between the culture product and everyday existence. (Horkheimer and 
Adorno, DofE, 101) 
For Adorno, there is underfoot a purposeful transformation of the culture industry, which 
does not differentiate between authenticity and the systematized dominance exerted by 
capitalist forces. The result is the sameness and uniformity that eradicates individual thinking 
and replaces human needs with manufactured consumer goods. Perhaps one is tempted to 
argue that MoMA’s profitable conscription of the Garage Sales confirms the point and 
reasserts the ‘dangerous’ power. But the fingerprints of negative dialectic do not belie the 
emancipatory power of Rosler’s aesthetic. Her work precisely shows the capacity of art to 
interrupt this state of affairs, prying us away from the cycle of alleged needs-wants-needs by 
way of materially embodying this cycle’s absurdity and distancing effect in her performative 
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‘character masks’ and sales events. Status ‘anxiety’ and systemic ‘naturalness’ are breached 
by an offering of the kind of critical examination asserted by Heidegger, Arendt, et al. 
Rosler’s work is evidence of this thought production and its political potential, particularly as 
the Garage Sales place our attention on the very site of exchange and its revealing 
characteristics. Indeed, we must view her work through this lens of a call-to-
questioning/thinking lest we fail to understand her political and ethical motivations and their 
impact. Says Karen Moss, “Ultimately, the Monumental Garage Sale is a destabilized 
pseudo-portrait of suburban life and of the artist’s own subjectivity that also represents and 
creates metaphors for economic, social, and psychological conditions” (696). As we have 
seen, the sales become sites of social and economic exchange, bearing the traces of Marxist 
ideas and a Benjaminian hope for artists to balance quality and tendency as they reach 
outward in order to emancipate a lower-class citizenry.  
 Rosler thus turns institutions into sites of social critique, transforming the structures of 
cultural control into revolutionary centers for dialogic expression. She shifts cultural 
structures to atmospheric dispositions resembling, metaphorically speaking, Sloterdijk’s 
notion of ‘air.’ As such, one might say, she is assisting with their ethical rehabilitation by 
breathing the air of violence and consumerism, yet converting it to an atmosphere of 
freedom.  
 
§ 3.6: CONCLUSION 
 This chapter has sought to illuminate the context, thematic practice, and the functions 
underpinning Rosler’s production. We explored the broader global climate surrounding her 
lifetime, including the generalized acceptance of atmo-terrorism, as Sloterdijk explained. We 
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then established Rosler as an artist-producer, in line with Benjamin’s elaboration of an 
author, who aims to advance revolutionary cause. We looked at the operations inherent in 
reproductions, noting the structures that impart meaning for the good and bad, then 
undertook a closer reading of Rosler’s collages in order to appreciate their full dialogic 
effect. Finally, we added the performativity of Rosler’s Garage Sales series to shed light on 
further ways she addresses current societal issues. A number of thematic movements have 
become visible as a result of this investigation, and we have seen how the concept of 
estrangement and commodity fetishism became central to Rosler’s life’s work. While 
speaking with Michael Rush in a New York Times interview, Rosler explained, “My art is a 
communicative act, a form of an utterance, a way to open conversation” (NYT). Perhaps 
conversation might appear, at first blush, to fall short of the revolutionary political 
aspirations Benjamin sets forth in the Artwork essay and “Author as Producer.” And yet, 
human conversation is a staple of any oral tradition; it renders thoughts concrete for social 
exchange. In Benjamin Buchloh’s words, Rosler’s work “was not didactic and impositional” 
but “dialogic and activating” (Moss 718). Political intercourse must begin, at its very 
inception, with opening discourse. Rosler provides us with ample opportunity to exchange 
ideas, adding the voices of her audiences to the conversation.  
We have seen how Rosler carefully crafted composited scenes and performances in 
order to shift meaning and hold her viewer accountable for both self-reflection and critical 
awareness of his surrounding world. In her photomontages her boldest achievement rests in 
confronting us with the other, whose life is forever altered by atrocities to which we are only 
indirectly a witness. From this other, we are returned to ourselves—interrupted from our 
distracted and absorbed point of view. Sontag asks, “Who caused what the picture shows? 
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Who is responsible? Is it excusable? Was it inevitable? Is there some state of affairs, which 
we have accepted up to now, that ought to be challenged? All this, with the understanding 
that moral indignation, like compassion, cannot dictate a course of action” (RPO 117). 
Viewed in this light, Rosler’s photomontage work is, effectively, a redressing of myth. And 
yet, her work can only hope to motivate sustained action on the part of her viewer. Combing 
through the events and memories that have shaped each frame allows a more honest appraisal 
of their implications. Her subject matter sounds again for us the notion of being entangled in 
the world and its enframing myths and reaffirms that truth lies between what is known and 
what one brings to bear to any given situation. The artworks – as an aesthetics of action – 
thus enhance the philosophical ideas under consideration. In her performances, including the 
Garage Sales Series, Rosler participated in a new means of disseminating ideas, blurring the 
divisions between autonomous artworks and theatrical performances at a time when 
consideration for artworks remained relatively limited to Greenbergian preoccupation with 
form and material.  
The introduction of a new platform from which artists can build ideas, implicating its 
audience as participants in the exchange, heralded a new form of installation art—a medium 
we will look at in more depth in the next chapter. While her work existed concurrently with 
other artists whose projects pushed the edges of performance, namely Joseph Beuys, Yves 
Klein, Carolee Schneemann, et al, the Garage Sales Series activated the audience in its 
engagement and political critique. Overall her work amplified the capacity for art to engender 
thought and action by forcing us to look upon ourselves, thus extending Benjamin’s implied 
provocation to self-examination despite his having fallen short of defining how such 
knowledge might be achieved. With Barthes in mind, we also saw how Rosler shows us how 
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artworks are able to maneuver multiple levels of meaning, from her role as author qua artist-
producer, to imploding myths. She forces a profound questioning of one’s position vis-à-vis 
our experience, while simultaneously asserting a strong cultural critique. 
 I have not meant to suggest that Rosler’s efforts are a means for idealistically 
overturning the reality of technology’s hold on our being-in-the-world. But the profound 
‘interruption’ levied by her aesthetic action highlights and equips the fundamental ability to 
think in the face of this presence. If we are to shift the course of our current climate, we must, 
in Heidegger’s words, “be ready to learn thinking” and “[w]e learn to think by giving heed to 
what there is to think about” (Krell 369-370). This is not to conceive of a world without 
technology. Rather, it is to think beyond the barriers that reduce human beings to standing 
reserves. In the blending of philosophical ideas and the production of work, Rosler embraces 
thinking as a moral, revoutionary praxis. As Sontag noted, “The nature of moral judgments 
depends on our capacity for paying attention—a capacity that, inevitably, has its limits but 
whose limits can be stretched” (AST 226). Rosler’s work offers a ‘stretching’ by virtue of 
being a visual illustration of Arendt’s thoughts regarding how evil operates in seemingly 
ordinary circumstances. In addition, Rosler clarifies the ambiguities of Benjamin’s 
exploration of the technologically driven work of art by demonstrating both the positive and 
negative implications of this medium. Somehow, despite the low-fi reproduction of the early 
series and its outlets, her work has retained the status of a work of art, displayed in 
collections around the world. She bridges the roles played by artists (in the traditional 
understanding of the term) and Benjamin’s concept of author-producer as a reflection of the 
tendency necessary to move ideas forward. In the collision of disparate imagery and the 
reconfiguration of ideological messages, she arrests our attention and fosters a deeply felt 
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experience. Heidegger tells us, “To experience something, whether a thing, a human, or a 
god, means that something befalls us, strikes us, comes over us, overwhelms and transforms 
us” (OWL 57). In transformation we are returned to thinking as a moral act, inspired by our 
creative imaginations and creative production. In such a scenario, Rosler’s work answers the 
call.  
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CHAPTER 4: 
FASHIONING TRUTH FROM FICTION AND MEMORY:  
THE ESSENCE OF TRUTH INTERPRETED THROUGH THE WORK OF BOLTANSKI + WODICZKO 
- 
What is philosophy if not a way of reflecting, not so much on what 
is true and what is false, as on our relationship to truth? . . . . The 
movement by which, not without effort and uncertainty, dreams 
and illusions, one detaches oneself from what is accepted as true 
and seeks other rules—that is philosophy. 
                 MICHEL FOUCAULT 
 
§ 4.1: INTRODUCTION 
As we have seen, Martha Rosler’s work taps deeply into the collective lived 
experience of objects and significations. Not only does she insist on her viewer’s full 
engagement, but she re-presents objects of consumption and re-activates the cycle of 
signification such items embody. As Rosler explains, “The garage sales were part of that 
impulse to take the clothing of ‘just yesterday,’ with the ghosts of people still in them, and to 
denaturalize them in some way so that they told a social story rather than an individual [one]” 
(de Zegher 47). These ‘ghosts’ are critical to the alteration of meaning she seeks to create as 
a point of access to our collective understanding and memory. Her use of personal effects in 
her Garage Sales Series literally superimposes the past onto the present, creating a 
palimpsest, while the audience simultaneously adds its collective voice to the narrative. In 
addition, though not explicitly, her audience can glimpse moments of an autobiographical 
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tale meted out through small encounters with her intimate past. Rosler invites her audience to 
participate and contemplate without imposing herself in any way other than in the suggestion 
of a query; ‘dialogically rather than didactically.’ Clothing, objects, and collective 
participation manifest a powerful call to remember or contemplate conditions of existence. 
This particular intersubjective exchange, driven by the “ghosts of people” at its core, remains 
of paramount importance as we prepare for the work of the present chapter, in which notions 
of memory, interaction, finitude and truth will emerge.  
Rosler’s work poses questions, however, that require us to clarify collective 
participation and the memories objects invoke. Both archives and sites must be carefully 
considered as mediums in which truth can be revealed. In addition, the democratization of 
artworks needs further explication as we seek to understand the potential for emancipation 
through the realm of art. Building from Rosler’s use of personal artifacts, we must ask to 
what extent does such a practice manifest an alēthiac unconcealment? In addition, we need to 
explore the ethical role of such an exchange. To this end, we must also investigate the ways 
memory participates in the creation of collective and collaborative truths.  
This chapter is a meditation on the possibility for a manufactured, collective notion of 
truth, embodied in and communicated through disparate, unrelated objects, images, sites and 
signs. It will also afford a closer look at memory and narrative as necessary means of 
catharsis for the artist, the subject and the audience alike. We will do so by examining 
specific examples from two installation artists practicing today. We will begin with French 
artist Christian Boltanski, whose gatherings of disconnected artifacts and materials exemplify 
art’s ability to tap into our common consciousness and thereby create a holistic 
understanding of our relationship with truth, particularly that which resides within our inter-
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subjective being. The second artist, Polish born Krzysztof Wodiczko, heightens inter-
subjectivity and the polyphonic through carefully mediated architectural projections, literally 
igniting public spaces with memories and a call to awareness. As we will see in the latter 
portion of this chapter, Wodiczko’s interventions cut through layers of noise to deliver clear, 
honest appraisals of events and memories—a positive cathartic exercise that often shifts 
perspectives and engenders change. The thread that binds both artists is a mutual quest for 
truth through a probing of past and present, a probing that ushers their works into broader 
consciousness to reveal much about the human need to re-member and consider the past, near 
or distant—not to dwell in its murkiness, but rather to move forward somewhat altered by the 
exchange. Importantly, both artists’ works are embedded in advancing technologies, while 
simultaneously asking us to step back from the ‘challenging-forth’ and ‘enframing’ effects—
in essence, revealing a Heideggerian salvation within the danger. Relatedly, both use 
technology to return Dasein to its questioning disposition, bringing about moments of truth in 
alētheia.  
We will investigate how it is possible for an artist to access collective awareness and 
create a response from staged objects, images and public spaces, and speak to the essence of 
truth that is embedded within historical, collective memory. Through an analysis of both 
Boltanski and Wodiczko’s installations, this chapter will demonstrate that immanent truth is 
accessible on a deeper, Heideggerian level through a careful combination of archives and 
artifacts, despite the lack of strictly representational connection with material reality or 
correspondence theories of truth. Boltanski and Wodiczko, unburdened by the imperative of 
‘fact,’ produce aesthetic events of alētheia that are accessible to their publics in a way that 
allows the work-character of the works to become more pure, essential and collective. The 
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works offer an opening that is uncontaminated, necessary and borne in shared historical and 
cultural experience. Boltanski’s management of truth is loose and interpretive, while 
Wodiczko works more closely from recall and perspective. Wodiczko, whose focus dwells in 
more recent political events, marks public spaces with the voices of victims, transcribing 
memories onto places of cultural significance and meaning.  
In support of these claims, I will build on prior chapters while continuing to examine 
ideas from a small selection of philosophical writings. As a foundation, Martin Heidegger’s 
On the Essence of Truth and Origins of the Work of Art, most notably his hermeneutic 
exploration of the Greek term alētheia (as we saw in chapter 1) and, now more clearly, the 
relation of truth to freedom. These points of references will help us see a circular operation of 
‘parts’ and ‘wholes’ within the elements of Boltanski and Wodiczko’s works. This operation 
is imparted through the artists’ complex installations in a way that accentuates how truth’s 
revelatory character involves a drawing out of oneself ‘beyond’ the self. As a reminder, 
Heidegger shifts away from both a correspondence model of ‘factual’ truth as well as a 
metaphysically ‘transcendent’ conception of the essence of truth and being; bracketing both, 
he moves to a more robust, unfolding finite disposition of truth and Dasein. The aesthetic 
event of such bracketing importantly involves, we will see, the pivotal way in which in the 
case of these works, time, narrative and the responsibility for the ‘other’ relate to collective 
memory as a unifying device. I will analyze the notion of postmemory as posited by 
Marianne Hirsch, noting the capacity for memory to bleed forward through time, producing a 
transhistorical narrative and shifting artistic production into a place where memory is both 
experiential and transferred. Memory takes on a fluid, permeable narrative quality that 
inspires interactions and thoughts. As with Rosler’s use of home goods as triggers for 
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personal stories to emerge, the intersubjective meaning of memories will play an important 
role in our interpretation of our remaining artists, both here and in chapter 5.  
To link together and extend the alēthiac and the postmemory, we will consider the 
hermeneutic philosophy of Hans Georg Gadamer, who in The Relevance of the Beautiful 
speaks to the inherent power and responsibility of the work of art as a vehicle for imparting 
meaning and altering perception. Paul Ricoeur’s “Life in Quest of Narrative” and “A New 
Ethos for Europe,” and Emmanuel Lévinas’ Totality and Infinity and Entre Nous will help 
speak to the role of the other in artistic production. Michel Foucault’s Archeology of 
Knowledge and Fearless Speech will shed crucial light on the intrinsic power of both 
Wodiczko and Boltanski’s collected materials as archives of our past and thus carriers of 
meaning in their own right. Jacques Derrida’s Archive Fever, a text highlighting the slippage 
occurring in the very act of collecting documents for archival purposes, echoes Foucault’s 
preoccupations while looking at the interstice of absence. Additional voices such as Walter 
Benjamin, Herbert Marcuse, Marcel Proust, Sigmund Freud, John Sallis and others will 
further specify how history and memory operate as vehicles of truth and ongoing narrative. 
The sum of these ideas will reveal the complex and powerful experience of participating 
within both Boltanski and Wodiczko’s works and the meaning they evoke, while continuing 
to press forth Heidegger’s plea for an ethics of thinking through the realm of art. 
 
§ 4.2: THE SPACE OF TRUTH AND MEMORY 
First, we must define some key terms and the conceptual work they perform. The 
most significant of the concepts are: essence, truth and alētheia, the collective, archive, 
memory as well as post-memory (distinguishing between constructed histories and the 
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transference of the past, including encountered signs), and necessarily intermedial or 
installation art. The sharpened focus on memory fills in perceived gaps in Heidegger’s 
consideration of truth and underscores common experience as a motivator of ethical 
responsibility.  
 
A. The Work of Truth 
At the basis of our analysis is the idea of truth as originary—as an open, unfettered 
examination of what essence is in its mode of ever-unfolding. We broached this matter in 
chapter 1’s discussion of Heidegger’s Technology essay, citing his rejection of the notion 
of essence conceived as a given, fully present and objective thing, and his embrace of 
truth’s immanent becoming. We saw how this turn is found first on the level of our 
engagement with ontic entities. It bears repeating Heidegger’s notion, “[T]o let be—that is, 
to let beings be as the beings which they are—means to engage oneself with the open 
region and its openness into which every being comes to stand, bringing that openness, as it 
were, along with itself” (Krell 125). Similar language occurs in the “Origins of the Work of 
Art”: “The artwork opens up in its own way the Being of beings. This opening up, i.e., this 
disconcealing, i.e., the truth of beings, happens in the work. In the art work, the truth of 
what is has set itself to work. Art is truth setting itself to work” (Krell 261). The language 
is challenging, and we will shortly return to this important extension by which, according 
to John Sallis, “Heidegger marks a departure from the metaphysical thinking of the past, 
relegating it to the past, while advancing art’s future promise of unconcealment . . . of 
flourishing in its ability to reveal truth” (Sallis Trans. 156). The first point to note is that it is 
within the reveal—the unconcealment of truth—that its essence resides; truth’s essence is not 
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reducible to calculability and certitude. As well, truth moves with an adherence to 
ontological mysteries in the makeup of self and world, but not mysteries to be handled or 
resolved according to the long-standing dichotomy between the realms of the ‘sensible’ and 
‘intelligible.’ Says Sallis:  
Truth and sense are precisely the terms that, in their metaphysical 
guise, could never quite be matched, and it is that impossibility 
that proved to constitute the limit of artistic presentation and that 
led Hegel—except in those remarkable moments of reversal—to 
declare the pastness of art. Undoing this bind requires the most 
radical rethinking of truth and sense, of the truth that obtains 
existence for itself in the artwork and of the sensible as it is there 
in the work. (Trans 171)  
Before turning to the artistic opening, we need to appreciate this preparatory point about the 
‘rethinking of truth and sense,’ for Boltanski as ‘artist-philosopher’ will enact the same 
‘undoing.’ In a quasi-Nietzschean move, Heidegger’s unification of truth and sense combine 
the whole of life’s processes while pushing for full integration of sense and body, thought 
and environment, etc. However, Heidegger moves beyond Nietzsche’s focus on sense as 
superior to mind, asserting a more holistic belonging of all parts to a greater, unfinalizable, 
whole. Sallis explores this rift: “Such is, then, for Heidegger [. . .] the direction in which 
genuine overcoming of aesthetics would be required to move: it would be imperative to 
attend to the ascent beyond (outside) oneself, in contrast to a feeling turned back upon 
oneself, ordering and empowering oneself” (Trans 168). We must hear in this shift away 
from the strictly autonomous self of ‘consciousness’ to a greater composition of world and 
earth in which Beings dwell, and there from the epistemic to the aesthetic in a reconfigured 
way. A decisive implication of this connects matters of aesthetics, epistemology, ontology, 
and subjectivity: “Heidegger’s interpretation thus moves in a direction that would take the 
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beautiful to designate the way in which being as such shines forth in the midst of the 
sensible, the way in which it shines forth to us in our immersion in the sensible, bodily 
domain so as to draw us beyond (and beyond ourselves)” (168).  
Notice how his shifts in aesthetic beauty and pleasure earmark the reconfiguration of 
subjectivity and truth. One specific implication is found in a written exchange with Rudolf 
Krämer-Badoni. Heidegger states: “The entire treatise [in the Origins of the Work of Art] 
opposes the interpretation of art in terms of ‘mere enjoyment of art’ [blosser Kunstgenuss]. 
Thus ‘beauty’ is not thought in terms of enjoyment [Gefallen], but rather as a way of shining. 
. . , i.e., of truth” (Heidegger qtd. in Sallis 163). The phenomenon of ‘shining’ is the artistic 
specification of the disclosedness side of alētheia. Heidegger is contradicting Kant’s stress 
on the delight (or pleasure) one feels through beauty in art and nature, and also bringing the 
aesthetic experience down from Hegel’s lofty understanding of Geist. The result is an 
alethiac ‘illumination’ – one we will see translated in something as discrete as Boltanski’s 
appropriation of bare bulbs to directly illuminate his subjects. But first, here we must be 
careful not to think alētheia as truth in any ‘absolute’ sense. Rather, as a ‘way’ and ‘event’, 
it points to the open space of questioning that allows a fluid encounter with truth as essence 
of Being; art – extracted from its consignment to the mere ‘sensible’ side of experience – 
materializes this operation while simultaneously catalyzing greater questioning. Thinking 
truth strictly on the basis of verifiable judgments, and thinking beauty on the basis of 
formal pleasure or the concretization of Spirit alike fail to honor the deeper makeup of 
essence; they enframe essence’s purity. When Heidegger says, “Truth signifies sheltering 
that clears [lichtendes Bergen] as the basic characteristic of Being . . . [T]he question of the 
essence of truth finds its answer in the proposition the essence of truth is the truth of 
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essence” (Krell 137), he means that truth and essence are not definitional matters, nor pure 
ideas in the transcendent sense, but events of openness, exposure, and freedom. We need to 
be clear on this conceptual subtlety or else we will misunderstand how the reconfiguration 
of truth and subjectivity is, as our artists will show, an aesthetic phenomenon. Sallis 
explains:  
Setting truth into the artwork, setting it to work in the work so 
that it happens there—and only in such a setting—as truth, will 
not be a matter of setting something intelligible into a work that, 
simply by virtue of its sensible character, cannot measure up to 
that truth. The truth that, in Hegel’s phrase, obtains existence for 
itself in the artwork, will be a truth that—to reverse what Hegel 
says of postclassical art—is so akin and friendly to sense as to be 
capable of being sensibly presented. (Trans 157). 
We need to hear how this formulation of ‘setting truth to work in the work’ marks the 
convergence of the essence of truth with the materialization of a ‘beyond’ space in artworks. 
Heidegger indeed thinks this very convergence on aesthetic grounds. As the phenomenon of 
truth then shows itself to be irreducible to an intelligible-sensible binary, it also shows a 
‘setting to work’ of a distinctly non-formalist illuminative (literally ‘light-laden’) opening, 
or Lichtung.  The opening provides the space for thought. But we must not mistake the 
relationship between the open space of truth and the open work of art as a ‘full’ 
illumination or ‘finished’ topos of freedom. In a very late seminar of the 1960s Heidegger 
clarifies the relationship between alētheia and Lichtung:  
What is cleared is the free, the open. At the same time, what is cleared is what 
conceals itself. We may not understand the clearing from out of light; rather, we must 
understand it from the Greeks. Light and fire can first find their place only in the 
clearing. In the essay, ‘On the Essence of Truth,’ where I speak of ‘freedom,’ I have 
the clearing in view [. . . .] Our concern is to experience unconcealment as clearing. 
That is what is unthought in what is thought in the whole history of thought.” (HS 
161-62) 
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The passage says two things that are important for our interpretation of artworks. First, the 
‘clearing’ in the open space that is truth is not a light that the ‘light of reason’ explains, but 
an event of light and shadow. Second, though the event is ‘essential’ in the sense of being 
intrinsic to truth, we must still work to ‘experience’ it. Truth’s very nature is to advance 
and retreat, reveal and conceal, but the kind of ‘light’ that persists in this dynamic is real 
‘in’ its finitude. In fact, the lighting-effect of alētheia is at once the experiential essence of 
truth and freedom alike. But again, and crucial to the setting-to-work that we want to 
understand and experience in Boltanski and Wodiczko’s works, the dynamics of the ‘open’ 
and the dynamics of ‘thinking’ are of the same character and event. Unconcealment is an 
event of ‘letting-be’ on the side of truth that asks for and equips a letting-be (in the sense of 
yielding) on the side of thinking. How ‘freedom’ operates in these dynamics must, therefore, 
be something that is before and beyond an individualistic property of sheer volition; to think 
freedom as ‘letting’ is, our artworks will show, a matter concretized in the way bringing-
forth, as an aesthetic and collective practice, ruptures the enframing character of challenging-
forth.  
  
B. The Archive as Record of Common Experience 
 How do these conceptions of truth and freedom connect with our ethical 
responsibility? Heidegger is focused on the opening of a world and the being-with of 
human dwelling (see chapter 1’s discussion of Mitsein). But to more fully appreciate and 
approach the matter of ethical responsibility as something ‘set to work’ in our artworks we 
need to turn to Lévinas, who observes, for example, that “I cannot disentangle myself from 
society with the Other, even when I consider the Being of the existent he is” (Totality 47). 
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With this statement, the notion of community and collectivity are more sharply introduced 
into the conversation regarding essences. Community infers a shared history and place, a 
bonding among beings resulting from the interdependency of our temporal and finite 
existence. Ricoeur and Derrida, as we will see, nuance the dynamics of this shared 
experience and the consequences of our coexistence in texts such as “Life in the Quest of 
Narrative” and Of Hospitality. Furthermore, both Derrida and Foucault support the theme 
of ethical responsibility and provide a bridge to our issue of collective memory by 
addressing the archive as a collection of gathered evidence that connects past to present 
through its role in the re-presentation of history. Indeed, as Hirsch tells us, “Archival 
practices invariably rely on documents, objects, and images that survive the ravages of time 
and the destruction wrought by violent histories” (247). The archive, however, can only be 
fully understood through a historical perspective that binds us to a shared past and 
substantiates memory. As Foucault states, “[The archive] is the border of time that 
surrounds our presence, which overhangs it, and which indicates it in its otherness; it is that 
which, outside ourselves, delimits us” (130). Understood thus, archives form the 
parameters of our existence, re-presenting the past and shaping our identity. Foucault 
primarily critiqued archives as “a set of hegemonic rules that determine how a culture 
selects, orders, and preserves the past” (Hirsch 227). Art historian Hal Foster likewise 
speaks of “an archival impulse,” a practice particularly active during the 1990s, and 
describes its import in the art world.1 Foster asserts, “archival artists seek to make historical 
information, often lost or displaced, physically present. To this end they elaborate on the 
found image, object, and text, and favor the installation format as they do so” (4). Archives, 
thereby, become a medium of expression in and of themselves, deployed by artists and 
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philosophers as invitations to contemplation and interaction from the percipient. To think this 
possibility, we will need to see how Derrida approaches the interstitial space of absence, as 
represented by acts of omission occurring in the process of gathering documents and 
ephemera. The archive reveals editing decisions which alter future impressions of past 
events, and the very act of collecting information represents a defining feature 
underpinning the need to gather memories. His ideas touch on notions of power, selection, 
editing and control of documents, and he shows that the archive is also a record of its missing 
components — thus creating ghosts of the past in the fact of their omission. Archive, for 
Derrida, encompasses more than just a collection of documents. As with much of his other 
writing, the term is inclusive of a broader understanding, thus transforming it into “a psychic 
archive distinct from spontaneous memory” (Derrida AF 19). Indeed, absence, whether 
intentional or not, shifts remembrance and impacts future patterns of thought. This 
complicates how events are both understood and transmitted generationally, especially in 
remembrances of trauma or war.2 These phenomena of omission and transformation of 
course relate in broader terms to how shared consciousness is born in the way recollections 
of our histories move into our present. Here, with the help of Hans Georg Gadamer, we will 
see that collective memory and community literally bridge the past to the present and find 
(through this communion) their simultaneous manifestation in the festival, a “deliberate 
gathering that bonds humans through common purpose” (9). 
The previous chapter showed how archives or reproduced images are reconfigured 
to access more essential truths. Rosler’s House Beautiful series is an illustration of this 
appropriation of archives as purveyors of thought. We will now see that Boltanski’s work 
is the “limit case” for any internalization of the past, or of traumatic events is the holocaust 
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with its magnitude and challenges to language. Recalling Adorno, “There can be no poetry 
after Auschwitz.” As noted in chapter 2, Henryk Ross’s buried photographic 
documentation of Lodz Ghetto has garnered recent attention and achieved museum status3 
with multiple concurrent exhibitions that celebrate their importance as both artworks and 
durable carriers of the past. The ongoing preoccupation with images as evidence 
underscores both an appreciation of his efforts as a chronicler of the atrocities against the 
Jews and our need for verification.     
 
C. Memory as Mediator of Common Experience 
A few further remarks need to be said about the concepts within the term ‘memory’ — 
the fluid and sensory activity of the mind that allows human beings to look back at events 
with selective attention to significant details and information. As stated above, archives 
help substantiate memory by keeping alive the sensory inscriptions of the past, regardless 
of how distant, as traces of what has been. Sontag likewise addresses images as memento 
mori—reflecting the attachment photographs have with memories, while also 
acknowledging the moment as a death. In many ways, memories define us, shaping our 
mind’s instrument of reflection and projection. Memoirs, artifacts, and chronicles of events 
passed down from generation to generation all color our collective understanding of our 
past. Archives and artifacts act as “points of memory,” a term Marianne Hirsch uses as she 
unpacks old photographs embedded with unspoken meaning. She speaks of “points of 
intersection between past and present, memory and post-memory, personal remembrance 
and cultural recall” (61). She explains, “It is this presence of embodied and affective 
experience in the process of transmission that is best described by the notion of memory as 
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opposed to history. Memory signals an affective link to the past —a sense, precisely, of a 
material ‘living connection’—and it is powerfully mediated by technologies like literature, 
photography and testimony” (Hirsch 33). In a way, the phenomenon of memory is like a 
specification of the event of truth’s essential opening/clearing, but one that is as vulnerable 
in its play of disclosure and withdrawal as it is powerful in its formation of self and 
community.  
Marcel Proust’s Remembrance of Things Past is an iconic example of one man’s 
sensory journey to his childhood in what has been a timeless coming to terms with one’s 
personal history. Proust believed memories are made indelible only through immediate 
encounters: “The truths which intelligence grasps directly in the open light of day have 
something less profound, less necessary about them than those which life has communicated 
to us in spite of ourselves in an impression, a material impression because it has reached us 
through our senses” (Proust qtd. in Bennett 7). Benjamin similarly reflects: “The true picture 
of the past flits by. The past can be seized only as an image which flashes up at the instant 
when it can be recognized and is never seen again. ‘The truth will not run away from us’ . . . . 
For every image of the past that is not recognized by the present as one of its own concerns 
threatens to disappear irretrievably” (IL 255). Memory underpins collective consciousness 
as it keep us connected with the past and, however painful at times, to events that have 
altered our existence. For this reason, the importance of memory for this chapter and the 
project as a whole cannot be overstated. We will approach it from the vantage points of the 
individual and the larger social community and will explore its transference from one 
generation to the next, collapsing time and enhancing a trans-historical narrative. Though 
Heidegger does not fold the phenomenon of memory within his network of essences 
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(Dasein, truth, art, freedom), he does speak of memory as a “gathering of thought upon 
what everywhere demands to be thought about first of all” (Krell 376). He values memory 
as “the Mother of the Muses” and explains “this is why poesy is the water that at times 
flows backward toward the source, toward thinking as a thinking back, a recollection” 
(Krell 376). Note this term ‘poesy’ echoes the ‘poetic’ essence, for Heidegger, of art, and 
springs from the root term, poēisis. Memories are woven together in formation of personal 
narratives, where such formation shares the same sense of unfolding’ as we found in 
Heidegger’s assemblage of ‘essences.’ They are used as testimonials that shape human 
behavior, binding us in a common experience. In both Boltanski’s and Wodiczko’s 
artworks, memory is the primary vehicle of transmission, allowing us access to meaning 
and thought. Through collective memory, both artists bridge the gap between creative 
impulses and the broader community of viewers with whom their work resonates, thereby 
tapping into the reservoir of collective truth.  
 
D. Memory as Theater of Translation 
Applying this point to what we explored at the outset of this section, one must 
wonder how memory gathers its thoughts and thinks back? What is its inherent potential to 
enhance alētheia qua truth, and how might it also elide the constraints of the sensible-
intelligible dichotomy? In the introduction to Illuminations, Arendt emphasizes Benjamin’s 
interest in history as details of one’s particularly subjective memory. In “Theses on the 
Philosophy of History,” Benjamin states, “To articulate the past historically does not mean 
to recognize it ‘the way it really was’ (Ranke). It means to seize hold of a memory as it 
flashes up at a moment of danger” (IL 255). His Berlin Childhood around 1900 is a 
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beautiful example of such remembrance and reconstruction. Benjamin writes, in a letter to 
Gershom Scholem, “These childhood memories . . . are not narratives in the form of a 
chronicle but . . . individual expeditions into the depths of memory” (BC xii).4 Regarding 
this backwards glance, Arendt notes,  
When Adorno criticized Benjamin’s ‘wide-eyed presentation of 
actualities’ (Briefe II, 793), he hit the nail right on its head; this is 
precisely what Benjamin was doing and wanted to do. Strongly 
influenced by surrealism, it was the ‘attempt to capture the 
portrait of history in the most insignificant representation of 
reality, its scraps, as it were.’ (Briefe II, 685) (IL 11) 
Benjamin is collecting the details of his environs, citing the Flaneur as best able to appreciate 
and understand his epoch, and in a way looking for the saving power within the danger. His 
Arcades Project, much like Proust’s Remembrances, are a chronicle of the tiny details that 
narrate history, much like an archive of sensations and impressions that lends the reader a 
particular lens through which to look.  
While there is a distinct separation between memories and history, the two are 
intertwined. Benjamin’s Angel of History is a fitting illustration of this intrinsic connection 
(figure 4.1). In his “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” Benjamin writes, 
A Klee painting named ‘Angelus Novus’ shows an angel looking 
as though he is about to move away from something he is fixedly 
contemplating. His eyes are staring, his mouth is open, his wings 
are spread. This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face 
is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, 
he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon 
wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to 
say, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. 
But a storm is blowing from paradise; it has got caught in his 
wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. 
This storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his 
back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows 
skyward. This storm is what we call progress. (IL 257-258) 
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If Benjamin’s Angel of History is a representation of the human inclination to look back in 
time, to ponder events even as they accrue, its influence on memory as the process of 
translation or assimilation is strong. Even the Angel is powerless in affecting any change to 
the past and frozen, with his back to the future, as progress devours humanity. That said, 
Benjamin believes in such an exercise, of turning one’s glance arrears, in order to foretell the 
future, and we will see this practice in the works of both Boltanski and Wodiczko. In a 
passage from his 1932 Berlin Chronicle, he explains, “Memory is not an instrument for 
surveying the past but its theater.” Notice how this ‘theater’ echoes Heidegger’s sense of the 
‘open.’ He continues: “It is the medium of past experience [Medium des Erlebten], just as the 
earth is the medium in which dead cities lie buried. He who seeks to approach his own buried 
past must conduct himself like a man digging” (BC xii). For Sigmund Freud, digging yields 
relief from neuroses (hysteria). Dreams liaise with past experiences. By probing the images 
of the mind, ones conjured in the ‘dream-work’ of sleep, Freud believes one finds 
emancipation from trauma. Benjamin’s perspective is similar, for “What is unearthed in the 
operations of remembrance, as it delves to ‘ever-deeper layers’ of the past, is a treasure-trove 
of images” (BC xii). The work undertaken “reveals the palimpsest character of memory” (BC 
xii). This character underscores Freud’s notion of the visual nature of our dreams and their 
underlying narratives of self-understanding: “Benjamin’s conception is similar to that of 
Freud, who holds that past traumas enslave individuals, and argues, in a different register 
than Benjamin, that working through the source of trauma can free individuals from past 
blockages and suffering” (Kellner footnote 33). Berlin Childhood is composed of delicate 
visual impressions of a distant past, though its characteristics linger in Benjamin’s 
encounters. It foretells the ways Boltanski and Wodiczko approach the work of memory in 
   237 
relation to trauma and emancipation. As though mimicking Heidegger’s open space, or 
Lichtung, in which thinking unfolds, memories appear, analogous to revelations of thoughts, 
tied to the past and to the narrative (or ‘poesy’) defining one’s lived experience. Perhaps we 
may likewise say that memory can function as a ‘setting-to-work’ in the aesthetic sense of 
‘letting-be.’   
 
 In his markedly positive view of memory’s agency, Marcuse observes, “Its truth 
value lies in the specific function of memory to preserve promises and potentialities which 
Figure 4.1: 
Paul Klee 
1920 
Angelus Novus 
Oil transfer and watercolor on paper 
31.8 cm x 24.2 cm 
The Israel Museum in Jerusalem 
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are betrayed and even outlawed by the mature, civilized individual, but which had once been 
fulfilled in the dim past and which are never entirely forgotten” (EC 18-19, Kellner 32). The 
view that memory can encapsulate positive events means, for Marcuse, that memories 
transact intersubjective bonds. In a footnote, Kellner suggests, “A dialectical conception of 
memory merging Marcuse and Benjamin might argue that both remembrances of past joys 
and happiness and suffering and oppression could motivate construction of a better future if 
oriented toward changing rather than just remembering the world” (33). This suggestion 
recalls Benjamin’s understanding of the “Author as Producer” and the agency inherent in his 
life’s work. Surely orienting one’s endeavors toward change turns the angel of history’s 
glance forward. How this alteration of history’s course is achieved remains central to this 
investigation.  
  
E. The Open Work of Intermedial Art 
Proceeding with the terminological concepts grounding this chapter, it is interesting 
that what we now call installation art was more often referred to as intermedial work when it 
appeared in the mid-twentieth century. Intermedial infers a “coming between two things in 
time, place or character; to intermediate” (Oxford). Displacing autonomous artworks to a 
more temporal, intersubjective space requires a forward-thinking approach to creative 
expression. Intermedial can also signify an interception or mediation between human beings 
that brings forth an intersubjective, theatrical space. Its reception and critique were not 
always favorable. We noted, in response to Rosler’s Garage Sales, contentious conversations 
with Marcuse that centered on the appropriateness of such undertakings in light of 
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formalism’s rule within the greater art markets. Clement Greenberg also registered an 
influential complaint, as summarized by Juliane Rebentisch in Aesthetics of Installation Art: 
To Clement Greenberg’s mind, such art constitutes the dregs, as 
it were, of a progressive democratization of culture that has been 
taking place since the mid-nineteenth century, threatening both 
the ‘levels of aesthetic quality’ with the social rise of a semi-
educated middle class and the loss of the authorities that establish 
and preserve values. Accordingly, in 1981[. . .] he writes: 
‘What’s ominous is that the decline of taste now, for the first 
time, threatens to overtake art itself. I see intermedia and the 
permissiveness that goes with it as symptoms of this.’ 
(Rebentisch 79). 
The decline of taste, degrading the aesthetic quality of artworks, and a democratization of 
culture, for Greenberg, were unacceptable formulations in the consideration of an artwork’s 
inherent constitution. Recall that to Marcuse’s mind, the Garage Sales were too much a 
repetition of what actually is and failed to meet his criterion that “All authentic art [. . .] aim 
at ‘the negation of unfreedom’” and express “a demand for liberation” (Kellner 34). But the 
medium of intermedial art began to flourish and Boltanski and Wodiczko emerged from a 
burgeoning tradition. Their ability to overcome cultural barriers and affect large numbers 
of viewers are testimony to the impact such artworks can have.  
 How might installations function as emancipatory vehicles? Can the immersion in 
an artist’s materialized thoughts shift thinking? Intermedial artworks have the capacity to 
connect with viewers in ways inaccessible to their autonomous counterparts. The potential 
for truth to reveal itself through the memories and thoughts articulated in performance (or 
theatrical ideas) renders the work more discursive and invites an open-ended thinking that 
is otherwise difficult to attain. Installations have the ability to bring agency to the concepts 
we have just investigated: essence, truth, freedom, the collective, archives and memory. Of 
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course, installations can also act with ‘tendency.’ Rosler’s Garage Sales did so with 
consumerism and the culture industry. Installations are also vehicles for polyphonic 
exchange, to borrow a term from Mikhail Bakhtin, in which a dialog is driven by multiple, 
equal voices. For the purpose of this chapter we will concentrate especially on truth and 
freedom as emanating from the works of Boltanski and Wodiczko.  
 
§ 4.3: CHRISTIAN BOLTANSKI: CONTEXT, MEMORY AND THE WORK OF ART 
Heidegger’s understanding of the truth-art relation indicates the need for an 
unfettered, open space for thought. We have documented how he extends the specific 
openness of this space to ‘freedom’ understood as a practice of ‘letting-be’ that (a) engages 
with the play of concealment and disclosedness, and (b) rejects the tendency to think 
reductively about what is before us, as though its presence were given in pure total form. If 
the essence of truth is ‘set to work’ in the poetic essence of artworks, then let us consider 
what may obtain when the specific subject-matter and aesthetic topography of given works 
set-to-work the essence of memory. The common thread resides in art as an expression of 
freedom in the mode of an open engagement with ourselves and others. This tripartite event 
of essences – truth, art, memory – can yield an ethical awakening.   
The aim of this section is to document the connections between lived experience, its 
memories, and the communion of shared understanding as embedded within Boltanski’s 
installations. I will first trace these connections through his biographical narrative, the 
always-lingering recollections of the Shoah and the common ground of human 
relationships as experienced through his work. We will then examine how the sensibilities 
manifest in his work allow the viewer relives an ethical obligation to the other while 
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viscerally feeling the haunting of the past. Within this affect, more specifically, is 
Boltanski’s use of “daily items as main creative elements to construct an archive of 
humanity” (emphasis added, “Storage Memory”). These sensibilities, already opposed to 
reductivist thinking, nurture a meditative opening, a cathartic release of trauma, and a move 
beyond subjectivity to the ‘letting’ of a broader ethical responsibility. Clearly, the 
unavoidable consequence of temporal experience, and the equally important effects of 
memory, reveal themselves in the visual work artists produce. Boltanski’s personal 
memory plays a particularly important role. Born to a family of mixed religion in 1944 
during the German occupation of France, Boltanski understood from a very young age the 
dangers of being Jewish. He explains, “[O]f course, we knew we were Jews. My father’s 
hiding place was right there in the house—but it wasn’t something we talked about and it 
filled me with shame. I really only took ownership of it and showed it in my work after my 
father’s death” (Barliant, “The Possible Life of Christian Boltanski”).  
The impact of his childhood memories runs throughout his oeuvre with a rare 
potency that inscribes a place of exchange between concealment and unconcealment. While 
he was initially loath to delve into this material on an extrinsic, conscious level, it became 
imperative in the unfolding of his life’s work. In a 2016 conversation with curator Jens 
Hoffmann at the Jewish Museum in New York City,5 Boltanski explained that the Shoah, as 
embodied in the familial whispers of his early childhood, was his trauma and thus 
something to be processes aesthetically in multiple ways. He describes himself as a 
“shaman,” stating that his “life and art concerned asking questions and eliciting emotions” 
(Jewish Museum). In addition, Boltanski equates his impulses with those of Louise 
Bourgeois, explaining, “In all of one’s existence, we must speak about the trauma and 
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make it better.” He reveals an underlying sympathy with the aforementioned views of 
Freud and his prescribed psychotherapeutic release and refers to this activity as “a search 
for the key that unlocks the door” to reveal, expose and come to terms with the angst meted 
out within one’s personal history (Jewish Museum). Given Boltanski’s birthdate near the 
end of WWII, his memories become impressions absorbed from family and surroundings. 
Without diminishing the power of his experience, he feels his trauma at a generational 
remove, receiving its destruction obliquely.  
Here we may speak of postmemory, which Hirsch defines as “the relationship of the 
second generation to powerful, often traumatic, experiences that preceded their births but that 
were nevertheless transmitted to them so deeply as to seem to constitute memories in their 
own right” (107). Hirsch explains the ways such transferred experiences manifest within the 
child’s mind. Says Hirsch:   
[They] are shaped by the attempt to represent the long-term 
effects of living in close proximity to the pain, depression, and 
dissociation of persons who have witnessed and survived massive 
historical trauma. They are shaped by the child’s confusion and 
responsibility, by the desire to repair, and by the consciousness 
that the child’s own existence may well be a form of 
compensation for unspeakable loss. Loss of family, of home, of a 
feeling of belonging and safety in the world “bleed” from one 
generation to the next. (Hirsch 113) 
In agreement with Boltanski, Hirsch draws on a Freudian perspective regarding the need to 
excavate and exorcise the layers of memories clouding our vision, asserting that only 
through such a clear-minded understanding will relief manifest. The implications of 
Boltanski’s childhood pertain in this way to Gadamer’s notion of history and selfhood:  
History does not belong to us; we belong to it. Long before we 
understand ourselves through the process of self-examination, we 
understand ourselves in a self-evident way in the family, society 
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and state in which we live. The focus of subjectivity is a distorted 
mirror. The self-awareness of the individual is only a flickering 
in the closed circuits of historical life. That is why the prejudices 
of the individual, far more than his judgments, constitute the 
historical reality of his being. (276-277) 
Gadamer moves us from personal experience as the locus of memory and its effects to a 
historical consideration blending beings into their contextual environment. Applying the 
point, what is important is the unspoken connection forged by Boltanski’s personal narrative 
and that of his viewer through a shared portal. His own biography and installations suggest a 
narrative that is then inscribed by each individual participant as a result of this ‘common 
horizon.’  
During the conversation at the Jewish Museum, Boltanski explained that making art, 
for him, is akin to speaking with his audience (something which parallels Rosler’s impulses). 
The success of this dialogue can only be achieved if the topic regards something everyone 
knows, whether overtly or intuitively. Despite varying levels of representation, and multiple 
ways of understanding, the underlying language that is, following Heidegger, lived ‘in’ and 
‘through,’ must be universal, able to speak to a broad audience. It also allows for the ebb and 
flow of ideas, the alētheiac unconcealment. To this end, Boltanski suggests ambiguity as a 
means for viewers to relate to artworks on similar frequencies, but not an ambiguity that 
elides specificity. While making cultural references, he believes the artist and work must, in 
Gadamer’s sense, “leave the person who responds to it a certain leeway, a space to be filled 
in by himself” (26). He continues, “It should also be true of the play of art that there is in 
principle no radical separation between the work of art and the person who experiences it” 
(28). In this spirit Boltanski choreographs a letting be that opens his audience to the 
collective. Many of the cultural references Boltanski puts into his installation remind us of 
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Rosler’s Garage Sales; he visits flea markets to acquire used clothing and then breathe a new 
life into the items. We are reminded of the “ghosts of those who wore them” and experience 
a resurrection of sorts. Boltanski literally encloses the viewer in the installation, making him 
a physical part of the narrative exchange. He activates the signifying potential artifacts hold 
in service of his broader message, one he hopes will enhance his conversations with his 
audience.  
Memory gathers thought. It is also a shared medium, lending its collective depth to 
Boltanski’s visual grammar and moving the viewer from contemplation to a broader ethical 
space. His works explore the limit case of humanity’s destructive potential, the ultimate 
manifestation of fascism, as described in Benjamin’s epilogue. One must ask how this laying 
Figure 4:2: 
Christian Boltanski 
Missing House, Berlin 
Site-specific installation 
1990 counter-memorial 
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bare of trauma serves our emancipation? To be sure, Boltanski’s focus on his traumatic 
absorption of the Shoah poses certain cultural problems elsewhere acknowledged by post-
World War II thinkers such as Albert Camus or Adorno. The confrontation with the effects of 
trauma does run the risk of alienating viewers and violating Adorno’s oft-quoted notion that 
“there should be no lyric poetry after Auschwitz.” For Adorno, moving forward requires 
forging a new form of redemption and securing the very grounds for this in an encounter with 
inhumanity. It is, in fact, a need for coming to terms with the unthinkable. How, we ask 
again, might this transcendence manifest within an artwork? 
To answer this question, let us look at Boltanski’s artworks and investigate the 
triggers with which he is able to engage his viewer. We know that his work embodies post-
memory and its embedded trauma, both familial and historical. He shifts our attention from 
the suggestion of an exorcism to a more fact-based acknowledgment of human costs. From 
here, Boltanski seeks new ways of expressing his ideas, in essence, satisfying Adorno’s 
demands for a reassessment of our position vis à vis creative output in the shadows of the 
Shoah. To do so, Boltanski deploys “strategies of representation that supplement the 
documentary mode that is no longer possible” (Hornstein 99).  
The site-specific artwork entitled Missing House successfully highlights the 
“interplay between Jewish absence and presence” (Hornstein 291) (Figure 4.2). It emphasizes 
the open space where a structure, never rebuilt after World War II and never reclaimed by the 
Jewish owners who were victims of the Holocaust, once stood. Its physical opening offers the 
space for contemplation, layering the fact of destruction with the metaphor of absence. It 
manifests concretely alētheia’s play of concealment/unconcealment in communal space. The 
families are memorialized with plaques attached to the adjacent structures, silently bringing 
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the bystander’s attention to their deaths. This use of space and absence underscores the 
“erasure of humanity that the Holocaust exacted” (Hirsch 248). Utilizing the emptiness 
where the structure once stood, he recalls Hirsch’s point that, “The void cannot be filled with 
real or mimetic objects, it can only point to its own status as a void” (292) and eloquently 
expresses the “relationships between contemporary German life and the memory of Jewish 
culture” (Hornstein 291). Missing House is “emblematic for Boltanski of the missing Jews 
who had once inhabited it . . . as its void invited him to fill it with memory, he hoped it 
would incite others to memory as well” (Hornstein 69). For those who might have 
remembered the home prior to the war, the absence expresses profound loss. For those 
conscious of the impact of the final solution, the emptiness is a haunting, post-memory 
activation of millions of lives lost. The emptiness stands as silent testimony with unspoken 
tributes to those who perished. Hirsch points out, “In an opposite move, however, silence, 
absence, and emptiness are also always present, and often central to the work of 
postmemory” (247). The void created in Missing House challenges the notion of authenticity 
as exclusively the domain of archives and tangible objects. Furthermore, the use of site-
specific works effectively operates in this case as a means of addressing human conflicts both 
ethically and in the transfer of meaning. Missing House is, thereby, a gathering of thought 
that successfully brings the viewer’s attention both to his own recollections and to the 
absence of those who have perished. Other installations further show how his visual systems 
are choreographed in service of our intersubjective experience.  
Monument: The Children of Dijon was created in 1986 as a temporary exhibition, a 
series comprised of 142 black-and-white photographs, metal frames, glass, bare light bulbs, 
wire and articles of clothing (Figure 4.3). The photographic images measure 20.5 x 15 cm 
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each and were placed in grid-like fashion on the walls of the Chapelle de la Salpêtrière in 
Paris.6 The articles of clothing were carefully arranged on the floor of the chapel’s central 
nave, interrupting the line of sight to the sanctuary in which an abundance of starkly lit 
portraits was hung (Figure 4.4). This collection of artifacts and images elicits a multi-sensory 
response in its viewer, opening a vast introspective space for questions and mnemonic 
exchange. Within this once sacred yet historically controversial building, Boltanski 
successfully directs, following Gadamer, a fusion of horizons between the past and present, 
individual and collective memory, and notions life and death, both intrinsic and extrinsic. He 
establishes an ambiguous yet overwhelming connection to the Shoah by multiplying 
recognizable visual clues related to collective consciousness. Moreover, Boltanski disrupts 
notions of portraiture and vexes the understanding of photography as a conduit of fact and 
indexical reality (here we may recall Benjamin and Barthes’ reflections on the medium). “In 
most of my photographic pieces,” explains Boltanski, “I have manipulated the quality of 
evidence that people assign to photography, in order to subvert it, or to show that 
photography lies—that what it conveys is not reality but a set of cultural codes” (van Alphen 
111).  
The result of such aesthetic manipulation is that he opens our conversation about the 
potential for artistically fashioning truth from fiction precisely in and as the alēthiac and 
memory-based notions of truth in personal narrative. As a materially manifest space for 
unconcealment, the visual grammar ‘opens’ the topos of thought. The affect is an intermedial 
event of ‘bringing forth’ that, following Heidegger, ‘works’ to place being “in the open 
region in such a way that what is to be brought forth first clears the openness of the open 
region into which it comes forth.” There is thus a work of openness in artistic creation that 
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“brings the openness of beings, or truth” in an unconcealing mode of reception (Krell 187). 
An artwork must likewise be “understood as a discovery and disclosure of truth,” (Gadamer 
Aesthetics and Hermeneutics 101) one that exposes an essence of Being and powerfully 
eclipses established correspondence theories of truth. But how can an artist’s visual grammar 
work through the specifics of experience – its very objects – without overly ‘objectifying’ the 
meaning that is brought-forth? 
 
Figure 4.4:  
Christian Boltanski 
Monument:The Children of Dijon  
Site-specific instcllation 
Chapelle de la Salpêtrière 
1986  
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Consider for a moment Heidegger’s analysis of Vincent van Gogh’s Peasant Shoes 
(Figure 4.5) (noted in chapter 1). Presumably, Van Gogh chose to paint these in homage to 
the toils of the common man. But Heidegger questions this presumption, concluding that the 
purpose, or intangible role it reveals, is its truest being. He explores the artist’s expression of 
the equipment-ness or object-ness of the shoes, noting that they are what they intend to be. 
This idea requires that one understand the relationship between parts and the whole in the 
apprehension of the work, and the spiral effect specifies the hermeneutic circle in terms, 
specifically, of allegory and symbol: 
The artwork is, to be sure, a thing that is made, but it says 
something other than the mere thing itself is, allo agoreuei. The 
work makes public something other than itself; it manifests 
something other; it is an allegory. In the work of art something 
other is brought together with the thing that is made. To bring 
together is, in Greek, sumballein. The work is a symbol. (Krell 
145) 
The sense of ‘gathering’ aligns with Boltanski’s works, but Heidegger’s view does not 
adequately acknowledge allegory and symbol’s fundamentally different functions. 
Boltanski’s work operates as an allegory, alluding to an exchange of meaning and intellectual 
discourse rather than an essentialist transaction between sign and signified. Allegory, in this 
case, occludes the various symbols and communicates through their merged relationships. As 
Craig Owens points out in his essay “The Allegorical Impulse: Towards a Theory of 
Postmodernism,” “[A]llegory occurs whenever one text is doubled by another” (1026) and 
“[W]ork and site thus stand in a dialectical relationship” (1027). The symbol within 
Boltanski’s work upholds the allegory; it is absorbed within its narrative powers and 
performs the bridging of past to present. As an embodiment of content, allegory works as a 
vehicle for meaning to emerge; in this case communicating with the viewer through the 
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grammar of memory. The inexpressible truth that underlies an unimaginable event such as 
the Shoah can only be imparted by means of allegory and a subsuming of various 
representative symbols. Owens further explains this function: 
[Allegory has the] capacity to rescue from historical oblivion that 
which threatens to disappear. Allegory first emerged in response 
to a similar sense of estrangement from tradition; throughout its 
history it has functioned in the gap between a present and a past, 
which, without allegorical reinterpretation, might have remained 
foreclosed. A conviction of the remoteness of the past, and a 
desire to redeem it for the present — these are its two most 
fundamental impulses. (Harrison and Wood 1026)  
The function is thus more enacting than merely referential. Gadamer explains: “[T]his is the 
open space creative language [and visual art] give us and which we fill out by following what 
the writer evokes . . . we start to decipher a picture like a text” (27). The material of art 
exists, as an embodiment of its visual content, and carries it forward for interpretation. In our 
search for its inherent truth, we now look beyond the physical constructs found within a 
frame or space. Instead, we extrapolate signs and connect to the triggers in our psyche. We 
need not set allegory and symbol at odds, for the visual language is symbolic to each of us 
individually, in addition to its collective importance.  
This notion of image as symbol carries tremendous weight as we further clarify the 
potency of visual language and the ways such elements become internalized and assimilated 
by the viewer. As Heidegger writes, “If there occurs in the work a disclosure of a particular 
being, disclosing what and how it is, then there is here an occurring, a happening of truth at 
work” (Krell 161-162). The happening within Boltanski’s Children of Dijon brings forth 
truth by means of an overall experience—art as event, prompting a mediation of the work 
through the self and the other. Thus we are returned, by means of allegory and symbol, to 
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personal and shared narratives and memories. The work provides the space for questioning 
without intending or requiring fixed responses. Truth, in its transient state, resides in the 
tension between what is known and what is new. The collision of the past and present 
moments introduces a Morpheus-like quality that renders truth irreducible to a fixed, 
calculable result. 
Confronted by Boltanski’s choreographed experience, the viewer likely felt what 
Gadamer has described in saying, “Language often seems ill-suited to express what we feel. 
In the face of the overwhelming presence of works of art, the task of expressing in words 
what they say to us seems like an infinite and hopeless undertaking . . . . one says this, and 
then one hesitates” (Truth 401). For Gadamer, the functions of language apply to visual 
perception as important modes of signification. The Children of Dijon engenders this 
Figure 4.5:  
Vincent Van Gogh 
Peasant Shoes  
Oil on canvas 
38.1 cm x 45.3 cm 
Van Gogh Museum / 1886  
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‘hesitation’ by coordinating layers of archeological sediment, linking historical and present 
experience. Donald Kuspit summarizes the installation’s troubling effect: 
It is as though the faces were fragments of existence that 
Boltanski had excavated from some ruin of time—a remote 
past, all the more intangible by reason of the blurred look of 
the photographs, a sign of temporal erosion. They belong to 
collective memory—they form a collective unconscious, if one 
without defining contours, implying that it is limitless 
(everyone has a dead child inside himself or herself)—but the 
content of the memory is at once uncertain and matter-of-fact, 
obscure yet straightforward, indistinct yet unmistakable (98). 
The installation—lit only by means of small bulbs that starkly illuminate the many 
anonymous children’s faces, with the remainder of the space kept intentionally darkened to 
magnify the impact of the arrangement—elicits a contemplative mood and solemn 
ambience that grips the viewer and demands his intense participation (Figure 4.3). The 
boundary between artwork and audience was blurred. The viewer was literally engulfed in 
the work through the implication of containment within the architectural and symbolic 
space blended with the delineation of the installation. The space becomes at once a place of 
reverence, sacred and meditative, while simultaneously an indictment of complicity in the 
death of so many children. Thus, we see that, though neither Heidegger nor Gadamer 
address ‘installation space’ per se, their ideas are expanded through both the medium and 
its artworks, resulting in an open space of contemplation.  
It is in the abstract and mysterious nature of the work, deliberately housed in the 
chosen space, that an acutely truthful narrative ‘translates’ into being. It is especially 
noteworthy that Boltanski is able to conjure this truth by building entirely upon fictional 
foundations. He problematizes our desire for demonstrable fact or absolute truth, and puts 
into crisis the authenticity of the encounter by denying the viewer concrete, verifiable 
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information. Yet, in an interview with the Tate, Boltanski declares, “[t]o speak the truth, you 
must first be a liar” (Tate Magazine, “Studio: Christian Boltanski”). He is addressing 
detractors who may feel duped by his contradictory choice of materials but feel this way 
because they hold to the premise that truth as such is something verifiable and concrete. 
Bolstanski’s strategic ardor was demonstrated when it was discovered that one of his ‘dead 
Swiss’, whose image was included in an installation bearing the same name, turned out to 
be very much alive.7 But to discredit the work on such grounds is to miss the point. Despite 
their fabricated provenance and drift from accepted forms of identification, it is in the 
interstice created by the disparate visual language that a poignant truth emerges. The sum of 
this gesture powerfully echoes Heidegger’s hermeneutic project and magnifies his objection 
to the narrow confines of Western metaphysics, particularly in reference to his focus on 
poetics. In Truth and Method, Gadamer extends Heidegger’s attention to truth as alētheia to 
its broader implications for “a philosophical effort” that must “account for understanding as 
an ontological—the ontological—process of man” (qtd. in Palmer 163). Experience must be 
understood as “a stream in which we move and participate, in every act of understanding” 
(Palmer 117). Taken together, ‘process’ and ‘understanding’ yield a hermeneutics of 
dialogue in philosophy and art alike. This feature is enacted in the historical yet also timeless 
questions posed by The Children of Dijon.  
In broader terms, what we find is a connection between memory, the archive, an 
opening space, and the emergence of truth within this complex of creative means. Boltanski’s 
use of artifacts and quotidian objects in order to stir recollection and a common experience is 
again important on this score and in the modes of alētheia evident in The Storehouse, Lycée 
Chases and Dead Swiss. And the hermeneutic valence generated through his placement of 
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artworks in spaces such as the Chapelle de la Salpêtrière enacts the Heideggerian stress on 
parts and wholes – in, for example, the Greek temple: “[I]t is the temple-work that first fits 
together and at the same time gathers around itself the unity of those paths and relations in 
which birth and death, disaster and blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and decline 
acquire the shape of destiny for human being[s]” (Krell 167). Boltanski’s particular 
installations also concretize Gadamer’s understanding of how art’s meaning and truth is 
extended by its viewer’s experience, both past and present. The installations affect spaces of 
a hermeneutic event comprised of time, memory, and emerging order. So doing, the works 
furnish a temporal fusion of horizons; reader and author are merged in “an event in which a 
world opens itself to him” through both language and art (Palmer 209). But we have not yet 
completed the decidedly aesthetic manifestation this ‘event’ in relation to the matters of truth 
and hermeneutic circularity. Gadamer, after all, asks, “What is the importance and 
significance of this particular experience which claims truth for itself, thereby denying that 
the universal expressed by mathematical formulation of the laws of nature is the only kind of 
truth?” (Philosophical Hermeneutics 16-17). He is implying that the position from which 
truth’s ‘veracity’ is sought must itself be resituated more existentially, thus drawn away from 
the topos of mathematical equivalence. That shift may in turn allow an event of truth’s 
disclosure that is more honest than the ‘correspondence’ paradigm can ever be. Both 
conceptually and literally, the honesty is ventured in Boltanski’s departure from accurate fact 
in order to shed light in corners normally kept dark. Recall that with alētheia and Lichtung 
Heidegger proposes a more fundamental understanding of being and truth that incorporates 
the binary of light and shadow to function together, lending equal importance to the tension 
between what is in view and what lies hidden. Boltanski’s use of lights, images and artifacts 
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create a sum of truths that act in unison and flux to lead the viewer on a journey of questions 
and suggested conclusions, while withholding any concrete narrative (see Figure 4.4) that 
would supervene on the hermeneutic event. The use of light and dark in a hermeneutic 
circularity also instantiates the spiral quality of exchange between the material artwork’s 
involvement of the self and, subsequently, the community.  
On this score Boltanski’s works show how Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur bridge the 
abstract nature of Heidegger’s thought to the more concrete phenomena of the artwork and 
the emancipatory potential he ascribed to it. The spiral affect consists in layers of aesthetic 
meaning. Gadamer explains: “When a work of art truly takes hold of us, it is not an object 
that stands opposite us which we look at in hope of seeing through it to an intended 
conceptual meaning . . . the work is an Ereignis—an event that ‘appropriates us’ to itself. 
It jolts us, it knocks us over and sets up a world of its own, into which we are drawn” 
(Palmer 72). Boltanski’s layerings of space, memory, allegory and symbol, and the 
subjective and collective engender such an event in the interplay between the artwork and 
its participant and the deeply felt internal shift. In addition, the subject/object dichotomy is 
rendered diffuse by one’s bodily participation within the work.  
But what of the distinctly ethical component of such an appropriation? How does 
this charge come to light? Boltanski’s work powerfully underscores Lévinas’ understanding 
of ethical responsibility in the ‘face of the other’ (something that will remain crucial for us in 
the forthcoming artworks) through its prolific deployment of anonymous portraits of those 
presumed dead and those for whom the audience feels collective responsibility. In 
Monument: Children of Dijon, an ethico-sensory experience of cultural heritage is 
embedded in the moment of encounter as the collections of archival photographs and pieces 
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of clothing make reference to non-identifiable bodies of the past. The sheer numbers of 
faces and objects, offered as objects of memory, return the viewer to the Shoah through the 
anonymous listing of lost beings and their physical reduction to accumulated artifacts. The 
process is both mysterious yet connective. We recognize pieces of our past and of ourselves 
in the exchange. Taken separately, each of the elements carries meaning. Ingested en 
masse, they allude to the lists and dehumanization imposed upon Jews during the rise and 
height of the Nazi party. When writing a review for Frieze, Rose Jennings describes the 
work: 
As a random example, in Les Enfants de Dijon (1985), a vast 
wall of blurred and funereally lit photographs of children 
implied a story of wartime extradition but in fact were photos 
of a class from a Dijon school, each re-photographed for 
further age-aestheticised effect. (The bodies, meanwhile, so 
redolent of attics, schoolrooms, fragile pre-computer 
repositories of memory are in fact made up by the artist.) ‘I am 
working with the idea of fragility and disappearance’, 
Boltanski has said, ‘. . . so if my work is about childhood, for 
example, it is not because I am interested in childhood, it is 
because that is the first part of us that is dead, we are dead 
children.’ (Jennings) 
In response, Tom Lubbock asks, “How then to go on about an art which speaks so clearly for 
itself, and what it says over and over is dead, dead, dead?” (“Remembrance of Things Past”). 
After Auschwitz, after all, does not art that references such atrocities simply re-open old 
wounds? On the contrary, in a cathartic move, Boltanski’s works radiate a healing quality of 
ethical vocation, one that permeates the space in which his works are shown and one that 
inevitably exercises its power on the viewer. 
The embedded symbolism of the chapel forces a solemnity that exalts those 
represented beyond earthly existence. The viewer is compelled to interpret the message 
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through discernable signs and familiar triggers that draw on stored memory. The 
phenomenon evokes what Gadamer calls art’s power of ‘recognition,’ where “recognition 
always implies that we have come to know something more authentically than we were able 
to do when caught up in our first encounter with it. Recognition elicits the permanent from 
the transient” (Gadamer 47). In other words, we feel a deeper connection to that which 
appears familiar, as though in its re-presentation it is already partially known and interpreted 
as truth. Our understanding of the chapel as sacred precedes our experience of its contents, 
thus allowing familiarity to support our interpretation of the overall effect and its moral 
charge. Certainly, the additive nature of Monument: The Children of Dijon stirs associations 
with the stores of images lodged in our memories and transfers meaning by means of its 
recognizable elements. It bears questioning how both the site of exchange and the images 
contained therein reinforce Heidegger’s Miteinandersein, or our being as involved with 
others, in terms of structure and its embedded meaning.8 Here we may see an emerging 
overlay between Heidegger’s structural accounts of being-with and being-toward, his sense 
of aesthetic parts and wholes, Gadamerian recognition, and Lévinas’ insertion of a 
grounding event of otherness and responsibility. But how else do the material specifics of 
the artwork enact an ethical charge within the ‘gathering’ of parts and wholes? 
 Other symbolic content in Boltanski’s installations includes biscuit boxes, pieces of 
clothing, yearbook photos, or newspaper clippings, bare lightbulbs and other fixtures that 
permeate our modern existence (Figures 4.6–4.9). If we consider these artifacts and tools 
through Heidegger’s lens, each piece is related to the whole and meaning is ascribed 
through their interconnectedness. As with the totality of Being, tools exist in relation to 
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other tools and those who put them to use. They come to be understood as their purpose is 
made manifest—through, as Heidegger asserted, a ready to hand quality that translates  
 
their meaning as they are put to use. Where Heidegger is speaking of our being in relation 
to the specifics of our world, Boltanski is speaking to the at-handedness of our memory. If 
Figure 4.6 – 4.9: 
Christian Boltanski 
Symbolic Content: biscuit boxes, lights, 
faces, locations. 
Miscellaneous installations 
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taken separately, the individual elements trigger memories of childhood, nostalgic 
reminders of those with whom we have shared experience. One sees the bridge connecting 
personal narrative with the broader collective experience. We find both Heidegger’s 
alētheiac openness and Lévinas’ ethical charge. The yearbook photos of children and 
young adults speak to a past presence that leaves questions surrounding fate and an 
inevitable finality of life. We recognize the newspaper clippings and attach to them a 
personal significance based on this prior knowledge. The remnants of clothing contained in 
the biscuit boxes, for example, draw parallels to reliquaries and death.  
I spoke earlier of the distinct internal shift brought about in viewers by Boltanski’s 
layerings of space, memory, allegory and symbol, and the subjective and collective. And 
we have now specified the emerging ethical center point of this hermeneutic event. 
Working intertextually between the philosophical grain of hermeneutic phenomenology 
and the material grain of these installations, we see how Boltanski’s complex conceptual 
and material web is an immersive and emancipatory experience. The collective significance 
of the symbols I have just noted is altered when assembled in large numbers, creating an 
additive formula whereby narrative is transformed and meaning changed. Every viewer 
sees the pieces differently, yet the overall effect is strangely shared and understood. The 
unified artwork, then, acts as a locus of meaning that is offered for interpretation to the 
viewer, much the way allegories function. Following Gadamer, it puts something in play, 
something much larger than the self as it relates to the artwork. The cultural production is 
thus an assemblage of signs to be deciphered in order to merge past and present for a 
fullness of understanding. When I characterize the ethical as the center point in this spiral I 
do not mean that there is a hierarchy afoot in the aesthetic dimensions; after all we cannot 
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abstract one experiential part from the whole. But I do maintain that the underlying feature 
of this immersive experience in a Boltanski space is an alēthiac event of moral truth, and 
the potential for this is orchestrated (we might say ‘author-produced’) through every 
atmospheric and material detail.   
 
Let us press further into how Boltanski implicates his viewer-participant in a 
Lévinasian intersubjective experience and call to responsibility for the other, and how the 
visual grammar of this event utilizes the ‘archive.’ As with Monument: Children of Dijon, 
many of his other installations include sequences of blurred black-and-white headshots, 
desk lamps, and evocative artifacts arranged in an organized, linear, altar-like fashion. 
They are photographic and tactile, intentional yet mysterious. In each, he repeatedly stirs 
our collective memory, while leading us methodically toward and through a disturbing, 
Figure 4.10: 
Christian Boltanski 
The Storehouse 
1988 
MoMA, NYC 
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abstract mood of finality. These affects put into crisis the notion of image as index, as he 
creates meaning from sometimes inauthentic evidence. By the technē (in its positive sense) 
of inserting objets trouvés into his installations, Boltanski once again asserts his belief in 
and use of fabrication as the foundation for revealing a Heideggerian essence of truth. His 
use of archived images, collections of people whose lives he knew nothing about, pushes to 
the fore the ways that anonymity becomes general—as his audience easily accepts its 
collective ascription.9 
Using the archive as a means of engaging broader memory is a powerful tool for 
implicating the collective community in its contents. Another installation titled The 
Storehouse, now in MoMA’s collection, typifies this effect (Figure 4.10). Curator Roxana 
Marcoci writes the following about its presentation: 
Enlarged photographs of seven young girls are propped atop a 
stack of unlabeled tin biscuit boxes containing scraps of fabric. 
These boxes are corroded as if marked by time and are infused 
with symbolic associations—they evoke reliquary boxes, archival 
containers, and funerary urns. The black-and-white photographs 
connote another era; out of focus, they constitute a visual analogy 
to memory, fading over time. Electric lights illuminate the seven 
faces like devotional candles, underscoring the effect of a 
memorial, an orchestration of signifiers indicating loss and 
remembrance. Old photographs, the tension between 
individuality and sameness, and the implication of vast numbers 
evoke the tragedy of the Holocaust.  (MoMA.org) 
As with the Children of Dijon, again we find visual memories and triggers stored over the 
course of one’s life. The headshots, as blurred and unidentifiable as they are, recall Anne 
Frank, whose universally read diary bore her image (Figure 4.11). The rows of faces point to 
a police line-up. The desk lamps shed blinding, intense light, reminiscent of torture and 
questioning. The bare bulbs feel less like Marcoci’s devotional candles and more like an 
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acute deprivation, as they render the subjects in the installation unable to see past their 
aggressive effect while also further blurring each subject’s facial features. In addition, their 
own proximity to each other would create pronounced discomfort from the tremendous heat 
they would be generating. The biscuit tins, each containing pieces of cloth, provoke 
disquieting questions and force the viewer to provide his own answers. The controlled 
arrangement of faces harkens Foucault’s notions of dominance and a repressive political 
reduction of human freedom. The gathering of symbols, individually chosen and arranged, 
amasses strength in their numbers and becomes allegorical. In a circular process from whole 
to the parts and back again, Boltanski leads his viewer to discover the message. Here we may 
renew two prior questions: To what extent does Boltanski’s visual strategy unburden the 
viewer of enframing qua alienation? How is the artwork an ethical gesture per Lévinas or 
Arendt?  
Figure 4.11: 
Anne Frank 
Cover image for The Diaries 
The diary was written between 1942-44 
Anne Frank House, Amsterdam 
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As truth emerges from the careful edit of elements, the parallels to the Holocaust are 
indelible. There is also a connection to the Catholic iconography of reliquary, altar and 
human sacrifice. An intense psychic discomfort occurs when one apprehends the 
approximate ages of the girls (figure 4.10). Their innocence contradicts the sum of the 
message, creating a palpable tension and a collective sense of mourning and responsibility 
for the deaths of more than six million Jews. The combination of disparate objects and 
images provokes a truth that resides in expansive cultural memory, more specifically in 
Western memes. Each individual object carries its connotative significance to the viewer, 
who, as we have seen, is a critical part of the dialogue: 
The viewer is part of the work. I try to communicate with him by 
stimulating his memory: the viewer has the right to interpret the 
pictures as he likes, to make his own picture. For me, it’s enough 
to just give him the signs, to communicate with him without 
trying to teach or direct him. I want to bring out the viewer’s 
interior and invisible powers. (Stiles 614) 
Such ‘stimulation’ and ‘bringing out’ reflects Gadamer’s idea that “it is in the sheer being 
there (Dasein) of the work of art that our understanding experiences the depths and the 
unfathomability of its meaning” (Palmer 72). And, as we will continue to see, such 
‘meaning’ bears a distinct Lévinasian hue.  
Boltanski deploys the same strategies in Dead Swiss, when he gathers anonymous images 
from obituaries and news stories, once again blurring identities and concocting new 
narratives in which the images exist. Marcocci explains, Boltanski “creates an atmosphere of 
general, unspecified mourning through means—photographs, relics—traditionally valued for 
their privileged claim to specificity, uniqueness, and authenticity. A vocabulary of 
documentary signs is used movingly, but deceptively, for symbolic effect” (Marcocci 86). 
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Boltanski himself explains, 
What drives me as an artist is that I think everyone is unique, yet 
everyone disappears so quickly. I made a large work called The 
Reserve of Dead Swiss (1990) and all the people in photographs 
in the work are dead. We hate to see the dead, yet we love them, 
we appreciate them. Human. That's all we can say. Everyone is 
unique and important. (Tate Interview) 
Boltanski’s thoughts point to an appreciation for both our temporality and value as beings. 
They shift the viewer’s attention to his responsibility for the other, for a need to acknowledge 
and understand the community shared within the past. As we feel this shift in experiencing 
the work, so, too, do we recognize a collective complicity in the overall narrative. Indeed, the 
sentiment of one’s uniqueness and social significance is emphasized by Lévinas as part and 
parcel of our intersubjective, ethical exchange. We are now in a position to better stress the 
primacy he places on this in the orders of meaning and selfhood. He states, “But it is always 
starting out from the Face, from the responsibility for the other that justice appears, which 
calls for judgment and comparison, a comparison of what is in principle incomparable, for 
every being is unique; every other is unique” (EN 104). And as for this ‘starting out’ in the 
immersive realm of the ‘unique’ signified by the ‘face’ of the other, he explains “the order of 
meaning, which seems to me primary, is precisely what comes to us from the inter-human 
relationship, so that the Face, with all its meaningfulness as brought out by analysis, is the 
beginning of intelligibility” (EN 103). Boltanski manipulates our encounter with the face, 
manifesting a Lévinasian experience of intersubjective exchange within the felt moment. The 
multiple anonymous images create a powerful scenario in which one feels afresh the primacy 
of collective accountability.  
We began this section with a look at Boltanski’s life and its impact on his artistic 
production. From this base, we moved through the ways trauma, memory, site, and 
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artifacts/archive constitute an ethical encounter through the artwork. We have seen how 
Boltanski’s work is both expanded by philosophical ideas, and, in turn, extends these same 
ideas through his installations. We must understand the complexity of his artworks in order 
to fully appreciate its ethical tenor. Boltanski creates a mise-en-scène that addresses larger 
truths. He transcends the need for indexical reference of reality and creates a visceral, more 
widely accessible, story that engages collective memory and its endless spectrum of 
impressions.  
He literally realigns the images to create a dialog with his viewers, who are 
implicated in their translation. Says Enwezor, “His work oscillates between inert 
collections and arrangements of conservation, sometimes pushing his concerns to perverse 
extremes, blurring the line between the fictive and the historical” (Enwezor 31). It is the 
sum of the elements that are creating the significance of the work. To review: 
It is not only his own history that he manufactures. He has 
created installations consisting of artifacts from the life of a 
fictional family. He treats banal objects reverently. The biscuit 
boxes he uses have only been made to look old; the articles of 
clothing do not belong to Holocaust survivors; the Jewish 
children in the prewar photographs may or may not have died. 
And even “Reserve of Dead Swiss (large)” includes one 
unidentified photograph of someone still alive. (Kimmelman) 
Knowing that the figures in his installations are appropriated, and to a large extent imaginary, 
does not diminish the strength of his message. As Boltanski states, the “installation became 
the means for metaphysical reflections on memory, death, the human condition, and the 
tragedy of the Holocaust” (Stiles 590). Our associative powers override the knowledge that 
the portraits are appropriated and the confluence of signs triggers our recollections, namely: 
the Holocaust took place and cost millions of lives, lives that continue to haunt our collective 
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conscience through his oeuvre. But would not Lévinas question art’s ability to motivate an 
ethical exchange? At the end of his essay “Is Ontology Fundamental?” he asks, “Can things 
take on a face? Is not art an activity that lends faces to things? . . . We ask ourselves all the 
same if the impersonal but fascinating and magical march of rhythm does not, in art, 
substitute itself for sociality, for the face, for speech” (Lévinas, BPW, 10). Lévinas offers no 
answer. Yet, as we experience the face within Boltanski’s installations, there is no question 
we feel the presence of the other (l’autrui) and experience a culpability of understanding in 
the wake of the unthinkable.  
The ethical undertones and intersubjective exchange permeating Boltanski’s work 
move us to a broader dialogue centered on the phenomenon of narrative. Let us return briefly 
to this issue, which is important not only as an interpretive matter but also as a way to further 
see how these artworks achieve an intertextualization of philosophical ideas otherwise not 
fully available on the level of conceptual comparison alone. We have seen that, in the works, 
the bridging of past to present brings about a dynamic layering of transference and translation 
at the intersection of memory and becoming. The viewer’s individual reading of the narrative 
initiates an evolving story, but one without the finality of a fixed or finished hermeneutic. As 
Caines explains, “[A]rt makers such as Christian Boltanski have become a familiar focus for 
the problematics of understanding personal and cultural remembrances and their relationship 
to history, identity and memorial, yet they also offer us new ways to map the performativity 
of memory” (4). These are ways in which the self acquires qualities of the other and 
integrates these into a personal narrative that is ever changing. We carry with us traces of 
history, remnants of the past that define us and bridge to the future, and this exchange alters 
our interpretation of narrative content. Ricoeur sees this flux as emblematic of inter-
   267 
subjective experience that places the reader in a constant state of becoming. Content 
transforms as it is carried forth in its various readings, creating a truly dialogical relationship 
between the author/artist and his reader/viewer. The textual quality of Boltanski’s work 
invites viewer participation while at the same time altering perception. Recall Heidegger’s 
notion of the ‘work-character’ of an artwork, where “the revelation that happens through the 
encounter with an artwork, not the art object, is the work of art” (Bolt 41). Now we are able 
to say that the profundity of the encounter with an artwork’s ‘work’ lies within the 
experiential exchange and in the creation of a new narrative. Thus Boltanski’s work reveals 
how narrative, or emplotment without finality, can be added to the bringing-forth of 
Heidegger’s work-character.  Drawing on Aristotle’s Poetics, Ricoeur holds, 
My thesis is here that the process of composition, of 
configuration, is not completed in the text but in the reader and, 
under this condition, makes possible the reconfiguration of life 
by narrative. I should say, more precisely: the sense of the 
significance of a narrative stems from the intersection of the 
world of the text and the world of the reader. (Wood LQN 26) 
This language of configuration and reconfiguration across worlds adds to Heidegger and 
Gadamer’s views the viewer’s internalization and subsequent translation of the work, which 
in turn alters truth once more. He is supplementing the hermeneutic unveiling of truth, while 
reinforcing the implied ethics of an artwork and its potentially intersubjective force. The 
convergence of reader and artist also echoes the ideas of Barthes and Benjamin (examined in 
the previous chapter in relation to Rosler’s work), as well as Gadamer’s fusion of horizons. 
As the viewer interprets Boltanski’s installations, he discovers a new text and is transformed. 
In short, there is an exchange of meaning or transference of memory, an intersection of 
personal and collective memory wherein an impermanent community of ideas is manifested.  
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 It should be evident that we must be careful to treat the artworks not only as visual 
encounters but also as the storied paradigms of their content. In other words, the artworks 
parallel ideas on language and narrative beyond the visual legacy they leave behind. Let us 
see how Ricoeur equips us to appreciate this matter, then run it back through some of the 
interpretive signposts we have explored. In his essay “Reflections on a New Ethos for 
Europe,” Ricoeur suggests modes of inter-subjective relations that underscore the notion of 
narrative transformation. The first of these is translation, which he interprets as “a matter of 
living with the other in order to take the other to one’s home as a guest . . . in this sense we 
can speak of a translation ethos whose goal would be to repeat at the cultural and spiritual 
level the gesture of linguistic hospitality” (Kearney 4). The second mode of ‘relation’ is 
found in the exchange of memories, in which Ricoeur states, “a new ethos is born of the 
understanding applied to the complex intertwining of new stories which structure and 
configure the crossroads between memories. It is a matter there of a genuine task, a genuine 
labor, in which we could identify the Anerkennung of German Idealism, that is of 
‘recognition’ considered in its narrative dimension” (Kearney 5). Again, Ricoeur’s position 
in regards to ‘relation’ points to how the reader belongs “at once to the work’s horizon of 
experience in imagination and to that of his or her own real action” (Wood LQN 26). Finally, 
a model of forgiveness is offered as a means of releasing the past to remain in the present, 
perhaps unencumbered by memories or guilt. Recognition, reaction, and forgiveness, if 
understood through the narrative experience of Boltanski’s works, can accentuate Lévinas’ 
point regarding the primary ethical obligation through the face of the other. The installations 
reinforce this inter-subjective exchange and integrate the other in our thoughts and memories. 
Individuals seek a blending of memories to redefine the self and develop a more holistic 
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perspective on the essence of truth. As though restating Ricoeur’s point, Lévinas holds “[I]t 
is a mediation between man and the world, between man and man, between man and himself; 
the mediation between man and the world is what we can referentiality; the mediation 
between men, communicability, the mediation between man and himself, self-understanding” 
(Wood LQN 27). But how are these components of ‘exhange’ and ‘mediation’ further 
evident in the collective experience of truth that Boltanski enables? 
 
Figure 4.13: 
Christian Boltanski 
Faces  
Children of Dijon 
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In her article for After Image, Rebecca Caines stresses a feature that might seem 
counter to the resilience of these features: 
[Boltanski] suggested that if such a thing be made, it should be 
made of something ‘fragile, that would not last, like paper,’ so 
that the monument in order to last had to be ‘constantly tended, 
looked after and rebuilt,’ as perhaps in the frequent physical 
watching over and rebuilding of the monument instead of 
building a monument in bronze that we could leave behind and 
forget,’ . . . we would have to physically act to remember and 
keep remembering. (Caines) 
The fact that the very substance of the installation should be fragile and require tending 
parallels the need for care for our intersubjective dispositions. The hidden truth underlying 
what continues to be an unthinkable event must therefore be constructed in order to 
perpetuate an ethos of care for the other. The broader lesson here is that this gesture reflects 
an enterprise in creative truth that can elucidate and materialize Heidegger’s interpretation of 
alētheia. Boltanski’s repeated use of the face of the other in his installations connects with 
our a priori understanding of the interdependency of beings, thus inserting a real-time 
Levinasian ethics into a Heideggerian being-with and solicitude. What is remarkable is that 
the insertion fortifies the primacy of the ethically intersubjective by way of the fragile. This 
point is important because it not only builds on what I have been showing in terms of the 
intertextuality between (a) our philosophical concepts and the installations, and (b) the 
resulting intertexual results on the side of the philosophical dialogue, but also (c) a distinct 
supplement Boltanski brings to the Lévinasian ethic.  
While Lévinas is referring to individual exchanges between two beings, isolating the 
ethical impulse in a singular encounter, Boltanski overwhelms the viewer with a multitude of 
anonymous faces from whom a returned gaze is impossible (figure 4.13). For Lévinas, “the 
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epiphany of the face is ethical” (199). For Boltanski, we must care for the other and nurture 
the fragility of our temporal existence. Though different in terms, the events are alike in kind. 
For Lévinas, 
The transcendence of the Other, which is his eminence, his 
height, his lordship, in its concrete meaning includes his 
destitution, his exile  [dépaysement], and his rights as a stranger.  
I can recognize the gaze of the stranger, the widow, and the 
orphan only in giving or in refusing; I am free to give or to 
refuse, but my recognition passes necessarily through the 
interposition of things. Things are not, as in Heidegger, the 
foundation of the site, the quintessence of all the relations that 
constitute our presence on the earth (and ‘under the heavens, in 
company with men, and in the expectation of the gods’).  The 
relationship between the same and the other, my welcoming of 
the other, is the ultimate fact, and in it the things figure not as 
what one builds but as what one gives. (Totality 76-77) 
Ultimately, the agency Lévinas describes is that we choose a generous disposition of 
responsibility, without which there is no real genesis of subjectivity. Art, by the same token, 
returns us to a more authentic grounding of the self in terms of the collective and by way of 
the face, in real-time aesthetic experience. Boltanski brings us to the Lévinasian space of 
address and ‘height’ by means of objects and memories, interspersed with images of others 
assumed dead. Things become more than objects, and the viewer is implicated the scene of 
death and complicity. Returning to the issue of our at-handedness in relation to the world, the 
installations effectively bracket what Heidegger termed our ‘equipmental’ relation to objects 
and the self-directed purposes motivating this.  
 Note, further, how such bracketing is unique in the way it deprives us of a full 
knowledge of the other while tasking us with (and indeed constituting us through) an 
unspoken responsibility. This feature points back to the idea of transcendence and height 
noted above and links powerfully with Boltanski’s technique of erasing individual features 
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and multiplying anonymous face. Societal memory gains its ethical charge and plants the 
viewer back in the “primordial discourse” of a narrative “whose first word is obligation, 
which no ‘interiority’ permits avoiding” (Lévinas, Totality 201). Here one’s drive for 
recognition becomes both an aesthetic resource and point of development – an intersubjective 
space for truth to manifest and transform.  
What is the summary outcome of these affects? We acknowledged that offering 
fabrication as truth is questionable. The fictional foundation of Boltanski’s artworks poses 
important philosophical questions: Is art an aggressive Making (challenging-forth) or a 
Letting-Be form of enlivened poēisis? For Heidegger, art’s role is to allow for the open space 
of thinking to manifest, for questioning to arise. From Plato’s perspective, fashioning truth 
from fiction presents a danger. The ascription of a common truth to mnemonic 
representations places the responsibility for translation on the viewer and assumes the 
commonality of the symbolic triggers. In addition, as we see in Boltanski’s works, overtly 
falsifying identities and story lines in order to create a more essential truth could be said to 
put in crisis the supposed authenticity of the archive itself, thus entirely undermining its 
credibility as a translator of memory and experience. But to read Boltanski’s work under this 
lens is a mistake. What is most powerful is the opening for questions that he is able to create, 
and the allowance for a fluid response to emerge for each viewer-participant. If we apply a 
correspondence theory to Boltanski’s work, and/or come to it from the position of analytic 
distance and art-critical explanations of what is expressed, we miss its capacity for alētheia, 
thus eliminating the possibility for a manifestation of open space for contemplation and 
responsive thought.  
 
   273 
§ 4.4: KRYSZTOF WODICZKO: TRUTH, TEMPORALITY AND FEARLESS SPEECH 
Thus far, we have traced the possibility for unconcealment and intersubjective 
exchange in Boltanski’s multi-layered artworks. In addition, we have noted the importance of 
memory and its function in the ‘fusion of horizons’ as one participates in the event of the 
artwork. Through an analysis of Boltanski’s visual grammar, we have mapped the ways 
personal and collective memories merge through artifacts, history and the face of the other. 
With these observations in mind, we must now turn to the ways technology aids in the 
transfer of such an ethical, intersubjective exchange and clarify the role artworks play in 
negating enframing qua alienation. The work of Krysztof Wodiczko will help us navigate this 
extension. 
Figure 4.14: 
Krzysztof Wodiczko 
Bunker Hill Memorial 1998 
Charlestown, Massachusetts 
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At first glance, we find a number of important parallels connecting his life’s work 
with that of Boltanski. Beyond the basic fact that they belong to the same generation 
emerging from World War II, according to Sanford Kwinter, “Wodiczko is a product not 
only of a Europe degenerated frighteningly and swiftly into Fascism, but [he] is also a Jewish 
offspring of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising of 1943” (Kwinter 8). Wodiczko’s career grew out 
of this particular challenging reality, likely carrying with it the effects of postmemory seen in 
Boltanski. While Boltanski’s work focuses on memory with an invitation for viewers to 
surrender to introspection and an unveiling of meaning qua truth, Wodiczko’s oeuvre is more 
disruptive and public, acting as both a therapeutic exchange and political confrontation. But 
both artists seek to reveal truth as multi-layered and polyphonic. They bring forth the 
dialogic qualities (as also seen in Martha Rosler’s work) that allow their participants, through 
an orchestrated process of ethical human exchange, to come to a critical truth perhaps not 
otherwise available.  
Furthermore, both deploy certain specific technologies in service of their overall 
message, be it through the use of lights, projections, artifacts or otherwise—a feature that 
remains essential to the trajectory of this project. As a trained industrial designer, Wodiczko 
pushes the edges of technology’s potential as a medium for dialogue, using well-planned 
video projections at significant public sites of memorial. He calls his artistic genre 
“interrogative design” (Transformative Avant-Garde 9) and has extended his process to a 
number of organizations affiliated with institutions, such as MIT and Harvard University, 
among others.10 He considers himself an interventionist, “a notorious trouble-maker who 
troubles a troubled world by making its troubles visible” (Transformative Avant-Garde 12, 
19). Moreover, he believes strongly in the human need to “testify to the wrong in order to 
   275 
propose a change for the better” (Transformative Avant-Garde 12).  
Benjamin’s artist-producer resonates in Wodiczko’s thought, and within the strategies 
he undertakes to raise up disenfranchised members of society. George Smith, in his essay 
“The Art of Critique in the Age of Addiction,” recounts Wodiczko’s efforts in Charlestown, 
Massachusetts, at a time when drug wars were taking many teenage lives. Smith explains,  
As Charlestown disintegrated in its own ethnic solidarity, 
Wodiczko went to the homes of the murder victims and made 
video interviews with the mothers of the boys who’d been killed. 
Then at night he projected the videos onto Charlestown’s Bunker 
Hill Monument. Thousands watched. Within hours the code of 
silence was broken, and within days arrests were made and the 
murders stopped. (2-3) 
Smith’s account of Wodiczko’s intervention highlights the ethics underpinning his work 
(figure 4.14). His use of the Bunker Hill Monument is a strong and subversive metaphor 
“symbolizing freedom” while simultaneously “[emanating from] the phallic power or 
patriarchal tradition and domination” (Smith 3). Doing so through community collaboration 
demonstrates the more potent grassroots exchange. By giving voice to victims’ mothers and 
sharing the recorded testimony with the broader public through using the Bunker Hill 
Monument, Wodiczko transcends invisible barriers and brings a devastating wave of crime to 
an end.  
Heidegger’s position on technology qua enframing also helps us understand 
Wodiczko’s intermedial intentions. One will recall Heidegger’s focus on Hölderlin’s words: 
“But where the danger is, also grows the saving power.” Wodiczko achieves a transformative 
public healing through his technologically driven installations, even to the point of 
mobilizing the language in which beings dwell. He brings the voiceless together with the 
public in a powerful, ethical exchange by manipulating language, space and technological 
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means to reveal deeper truths that expose “the needs that should not, but unfortunately do, 
exist in the present civilized world” (Transformative Avant-Garde 9). Whereas Boltanski 
immerses his viewer in the face of the other, Wodiczko adds to this the layering of speech, a 
feature that drives home our intersubjective responsibilities in the manner of Lévinas’ 
‘address’ of the other. The truth Wodiczko brings forth has the power to liberate the speakers 
from their traumas, and he devotes decades to facilitating the overcoming of otherness. His 
projects illustrate Dostoyevsky’s concept of social responsibility, as expressed through the 
character of Zosima, who says, “We are all guilty for everything and everyone, and I more 
than all the others” (qtd. in Lévinas, EN 105). In addition, Heidegger’s understanding of both 
dwelling and truth as freedom takes form in the myriad of experiences Wodiczko is able to 
record. Thus, we will see how Wodiczko’s artistic production, growing out of his own life’s 
experiences, expresses a relentless need to overcome democracy’s failures. We will trace 
these impulses first through an examination of his life and beliefs, and then through the 
instruments of translation that instill in his works a healing potential.  
Wodiczko acts as an outspoken agent of truth in relation to social-political traumas he 
is acutely disposed to see. When speaking of his 1977 journey from Poland to the United 
States, Wodiczko explains, “Fairly quickly I came to realize that my hope for finding 
democracy and receiving its presents is a utopia . . . I came to realize that democracy is 
something that has to be made by ourselves because nobody can make it via a ‘directive from 
above’” (Transformative Avant-Garde 26). Significantly, he also came to recognize that 
societal inertia undermines one’s ultimate freedom. He states, “In my unending pilgrimage to 
democracy, I also started to understand that the privilege of having the rights which 
democracy can offer is connected to the duty to wake it up from the lethargic sleep it has a 
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tendency to drift into” (26). We are reminded of Arendt’s understanding of the source of 
totalitarianism as societal stasis. He states: “I saw clearly that there is nothing worse for 
democracy than the passiveness of its citizens” (26). He implicitly and explicitly relies not 
only on Arendt’s political ideas as reflected in these words but also those of Foucault, 
Lévinas (Face of the Other), Ricoeur (intersubjectivity), Benjamin (history and memory), 
Brecht (alienation or defamiliarization effect), Derrida (slippage and language), and Freud 
(psychotherapeutic exchange and catharsis), to name only a few. His work is rich in 
references to ancient Greek practices, including parrhésía, and its privileging of what 
Foucault calls fearless speech, in which difficult truths are spoken openly within public 
spaces. We must focus on this quality for a moment, as it effectively evidences the close 
proximity between biography and aesthetic expression in a deliberate way.  
Wodiczko explains, “Foucault’s politico-ethical democratic project on the issue of 
fearless speaking in the struggle for the truth as a ‘critical truth’ must merge with critical 
memory and with recovery from trauma to become one complex social and aesthetic project” 
(31). Indeed, Foucault determines that, not only is parrhésía a socio-political event, it also 
depends on an audience to complete the process of veridiction. Foucault explains, “In ancient 
culture, and therefore well before Christianity, telling the truth about oneself was an activity 
involving several people, an activity with other people, and even more precisely an activity 
with one other person, a practice for two” (CT 5).11 He continues by quoting a passage in 
Galen, “[t]o tell the truth about oneself and to know oneself we need someone else whom we 
can pick up almost anywhere, so long as he is old enough and serious” (qtd. in Foucault 5). 
Notice the stress on ‘bond’ as he summarizes: “In short, parrhésía, the act of truth, requires: 
first, the manifestation of a fundamental bond between the truth spoken and the thought of 
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the person who spoke it; [second], a challenge to the bond between two interlocutors (the 
person who speaks the truth and the person to whom this truth is addressed)” (CT 11). In 
other words, the free exchange of truth manifests only through the speaker and his recipient, 
while the latter must present a challenge and warrant courage on the part of the former. 
Though more politically oriented, Foucault seems to be in agreement with Gadamer’s 
premise that dialog enables hermeneutics and interpretation. 
Wodiczko’s entire life’s work can be viewed through the lens of fearless speech and 
the need to expose truth, to experience truth as an unfolding event regardless of the impact it 
may have on the recipient. The truths may be fleeting, as temporary projections transforming 
spaces a citizenry might otherwise take for granted. But they interrupt the normalization of 
problematic distraction, invigorating the new space with significance and authority. Czubak 
clarifies Wodiczko’s intention: 
The performative instruments and projections are, according to 
the artist, “cultural prostheses,” serving the contemporary 
parrhésíastes, the followers of the Cynic philosophers, 
continuators of the Classical tradition of speaking the 
uncomfortable truth—the ‘truth that makes trouble, that is always 
spoken on one’s own behalf and falls foul of all the truth-
producing instances.’ (15)  
How does Foucault’s appropriation of Greek parrhésía help us understand Wodiczko’s 
aesthetic? Due to the potential for conflict should the truth offend the recipient, Foucault 
attributes a much-needed amount of courage to the speaker. Wodiczko likewise summarizes 
his projects as a search for truth and healing, with the hope for instigating change—a positive 
change promoting responsibility for the other. Broadly speaking, his work is largely 
described as “deal[ing] with the issues of human rights, democracy, violence and alienation,” 
thereby advancing ethical concerns (Czubak, War Veterans, 31). Part self-understanding 
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through truthful speaking, part empathetic exchange with the other, the ethics embodied in 
Wodiczko’s work further advances Heidegger’s challenge to a monologic approach into a 
space of multiplicity. The notion of the ‘fearless’ thus adds another distinct layer of concrete 
agency within the relationship between truth as unconcealment and aesthetics as ethico-
address.  
Figure 4.15: 
Krzysztof Wodiczko 
War Veterans’ Projections onto Lincoln 
Union Square Park, New York City 
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Figure 4.16: 
Krzysztof Wodiczko 
Guests 
2009 Venice Biennale 
Venice, Italy 
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There are numerous projects that demonstrate this affect, and each of his installations 
continues to have immense relevance within today’s geo-political climate. That said, I will 
focus first on the War Veteran Projection Series, in which veterans of war are given a public 
voice through which to process trauma. I will then investigate Guests, an installation created 
for the 2009 Venice Biennale, which addresses immigrants and alterity in a way that further 
manifests our theme of intersubjective responsibility. While the War Veteran Projections 
illustrate Wodiczko’s trademark use of notable architectural edifices, Guest took place in a 
contained interior space in the Polish Pavilion at the Venice Biennale. Both formats 
demonstrate Wodiczko’s extraordinary ability to, borrowing poet Paul Celan’s phrase, “bear 
witness for the witness” 12 in the name of justice and truth. (Figures 4:15 + 4:16). 
There have been a number of War Veteran Projections around the globe, each of 
which bears consistent intermedial features. Wodiczko selects prominent monuments onto 
which he reveals the individual narratives of returning soldiers and at times he has projected 
onto military vehicles, such as a High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (Humvee). 
The most recent New York City event (2012) in Union Square involved a statue of Abraham 
Lincoln and inscribed the dialogue between war veterans of the conflicts in Vietnam, 
Afghanistan and Iraq onto the consciousness of residents.13 Such a choreography enabled the 
voiceless to speak out through the symbolism inherent in Lincoln’s sculptural representation 
in ways that cut through layers of invisible social separation. In a small volume titled 
Wodiczko, Božena Czubak vividly describes these experiences: 
Held at important sites, on prestigious buildings and monuments, 
Wodiczko’s projections brought their participants out onto the 
city stage, making them visible and strengthening their public 
presence. As the leading actors in these spectacular public 
spectacles, they became political subjects, speaking through a 
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multitude of experiences and identities, introducing their 
polemical, often conflicting, rationalities into public space. (13). 
Wodiczko chose the statue of Abraham Lincoln as the conduit through which the veterans 
would offer testimonials and process the emotional scars endured during their respective 
tenures in active duty. In a video interview created for More Art, Wodiczko explains that the 
veterans are recorded with the form of the statue in mind.14 Faces and hands are given 
priority and are “juxtaposed onto the bodily form of this statue so they will be partially 
themselves and partially Lincoln” (More Art) (Figure 4.17). Wodiczko continues, 
“Previously dormant, memorials of heroes from the past become animate with gestures and 
voices that include them in the public debate on war and veterans” (27). The superimposition 
of animated faces atop statuary further extends art as event and the Lévinasian encounter 
with the other.  
In addition, Wodiczko activates Gadamer’s fusion of horizons in the narrative 
exchange and echoes Ricoeur’s understanding of the results such a fusion creates. Ricoeur 
states, “To appropriate a work through reading is to unfold the world horizon implicit in it 
which includes the actions, the characters and the events of the story told” (LQN 26). The 
subjects of Wodiczko’s performances reveal personal narratives that are challenging in their 
forthright emotional content and truth-telling capacity. Recall that Lincoln is regarded as one 
of America’s greatest rhetoricians, one who addressed his nation and era in the mode of 
caring ‘fearless speech.’ The Lincoln sculpture is elevated, which forces the viewer to look 
up in order to bear witness to the veterans’ speeches. This gesture lends the scene better 
visibility while also combining the statue’s authority with their respective voices. It not only 
accentuates the gravity of the dialogue, but merges past and present, compressing time into a 
trans-historical narrative. Wodiczko hopes that by “bringing back the past to think through it 
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so maybe the mistakes of the past won’t repeat themselves again is something humans can 
do, but only if we help them” (More Art). What is most striking in the War Veterans 
Projection is the absolute coordination of the video footage and the scene; the present is 
layered onto the past, obliterating the passage of time and creating an open space for self-
reflection.  
Without question, the public discourse in the mode of parrhésíc exchange fuels a 
more extended polyphonic. Such a dialogue marks an important convergence of the ideas of 
Lévinas and Foucault. Speech, for Lévinas, “is a relationship between freedoms who neither 
limit nor deny one another, but reciprocally affirm one another” (EN 35). While Foucault 
primarily expresses speech as a form of catharsis in truth-telling, Lévinas moves speech 
closer to an affirmation of the other. Within the mutual exchange of story, Lévinas continues, 
“The respected one is not the one to whom, but with whom justice is done. Respect is a 
relationship between equals. Justice assumes that original equality” (EN 35). Indeed, the 
discourse Wodiczko creates becomes a scene of therapeutic exchange, invoking Freud’s 
understanding of exploring memories in combination with a Lévinasian undercurrent of 
ethical responsibility for the Other. While this pairing of thinkers seems an improbable 
match, Wodiczko connects their ideas through an overt, psychotherapeutic narrative process 
in which he also implicates his audience. Through language, the catharsis of the victim 
thereby also becomes the responsibility of the viewer. Veterans literally become “living 
monuments of their own trauma” (Wodiczko, AoW 25). Wodiczko insists that “[t]he first and 
foremost purpose of projections informed by the psychological condition of veterans and the 
society they live in is to produce a psychotherapeutic effect” (AoW 27). The veteran thus 
becomes a self-healer by performing a public cleansing, exercising the Foucaultian parrhésía 
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in spoken words that emerge as expressions of personal truth and demand the viewer’s 
attention.  
 Wodiczko cautions, however, that “in order to animate a historical monument, the 
veterans first need to animate themselves, that is learn to speak out and free themselves from 
trauma” (AoW 27). There are, in this respect, inherent emotional risks to his projects, and 
Wodiczko tries to minimize any potential negative consequences by paying particular 
attention to the mental health of those participating in his projects. We must not overlook this 
praxis of ethics ‘in’ the generation of ethical works. He explains, 
The psychotherapeutic aspect of this work—dealing with 
traumatic memory—requires creating special conditions or, to 
quote from Donald Winnicott, a ‘potential space.’ In creating 
such a space I work with NGOs and experts helping veterans deal 
with posttraumatic stress. This ‘potential space’ is a space of 
freeing memory and communication. (AoW 25) 
Here again, as with Boltanski’s work, memory is interrogated. There is an intrinsic 
connection between the potential space to which Winnicott refers and Heidegger’s Lichtung, 
resulting in an open space for thoughts and ideas to come forth. There is also a distinct 
‘yielding’ afoot in the experience. In her essay “Reading Wodiczko,” Rosalyn Deutsche 
states that his work is deeply “influenced by Fornari’s assertion [in the 1966 volume titled 
Psychoanalysis of War] that we must return to the unconscious of the individual subject in 
order to stop war. Wodiczko, with incandescent wit, notes that we are ‘inner war memorials,’ 
which, like external ones, must be disarmed” (Wodiczko, TAW 12). The disarming can only 
take place through language by means of public exposure of truth and a depth that comes 
from activating the dormant meaning within the chosen milieu or monuments. In the clearing 
for fearless speech, original justice, and thought, victims of trauma safely meet the revelaton 
of necessary and poignant truths.  
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 Notice that we are speaking now on a level beyond just individual healing. How 
might Wodiczko’s work offer an extensive societal emancipation without presuming to 
‘finalize’ some calculative formula? The question requires us to take a broader view of the 
sites and spaces in which Wodiczko operates. In a video trailer for Maria Niro’s upcoming 
film, Un-War, Wodiczko tells his audience: “Everything we call national culture is, in 
principle, war culture. We have to question the whole democratic system and deploy new 
radical democratic methods to wake up this system. We have to attack so called democracy 
because, the way political economic systems work should not deprive people of their 
[fundamental] rights” (Niro, Un-War).15 There are powerful echoes of the epilogue to 
Benjamin’s artwork essay embedded in these thoughts. Wodiczko points to history’s favoring 
of the winners, and the capture of collective memories in the public edifices erected to 
celebrate such epochs. His efforts to redress historical priorities are a challenge to centuries 
of archives and collective memories. In Wodiczko’s words, “I try … to use public memorials 
as media enabling alienated citizens to communicate through the spatial symbolism of cities. 
A monument speaking with veterans’ voices lends them its cultural and historical prestige” 
(AoW 27, my emphasis). The strategy reconfigures the space of social memory much in the 
way that Ricoeur spoke of the reconfiguration of life by narrative. Deutsche explains, 
Against instrumental memory and its correlative, narcissistic 
memory, [Wodiczko] helps the statues perform the duty of 
ethico-political memory, doing justice to the victims of the social 
forces the monuments represent. Ricoeur insists that the moral 
priority of collective recollection must belong to the victim, and 
‘the victim at issue . . . is the other victim, other than ourselves.’” 
(Wodiczko, TAW 8-9) 
Deutsche implies the need to look outward, to see beyond ourselves to our ethical duty 
toward our community. Without losing sight of the affinities found in Foucault and Lévinas, 
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Deutsche’s invocation of Ricoeur’s ideas (particularly in light of the other as victim) recalls 
the second mode of intersubjective exchange, or relation, detailed earlier in this chapter in 
reference to Boltanski’s work, in which our connection with the other is founded in an 
exchange of memories resulting in a mutual recognition and complex web of interrelated 
experiences.  
Evoking afresh our shared humanity, despite divergent experiences, places the focus 
on what is held in common and encourages a fundamentally more compassionate interaction. 
Ricoeur’s proposal for a “New Ethos for Europe” is as timely today as it was when he put 
forth his theories; one has only to look as far as the Syrian refugee crisis. The global 
immigration crisis, particularly in the regions of North Africa and Mediterranean Europe, 
bring our attention to an ever-increasing xenophobia and a cultural climate antithetical to 
Ricoeur’s proposition. For Wodiczko, such rising tensions and resulting oppressions are 
fodder for more action, more ‘speaking with.’ To this notion, Adorno would certainly assert, 
“By cathecting the repressed, art internalizes the repressing principle, i.e. the unredeemed 
condition of the world (Unheil), instead of merely airing futile protests against it” (AT 27). 
He continues, “Art identifies and expresses that condition, thus anticipating its overcoming” 
(AT 27-28). Adorno understands Wodiczko’s avowed care for the other, the need to 
overcome through artistic interventions the disparities that plague modern civilization. 
 In a Lévinasian turn, Wodiczko implicates the audience and its fundamental role in 
the exchange of truth. Czubak expresses this shift in the introduction to Galeria Labirynt’s 
exhibition catalogue: “The aesthetic of Wodiczko’s projections comes as a response to 
ethical challenges, especially the ethics of humility formed by the philosophy of Emanuel 
Lévinas, where by meeting Others we become aware of our own alterity” (Czubak 15). The 
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response is nowhere more visible than in the 2009 installation titled Guests, in which 
Wodiczko ingeniously reveals his affinities with both Lévinas and Arendt. Where the War 
Veterans Projections confront us with the face, speech, and pathos of the other, mandating a 
responsibility with regards to his care, Guests turns the viewer back into himself by depriving 
him of the other’s face so as to heighten the urgency of bringing our culpability to light. This 
does not mean the face nor its speech is now lost. Wodiczko shows “the exceptional event of 
the facing [en-face]” (EN 57) by letting it anonymously animate humans’ presence as they go 
about their daily tasks. Such anonymity is perplexing and might at first seem to elicit distance 
rather than proximity in the aesthetic experience. But the effect is that we find ourselves 
accountable even for the other’s invisibility. To leave merely a blurred sensation of presence 
heightens the anxiety of the encounter with the unfamiliar and subverts a viewer’s 
complacency and distraction. This magnification of fear calls into question our essential 
relationship with the other, or the unfamiliar, and returns us to ourselves to question our 
position in relation to such guests.  
Guests was comprised of a series of large arched illusory windows surrounding the 
interior space of the Polish Pavillion. The scenes were projected onto the walls and ceiling, 
mimicking access to an exterior world that did not, in fact, exist materially. The interior 
space was darkened to magnify the impact of the projections and the paradox of being a guest 
in a series of films addressing alterity. At issue is the notion of being other — excluded and 
unseen — in one’s circumstances. The phenomenon foregrounds the notion of alterity or 
foreignness. Derrida investigates the notion of the foreigner in his short volume Of 
Hospitality. As though mirroring Lévinas’ face as ethical origin, Derrida suggests, “As 
though the foreigner were first of all the one who puts the first question or the one to whom 
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you address the first question. As though the foreigner were being-in-question, the question-
being or being-in-question of the question. But also the one who, putting the first question, 
puts me in question” (3). What becomes clear is the intricate interconnection of beings. 
Derrida states, “So it is indeed the master, the one who invites, the inviting host, who 
becomes the hostage—and who really always has been. And the guest, the invited hostage, 
becomes the one who invites the one who invites, the master of the host. The guest becomes 
the host’s host. The guest (hôte) becomes the host (hôte) of the host (hôte)” (OH 125). How 
does this occur in the work? Within the projected scenes, immigrants simultaneously go 
about their daily business, cleaning windows, discussing their lives with one another, and 
altogether executing the menial labor assigned to them. There is a voyeuristic quality to 
standing in the space, bearing witness to that which one cannot truly see. The blurred images 
highlight the inherent separation between groups of people, and Wodiczko is conscious of the 
effect: “Through the fog of the windows the viewers are put in a space in which they turn 
back toward their own interior, their own inside. They are put in a situation in which they 
must in fact acknowledge the way they see the world from inside themselves” (242). 
Accompanying the vignettes are the sounds of their concurrent conversations: the cacophony 
of noise makes it difficult to penetrate their thoughts. What one apprehends are partial 
narratives offering details of difficult lives in limbo—or to use Arendt’s terms, their 
statelessness.  
 Wodiczko is well aware of the power this veil of ambiguity creates, and we might 
rightly regard it as a showing of the way human unconcealment is obfuscated. The 
invisibility of the other is critical to his message. He explains, “As the political philosopher 
Hannah Arendt has implied, in a democracy, visibility is equality. Invisibility and inequality 
   289 
go hand [in] hand” (TAW 17). Indeed, in the visual separation the viewer feels his culpability 
more deeply, thereby forcing us into an encounter with our own beliefs and narratives. In 
conversations with Wodiczko, John Rajchman suggests that the dilemma one faces when 
participating in this particular dynamic is one of “dis-identification,” which is very much like 
Bertolt Brecht’s notion of alienation (we have noted earlier).16 Brecht defines this effect as 
one “which prevents the audience from losing itself passively and completely in the character 
created by the actor, and which consequently leads the audience to be a consciously critical 
observer” (91). Alienation insists upon “making the familiar strange” in order to distance one 
from the emotional manipulation inherent in cinematic practices.  
 As a specific event of the what we have been calling ‘emancipation,’ Guests exposes 
a global issue affecting millions of displaced populations, people who have been deprived of 
legal rights to live and work in the cities or countries they now inhabit (figure 4:16). Climate 
change and war have forced the dangerous and often deadly evacuations of already 
vulnerable people. Wodiczko, who at the time was questioning Europe’s increasing 
xenophobia and nationalism, seems to have anticipated the exponential growth of the 
problem as we moved deeper into the twenty-first century. During a United Nations panel 
discussion on the matter of displaced populations, William Milberg, a professor of 
Psychology at Harvard medical school, suggested a deconstruction of the myths driving 
xenophobia and its related epidemic of fear. Milberg explained the economic implications of 
added labor forces as beneficial to the overall social fabric. Milberg and Wodiczko both 
essentially ask: why does statelessness result in having no rights? Milberg pointed to John 
Rawls’ notion that a “society is better off when the worst off is thriving” (Milberg) despite 
the oppressive need host countries have of depriving such privileges to their guests.17  
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Wodiczko invokes Kant: “I would emphasize a notion of democratic space as founded on 
Immanuel Kant’s postulate that our ability to judge is based on exchange with others, on 
‘using our own reason’ and not on adhering to existing norms. It is only in confrontation with 
other people that we may express our own ideas and decide whether to uphold them or not” 
(Wodiczko 23). Whether at the United Nations or the Polish Pavilion, the task is one of 
enacting the kind of disarming alienation that can provoke an act of ‘original justice’ and 
‘ethics of humility’ through a reconfiguration of the host-guest relationship.  
Guests poses many questions of its viewers, while checking the balance of invisibility 
and visibility, of inequity and presumed freedoms. By formulating the question of what it 
means to be foreign in a land in which one has no rights, Wodiczko suggests what is most 
needed is fearless speech, lending a voice to the voiceless; but he realizes, at least in the 
current political climate, such speech seems a utopian delusion. Yet the dire necessity for 
such an event to unfold, providing the intersubjective exchange that might well move thought 
forward and offer relief to the voiceless, is exactly what Wodiczko seeks to create. The 
aspiration contains a distillation of the aforementioned ideas, including a multi-layered 
inclusion of Foucault, Lévinas, Ricoeur, Arendt and Heidegger’s thoughts. His hope for 
mutual respect and understanding, unbounded by fear and suspicion can only manifest in 
such a utopian exchange. He states, 
One among such parrhésíastic projects for artists and designers to 
create inspiring artifices, situations and events to aid expression 
and communication through which silent and unheard residents 
will be able to fearlessly open up and share the unsolicited truth 
about their existence while others, thanks to the event, will gain 
the courage to be able to fearlessly bring themselves closer to 
them, to listen to them and to hear them. (AoW, 29) 
The space his work is able to create forces the viewer to think, and to re-consider any 
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organized, pre-ordained ideas regarding alterity. Wodiczko orchestrates the ethical exchange 
and, again, echoes Lévinas’ belief in the primacy of human connection: “If the absolutely 
Other appears to me, is its truth not integrated by that very fact into the context of my 
thoughts, there to find a meaning, and into my time, there to becoming contemporary?” (EN 
55). Thus, beginning in our Mitsein, to borrow Heidegger’s concept, and integrating in a 
dialectical confrontation, we emerge on the same plane, establishing our equality and 
rendering visible those who have walked in societal shadows for generations. On the side of 
our conceptual points of reference, we can now see that Wodiczko’s artworks are not just 
resonant with the ethico-aesthetic ideas, but uniquely intertextualize Gadamer’s ‘fusion of 
horizons’ with Lévinas’ ‘ethics as first philosophy,’ and secure the event of art as a primary 
site of intersubjective exchange in the alētheiac dynamic of Heidegger’s ‘being-in-the-
world.’ The works spur a collective catharsis and initiate a disposition toward social 
responsibility that would otherwise be neglected or forgotten, just as the foreigner is rendered 
invisible through a lack of conscious consideration.  
How has Wodiczko’s work advanced the emancipatory potential we seek to disclose? 
Where Rosler turns the audience toward reflection and increases awareness of social 
imbalances, and Boltanski immerses his audience in the power of postmemory and its 
haunting implications, Wodiczko applies technological means in order to manifest the active 
space of human collaboration. He embodies Arendt’s philosophy of thinking and action and 
demonstrates the power such a process can have. In other words, he encourages critical 
thought and its subsequent active participation as an imperative source of healing. Wodiczko 
insists, “The art of new public domain can be precisely such a hybrid of construction and 
deconstruction” (23). He builds intricate installations, which, on their faces, appear quite 
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simple: people voicing individual experience through the conduit of the past and collective 
memory, deploying the authority inherent in ancient architectural features. Each project 
requires months, if not years, of careful planning, measuring, composition and care, with 
heavy emphasis on the solicitude for the other. The implications of Wodiczko’s work in the 
current geopolitical climate are significant as potential avenues toward a more conciliatory 
worldview. The issues he addresses are ongoing, including veteran’s rights issues and 
increased alienation in the aftermath of service, as well as a global crisis of human 
displacement. Without a doubt, critical consideration of how these issues can be addressed 
via human relationships and language is needed. As Wodiczko explains, “We need to restore 
and refresh the meaning of the language of democracy” (Transformative and Avant-Garde, 
27).  
 
§ 4.5: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
I have sought to show how a deeper, more meaningful truth is translated and brought 
forth through the works of Christian Boltanski and Krzysztof Wodiczko. Throughout, I have 
focused on art as event and truth as fluid and ever-unfolding narrative, building from 
Heidegger’s understanding of truth as unconcealment and returning to the underlying 
question of intersubjective ethics. To be clear, although that association is warranted on the 
side of comparative philosophical concepts, its full activation has been something singularly 
affected in the artworks. Most of this chapter’s philosophical study was weighted on the side 
of our Boltanski investigation, but it should be clear that those ideas also prepared us to read 
the depths of Wodiczko’s aesthetic and identify further philosophical nuances converging 
with those prior. We have seen the ways both artists extend philosophical ideas, often 
bridging differing philosophical discourses while gathering together dissonant voices of 
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human experience for the sake of dialogue, provocation, healing, and the reconfiguration of 
narratives. While the artists in question address different premises, their ultimate goal is to 
access truth as an opening for thought and, ambitiously, to achieve the correlative of action 
per Arendt’s prescription. To that end, Wodiczko insists,  
Referring to Walter Benjamin, the prophetic act of 
‘interrupting history,’ an act which can arrest time, must be an 
act of closeness to our ‘time now’ and a consequence of one’s 
revolutionary intuition of the present, this must be combined 
with the hope that one can prevent the future from repeating 
the past and present catastrophes and injustices. 
(Transformative and Avant-Garde 33) 
In other words, we must belong and respond to the epoch in which we live and by which we 
are shaped in our lived experience while simultaneously bringing forth the lessons history 
has taught us. Through evocative visual language, ideas are able to emerge from darkness, 
translating experience into shared truth. Both Wodiczko and Boltanski grow from events 
surrounding them, either by means of felt experience or a transference of post-memory. 
Boltanski relies on the familiar and the face, while Wodiczko enhances these characteristics 
by adding speech and altogether reconfiguring the at-handedness of modern technology. Both 
artists successfully move the viewer to an ethical plane.  
 The application of memory in the works shifts the human inclination toward self-
understanding (as proposed by Heidegger) to a space of mutual consideration (as set forth by 
Lévinas, Ricoeur and Arendt). As an ethical gesture, sharing experiences moves beings into 
an empathetic disposition, one which might potentially nurture a better future. In reference to 
Marcuse, Douglas Kellner explains that, “Remembrance . . . thus re-members, reconstructs 
experience, going to the past to construct future possibilities of freedom and happiness” (33). 
This hopeful outlook can be seen in the aftermath of artistic exchange as viewers appreciate 
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the other whose experience is being expressed. This empathy is certainly true of Wodiczko’s 
Bunker Hill Monument when the bloodshed he addressed through the mothers’ narratives was 
curtailed.  
 What are the most important elements we have seen in the way such artworks address 
us? First, Boltanski is able to fashion truth from fiction, revealing to his viewers an open 
space of questioning collective consciousness. As Heidegger has intimated, in an artwork 
‘truth is set to work’ in way that holds the ‘essential’ in the ‘temporal’, and vice versa (Krell 
175, 202). By means of multiple anonymous headshots, bare bulbs and wires, along with 
would-be personal effects acquired haphazardly at thrift shops and junk stores, Boltanski is 
able to haunt the present with ghosts of the past, translating his personal journey into a 
powerful shared communal truth. Boltanski’s installations demonstrate Heidegger’s, 
Gadamer’s and Ricoeur’s notion that truth is ever changing, existing in a constant continuum 
of translation and inter-subjective interpretations. In a deeply personal way, the works access 
the ethical operations of the human mind, implicating our collective responsibility for the 
other as we search through and endless series of stories for the faces that anchor us in our 
fragile lives. Boltanski is fulfilling an important role as artist-philosopher, truth teller and 
revealer of light. He carries forward the memories of the Shoah, and, profoundly, bears 
witness to the nature of human beings as revealed in the continuation of genocides and 
inhumanity.  
 Second, Wodiczko activates the voices and stories of those who are otherwise silent 
and largely ignored by an enframing and unthinking society. He selects sites whose meaning 
is imbued with historical narrative and collective memory. These important features are the 
wellspring of intersubjective exchange, giving birth to a new, dialogic narrative, thereby 
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redressing history for a potentially better future. Noting the influence of Benjamin on 
Wodiczko, Czubak describes how the projections , “revealed that which the city’s official 
monuments would rather deny; into the memorials of victories and winners, Wodiczko [. . .] 
inscribed the history of losers, the ‘secret tradition’ of the conquered and excluded. 
Monumental history and the monopolization of collective memory were opposed by him with 
work on memory written out for multiple voices. (11) The polyphonic nature of these 
performances also fulfills and enacts Arendt’s suggestion that peaceful interactions can only 
be achieved through cooperation, and they extend Heidegger’s Mitsein to a more 
collaborative disposition seated within the poignancy of unfolding narrative. There is a sense 
that Heidegger too, though imperfectly, envisioned a similar extension. In a discussion about 
the notion of dialogue in Heidegger’s writing, Francisco J. Gonzalez writes, 
[His] later account is that Miteinandersein is a being-involved-
with-(Sein bei)-something-common (Gemeinsames) and that 
what we partake of in common is the truth of unconcealedness 
of the things to which we relate. In short, Miteinandersein is a 
‘sharing in the truth’ (Sichteilen in die Wahrheit). (67) 
As with Foucault’s Fearless Speech, sharing the truth provides the essential moment of 
catharsis and mutuality that are indispensable to an ethical exchange. Gonzalez continues, 
“Yet especially important in the present context is that Heidegger also maintains [. . .] that 
truth is of its essence shared with. . . , even if one hides the truth from others, even if others 
do not exist” (67). The point, as we have seen, echoes profoundly in Wodiczko’s own stated 
priority of speaking with veterans’ voices. As we turn our attention to the coming chapter, the 
multiplicity of truth and historical foundations at work in this ‘sharing in the truth’ will 
become evermore important. Both Boltanski and Wodiczko rely on history and memory as 
sociopolitical sites of exchange overlaid with the weight of discourse and interpretation. The 
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themes of site, memory, truth and history will continue to resonate as we embark on the final 
chapter, which addresses the work of Noor Mirza and Brad Butler. 
   297 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5:  
 
TECHNOLOGIZED TRUTH:  
THE AMBIGUITY OF TRUTH / NON-TRUTH IN THE WORK OF MIRZA + BUTLER 
 
My intention was not to deal with the problem of the truth, but with the 
problem of the truth-teller, or of truth-telling as an activity: . . . who is able 
to tell the truth, about what, with what consequences, and with what 
relations to power . . . With the question of the importance of telling the 
truth, knowing who is able to tell the truth, and knowing why we should 
tell the truth, we have the roots of what we could call the ‘critical’ 
tradition in the West. 
                               MICHEL FOUCAULT 
- 
§ 5.1: INTRODUCTION 
Heidegger assures us: “The closer we come to the danger, the more brightly do the ways into 
the saving power begin to shine and the more questioning we become. For questioning is the 
piety of thought” (Krell 341). He thus closes the “Question Concerning Technology” with an 
offering of hope: We might potentially emancipate ourselves from technological 
enframing—however, only if we can negotiate its profound and prolonged effects through a 
coming to terms with its essence as one manifestation of technē. As we have previously 
discussed, we do this by remaining open to questioning and, subsequently, thinking—thereby 
expressing our ultimate ontological freedom as Dasein. One might say we do so by 
cultivating a form of defiance, one that negotiates and resists the complacency created by 
normative structures of power. Howard Caygill summarizes Heidegger’s project as an 
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attempt to “recuperate the un-recuperable,” (Berlin)1 though at first this statement may seem 
to imply a foreclosure on our ability to break the chains of enframing qua alienation. The 
inherent difficulty in disrupting an embedded cycle, which, by its very nature, hobbles 
thought, certainly continues to pose problems, as artists grapple with the cultural inertia 
affecting much of the West. What we have thus far seen in the artistic agency of Rosler, 
Boltanski, and Wodiczko is an embrace of this difficulty and what we may now call the 
‘emergency’ it reflects. To do so they first of all ‘feel’ the urgency, and this is something we 
cannot take for granted. Working between ontology and ontic experience, Heidegger writes, 
“The dispropriation of beings, which takes from them the truth of beyng, allows humanity, 
ensnared in such beings, to fall into a lack of sense of emergency” (The Event 141). 
Enframing creates such a lack, blocking thought and preventing a concentrated examination 
of that which imprisons Dasein. Santiago Zabala writes about this apathy in his recent 
volume Why Only Art Can Save Us, in which he explains, “This [condition] demands we 
intervene in a project of assistance, reconciliation, and recognition. For this existential 
project, it is not enough simply to dwell in the accounts of the victims or to recall their 
experiences. We must participate in the invisible wounds, experience the ignored genocides, 
and proclaim the denied dispossessions” (125). In other words, grasping the sheer fact of our 
challenging- and challenged-forth condition, and then in turn undertaking a rival technē of art 
and thinking, we must unrelentingly question the very sites of experience, their levels of 
concealment notwithstanding.   
What have we learned thus far about how our artists, and the questions their 
respective works pose, feel and engage with the ‘emergency’ situation? Furthermore, how do 
they reach into the viewer’s psyche to engender a rebirth of Arendtian contemplation and 
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action? And how do these lessons draw our inquiry back into its philosophical register in a 
more animated and nuanced way? Though employing different visual language, their varied 
works foster a state Heidegger calls astoundedness, or, in our case, the viewer’s awakening 
from perpetual distraction. Such astoundedness, as we have seen, must be renewed as the 
emergency precondition for poēisis, involving a disarming of our challenging-forth on the 
individual and collective levels of our being-in-the-world. As with the case of Heidegger’s 
‘ethical’ register (seen in chapter 1), here too there is an important antecedent: the aesthetic 
phenomenon of what the Kantian sublime brings forth in terms of balancing us precariously 
between perceived danger and transformative relief. Likewise, in his A Philosophical 
Enquiry into the Origins of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, Edmund Burke points to 
the space of the fearsome and incomprehensible. Elaborating on the sublime, Burke explains, 
Whatever is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pleasure and 
pain, and danger, that is to say, whatever is in any sort terrible, 
or is conversant about terrible objects, or operates in a manner 
analogous to terror, is a source of the sublime, that is, it is 
productive of the strongest emotions which the mind is capable 
of feeling. (Burke 39) 
In essence, the sublime places us in danger’s proximity while allowing us to hold onto the 
knowledge that we are, ultimately, safe and indeed inspired. In much the same way, beyond 
shaking us out of distraction, astoundedness awakens us into Letting-Be (Gelassenheit) 
which, in turn, gives way to thought. We may then say that astoundedness in the face of the 
sublime becomes, for Heidegger, action in the face of danger – an action born first of all 
from the ‘yielding’ intrinsic to the deeper essence of technē. Thus, the kind of artistic 
emancipation that occurs as defiance in the face of enframing and its resulting inertia will 
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contain an astounding sense of emergency and the resulting provocation of contemplation 
and action.  
We have charted some specific features of the tightening technological grip in the 
recent cultural milieu. A further feature of today’s ‘emergency’ can be called, following 
George Smith, addiction. In his essay “The Art of Critique in the Age of Addiction,” Smith 
writes of Krzysztof Wodiczko’s oeuvre:  
Such developments in the art of critique are promising as 
regards political emancipation; but just as drug addiction and 
alcoholism do not discriminate according to age, race, gender, 
class, or ethnicity, globalized modern technology addiction 
exceeds all limits of the political and afflicts human beings no 
matter where they live or which side of revolution they stand. 
(4) 
As a pervasive symptom of enframing, addiction has occluded the space of astoundedness by 
generating an ever-increasing spiral of device obsession, shortened attention spans, 
alternative facts and rapidly disseminated misinformation that aims to destabilize 
governments and populations while sowing the seeds of discontent. What becomes true on 
the personal level leeches back into the collective theyness, where critical thought, central to 
the diagnosis of power, has given way to mediatized political showdowns and unfounded 
extremist views. This facet of our ‘emergency’ is further specified by Jean-François 
Lyotard’s conception of techno-science and informationism, and his appeal to the spirit of the 
avant-garde to practice defiance. He speaks of “the spectacular introduction of what are 
called the new technologies into the production, diffusion, distribution and consumption of 
cultural commodities,” and how “they are in the process of transforming culture into an 
industry” (Inhuman 34). He continues, “It seems to me that what is really disturbing is much 
more the importance assumed by the concept of the bit, the unit of information. When we’re 
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dealing with bits, there’s no longer any question of free forms given here and now to 
sensibility and the imagination” (34). Lyotard laments what we may call the ‘addictions’ 
inherent in the objectivist position and its reduction of being and thought to units of 
information. Though not speaking in the register of Heideggerian ‘astoundedness’ per se, he 
does appropriate and reconfigure its antecedent – the Kantian sublime – as a resource for the 
aesthetic interventions in our perilous, addictive, condition.   
 It goes without saying that we have been warned, not only by Heidegger but by a 
substantial number of cultural theorists, philosophers, artists and members of society willing 
to risk dissent. Among these many voices, as we have noted in previous chapters, are Susan 
Sontag, Roland Barthes, and Jean Baudrillard. To this list, we must also now include 
Lyotard, Julia Kristeva, Zabala and further insights from Caygill. In anticipation of what is to 
come, I will briefly position their ideas. We have seen how Sontag decries the cacophony of 
violent images proliferated in print and on the web, leaving the viewer numb to their impact. 
She reminds us, “It is passivity that dulls feeling” (102). This passivity is a prominent feature 
of enframing and, in Arendt’s view, the breeding ground for the banality of evil. 
Furthermore, passivity, as noted in our examination of Benjamin’s position vis-à-vis film, is 
also a characteristic of distraction as the audience receives its contents without questioning. 
As though speaking directly to the more nefarious effects of distraction, Barthes describes the 
mythology that results from the manipulation of signs and the subsequent emergence of 
political messages. Preying upon our ‘technical interest’ and blithe ‘assimilation’ of media 
‘nourishment,’ mythology assumes a distracted stance and requires a viewer who is 
absorbing its signs without critical thinking or the creation of original ideas. For Baudrillard 
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the resulting situation is one of simulation and pacification, a folding of reality into the 
hyperreal, where the culture industry, for example, manufactures war porn. In his words, 
Everything aestheticizes itself into spectacle, sex into 
advertising and pornography and the whole gamut of activities 
into what is held to be called culture, which is something 
totally different from art; this culture is an advertising and 
media semiologising process which invades everything. 
(Disappearance of Art and Politics: 10) 
Baudrillard anticipates the continuous dissemination of news and opinions that, like an 
addiction or myth that does not know itself, shapes the perspectives of large demographics 
without their notice. This proliferation recalls Baudelaire’s ‘tissues of horror’ served up with 
each morning repast. The culture industry creates infectious consumables. In his short 
volume The Spirit of Terrorism, he writes, 
The countless disaster movies bear witness to this fantasy, 
which they clearly attempt to exorcise with images, drowning 
out the whole thing with special effects. But the universal 
attraction they exert, which is on a par with pornography, 
shows that acting-out is never very far away, the impulse to 
reject any system growing all the stronger as it approaches 
perfection or omnipotence. (6) 
Like Sontag’s decrying of violent images and their numbing effect, Baudrillard’s reference to 
pornography brings to bear the addictive and ‘distracting’ nature of the medium.   
Where such surface evidence of our enframed condition begins to specify the 
concrete facets of our ‘emergency,’ it also reflects a deeper and abiding vulnerability that 
obtains at the intersection of our ontological makeup and socio-cultural myths: Julia 
Kristeva’s conception of the abject, and what we may term its artificially produced 
simulacrum. Baudrillard’s assessment of media qua porn here links to the irrepressible desire 
to participate in mediatized narrative on a primal level. According to Kristeva, as a matter of 
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course, abjection “disturbs identity, system, order. What does not respect borders, positions, 
rules. The in-between, the ambiguous, the composite” (4). So, what haunts the placid surface 
of a simulacrum world is a pre-linguistic, visceral psychic space of the abject, “a ‘vortex of 
summons and repulsions’ that maintains the border between life and death” (Kristeva qtd. in 
Barrett 70). The phenomenon suggests that the makeup of a culture gone awry has, on a 
deeper level, to do with the psychological receptivity to a culture’s illusion of cathartic 
potential. As cultural systems are erected and maintained in many ways on the basis of 
concealing or bracketing the abject, promising emancipation from it, two phenomena occur: 
(a) new technologized modes of abjection enter into our addictive propensities, and (b) the 
underlying psychic dimension of the abject surfaces to call their bluff.  Nearly speaking in 
the language of Heideggerian astoundedness, Kristeva details a visceral need to confront the 
abject – particularly through the arts — in an effort to negotiate internalized chaos while 
navigating our anxiety in Being-toward-death (to borrow Heidegger’s phrase).  
We will return to some of these ideas as we proceed, but I have taken some time to 
position them because they serve as points of reference for mapping the scene and the stakes 
of what a ‘saving’ turn from within the ‘dangerous’ power might involve. On the side of 
aesthetic possibility, we have the potential for astoundedness to play counterweight to 
emergency, poēisis to challenging-forth, the sublime to unthinking inertia. On the side of a 
more specific diagnosis of our contemporary predicament, we have a condition of addiction 
that manifests in techno-science, media violence and myth, simulacrum and war porn. And 
traversing both sides we have the coefficient of the abject running through our individual and 
collective being-in-the world, rendering us susceptible to false remedies while also 
preserving a space for the aesthetic reckoning with what ‘challenges us forth’ from within 
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and without. Admittedly, we must wonder whether Heidegger’s cautious optimism is 
warranted. To test this concern, we need to look more closely at how astoundedness and 
emancipation might take shape through the arts, and we need to apply some of the noted 
conceptual tools to the specific cultural-political scenes that constitute the ‘emergency’ felt 
and engaged by practitioners and the intentions in their works. 
 
Figure 5.1 + 5.2: 
Noor Mirza and Brad Butler 
The Unreliable Narrator 
Waterside Contemporary 
June 12 – August 9, 2014 
London, UK 
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With these layered thoughts in mind, this chapter focuses on one particular artwork 
by artists Noor Mirza2 and Brad Butler,3 their 2014 video essay The Unreliable Narrator. 
(figures 5.1 + 5.2) The artwork is a tour de force that depicts the 2008 terrorist attacks in 
Mumbai. The film’s goal is to return its audience to critical thinking and action by way of a 
consideration of multiple truths that unseat well-established beliefs and ideologies. The title 
alone puts the viewer on notice: the claims of any content we encounter must, by default, be 
questioned. Through a careful analysis of Mirza and Butler’s video essay, we will discover 
how the artists expose the profound implications of global enframing qua technological 
addiction. Through a highly technologized presentation that incorporates intercepted audio 
recordings, surveillance CCTV film footage, original Bollywood re-enactments and the 
overlay of spoken words, the artists have successfully held up a mirror for a wide-ranging 
audience. In addition, by actively exercising a Brechtian alienation effect and shifting the 
viewer’s attention to carefully mediated intersections, the audience is drawn into a 
reconsideration of truth and complicity, our collective responsibility for the Other and the re-
evaluation of interconnected global networks of power. Aligning with Benjamin’s view that 
film can offer a positive distraction by expressing sound ‘tendency,’ the co-creators of The 
Unreliable Narrator make it clear no one is immune to the ongoing addiction to technology’s 
promise of instant recognition and effect, as well as its capacity as a destructive weapon. The 
subject matter is specific: the audience and media/entertainment industries become 
participants in the ever-growing terrorist stage. Through this shift in accountability, the film 
and its broader implications provoke a species of ‘astoundedness’ in an audience that is 
largely demoralized, indifferent, and in a stubborn state of distraction. Mirza and Butler 
confront this problem in a manner reflective of Céline’s modernist literature as described by 
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Kristeva; they draw us nearer to what Kristeva calls the “abyss of abjection” through a 
sustained state of ‘indefinite catharsis’ (208-209).  
To properly treat the film and the singular way it affects emancipation along the lines 
of these themes, we must stagger our approach. It would be ineffective to simply arrange the 
relevant points of theory and then apply them to the artwork, or to first sustain a full reading 
of the film and then corroborate its work with the relevant philosophical ideas. Such 
approaches would be inadequate to the way I believe the film stands as an intertextual 
intersection in its own right between art, theory, and our contemporary social-political 
moment. Our work on the side of theory, correspondingly, is also gathering into a moment of 
intertextual convergence and possibility as it too, in Agamben’s sense, becomes 
‘contemporary.’ For these reasons in what follows we will proceed by (a) introducing the art-
philosophical nature of the film and the method required to interpret it, then (b) let that better 
attune focal elements of our philosophical apparatus, then (c) offer a detailed reading of the 
film that shows how the intertextualization of art, theory, and the contemporary ‘emergency’ 
in the discourse of the film affect a work of critical emancipation.   
 
§ 5.2: POSTMEMORY, DISCOURSE AND INTERTEXTUALITY: A PATH FORWARD 
work and theory 
Consistent with our prior chapter, as we analyze the artwork, we must examine 
notions of power, freedom, truth, and communal participation and inter-subjective 
responsibility. Doing so, we will once again witness the collapse of historical time with its 
traces carried forward through post-memory within individual and collective stories. 
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Marianne Hirsch outlines post-memory in her book The Generation of Post-Memory, in 
which she describes,  
[A] particular relation to a parental past described, evoked, and 
analyzed … [which] has come to be seen as a ‘syndrome’ of 
belatedness or ‘post-ness’ and has been variously termed 
‘absent memory’ (Ellen Fine), ‘inherited memory,’ ‘belated 
memory,’ ‘prosthetic memory’ (Celia Lury, Alison Landsberg), 
‘mémoire trouée’ (Henri Raczymow), ‘mémoire des cendres’ 
(Nadine Fresco), ‘vicarious witnessing’ (Froma Zeitlin), 
‘received history’ (James Young), ‘haunting legacy’ (Gabrielle 
Schwab), and ‘postmemory.’ (3) 
Hirsch understands the implications of such embedded memories as they travel forward in 
time, affecting beliefs and human conduct. As concerns The Unreliable Narrator, ‘vicarious 
witnessing’ underpins much of the ongoing narrative, and this allows us to ask how, in 
today’s digitized climate, the enframing aspects of the consumer industry and its various 
distributors and audiences become complicit in ongoing acts of terror. Furthermore, we will 
investigate the limits of change artists can engender through their probing and unveiling of 
truths. The issue is particularly significant as the artists deploy increasingly sophisticated 
technologies while simultaneously seeking to expose the dangers those same methodologies 
present. This approach places us squarely in the scope and tensions of Heideggerian 
astoundedness, and there furnishes a broadening way back through the question of alētheia 
qua poēisis as an unfolding event. In Butler’s words, the artists’ overall concern is “about 
what’s hidden. . . . It’s about the politics of translation, about the ways different voices 
and powers mediate their messages, in our conscious and unconscious minds, about how 
the connections between how our capital moves, how artists move” impact us (Sheerin, “A 
Portable Museum Makes Art on the Go”). In a work of unconcealment that invites the 
same, Mirza and Butler seek to expose what lies hidden from view, outside the scope of 
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structural influence guiding political actions. The stakes in such an aesthetic of exposure 
are great, for as Zabala asserts, “If [. . . ] there are a number of artists whose works demand 
our intervention rather than simple aesthetic contemplation, it’s not because they lack 
classically artistic sensibility but rather because the lack of a sense of emergency in framed 
democracies demands a new artistic shock” (5). How might The Unreliable Narrator 
address this lack and issue this shock? Says Butler, 
[The work] explores the contested power of the author(ity), 
class, privilege, violence and mediatized spectacle. It asks 
people to consider a 2011 Eton Exam question for 12-year-old 
boys arguing for the moral and necessary deployment of troops 
on UK streets in 2040. In the same space (separated by a thin 
curtain) a two-screen video work about the Mumbai Attacks 
depicts terrorists, journalists and Bollywood competing with 
each other to endure in human consciousness. (“Artes Mundi”) 
The need to be seen, to become indelible, and to manifest in the daily output of spectacle is 
understood in light of the human need for recognition and the ongoing function of post-
memory.  
How may the combination of spaces maximize the embedded layers of meaning 
within the film, and what is specific ‘lack’ Mirza and Butler seek to expose? First, there is an 
important contextual indicator. The artists include the Eton Exam as a signifier for the 
childhood development of British leadership past and future. The impact of extended British 
colonialism has had a lasting effect on the Asian subcontinent, rendering geopolitical 
relations particularly destabilized and violent over the last 70 years. Second, the facet of geo-
historical space is iterated through the interplay of the two distinct galleries, thus testing for 
us the plausibility of Heidegger’s artistic salvation across real-time borders of enframement. 
The layering of the thematic situation within the delivery site will graphically reveal the 
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broader emergency context for the work – the dire conditions of our globalized technological 
culture as evidenced above by Lyotard, Baudrillard, and Heidegger’s connective sense of the 
reduction of Being to standing reserve.  
Third, the layered space of The Unreliable Narrator’s meaning consists in the way its 
intertextual nature presents a confluence of multiple discourses that collapse time, implicate a 
violent history and highlight the devastating effects of underlying differences. Here the space 
of the work’s own ideas affords a dialogical opening to the polyphonic operation of the 
philosophical discourses we have set in motion. The content and consequence of the artwork 
sheds much needed light on how far we continue to be from Arendt’s prescription of 
understanding and cooperation, and plurality despite the compromises this condition 
demands. In the work itself there is a discourse of exposure and action happening within a 
surrounding discourse of concealment and pacification. When asked about the challenges of 
basing an artwork on events that continue to have ‘repercussions,’ Butler replied, “The 
challenge was to provoke insight by making imaginative connections overlooked in the 
recycling of totalizing images competing to represent their version of ‘normal.’ What are the 
challenges in using a frame from the real that is already fiction?” (Seymour, “The Unreliable 
Narrator: how should we represent terror?”). In other words, confronting closed minds and 
pre-determined ideas illuminates the barriers to freedom that must be overcome. Such 
deliberate intertextualizing in the ‘contemporaneity’ of the work lends itself to an 
intertextualizing with our conceptual discourses. For example, in Aesthetic Theory, Adorno 
states, “What recommends itself, then, is the idea that art may be the only remaining medium 
of truth in an age of incomprehensible terror and suffering. As the real world grows dark, the 
irrationality of art is becoming rational, especially at a time when art is radically tenebrous 
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itself” (AT 27). The hinge between the artists’ sense of their work’s timeliness and the 
theorist’s sense of art’s timeliness is, we may say, the shared priority of affecting 
emancipation from within the dangers of alienation. Common to the film and to Mirza and 
Butler’s other projects is the manner in which their responses to ongoing ‘emergencies’ form 
a prescient intersection of art and theory. The case was similar with artworks discussed in 
prior chapters, but here we will find a still sharper opportunity for theory to operate 
contemporaneously with art as the artwork operates contemporaneously with distinct features 
of today’s enframing. The result is that we will not just show, but indeed experience, how the 
dynamic ‘work-character’ (recalling Heidegger) of a work of art animates and extends the 
theory used to appreciate it. 
In order to approach The Unreliable Narrator in earnest with these needs and goals in 
mind, we will first of all work intertextually, while also tracking the geopolitical forces at 
play within the ongoing South Asia narrative. We will work in two distinct yet parallel 
methodological directions: The first involves a genealogical investigation of the context and 
subject matter of the film, while the second requires a phenomenological reading of the 
medium itself. In order to coordinate the layered issues underpinning the work the 
genealogical course will pass from an overview of historical events, through a consideration 
of post-colonial thought, and into the trans-historical nature of the November 2008 Mumbai 
attacks. These points of attention are important because the density of the narrative concerns 
structures of power and domination, India’s relationship with the British Empire, and the 
latter’s durable effects on her societies, past and present. We cannot offer a full treatment of 
the political and relational intricacies issues at play in the film and its gallery installation. But 
at a minimum, our study should offer a better understanding of the plurality of truths at play 
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within this consequential historical moment and its aesthetic re-presentation. We will also 
extend the work of genealogy to the work’s immediate culture-industry context by briefly 
examining the ratings-driven news analyses related to the 2008 attacks and their quality as a 
real-time technological spectacle of carnage and death served to a global audience. A 
resulting question will be how this mediatization places the viewer in proximity to his own 
mortality and whether that encounter forces one to confront the incomprehensible through the 
state of Heideggerian astoundedness. Herein is the pivot from the genealogical to the 
phenomenological, revealing how the film affects the viewer’s experience and sensibility.  
Treating this question regarding viewer experience and sensibility will move us into 
our more phenomenological study of The Unreliable Narrator, in which we will undertake a 
close reading through the lenses of Heidegger, Lévinas, Arendt, Foucault, Baudrillard, 
Kristeva and Lyotard. We will analyze the ways in which the aesthetic experience is being 
framed by the medium and its multi-layered content, including how the film’s sequencing 
moves its viewer through a complex, thought-engendering intersubjective experience. The 
dual narrative, emerging from both Rahila Gupta’s voice (as the primary narrator) and those 
of the handlers in Pakistan, echoes the distant past and discloses the power of discourse; their 
parallel dialogues underscore the need for questioning, the piety of thought so valued by 
Heidegger. We will also determine how the artwork itself contributes to the philosophical 
treatment of the issue of truth by disabusing its audience of the way we collectively relate to 
the real. Mirza and Butler challenge timeworn totalizing notions of the other, putting into 
crisis our understanding of ideological positions and considerations of geopolitical narratives. 
The result, I argue, reinforces our ethical intersubjective responsibility for the other and the 
need, as Arendt asserts, for the openness and acceptance of the plurality of the human 
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condition, along with its demand for cooperation and compromise. Working 
phenomenologically will also enable us to press more deeply than the commonly settled 
focus on how the meaning of Mirza and Butler’s artwork centers on its disruption of current 
geo-political spaces. While this reading is in keeping with the artists’ statements, the 
undercurrents running through the entire video essay carry with them a richer narrative and 
disclose the need for a reconsideration of multiple perspectives in light of post-memory and 
its impact on present-day tragedies. The questions I will be asking address the multiplicity of 
truths as events emerging from historical, geopolitical discourses and post-colonial traces of 
the same. I will investigate the binaries such as truth and fiction, totalization versus 
acceptance of a plural world, and the potential for breaking free of the bonds alienation has 
imposed upon our Dasein.  
What we will learn by way of these methodological and thematic focal points will 
amount to a very specific case of an aesthetic event that demonstrates and enriches the 
elements of philosophical critique outlined above and carried over from prior chapters. The 
Unreliable Narrator makes clear the incredibly complex nature of Indo-Pakistani relations, 
while also illuminating the lingering post 1947 British Partition struggle for control of their 
borders. Adorno’s concern about the tenability of poetry after Auschwitz echoes in what this 
video essay undertakes as it seeks to expose the visceral components of a constant state of 
emergency and its instrument of contrived political control through fear. We must remember 
that, if Heidegger and Zabala are right, it is the ‘absence of emergency’ (the unperceived 
emergency), or generalized inertia, that should sound the alarm of enframing’s dangers. But 
Mirza and Butler face a time in which, ironically, the alarm is sounded through a misleading 
categorical discourse of ‘global terrorist acts,’ and so their work of ‘exposure’ must press 
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deeper still into the layer of those infected intersubjective relations that shape human conduct 
and too easily negate efforts toward reconciliation. Ultimately, The Unreliable Narrator calls 
into question the hyperreal, the feast of violence and the global consumption of such 
territories.  
I have been speaking of how the intertextual layers within the film shape its ability to 
sound the alarm of a ‘lack of emergency’ and in turn attune its viewers to a reflective 
engagement with how phenomena of power, freedom, truth, and communal participation and 
inter-subjective responsibility hold concrete, and urgent, implications. And I have explained 
how a genealogical and phenomenological method of reading the film is necessary if we are 
to apprehend the full measure of this aesthetic attunement. The motive and opportunity on 
both fronts comes from our initial considerations (above) of how astoundedness can engage 
with emergency, poēisis with challenging-forth, the sublime with unthinking inertia, and how 
the play of techno-science, media violence, addiction, and war porn constitute a simulacrum 
effect within which abides the vulnerable variable of the abject. It may seem as though we 
are freighting the work of Mirza and Butler with a tall order of conceptual issues to answer. 
Though I do believe their film meets this task, we need to point out that we are experiencing 
an attunement on the side of our theorizing that will coordinate with the emergency-
attunement affected in the artwork. More than just the mobilization of a critical apparatus, 
theory too needs to intertextualize in a way that can sound the alarm of the lack of 
acknowledged emergency in a crisis situation. I will now document how this is underway and 
how several other critical theories can serve its coordination with the film. 
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theory at work 
As we have begun to see, we come to The Unreliable Narrator with a stock of 
conceptual touchstones operating between philosophy and aesthetic works and earmarking 
art’s emancipatory capacity, namely: truth as a ‘propriative’ event, post-memory, enframing 
qua alienation, archive, authenticity and freedom. Already in Being and Time, Heidegger 
finds that, “In ‘poetical’ discourse, the communication of the existential possibilities of one’s 
state of mind can become an aim in itself, and this amounts to a disclosing of existence” (BT 
1962 205). The aim comes to apply to the poetic essence of the arts and the possibility 
therein for an astoundedness before the possibility that “the frenziedness of technology may 
entrench itself everywhere to such an extent that someday, throughout everything 
technological, the essence of technology may unfold essentially in the propriative event of 
truth” (Krell 340). We know that the statement refers to the emergence of the saving power 
within the danger of enframing, but the idea will be realized in a more material way in The 
Unreliable Narrator as we reckon with our own beliefs and fixed ideas while propelled into a 
state of confusion within the careful choreography of horror. This realization requires a 
curated encounter with the psychic space Kristeva attributes to the abject, as well as a 
recognition, with Foucault, of how discourse manipulates and manifests within systemic and 
individual behaviors. It also requires a further extension of Arendt’s ethical aspirations for 
thinking and action, one that returns us to her position with regards to the banality of evil and 
the need for critical thought in order to avert the negative effects of totalization, but also an 
extension that draws upon her account, in The Human Condition, of possible avenues to 
peaceful co-existence. The stakes and scope of ‘astoundedness,’ as we have begun to see, can 
also be nuanced by reading The Unreliable Narrator in concert with Baudrillard’s The Spirit 
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of Terrorism and War Porn, where we find that the detachment-effect of the hyperreal is 
shown in situ through the Mumbai attacks and the spectacles emanating from the shadows of 
9/11 – events that test our limit experience and the utter inability of the West to digest such 
atrocities. Where Baudrillard’s ideas cannot, however, do full justice to the nuances and 
complexities of Mirza and Butler’s work, we do well to reengage Lévinas’ decisive emphasis 
on intersubjective responsibility in the phenomenal encounter with the face. The disorienting 
experience generated by Mirza and Butler’s artwork evokes a Lévinasian meeting with the 
other – an originary ontological alarm, so to speak – and the essential ethical considerations 
that emerge as a result.  
I will return in a moment to some important nuances in Lévinas, Arendt, and Kristeva 
that will animate and be animated by the film. But first, we need to position how the 
specifications of discourse theory in Spivak, Foucault, and Said, can signal the way that (a) 
theory can intertextualize to sound the emergency situation, and (b) this can help us hear the 
way the phenomenological and genealogical aspects of the film sound its own alarm. Spivak 
equips us with ways to understand the post-colonial context and its effect on identity and 
consciousness in South Asia and elsewhere. Her ethical perspective and focus on the rise of 
meaning through the social domain addresses the depths of post-colonial demarcations and 
reveals the foundations of the violent past that bleed into the present (both literally and 
figuratively). The imperial structures of power, the long-since abandoned British Raj, 
continue to play a role not only in the ways post-colonialists perceive themselves but also in 
the ways the West interprets the ongoing Orientalist discourse. In her essay “Who Claims 
Alterity?,” Spivak describes her own experience as a ‘post-colonial’ in a way that, as with 
Hirsch’s aforementioned notion of post-memory, shows how the internalized experience of 
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the past shapes identity and cultural mores. What becomes poignantly clear is the degree to 
which we as individuals attach ourselves to knowledge or meaning as prescribed by varying 
external forces.  
Identifying the authors of such embedded knowledge frameworks requires an 
understanding of Foucault’s interpretation of both discourse and épistème, cornerstones of 
his writing in The Archeology of Knowledge and The Order of Things. John Protevi defines 
épistème as “Foucault’s name for the objects of his archeological method of analysis” (176). 
He continues: “An épistème is a set of relations or rules of formation that, at a given place 
and time, unite the set of discursive practices that make up an apparatus of knowledge 
production.” It operates as “a set of dynamic relations that exist only in their concrete 
occurrences in discursive regularities across fields of knowledge in a particular historical 
epoch” (Protevi 176). Fundamental structures of knowledge rely on épistèmes as their 
building blocks; épistèmes define our understanding of the constitution of history. Taking a 
broader view, discourse is, by necessity, as fluid as it is constitutive — changing with the 
forward flow of history and its authors. It is determined by the networks of knowledge and 
power in control of contextual ideas and apparatuses. Discourses, almost in the manner of 
functioning social a prioris, are, per Chris Weedon,  
. . . ways of constituting knowledge, together with the social 
practices, forms of subjectivity and power relations which 
inhere in such knowledges and relations between them. 
Discourses are more than ways of thinking and producing 
meaning. They constitute the 'nature' of the body, unconscious 
and conscious mind and emotional life of the subjects they seek 
to govern. (108)  
Expansive and enabling on certain terms, and strategic in the systemic organization of 
knowledge and power frameworks, discourse shapes its recipient, affecting ideas and 
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dispositions in order to assert control. It is durable, embedding itself in beliefs, altering 
human conduct and individual freedoms; one could say that discourses establish the 
conditions in which and to which the alarm of astoundedness may be sounded or (as is often 
the case) suppressed.   
The problem is not simply that this discursive agency happens, but that it is a coveted 
position of authority. In The Order of the Discourse, Foucault explains, “discourse is not 
simply that which translates struggles or systems of domination, but is the thing for which 
and by which there is struggle, discourse is the power which is to be seized” (Foucault 211). 
He notes that “in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, 
organized and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its 
powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, 
formidable materiality” (210). He ascribes to it “that prodigious machinery designed to 
exclude” (214). With such a will to knowledge as its essential element, colonialist discourse 
and its far-reaching tentacles became the focal point for those acting in resistance to its 
nefarious effects. The centuries of external influence certainly have left indelible marks on 
the South Asian narrative. The long-standing archives and literature forming the colonialists’ 
views have “exert[ed] a sort of pressure and something like a power of constraint … on other 
discourses” (Foucault 213). 
Acknowledging his debt to Foucault in his seminal text Orientalism, Edward Said 
writes about the Orientialist perspective: 
I doubt if it is controversial, for example, to say that an 
Englishman in India, or Egypt, in the later nineteenth century, 
took an interest in those countries, which was never far from 
their status, in his mind, as British colonies. To say this may 
seem quite different from saying that all academic knowledge 
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about India and Egypt is somehow tinged and impressed with, 
violated by, the gross political fact—and yet that is what I am 
saying in this study of Orientalism. (11) 
Colonialist discourse carries within its script the defining narratives of post-colonialism and 
is thus imperative for our reading of The Unreliable Narrator. Colonialism’s roots in 
oppression and inequality, in imposed educational systems and traditions, in a loss of 
heritage and cultural identity, have left the subcontinent enframed in a “closed space” of 
“strict rules” (220) that author what counts as knowledge and identity. The state of affairs 
may be termed a technological apparatus; and the operating features of a discourse recall 
Derrida’s attention to how archives are edited, controlled and purposefully biased, indicating 
a need for a return to plurality as a guiding principle. As the features of discourses function 
still further within academic theory, we see with Said how what ought to be a space of 
critique calcifies as a complicit party:  
Taking the late eighteenth century as a roughly defined starting 
point, Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the 
corporate institution for dealing with the Orient — dealing with 
it by making statements about it, authoring views of it, 
describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, 
Orientalism is a Western style for dominating, restructuring, 
and having authority over the Orient. (Harrison and Wood 
1006–1007)  
In short, Orientalism and its totalizing effect are clear demonstrations of the propagation of 
discourse. As what we may call an instance of ‘theyness’ and enframing at a discrete and 
consequential pitch, the effects of such institutionalized knowledge are immeasurable and 
often deeply destructive. There is not only the side of ‘othering’ at the hands of social-
political-historical discourses, but also the lateral function of academic épistèmes to enjoy a 
strategic power of their own. Said goes on to say, “Orientalism, therefore, is not an airy 
   319 
European fantasy about the Orient, but a creative body of theory and practice in which, for 
many generations, there has been considerable material investment” (Harrison and Wood 
1008). Such ‘investment’ expects its rewards, in which case the discourse must ‘ward off’ 
any sense of ‘emergency.’ Cloaked behind an apparent ‘lack’ of emergency, then, Said 
determines that, “Because of Orientalism, the Orient was not (and is not) a free subject of 
thought or action” (Said 1007).  
The importance of Said’s assessment to the ongoing conflicts in South Asia cannot be 
overstated: the devastating implications have directly informed both the 2008 Mumbai terror 
attacks and the related material content of Mirza and Butler’s The Unreliable Narrator. It is a 
matter of fundamental freedom, both collective and individual, and yet at the same time a 
precise instance of an ‘emergency’ that conceals its own enframing operations. Lingering 
subjugation, whether extrinsic or now internalized, continues to manifest within inter-
subjective dynamics. Anthropologist Talal Asad describes Said’s work as  
. . . not only a catalogue of Western prejudices about and 
misrepresentations of Arabs and Muslims ... [but an 
investigation and analysis of the] authoritative structure of 
Orientalist discourse—the closed, self-evident, self-confirming 
character of that distinctive discourse, which is reproduced, 
again and again, through scholarly texts, travelogues, literary 
works of imagination, and the obiter dicta of public men-of-
affairs. (648). 
One hears in this description how the inertia of complacency – that which an alēthiac artwork 
wants to ‘defy’ and place before the face of the other – is active. The totalizing effect of 
globalism results in an inability to distinguish the unique character of a society, let alone of 
an individual. Vast populations are lumped into specific categories by means of embedded 
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ideas, disseminated by the dominating power. An attunement to such phenomena is crucial to 
any investigation of the emancipatory critique offered in The Unreliable Narrator.   
To this state of affairs, an aesthetically issued emancipatory critique would doubtless 
need to engage the problem of inter-subjective violence, something further insights from 
Arendt and Lévinas supply. Arendt bases her critique on an account of person-to-person 
relations, where the importance of respecting individual character is paramount to one’s 
essential freedom. She explains, “the moment we want to say who somebody is, our very 
vocabulary leads us astray into saying what he is; we get entangled in a description of 
qualities he necessarily shares with others like him; we begin to describe a type or a 
‘character’ in the old meaning of the word, with the result that his specific uniqueness 
escapes us” (HC 181). Her statement points to the destructive disposition of unquestioned 
discourse and its inherently reductive nature. One of her resources for subverting this 
problem is, as we have noted earlier, the way Heidegger’s notion of Miteinandersein added a 
stress on ‘being-involved-with’ and ‘sharing in the truth’ to his more formal conception of 
Mitsein. One mode of this, Gonzalez points out, was ‘friendship,’ understood as “growing 
and resting ‘in a genuine passion for the matter that is shared [gemeinsame Sache]’ (147)” 
(Gonzalez 67). The idea confirms the importance and possibility of moving from a position 
of self-based preoccupation to shared experience. The idea of a shared passion corresponds 
as well to Heidegger’s (often overlooked) early sense of the historical nature of heritage and 
communal living. In §75 of Being and Time he explains, “The ‘world’ belongs to everyday 
trade and traffic as the soil from which they have grown and the stage where they are 
displayed. In public being-with-one-another others are encountered in the activities in which 
‘one’ ‘gets into the swim of things’ [mitschwimmt] ‘oneself.’” (369). He continues, “The 
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occurrence of history is the occurrence of being-in-the-world” (369). With this communal 
dynamic in view, Arendt presses into the political realm of plurality and our essential Being-
with. The application brings her to the themes of totalization and othering, which link her 
ideas to those of Lévinas and sharpens our focus on the matter of violence that will be of 
central importance to the film 
In Lévinas’ text, Totality and Infinity, ‘totalization’ is at once a conceptual and 
practical force that has a negative effect on intersubjective freedom. Anthony F. Beavers 
explains that totalization occurs on the personal level when  
I have cut off the connection with the other that is necessary if 
ethics is to refer to real other people. This is a central violence 
to the other that denies the other his/her own autonomy. 
Lévinas calls this violence totalization and it occurs whenever I 
limit the other to a set of rational categories, be they racial, 
sexual, or otherwise. Indeed, it occurs whenever I already 
know what the other is about before the other has spoken. 
Totalization is a denial of the other’s difference, the denial of 
the otherness of the other. That is, it is the inscription of the 
other in the same. If ethics presupposes the real other person, 
then such totalization will, in itself, be unethical. (“Introducing 
Lévinas to Undergraduate Philosophers”) 
Beavers’ explanation highlights the fundamentally unethical nature of such inter-subjective 
activity.4 Against this tendency, Lévinas holds: “A relationship to an Other that, precisely 
because of irreducible difference, refuses to give itself to a thematizing knowing and thus, is 
always assimilative” (Entre Nous 72). A recovery of ‘irreducible difference’ in thought and 
deed would break the hold of totalization’s reduction of persons and communities. By the 
same token, Arendt would say that totalization denotes the violent breach of Heidegger’s 
Miteinandersein, and does so through an increasingly violent momentum on the personal and 
collective levels that are simultaneously shaped by the power plays of discourses. What we 
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find within this breach is the manifestation of what Heidegger had termed ‘challenging-forth’ 
on a scale that is as broad and accelerating as it is specific and particular to the experiences of 
distinct people groups and historical moments. As experienced on the ground – the position 
from which and to which The Unreliable Narrator speaks – the violent momentum settles 
into a pattern of what we will call othering. As with the breach of Heidegger’s 
Miteinandersein, here we find the patterned inversion of what Lévinas sought to recover in 
alterity, and thereby the toxic reframing of our essential ‘being-involved-with’ and ‘sharing 
in the truth.’ Involved-with and sharing-in on what terms, on what discursive mobilization of 
power? In principle otherness should fold within the vocation of a healthy and just pluralism. 
Notice the Arendtian extension of ‘sharing-in’ as she clarifies her terms:  
Human distinctness is not the same as otherness. . . . Otherness, 
it is true, is an important aspect of plurality, the reason why all 
our definitions are distinctions, why we are unable to say what 
anything is without distinguishing it from something else. . . . 
In man, otherness, which he shares with everything that is, and 
distinctness, which he shares with everything alive, become 
uniqueness, and human plurality is the paradoxical plurality of 
unique beings. (HC 176) 
Arendt recognizes the challenge inherent in our plurality, while also compassionately 
marking the difference between otherness and distinctness. But where the contest for power 
prevails amid the mobilization of, and addiction to, discourses, otherness is appropriated as a 
coercive strategy; it becomes the grammar of Orientalism, denies human uniqueness, and 
creates a separation between ourselves and those we deem ‘different.’ In a subtle way, this 
strategy seeks to manage power’s ability to preserve an enframing agency at the expense of 
what would be a healthier praxis. Arendt explains the issue in terms pertaining to the 
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actualized relation between word and deed on the side of what the more just power of 
‘involvement’ and ‘sharing’ would be:  
What first undermines and then kills political communities is 
loss of power and final impotence; and power cannot be stored 
up and kept in reserve for emergencies, like the instruments of 
violence, but exists only in its actualization. Where power is 
not actualized, it passes away, and history is full of examples 
that the greatest material riches cannot compensate for this 
loss. Power is actualized only where word and deed have not 
parted company, where words are not empty and deeds not 
brutal, where words are not used to veil intentions but to 
disclose realities, and deeds are not used to violate and destroy 
but to establish relations and create new realities. (HC 200) 
In essence, non-hegemonic power manifests in truth, and truth emerges from the authentic 
collaboration between word and action. The enframing nature of discourse would be 
dispelled only in its return upon itself in truth. The ethical need to do so challenges 
established historical discourses (narratives) that serves to perpetuate empty dominance. 
Arendt’s point, operating like a robust advancement of Heideggerian ‘solicitude’ and a 
concrete application of Lévinasian ‘original justice,’ underscores the need for (and stakes in) 
deconstructing Orientalist discourse and its traces.  
What we are seeing here on the side of theory (and what will be paralleled on the side 
of The Unreliable Narrator) is an intertextualizing production that incorporates Heidegger’s 
ontology of our being-with and worldhood, Foucault’s analysis of the conditions and 
implications of discourse coursing problematically through both, Said’s specification of the 
hegemony inscribed in the Orientalism paradigm, and Lévinas and Arendt’s overlapping 
critiques of the violence within totalization and otherness. Taken together, these ideas 
envision and initiate an ethics of thinking and collective responsibility that would address the 
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social-political realm in a diagnostic and curative way. They also point afresh to the unique 
ability of artistic works to do the same. But for theory and/or art to reassert the just 
collaboration of word and deed they must at the same time traverse the deep interior 
divisions that form the ongoing psychological root of othering. Kristeva’s theory of abjection 
serves this need by revealing a kind of enframing afoot within the makeup of our fragile 
identities, and in turn within the social patterns of constituting systems of power on the basis 
of this fragility’s artificial marginalization. Let us return to this issue for a moment. Speaking 
ontologically to the tension internal to subjectivity and sociality alike, and their pretensions 
to maintain the ‘sameness’ (or semblance) of an identity, she explains how the abject 
amounts to what seems an ‘impure other.’ It is the space between birth and language, 
belonging to the realm of the maternal—floating somewhere in the placenta-filled void 
permeating one’s being prior to fully achieving autonomy. It is a place of visceral responses 
to environmental or bodily factors; we feel disgust, even horror, at spoiled milk, bodily 
emissions, dead bodies. But the tendency is to suppress the abject and put it out of play 
internally and externally across our Mitsein. “And yet,” she continues, “from its place of 
banishment, the abject does not cease challenging its master” (2). Operating as a kind of 
deconstructive threat internal to psyche and system, subjectivity and discourse, ego and 
épistème, abjection “disturbs identity, system, order.” Abjection, in its own way, resists 
‘totalization.’ She speaks of it as what “does not respect borders, positions, rules. The in-
between, the ambiguous, the composite” (4). This resistance follows the subject from within, 
drilling into the psyche while simultaneously informing yet revealing the contingency of 
personal, cultural and religious constructs. It is ultimately inescapable. But art – in her case 
especially modernist literature – can uniquely address the matter and show it, endure it, 
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reckon with it in a way that does not pretend a final purging of the fragility it evokes. 
Kristeva asserts, “On close inspection, all [art and] literature is probably a version of the 
apocalypse that seems to me rooted, no matter what its socio-historical conditions might be, 
on the fragile border (borderline cases) where identities (subject/object, etc.) do not exist or 
only barely so—double, fuzzy, heterogeneous, animal, metamorphosed, altered, abject” 
(207). Kristeva is executing her own genealogy of this particular function of the abject, with 
a more lived, a priori focus than that of Foucault – but one we can apply to the problematic 
operations of discourse that he has shown. The Unreliable Narrator will take on the double 
challenge of recognizing the psychological fact of abjection yet at the same time revealing 
the manipulative way specific systemic discourses and blithely categorical ‘emergencies’ 
constitute their power on the basis of, essentially, abjecting their ‘others.’  
 Returning us to the surface effects of the breaches noted above, we better appreciate 
Arendt’s opposition to identity-altering categorizations that deny individuals their unique 
ability to ‘distinguish’ themselves, to be unique among men, and to act on the basis of 
genuine pluralism. What must be recognized above all is the potential for each of us to hold 
distinct views, to believe in multiple principles and to be individual-plural. Such existence 
requires, as we have seen, the reconfiguration of power toward a better integration of word 
and deed, but without presuming that the constituent parts of the plural (be they persons, 
sects, or states) are fixed in static identities. She explains: “Plurality is the condition of 
human action because we are all the same, that is, human, in such a way that nobody is ever 
the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives, or will live” (Arendt, HC 8). This says: we are 
the same in terms of how we are never the same, and that should be a paradox that inspires 
justice.  
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In acting and speaking, men show who they are, reveal actively 
their unique personal identities and thus make their appearance 
in the human world … This disclosure of ‘who’ in 
contradistinction to ‘what’ somebody is — his qualities, gifts, 
talents, and shortcomings, which he may display or hide — is 
implicit in everything somebody says and does. (Arendt HC 
179) 
It is the acceptance of uniqueness and distinction, lending a voice to those who might 
otherwise be oppressed or without rights, that Arendt proposes as a path forward to peaceful 
coexistence. But this is no easy task, for as power is at the heart of discourse and control is 
exerted through its embedded texts, both the alarm over a ‘lack of emergency’ and an 
emergency intervention in the enframing must be sounded at once.  
 What discourse theory, post-colonial critique, and the alarms of totalization and 
othering alike point to is a technē of strategic objectifications and paralyzing implications 
that Arendt would have us recognize and subvert in the name of a durable pluralism. Taken 
as an intertextual body, these critical theories seek to ‘astound’ and thereby emancipate. They 
are not simply thematic supplements to the genealogical and phenomenological approach our 
reading of The Unreliable Narrator requires, but collaborators with the tendency, durability, 
bringing-forth, and face of justice, and indefinite catharsis affected in the film. The 
collaboration matters because, after all and as Weedon asserts, dispelling the authority of 
power structures requires an understanding of “a dynamic of control and lack of control 
between discourses and the subjects, constituted by discourses, who are their agents. Power is 
exercised within discourses in the ways in which they constitute and govern individual 
subjects” (Weedon 113).  As applied to local and international conflicts, trans-historical 
narratives and archives are active, complicit participants in the ongoing post-colonial 
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narrative and its consequences. We need to re-negotiate the traces of the past with an eye 
toward our uncertain future.  
 
§ 5.3: PAST–PRESENT: MUMBAI TERROR ATTACKS OF 26/11 
The Unreliable Narrator is, by necessity, multi-layered. Viewing it in isolation from 
its historical and contemporary context is, therefore, a mistake. The seventeen-minute video 
essay compresses a lengthy historical narrative into its frames. The film questions global 
power structures, media fascination with atrocity, issues of nationalism and truth’s 
multiplicity. Understanding its inherent potency requires an inquiry into South Asia’s 
complex past, though a detailed treatment of that full history exceeds the limitations of this 
project. That said, at minimum, we must assess a few key moments, while noting the traces 
of British imperialism that linger in ongoing acts of violence. A brief overview of the Indian 
subcontinent’s tumultuous colonialist narrative and ongoing conflicts is necessary. I have 
moved the main content of this genealogical study to Appendix C, but I will reprise a few of 
the key findings briefly here.  
Two immediate lessons occur on the near side of the region’s history. First, Mirza and 
Butler’s subject matter extends directly from the nationalistic tensions born of centuries of 
British rule in India, and the film specifically references the hostilities attending the 1947 
partitioning of the Indian subcontinent into separate nation states and its Hindu and Muslim 
populations. These events, and the discourse they materialized, persist in the collective post-
memory of that region today. Second, subsequent history shows the further exacerbation of 
geopolitical turmoil on the subcontinent as foreign powers – namely, the USA, USSR, and 
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China – vied for its strategic value in relation to conflicts and opportunities in, for example, 
Afghanistan.  
A further, and still more penetrating series of lessons occur when the deeper history 
of the region is considered. First, there was the instigating allure of South Asia to seventeenth 
century British trade interests, and the resulting conflicts that ensued as the material interests 
of the East India Company grew into broader strategic interests pitting the British against 
mounting competition from the Dutch, Danes, Portuguese, and French. The quest to advance 
and maintain strategic control led to military force (including the use of private armies) and 
occupation. Second, the rise of British rule meant the suppression of cultural pluralism 
through measures targeting language, education, and religion – acts that solidified the grip of 
discourses on ‘words and deeds,’ countered events of resistance, and established a pattern of 
material and cultural inequity funneling all the way to the pages of the noted Eton 
examination booklet. Third, with the rise of industrial technologies and international 
interventions at the entry into the twentieth century, the region bore the weight of war-bent 
global violence and resurgent inequities in the form of political abuse, the caste system, and 
British-inspired identity politics. Fourth, and related, the path of approach to the 
India/Pakistan partition saw discourses of racial superiority, contests for power between 
Muslim and Hindu governance campaigns, gross atrocities of inter-sectarian violence as land 
and laws were ‘transitioned,’ and in turn the death of an estimated one to two million 
civilians in the weeks after India and Pakistan won their independence from British rule. 
What Ayesha Jalal states regarding these events speaks to the broader nature and impact of 
each of the lessons we have noted: “the Partition is the central historical event in twentieth 
century South Asia. . . . A defining moment that is neither beginning nor end, partition 
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continues to influence how the peoples and states of postcolonial South Asia envisage their 
past, present and future” (qtd. in Dalrymple).  
Moving into the post-colonial context, the genealogy contextualizes the subject 
matter of the film by surveying how the exchange between discourse-function and lived-
experience authored new iterations of fragility, chaos, violence, territorial disputes, and the 
intrusions of global strategic interests on the subcontinent. Such events, and the power 
structures and contests that drive them, reveal how it can be deceptive to believe that 
‘freedom’ is a liberating force, and likewise how the atrocities brought to bear on the 
subcontinent continue to haunt current generations through a pervasive infusion of post-
memory and discourse. In each of their video essay’s choreographed frames, like each of 
these genealogical layers, Mirza and Butler draw the viewer into an encounter with a 
repetition of this brutal past complete in all its graphic details and urgency.  
Reading the contemporary moment in light of this genealogy, William Dalrymple of 
the New Yorker observes: “1947 has yet to come to an end” (New Yorker). The message of 
The Unreliable Narrator is much the same, and what confirms Dalrymple’s point is also 
what the film takes as its precise subject matter: the Mumbai terror attacks of November 
2008. We need to understand the nature of how these events reflect issues of the larger 
genealogy as they arise at the center of Mirza and Butler’s work. To this end, I will now offer 
a brief contextualization of the Mumbai attacks in concert with a return to some of our 
philosophical points of reference as we enter into the close reading of the film. There are five 
main points to note as regards technology’s advance and its perpetuation of our enframed 
condition. We will track these items as follows: (a) the use of technology as a driving force in 
global violence, (b) the spectacle of technologization, (c) technology’s facilitating of terror, 
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(d) the body as a technological weapon, and (e) the relentless perpetuation of embedded 
discourse. 
First there is the phenomenon of technological networking utilized for hostile 
disruption. As is the case with many épistèmes, on Foucault’s account, the impacts of South 
Asia’s history have spread beyond its own borders, implicating a broader global audience in 
the ongoing manifestations of violence. The expansion of historical momentum and discourse 
appears within each frame of The Unreliable Narrator and its exploration of multiple views 
of events. At their core, the attacks were technological, multi-national, and driven by deeply-
felt, hostile discourse and post-memory. The carefully choreographed assaults lasted 4 days, 
from 26 to 29 November 2008, and, as clearly expressed by the Pakistan-based handlers, 
were intended to rival the media spectacle surrounding the New York City events of 
September 11, 2001. The New York Times reported the events in Mumbai “may be the most 
well-documented terrorist attacks anywhere” (Bajaj and Polgreen “Suspect Stirs Mumbai 
Court”), underscoring its ‘success’ when considered from the perpetrators’ point of view. A 
series of networking systems were put into play throughout the siege: Twitter, Facebook and 
Flickr, along with news distributors and bloggers, and Google Maps. Numerous intelligence 
agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Research and Analysis Wing 
(RAW), coordinated with information-sharing services. The significance of such 
multipronged technological webs encircling a series of events highlights the depth of human 
addiction and the strategic value of this as a ‘standing reserve.’ As humans harnessed nature, 
technology, in turn, envelops beings. Per Heidegger, “[T]he revealing that holds sway 
throughout modern technology does not unfold into a bringing-forth in the sense 
of poiēsis. The revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging [Herausfordem], 
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which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy which can be extracted 
and stored as such” (Krell 320). The assailants perpetrating the Mumbai attacks understood 
this dynamic well enough to choreograph their actions for the technological stage. Enframing 
furnishes an opportunity for theater and spectacle.  
Second, there is the manner in which the agitations of globalization become an 
opportunity for affecting the kind of simulacrum — and spectacle-based narrative delivery 
system that advances group aims. Although separate terrorist groups were responsible for 
9/11 and 26/11, they both, symbolically and politically, exemplify the totalizing effects of 
globalization. The series of Mumbai attacks were carried out by a terror cell, Lashkar e Taiba 
(LeT).5 This group was originally founded to aggressively disrupt India’s continued control 
over the province of Kashmir. The group’s association with Pakistan and eventual operations 
as jihadists, serve as glaring reminders of ever-present post-colonialist conflicts. Separated 
by seven years, both events reveal much about an ongoing power dynamic driven by political 
and economic alienation. Baudrillard’s The Spirit of Terrorism, as well as his essay titled 
“War Porn” serve well on this point. He approaches terrorism through the lens of 
mediatization; he offers a critique of both the technological advances driving the accessibility 
and spectacle of such images, as well as news consumers. When speaking of 9/11, 
Baudrillard explains, “Among the other weapons of the system which they turned around 
against it, the terrorists exploited the ‘real time’ of images, their instantaneous world-wide 
transmission, just as they exploited stock-market speculation, electronic information and air 
traffic” (ST 21). The same can be said for the Mumbai attacks, aimed at crippling the 
financial systems rooted in the city center. The challenges presented by suicide bombers, the 
rupture of traditional methods of war and the omnipresence of such attacks forever alter the 
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landscape of the greater global community now perennially living under the specter of fear 
and violent outbursts. What emerges is a widely disseminated simulacrum of abjection and 
an unavoidable encounter with death.  
Our third point draws the first two into a now deeper consideration of how the attacks 
speak to the character of terrorism and its relation to enframing systems of domination. 
Baudrillard explains that, “Terrorism, like viruses, is everywhere. There is a global perfusion 
of terrorism, which accompanies any system of domination as though it were its shadow, 
ready to activate itself anywhere, like a double agent” (ST 8). The dominant discourse 
thereby carries within it an integrated refusal to appropriate fully its modes of oppression and 
lacks an Arendtian pluralistic cooperating spirit. In addition, this polemic refusal fails to heed 
the warnings issued in Spivak’s writing about nationalistic post-colonial discourse. The only 
possible consequence of such an impasse is the eruption of violence. As regards the totalizing 
effects of such globalization, Baudrillard continues,  
The more concentrated the system becomes globally, 
ultimately forming one single network, the more it becomes 
vulnerable at a single point (already a single little Filipino 
hacker had managed, from the dark recesses of his portable 
computer, to launch the ‘I love you’ virus, which circled the 
globe devastating entire networks). Here it was eighteen 
suicide attackers who, thanks to the absolute weapon of death, 
enhanced by technological efficiency, unleashed a global 
catastrophic process. (ST 7) 
Indeed, the technological capabilities facilitate such acts through available digital mediums 
such as Google Maps, satellite phones, SIM (subscriber identity module) cards and 
untraceable Voice over I.P. addresses. American David Headley, a member of Lashkar e 
Taiba and active participant in the 26/11 attacks, used Google Maps to situate potential 
targets.6 The LeT trainees subsequently practiced moving through their appointed 
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destinations by means of such specific information systems. Much like the events of 9/11, the 
Mumbai attacks focused on the heart of India's financial and Bollywood districts, with all 
their symbolic power. The opulence of the two primary hotels, the Taj and Oberoi, and their 
politically significant clientele, were as much primary targets as the lengthy historical 
narratives driving hostilities between India and Pakistan.  
As though commenting on the West’s inertia, Baudrillard suggests, “The aim is 
simply to wreck the system—itself indifferent to its own values—by means of its own 
weapons. Even more than the system’s technological weapons, the key arm they appropriate, 
and turn to decisive effect, is the non-meaning and indifference which are at the heart of the 
system” (ST 56). It is almost as though the terror cell sought to disrupt the ‘danger’ of a 
systemic challenging-forth by way of yet a further, and avowedly violent, ‘saving’ danger. 
The apathetic disposition Baudrillard critiques parallels what Arendt would consider a failure 
of thought and questioning, negating our potential for any developed understanding of our 
present human condition. Thus, the enframed character of the targeted attacks is not be 
disputed per se. Rightly, though in a terrible irony, the attacks lay bare the West’s inability to 
comprehend the motivating forces of such acts. Baudrillard clarifies, “Here, then, it is all 
about death, not only about the violent irruption of death in real time—‘live’, so to speak—
but the irruption of a death which is far more than real: a death which is symbolic and 
sacrificial—that is to say, the absolute, irrevocable event” (ST 13). But to use death as a 
strategy against ‘death’ is to materialize the dangerous power against the systematic scope of 
that very power. The shattering of a fundamental belief in preservation of life as a feature of 
our existence is indeed problematic, for specifically in this instance it severs the very premise 
of any saving power. Baudrillard states: 
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Not only do these people not play fair, since they put their own 
deaths into play — to which there is no possible response 
(‘they are cowards’) — but they have taken over all the 
weapons of the dominant power. Money and stock-market 
speculation, computer technology and aeronautics, spectacle 
and the media networks — they have assimilated everything of 
modernity and globalism, without changing their goal, which is 
to destroy that power. (15) 
Young jihadists commit to acts of martyrdom, looking to the afterlife for reward. They are 
incentivized by an ultimate performance, committed in defense of the greater Islamic 
community or ummah. Through concrete actions, with the finality of death as a medium, 
terrorists are able to subvert Western normative systems of thought, deeply disrupting 
discourse. Interestingly, Lévinas explains, “In war beings refuse to belong to a totality, refuse 
community, refuse law; no frontier stops one being by another, nor defines them. They affirm 
themselves as transcending the totality, each identifying itself not by its place in the whole 
but by its self” (TI 222). The assailants in both 9/11 and Mumbai transformed the self into a 
weapon in the name of religion.  
These tensions bring us to a fourth element at the intersection of Mumbai, the field of 
systemic enframing that terror seeks to disrupt, and specifically the phenomenon of 
surveillance at issue in The Unreliable Narrator. With the medium of terror attaching to the 
human body, and events multiplying across the globe, Baudrillard observes, “The specter of 
terrorism is forcing the West to terrorize itself—the planetary police network being the 
equivalent of the tension of a universal Cold War, of a fourth world war imprinting itself 
upon bodies and mores” (ST 62). By extension, the constant policing forecloses on concepts 
of individual freedom and privacy, in a concrete sense manifesting in a virtual panopticon. 
Foucault elaborates on the very essence of such surveillance and its correlative effect on the 
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human psyche. With the notion of being constantly watched, we begin to exist in a state 
marked by such conditions, including an effect on our relationships with others. 
Technological enframing, as described by Heidegger, is now embedded in daily life, 
supplanting Dasein’s ability to live authentically. Surveillance is characteristic of Zabala’s 
‘absence of emergency.’ As a reflection of our generalized complacency in the face of 
serious crises of existence, the degradation of questioning offers enframing full control. In 
sum, the networks undermining critical thought preclude access to the open space for other-
thinking to occur unfettered. Heidegger, Arendt, Foucault, Spivak and Baudrillard thus reveal 
the hidden emergencies (or absence of emergencies) occluding emancipation. What these 
points show is that we cannot presume to categorize the Mumbai events as egregious 
violence without first recognizing the broader systemic violence that, in large measure, 
motivated them. That it is not to say that terrorism is justified, but that it has its reasons; the 
film compels viewers to feel these reasons.   
 A fifth and final element of the contextual manifestations of how “1947 has yet to 
come to an end,” an element specifically represented in the film, concerns the more 
fundamental inter-subjective exchange unfolding beneath the surface of violence (Hajari 
261). It is important to note that, within the human subplots unfolding throughout the terrorist 
attack, only one assailant out of the ten Mumbai attackers survived. He was a teenager by the 
name of Ajmal Kasab. By jihadist standards, he failed in his mission by not being killed; he 
did not enter the realm of heaven and join Allah in celebration of his martyrdom. His 
testimony elucidated the tremendous amount of orchestration behind the attacks and offered 
substantial evidence implicating other Pakistani civilians as well as members of the Pakistani 
military.7 For his role, Kasab’s father was paid the sum of $1,900.00; this price reveals the 
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severity of economic alienation experienced by this family in Pakistan. It will become clear 
how Kasab’s capture, interview and humanization transformed him from an object of hatred, 
a terrorist, to one of compassion as a Lévinasian intersubjective exchange unfolded. The 
Times of India reported that “Kasab filed a mercy petition with the President of India, which 
was rejected on November 5th, 2012” (“Ajmal Kasab Hanged”). His plight—in the hands of 
his family, Lashkar e Taiba, the Indian courts and the global audience—shifted how he was 
perceived and undermined his guilty verdict.  
The five points of reference I have just addressed are not to be taken as strict ‘causes’ 
for the attacks nor the sensibility of the film. They speak to a genealogy of the present that 
has lasting implications. In the same way that Sloterdijk’s notion of atmo-terrorism forever 
alters the human landscape, acts of jihad, captivating the attention of a rapt global audience, 
continue to proliferate. Baudrillard notes, 
In all these vicissitudes, what stays with us, above all else, is 
the sight of the images. This impact of the images, and their 
fascination, are necessarily what we retain, since images are, 
whether we like it or not, our primal scene. And, at the same 
time as they have radicalized the world situation, the events in 
New York can also be said to have radicalized the relation of 
the image to reality. (ST 20) 
By turning to a phenomenological examination of the film, we learn how the work and its 
elements, including duration and assimilation of multiple perspectives, both reinforce 
narrative and undermine the connection with discourse. Understanding the profound impact 
effected through layers of sediment and discourse will leave the viewer and critic better able 
to appreciate the multiple perspectives represented, including how the Mumbai attacks 
exacerbated an already hostile environment and brought additional nations into the narrative. 
What remains to be seen is how these épistèmes are animated within the aesthetic experience 
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of the film, potentially wresting us from our stupor and offering emancipation from our 
enframed state. When speaking of the issue of freedom, as expressed by the ideas 
underpinning democratic consciousness, Butler renarks, “One of the complications here is 
the term freedom. In our research, we have found many of the greatest speeches about 
freedom have come from oppressed people. One then should ask—what are the forces that 
stop these radical visions coming into being?” (Seymour).  
 
§ 5.4: A CLOSE READING  
For the sake of insight, we will analyze the film in sequential order to draw out the 
ways in which the artists maintain the multiple layers of meaning throughout, revealing the 
depths of historical and socioeconomic underpinning its narrative. Throughout the film, 
phenomenologically speaking, several primary elements specific to the film’s unique 
aesthetic are simultaneously in play. The first of these elements is the steady use of the 
spoken word as a mediator of ideas, complete with variations in content and mood. (figure 
5.3) Language thus takes on its primary role as disseminator of meaning. One is reminded of 
Ricoeur’s essay “Life in Quest of Narrative,” in which he states, “[Language] is a mediation 
Figure 5.3: 
Noor Mirza and Brad Butler 
The Unreliable Narrator / Screenshot 
Waterside Contemporary 
Use of both spoken and written language 
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between man and the world, between man and man, between man and himself; the mediation 
between man and the world is what we call referentiality; the mediation between men, 
communicability, the mediation between man and himself, self-understanding” (27). It is, 
therefore, left to us, the audience, to interpret the narrative and decipher its meaning vis-à-vis 
the world and ourselves. Heidegger expresses this notion in a reference to discourse in Being 
and Time. He states, “Being-in and its state-of-mind are made known in discourse and 
indicated in language by intonation, modulation, the tempo of talk, ‘the way of speaking.’ In 
‘poetical discourse,’ the communication of the existential possibilities of one’s state-of-mind 
can become an aim in itself, and this amounts to a disclosing of existence” (BT 1962; 205). 
Mirza and Butler’s carefully composed overlapping of multiple voices is a specific visual 
grammar, a polyphonic expression of the multiple undercurrents.  
The second element involves the use of color to accentuate the mood of fear 
throughout the film. Color is the vehicle by which the artists move the viewer from one 
media source to another, while tapping deeply into our emotions. (figure 5.4) The third 
significant element is the use of archival footage and lo-fi imagery; a deployment of news 
Figure 5.4: 
Noor Mirza and Brad Butler 
The Unreliable Narrator / Screenshot 
Waterside Contemporary 
Use of color and lo-fi images 
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reels and amateur video capture. The artists spare no detail, including images of carnage re-
enacted in the Bollywood film. They translate the imagery by seamlessly connecting the 
Bollywood aesthetic with the surveillance footage. In using such crude devices, the artists are 
stressing the authenticity of the narrative and its direct connections to the unfolding events. A 
fourth important element is the use of embedded visual signs expressing the collision 
between east and west, while underscoring a fundamental alienation of the other. These signs 
create layers of connotation, alluding to the geo-political narrative underpinning the film. A 
fifth element is the careful use of momentary silence and emptiness, serving to heighten the 
viewer’s attention. Finally, the film reaches its apex in a shift of accountability, executed 
through the intersubjective exchange unfolding throughout but most notably during the 
interview of the only captured assailant. The blending of these particular elements lends the 
film its power, transforming the viewer into a complicit, responsible party. As we follow the 
film’s arc, these elements work synchronously, underscoring the emotional trajectory through 
which the artists create meaning.  
The film opens with a black screen and the sound of a telephone ringing. This 
deliberate emptiness heightens the viewer’s attention and emphasizes the voices that begin 
speaking in hushed tones. Subtitles translate conversations throughout the film. The second 
voice begins with an insistent demand — “Well?”—that immediately establishes a hierarchy 
of power. Indeed, in response, the first voice implores, “Please don’t be angry. I had to move 
things around a bit.” The commanding voice simply wants to know, “Has the work been 
done?” The subordinate replies that he was awaiting this communication so that his superior 
might “listen.” Instead, the leader quietly states, “Do it, in God’s name.” The omission of 
visual imagery allows swift understanding of the unfolding dynamic. (figure 5.5) In the next 
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moment, our eavesdropping and the concentrated darkness are punctuated by gunshots. 
Within the first thirty seconds of the film’s duration, the viewer surmises the existence of a 
power relation and unfolding of deadly violence. The caller confirms that a target was 
successfully achieved, stating: “Yes, both of them, together.” The screen transforms. 
 We watch shadows of men navigating through a body of water carrying burdensome 
equipment. (figure 5.4) A nighttime image, grainy and yellow, simulates infrared film. The 
lo-fi nature of the images signals a surveillance camera, though the action that is underway is 
difficult to apprehend. We recognize the infrared quality of night vision and its signification 
of military intelligence recordings. To this, Baudrillard would assert, “All the security 
strategies are merely extensions of terror. And it is the real victory of terrorism that it has 
plunged the whole of the West into the obsession with security—that is to say, into a veiled 
form of perpetual terror” (62). The implied necessity of incessant global surveillance 
suggests the terror cells have successfully shifted power structures and entirely limited the 
Figure 5.5: 
The Unreliable Narrator / Screenshot. Emptiness, language + sound.  
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liberal democratic conception of freedom. Mirza and Butler’s use of a military aesthetic flags 
these very limits and places the viewer within its operations – essentially, within the 
‘emergency’ so often ignored in our technological, enframed state. To apply Zabala’s point, 
Mirza and Butler force a reckoning with the ‘absence of emergency’ by “calling into question 
our comfortable existence” (Zabala 111). 
A woman begins to speak. The film’s primary narrator, she immediately establishes a 
tone of authority; she appears to belong to the documentary genre of ‘truth seekers.’ Her 
voice and language are solemn and express, at least initially, the tremendous gravity of the 
unfolding event. She tells us of the cell phone intercepts between the ten dispatched terrorists 
and their ‘controllers,’ who all belong to LeT. Her comments add further specificity to the 
opening scene. As though speaking directly to Baudrillard’s ideas, she comments, “Fear and 
technology become contiguous.” While the imagery shifts to a bluish hue, revealing a scene 
Figure 5.6: 
The Unreliable Narrator / Screenshot. Colors, Shadows, and the Abject.   
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of utter devastation inside a restaurant, she begins to pose questions: “Who is pulling the 
string? Who is checking it? Who is the puppeteer? Come I will show you the fear of the 
voice at the end of a dangling telephone line, the duty to report back full of darkness.” While 
she guides us through her questions, the film takes on the visual markings of video-game 
aesthetics, reducing the protagonists to actors in a hyperreal setting and creating the potential 
for the viewer to interact with the scene, as though its director. The audience ingests the 
action from within, actively participating in the assailants’ quest for more targets. Mirza and 
Butler push us to participation then pull us back in moments of dissonance, carefully 
reminding us that we are dancing on the borders between reality and fiction (Museum of Non-
Participation). This movement between fact and fiction mirrors Heidegger’s understanding 
of alethēia and the notion of truth as fluid both in its revealing and concealing. In short, there 
will always be the negative with the positive. The protagonists move with apparent 
confidence and purpose. Amidst these visual shifts, the narrator acknowledges the 
helplessness of the assailants, noting how they obediently respond to the orders meted down 
through their constant digital connection. These details reflect a specific position in society, 
one of powerlessness and economic disadvantage. Arendt writes about these characteristics 
as problematic to accountability. She states: 
I think we shall have to admit that there exist extreme 
situations in which responsibility for the world, which is 
primarily political, cannot be assumed because political 
responsibility always presupposes at least a minimum of 
political power. Impotence or complete powerlessness is, I 
think, a valid excuse. Its validity is all the stronger as it seems 
to require a certain moral quality even to recognize 
powerlessness, the good will and good faith to face realities 
and not to live in illusions. Moreover, it is precisely in this 
admission of one’s own impotence that a last remnant of 
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strength and even power can still be preserved even under 
desperate conditions. (RJ 45) 
Despite what little is known about the assailants as the film begins, it is safe to assume the 
young men are on this mission partly because they have been recruited from places of 
deprivation. The ‘impotence’ of these men in their own circles leaves them vulnerable to 
authorities promising them a better (perhaps emancipatory) path. 
Once again, the artists alter the color of the scene: The screen is filtered red. (figure 
5.7) Images flow as the terrorists shoot. The narrator continues, “They are using our 
technology against us.” The first-person plural brings ‘us’ increasingly onto the stage. We are 
implicated. She then quotes the Daily Mail, detailing the web of devices and methodologies 
that have guided the assailants—Global Positioning System GPS, satellite phones, Voice 
over IP, to name only a few. The young men incessantly used their cell phones, even 
shooting as they spoke on them.  
Figure 5.7: 
The Unreliable Narrator / Screenshot. Color and shadows.  
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The Mumbai attackers spent most of their onslaught on their 
phones, uploading their massacre to the internet. One fighter, 
the film points out, shot at police and filmed at the same time. 
The movies the attack spurned, most notably The Attacks of 
26/11 and the TV-series Terror in Mumbai, gave the attackers 
the oxygen they craved. 
The suggestion is clear. These murderous, attacks were 
designed for, actively targeted and hungrily craved the 
attention of the news cameras. They were rehearsed, and then 
they were performed. And, in the most macabre and repulsive 
way, an interactivity took place. The Mumbai attacks, and 
indeed every modern terrorist attack, is personally mediated by 
the perpetrators, even within the act. And we respond with 
relish. (Seymour, “The Unreliable Narrator: How should we 
represent Terror”) 
Terrorists monitored their Blackberries in order to check international reactions. The narrator 
tells us: “The gunmen troll the internet for information even after the hotel television feeds 
were cut.” These observations underscore the global connectivity and access, with particular 
emphasis on the need to be seen by a world obsessed with mediatized terror. The assailants 
carried out their actions on the global stage while their handlers claimed responsibility via 
emails sent to local news agencies. CCTV footage is also introduced to the sequence, adding 
yet another “cog in the spinning technological wheel.” As the viewer watches the assailants 
moving in the corridors of luxury hotels, the narrator initiates the first jarring moment of 
dissonance by sexualizing the young men. As though distracted by their masculinity, she 
describes them as “young, muscly, children firing toy guns . . . handsome, cool, wearing their 
branded baseball caps backwards, strolling slowly . . . killing at random” (The Unreliable 
Narrator). Her flattery transforms the assailants into Bollywood heroes, pop-culture symbols 
who grow larger than life as the action unfolds. Their role as video-game characters is 
magnified. (figure 5.8) 
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Her admiration and objectification of the assailants returns us to Baudrillard’s 
understanding of terror as war porn, fodder for the movie industry and its hungry audiences. 
This stinging Brechtian alienation effect prevents the viewer—now in possession of a 
heightened awareness of the critique—from losing himself in the narrative. In a point that 
relates to such aesthetic decisions, Baudrillard explains, 
For images to become a source of true information, they would 
have to be different from the war. They have become today as 
virtual as the war itself, and for this reason their specific 
violence adds to the violence of the war. In addition, due to 
their omnipresence, due to the prevailing rule of the world of 
making everything visible, the images, our present-day images, 
have become substantially pornographic. Spontaneously, they 
embrace the pornographic face of the war. (CoA 207-208)  
Figure 5.8: 
The Unreliable Narrator / Screenshot. Video game aesthetic and Brechtian alienation: the assailants attract Bollywood. 
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The point conveys the necessity of a Brechtian break that is capable of interrupting the 
ubiquity of the image. The narrator’s objectification of the young men points a finger at a 
film industry that scarcely waits to capitalize on the ongoing attacks. Baudrillard, in turn, 
reminds us of the continual barrage of images—perpetuated and replayed by both the media 
and film industries—that are rendered into addictive pornography rather than into any source 
of legitimate truth. We witness viewers mesmerized by their television screens; the handlers 
motivating the assailants in anticipation of the spectator’s fear response. Acknowledging the 
connection between Baudrillard’s ideas and The Unreliable Narrator thus frames the film’s 
impact within a greater contextual enframing. This bridging of ideas facilitates truth’s 
unconcealment in a way that distills the problem of the absence of emergency. The artists 
address the continual feedback loop that underscores the performative nature of violence 
in our global technologized environment as they endeavor to expose ideological discourse. 
In short, they point to the ways we negotiate meaning through discourse. Moreover, the 
multiple layers also concern the ways media industries interpret and benefit from acts of 
terror, obsessively replaying their images.  
The narrator returns to the cold facts, a counting of the dead in the ongoing siege: 
“10 in Leopold’s Café, 52 at Chhatrapati Shvagi Terminus, 5 hostages at Harriman House 
executed, 100 at the Taj Palace and Oberoi Trident Hotels” (Unreliable Narrator). 
Reportage footage is woven in, bringing to bear the overwhelming sense of panic gripping 
the city. A news anchor is heard suggesting “The whole city has been shot up.” (figure 
5.9) The film then cuts abruptly to more CCTV reportage documenting the violence as it 
took place. The frenzy overtaking Mumbai is clear: bodies lying dead, men running and 
hiding, cars racing in desperate attempts to rescue the mounting numbers of wounded and 
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dead. All the while, technology is woven throughout the delivery. Herewith, the Abject 
asserts itself, as does the long-lingering unconsciousness of post-memory and refusal of 
discourse that colonialism had long suppressed. The film places its viewer in immediate 
proximity to fatal events and the excrement that defines such encounters, “a ‘vortex of 
summons and repulsions’ that maintains the border between life and death” (Kristeva qtd. in 
Barrett 70).  
 
Defying the West’s understanding of conflict, the narrator explains, “It was agreed 
by the perpetrators that their own bloody fragments would be mixed into the body politic 
… together in death, the loop closed” (Unreliable Narrator). Death signifies success for 
jihad; it promises a reunion with Allah, who awaits the Jihadist martyr in heaven. This 
Figure 5.9: 
The Unreliable Narrator / Screenshot. “The whole city has been shot up” A Bollywood re-enactment of the explosion in Chhatrapati Terminus.  
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notion of death, as a means of reclaiming authority and power, bewilders European 
cultural discourse. Baudrillard clarifies, 
It is the tactic of the terrorist model to bring about an excess of 
reality, and have the system collapse beneath that excess of 
reality. The whole derisory nature of the situation, together 
with the violence mobilized by the system, turns around against 
it, for terrorist acts are both the exorbitant mirror of its own 
violence and the model of a symbolic violence forbidden to it, 
the only violence it cannot exert—that of its own death. (ST 
14)  
The power, anxiety, and death that constitute terror acts are a reflection of the undercurrents 
of the society against which terrorists fight. The programmatic approach to undermining the 
power dynamic results in an excess of reality, a framework the Western discourse forecloses. 
Emerging from alienation, seeking the stage to magnify their actions, the terrorists win a war 
on grounds on which the West will not engage. This refusal mirrors Kristeva’s understanding 
of the abject and the profound anxiety we feel as it “disturbs identity, system, order. What 
does not respect borders, positions, rules. The in-between, the ambiguous, the composite” 
(Kristeva 4). Only in the common ground of death, specifically, can the loop close.  
 Yet another layer is introduced, seamlessly edited into the film. The narrator tells us, 
“Bollywood closes in too.” Mirza and Butler appropriate scenes from the feature film 
“26/11,” further adding to the complex web of interests capitalizing on the unfolding 
atrocities. The footage gains clarity, moving seamlessly from the indistinct CCTV clips to hi-
definition capture. The images of the dead, strewn throughout opulent five-star hotel lobbies, 
are shown. A statue of Vishnu accentuates the religious undertones of the events, and the 
ongoing strife of Partition. (figure 5.10) The decades-old Muslim-Hindu animus creates 
another layer of connotation. The narrator states, “The meaning of an act lies not in its doing 
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but in its being seen.” Indeed, as Stuart Hall tells us: “The process of representation has 
entered into the event itself. In a way, it doesn’t exist meaningfully until it has been 
represented, and representation doesn’t occur after the event; representation is constitutive of 
the event” (Seymour, “The Unreliable Narrator: How should we represent Terror”). An act 
lives on the level of appearance, fulfilling the need human beings have for visibility. It is the 
consequence of enframing qua alienation we have explored in earlier chapters and is the 
underpinning theme of countless screenplays and dramatic re-enactments.  
 
The narrator continues, “Muslim gunmen in burning five-star opulence, Hindu Gods 
in the foreground . . . unstated clash of civilizations is a popular narrative here too.” (figure 
5.11) A number of important issues reside in these succinct lines: economic and political 
dominance and expressions of power, religion and its discourses, and a critique of the film 
Figure 5.10: 
The Unreliable Narrator / Screenshot. “The whole city has been shot up” A Bollywood re-enactment of the explosion in Chhatrapati Terminus.  
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industry’s opportunistic perpetuation of the cycle of violence through imitation. The contrast 
of 5-star opulence with those who fight against it carries traces of the colonial condition—the 
British Raj has been replaced with the guests of the Taj and Oberoi hotels. Per Hall’s 
aforementioned statement, the events remain incomplete until they have been rendered into 
film. Lashkar-e-Taiba has become “master of camera and choreography,” mobilizing not 
only the assailants as protagonists, but enlisting the media industries in service of their own 
discourse. Overall, The Unreliable Narrator shifts between scenes of carnage and the glow 
of television screens for which their multi-part plot is being deliberately directed. We, as 
viewers, become acutely aware of the human need for instant recognition, the social-media 
equivalent of seeking out ‘likes’ through unfolding action.   
 
Figure 5.11: 
The Unreliable Narrator / Screenshot. “Burning 5 star opulence” The Taj Oberoi Hotel burning.  
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The camera alters the landscape. The narrator organizes its importance into three 
categories. The first involves “events witnessed and possibly broadcast by the camera” that 
allows audiences to ‘see’ in real time what is happening ‘outside.’ Next, she distinguishes the 
events that are “already in progress that are changed by the arrival of the camera.” Lastly, she 
points to “events choreographed and created purposefully for the camera.” She continues, 
“Lashkar-e-Taiba utilizes all three—rich fodder for an industry waiting to profit. The narrator 
tells us: “18 titles associated with the November 26 attacks [were] registered, some while the 
event was still underway.” Reinforcing the excess of reality, the narrator continues, “This is 
an act of martyr, dangerous, explosive—the anti-thesis of the liberal acting in their own 
interest.” And, yet, this impulse—to be seen, to play for the camera, to be recognized by the 
spectator as we act out our scenes on the global stage—is a shared feature of humanity. In her 
volume, The Life of the Mind, Arendt explains, 
To appear always means to seem to others, and this seeming 
varies according to the standpoint and the perspective of the 
spectators. In other words, every appearing thing acquires, by 
virtue of its appearingness, a kind of disguise that may 
indeed—but does not have to—hide or disfigure it. Seeming 
corresponds to the fact that every appearance, its identity 
notwithstanding, is perceived by a plurality of spectators. (vol. 
1, 21) 
Thus, we are seen by a multitude of viewers, and in the case of the Mumbai attacks, by a 
global audience. Technology makes this urge for recognition accessible, in all its desperation 
and violence, as the Mumbai attacks have shown. The handlers in Pakistan maintained a 
connection with both their puppets and the world news organizations broadcasting their 
efforts. They conducted the onslaught with precision and intent, looking for images to reflect 
their efforts. As concerns this need, Arendt continues, 
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The urge toward self-display—to respond by showing to the 
overwhelming effect of being shown—seems to be common to 
[humans] and animals. And just as the actor depends upon 
stage, fellow-actors, and spectators, to make his entrance, every 
living thing depends upon a world that solidly appears as the 
location for its own appearance, on fellow-creatures to play 
with, and on spectators to acknowledge and recognize its 
existence. […] 
We, too, are appearances by virtue of arriving and departing, of 
appearing and disappearing; and while we come from a 
nowhere, we arrive well equipped to deal with whatever 
appears to us and to take part in the play of the world. (LM vol. 
1, 21-22) 
Arendt acknowledges our finitude and the temporal appearance we make as human beings. 
An indispensable feature of our existence is its shared nature—our unique presence among 
others. According to Estelle Barrett, “The heterogeneous language of the artwork, then, 
becomes a site of inter-subjective exchange with the viewer. The structure of the artwork 
thus has the capacity to effect a transference of affect that underpins the renewing and 
cathartic impact of aesthetic experience” (93).  
It is within this transference from the artwork to the viewer’s affective response that 
Lévinas must weigh in. How does the choreographed sequencing of The Unreliable Narrator 
return the ethical duty for the other back to the viewer? How can an audience be implicated 
in such acts of violence without active participation? We have already seen how a feature of 
the need for recognition is expressed in Lévinas’ ethics of intersubjective responsibility—in 
our encounters with the face of the other. Just as The Unreliable Narrator explores questions 
of spectatorship and choreographed performance, the screen fills with images of such 
encounters, bringing us in proximity with both specific victims and the only captured 
assailant. Lévinas explains, “I speak of responsibility as the essential, primary and  
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fundamental mode of subjectivity. For I describe subjectivity in ethical terms. Ethics, here, 
does not supplement a preceding existential base [as Heidegger would have it]; the very node 
of the subjective is knotted in ethics understood as responsibility” (EI 95).8 The inter-
subjective encounter engenders a visceral response. While we saw previously how Boltanski 
and Wodiczko implicate the viewer by forcing an encounter with the face of the other, Mirza 
and Butler extend Lévinas’ position by virtue of the assailants’ enmity. The resulting 
exchange is fundamentally empathetic, as we take on the burden of caring for the other, 
regardless of his violent intentions. In other words, with Lévinas’ input, we can better 
understand that the other for whom we feel responsible is also thought to be our enemy, in a 
sense someone to be overcome. Instead, we find ourselves in the midst of an exchange. 
(figure 5.12) Mirza and Butler animate this ethical position when they confront the viewer  
Figure 5.12: 
The Unreliable Narrator / Screenshot. Close up of a child’s face in Chhatrapati Terminus just prior to the explosion. Bollywood frame.  
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with the face of a young child whose life is abruptly coming to an end inside the train 
terminal. They press the issue further as Kasab, the captured assailant, undergoes a police 
interview. The film shifts from signifying a real-life video game to an ethical intersubjective 
exchange, calling into question embedded discourse surrounding the identities and nature of 
jihadists. The narrator states “The suicide mission closes the loop between the body and the 
weapon of terror.” The body and weapon become one and the same. In addition, the 
encounter between victim and assailant confuses the assailants, the victims and the 
spectators.  
The police officer interviewing Kasab tells him not to cry. (figure 5.13) He conducts 
the interview on live television, broadcasting Kasab’s confession in real time. He observes, 
“You have killed poor people like you,” suggesting Kasab “should have realized this before 
Figure 5.13: 
The Unreliable Narrator / Screenshot. The police tell Kasab not to cry.  
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[he] started.” The youth and vulnerability of the assailant, who now lies helpless in a hospital 
bed, reveals his humanity. The exchange initiates a confounding shift in perspectives, as we 
the viewers are no longer certain of our specific position with respect to a terrorist’s identity. 
We cease to objectify him as we acknowledge his fragility and emotional state. Lévinas 
elaborates, 
The proximity of the Other is not simply close to me in space, 
or close like a parent, but he approaches me essentially insofar 
as I feel myself—insofar as I am—responsible for him. It is a 
structure that in nowise resembles the intentional relation 
which in knowledge attaches us to the object—to no matter 
what object, be it a human object. Proximity does not revert to 
this intentionality; in particular, it does not revert to the fact 
that the other is known to me. (EI 97) 
An act of terror works to defeat this interplay; it seeks to annihilate the possibility for ethical 
intersubjective experience. Despite these efforts, the duration of the events, lasting four days 
and costing hundreds of lives, animated the exchange for both viewer and assailant. Of this 
effort, Baudrillard says, “The other will be exterminated symbolically. One sees that the goal 
of the war is not to kill or win, but abolish the enemy, extinguish [. . .] the light of his sky” 
(CoA 209). This goal ruptures the Lévinasian intersubjective relation by foreclosing on our 
experience of the other, turning man against man without encountering his face, thus shifting 
toward the death of the other and oneself as the unifying force countering alienation. This 
alternate plot creates a twist in the ethical dynamic brought about by corrupted structures of 
power, or what Baudrillard refers to as “the malady of modernity” (CoA 209).  
 From a distance, the handlers interrupt once again. Ironically, they begin speaking 
with the words “Peace be with you.” Immediately, the caller wants to know if the “fire has 
been set” as the images shift back to CCTV footage that reveals one gunman limping in a 
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hotel corridor, while the other attempts to kick in a doorway in search of more guests to kill. 
The intent is to spread more fear, and the caller points out that the “flames will begin to make 
the victims more afraid.” He continues by demanding the young men throw some grenades. 
“There is no harm in throwing a few grenades . . . how hard can it be . . . just pull the pin and 
throw it.”  
The handler’s physical separation from the events manifests in his distance from the 
intersubjective exchange underway in Mumbai. From their voyeuristic position, the handlers 
want to see the drama expand, demanding of the assailants an uptick in their actions. The 
handlers seem to be living from within a discourse in its own right —a subplot within the 
overall context of The Unreliable Narrator. The caller sarcastically comments, “We can’t 
watch if there aren’t any flames,” underscoring their choreography of the action. All the 
while, the young men are dazzled by the sheer magnificence of the luxury hotels, places 
hitherto off limits to them. They comment on the extravagant kitchens, gift shops and 30-inch 
computer screens, expressing a mood of astoundedness in a practical, tragic, though 
understandable vein. According to New York Times journalists Vikas Bajaj and Lydia 
Polgree, “It [was] clear from the electronic record that the attackers seemed unworldly tools 
of their handlers” (NYT, 20 July 2009). We are reminded of decades of colonialist 
oppression, economic disparity, and a narrative of European superiority playing out within 
the carefully arranged sequence of the film. Jaded, the handlers ask why they have not set fire 
to these various features; they are wanting to see the luxuries rendered to ashes on the global 
stage. The caller instructs the attackers to “start a proper fire. That’s the important thing.” 
The assailants promise to deliver. (figure 5.11) 
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 The past emerges once again within the present. Mirza and Butler return us, the 
viewers, to Kasab’s bedside. Over the course of his interview, we learn of his enlistment into 
LeT by his own father, whose economic desperation led him to sacrifice his son in the 
interest of remaining family members. The officer probes, “How much did they give you? 
Did they put [the money] in your account?” Kasab replies, “There is no account. They gave it 
to my dad.” As the teenage boy lies in his hospital bed, his story—complex, personal and 
tragic—alters the viewer’s perception. The underlying narrative is cruel and marked with the 
features of economic alienation—so extensive as to drive a father to send his own child to a 
premature, violent death. The transformation of our relationship with the captured assailant is 
impactful. Suddenly, we are faced with a moral crisis born in multiplicity and the desire to 
come to his aid rises within us. As a result of this transference, the interview had challenging 
repercussions during Kasab’s eventual trial, making its ultimate outcome controversial. 
Regardless of the effects of this intersubjective exchange, Mirza and Butler claim no moral 
ground. Butler explains,  
We tend not to moralise. Instead we ask ourselves: What is the 
line between a freedom fighter and a terrorist? and whose 
freedoms are being fought for? Male brotherhood? 
Independence from occupation? Marxist-inspired struggles for 
the freedom of the working class and the 99 percent? Can you 
be sure when the next revolution happens that you will be on 
the side you might have expected, hoped or imagined? What 
happens if a movement you believe in recognises you as its 
enemy? (Seymour) 
Instead of preaching a new brand of discourse, Mirza and Butler beg us to question its single 
story. Their intent sends the viewer to a place of contemplation and wonder. Straddling the 
genealogical and phenomenological, Butler states, “We set out to confront and challenge 
audience expectations” (Seymour).  
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In so doing, the artists disarm, halting the challenging-forth, and astound the viewer 
from within the primary scene of a larger, more nefarious structure of power actively shaping 
the players under its spell. In this way,  
Art is called upon to exploit its own unique capacities to 
contribute actively” . . . to the politics of testimony. In other 
words, art is not trying to take the place of testimony but to 
enhance testimony through engendering affective responses 
that ‘are not born of emotional identification or sympathy; 
rather they emerge from a direct engagement with sensation as 
it is registered in the work. (Bennett, 2005; 3, 7) 
The deliberate historical references become ever clearer. We must ask how these references 
are relevant to the unfolding scenes? Certainly, Mirza and Butler’s confrontation with our 
expectations motivates an interrogation of discourse. The film continues to accentuate the 
human drive for attention, the pressure to destroy and the ongoing directives issued by 
faraway handlers. The film’s narrator reminds us of our “complicity in our fascination with 
the power of the image.” At this point, she draws the important connection to Partition, 
describing the nightmare as “a moral response to the tortured, humiliated and photographed 
bodies of the slim men and women elsewhere . . . a drama of violent death . . . a form of 
revenge of Bollywood proportions.” The historical reference is underscored by the handlers’ 
resolute message, delivered through the assailants in their final moments. They insist the 
young men “give the government an ultimatum: say this was just the trailer. Just wait until 
you see the rest of the film.” Wearily, one assailant asks if he ought to write down these 
words lest he mistakenly misinterpret them. The handlers abbreviate their message and ask 
him to simply say that “the main feature is yet to come” (Unreliable Narrator). (figure 5.14) 
This ominous communication extends the reign of terror, appropriating the language of 
cinema and a promise for further global entertainment qua war. It implies a future of  
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violence, growing in the shadows of embedded discourse. Its intent is to perpetuate the fear 
that is constantly recycled by the news industry. Lashkar-e-Taiba implicates its global 
viewership, closing the loop between terrorist, victim and spectator, in its value as 
entertainment and within its ultimate ending in death. Like Baudrillard, and echoing Zabala, 
Gupta concludes, “the narrative is designed to form a situation of permanent emergency 
where there are no civilians and so, there are no innocent casualties.”  
The video essay comes to a close as Fadullah, the last assailant to be killed, is 
speaking on the telephone with his handler. We listen to his voice captured through cell 
phone intercepts. His voice is tired and pained. He is aware of his finitude and hesitant when 
asked to terminate hostages. His lack of will points to an ethical exchange as described 
above. Gupta asks us to consider his position when she says: “His final speech justifying the 
Figure 5.14: 
The Unreliable Narrator / Screenshot. “This is just the trailer. The film is yet to come.” 
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necessary and moral use of violence against Kafirs.”9 He watches as his companion dies, 
petitioning “Allah’s acceptance of his martyrdom.” The handler encourages him to get out 
and resume the attacks, instructing him to “fight bravely and put the phone in [his] pocket, 
leav[ing] it on.” The voyeuristic quality of this request is pronounced, deepening the 
handler’s apparent need for confirmation and attention. The Unreliable Narrator ends with 
the voice on the phone quietly calling out Fadullah’s name in the instant after his death. His 
lingering presence on the black screen reflects the disquieting effects of such violence, even 
when offered in the name of jihad. We are left much the way we started; with the singular, 
focusing effects of coordinated emptiness and sound.  
Figure 5.15: 
The Unreliable Narrator / Screenshot. Emptiness and sound, closing the loop to the beginning of the film.  
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Mirza and Butler’s video essay is deeply challenging. Its duration is difficult to 
endure and puts into crisis underlying expectations and normative beliefs. That said, we must 
ask where do the artists leave us as the film concludes? Otherwise stated, how does the film’s 
epistemic critique blend with its ‘astounding’ viewer impact in a way that initiates and 
motivates emancipation? What the film shows most viscerally is how stories, to borrow from 
Mirza and Butler’s artist statement, “slip between construction, rhetoric and reality with 
implausible ease: language itself appears to create and propagate the conditions of authority, 
violence, and division. As the Narrator continues to hijack the rhetoric of cultural and 
political discourse to rupture, Mirza and Butler expose the absurd ventriloquist act” (Museum 
of Non-Participation, The Unreliable Narrator). Returning for a moment to Sallis’ chapter 
“The Promise of Art,” he states: “One might well wonder whether the relation of the artist to 
the work is simply a matter of creation, even at the time he produces it, considering the need 
for that ‘other side,’ the need to be bound by something beyond oneself so that one is 
stretched beyond oneself” (Trans. 169). The implication shifts the role of artist to ethico-
political facilitator of change, superseding the materiality and presence of the work itself, 
lending a transcendent quality to artmaking. Sallis’ words underscore the ethical tendency 
present throughout The Unreliable Narrator, and its potential to move us beyond ourselves 
into more profound critical contemplation. Such a movement ‘beyond,’ as we have seen, 
happens by way of demanding a consideration of plurality and forcing a Lévinasian 
encounter with the other that sets into motion a response and shift in discourse. On this point, 
Butler elaborates, 
In our practice, we employ different methodologies to talk to 
different locations of power. . . . We also employ these 
strategies, whilst simultaneously championing the power of the 
imagination, absurdity, aesthetics and the desire to locate new 
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languages of resistance. After all, politically many of the forces 
we are fighting against are actively investing in their own 
imaginative agendas, often with limited censure and backed by 
huge resources. (Artes Mundi) 
Whether this statement points to the terrorists and their use of technological avenues is 
unknown. What is apparent is the intention expressed within the creation of artworks to give 
a wake-up call to the audience—to bring our focus to the emergency itself.  
The work that remains is to expand upon the ways the artists hold up a mirror for the 
viewer reflecting the layers of embedded beliefs and misinterpretations of the other, thereby 
fulfilling our initial stated purpose of responding to Heidegger’s call to action. We will do so 
by revisiting the thematic trajectory of the film. From our examination of post-colonial 
dispositions to embedded technological networks directing human interactions, the 
groundwork for understanding Mirza and Butler’s ideas has been made clear. Additionally, 
we have seen how they successfully critique the ways such beliefs are cemented in the 
collective consciousness. This turn further emphasizes the importance and function of the 
artwork as an emancipatory force, able to shift our thinking into a more active disposition. It 
answers, in its own way, Zabala’s belief that “[a]n aesthetic force is needed to shake us out of 
our tendency to ignore the ‘social paradoxes’ generated by the political, financial, and 
technological frames that contain us [including] the ‘historical accounts’ of invisible, 
ignored, and denied events” (5). The ‘social paradoxes’ to which Zabala points permeate 
historical narrative as it relates to the Mumbai attacks. The hidden truths buried in épistèmic 
structures mask disruptive energies that must inevitably surface in response to such controls. 
Kristeva’s proposition of the abject as repressed energy with which we must inescapably and 
uncomfortably reckon mirrors the need for a broad reconciliation with the undercurrents 
driving global terrorism. 
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 The overall nature of the project leads to a profound experience of confusion, as it 
disabuses the viewer of the way he relates to the real. Embedded discourse is interrogated 
and left open for judgment. Inter-subjectivity is foregrounded and the ethical responsibility 
for the other is powerfully experienced in each confrontation. As the narrator reminds us, we 
are all connected in a loop—in death, in our aspirations, in our plurality. As Mirza and Butler 
astound us, we are faced with the incomprehensible suffering imposed by centuries-old 
oppressive power structures and institutions that demand the self-sacrifice of indoctrinated 
religious foot soldiers. Baudrillard addresses the roots of this condition: 
It all comes from the fact that the Other, like Evil, is 
unimaginable. It all comes from the impossibility of conceiving 
of the Other—friend or enemy—in its radical otherness, in its 
irreconcilable foreign-ess. A refusal rooted in the total 
identification with oneself around moral values and technical 
power . . . bereft of otherness, eyes itself with the wildest 
compassion. (ST 49)  
The denial of the other in his essential state of being forecloses on his freedom. Acts of terror 
are an ultimate form of resistance to the spreading Western capitalist apparatus. Butler 
reminds us: “Next to victory, there is nothing so sweet as defeat, if only the right adversary 
overcomes you” (Seymour). In the aftermath of both 9/11 and 26/11, there is a pervasive 
failure to understand that systems of globalization and exclusion are creating the existing 
means of resistance.  
This interchange between the aesthetic experience of the film and the lived 
experience of our milieu magnify the issue of how, in a very real sense, discourse creates a 
false sense of safety. Returning to Foucault, we can now better appreciate how the layers of 
discourse upon which power structures depend operate. He explains,  
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In short, we may suspect that there is in all societies, with great 
consistency, a kind of gradation among discourses: those which 
are said in the ordinary course of days and exchanges, and 
which vanish as soon as they have been pronounced; and those 
which give rise to a certain number of new speech-acts which 
take them up, transform them or speak of them, in short, those 
discourses which, over and above their formulation, are said 
indefinitely, remain said, and are to be said again. (Young 
Holocaust Memorials 56-57) 
The latter form of discourse embeds itself in collective consciousness and anchors the 
accumulation of knowledge in a system of beliefs that perpetuate myths—myths of 
superiority, of sovereignty and the justification of oppressive methods. The colonialist 
discourse explicitly establishes cultural hierarchies. The Unreliable Narrator must be 
understood as a case of astounding in relation to emancipation from enframing.  
To be sure, the acts of violence rest in centuries of embedded beliefs, drawn forward 
in post-memory, thereby excluding the potential for multiplicity to manifest. Said offers an 
example of the destructive nature of embedded beliefs:  
So far as the United States seems to be concerned, it is only a 
slight overstatement to say that Moslems and Arabs are 
essentially seen as either oil suppliers or potential terrorists. 
Very little of the detail, the human density, the passion of 
Arab–Moslem life has entered the awareness of even those 
people whose profession it is to report the Arab world. What 
we have, instead, is a series of crude, 
essentialized caricatures of the Islamic world, presented in such 
a way as to make that world vulnerable to military aggression. 
(Said, “Islam Through Western Eyes,” 11) 
This statement speaks to the absence of political plurality that Arendt laments. This void in 
mutual understanding demands an examination of the interstitial space between differing 
discourses. Arendt, we recall, aspires to a more “democratic Being-with” or Miteinandersein, 
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thereby moving societies to a just political space in which freedom and equality are the norm. 
We must pass beyond the idea of the single view of the world to one that is inherently social 
and pluralistic—the very space that Mirza and Butler investigate throughout The Unreliable 
Narrator. In her book, The Phenomenology of Plurality, Sophie Loidolt explains,  
. . . that plurality should be actualized involves the normative 
claims that this alone makes the individual (qua individual) 
experience herself as meaningful, and that only the fostering of 
plurality keeps the common world from collapsing into one 
monolithic, and potentially murderous frame; it also comprises 
the ontological claims that in fact there are individualities to be 
gained and realized in interaction and that we are in fact 
dependent on others, i.e. on plural subjectivities, to achieve this 
state. (155)  
All the evidence presented herewith demonstrates that we have devolved into one 
‘monolithic potentially murderous frame,’ and so need to expose our own participation in 
reinforcing discourse. Butler states, “It is important to us to hold open a space for radical 
aesthetic practices, to continually experiment and invent new social and political forms” 
(“Artes Mundi Questionnaire”).  
One of the overall ways the film holds open such a space is by exposing a negative 
movement toward homogeneity in globalization, a further propagation of colonialist 
practices. Baudrillard understands the underbelly of such destructive advances. He states, 
What comes with the transition from the universal to the global 
is both a homogenization and a fragmentation to infinity. The 
central gives way not to the local, but to the dislocated. The 
concentric gives way not to the de-centered, but to the 
eccentric. And discrimination and exclusion are not accidental 
consequences; they are part of the very logic of globalization. 
(ST 69) 
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If this is the case, and the terrorist movement exists as a shadow of the system of 
globalization and totalization, Baudrillard’s assessment offers a plausible approach to current 
political nationalistic climates (in the United States and around the globe), in which alienated 
factions of society are turning to violence against a system that wants to absorb them. His 
assessment brings us face to face with the need to accept the other in his fundamental and 
distinct otherness, paying close attention to Arendt’s belief that “human plurality, the basic 
condition of both action and speech, has the twofold character of equality and distinction” 
(HC 175). To further enhance this view, we need Lévinas’ powerful input in order to fully 
appreciate the ethical position the film creates. It is insufficient to consider its emancipatory 
potential without his understanding of intersubjective, ethical responsibility. In essence, 
Lévinas completes the complex socio-emotional rendering, shifting our innermost beliefs and 
creating an important dissonance.  
There are more specific épistèmic indicators driving meaning within the film. The 
anchorage in the title suggests we must critically question, taking nothing we see or hear for 
granted. Neither can we assume the existence of any single plane of truth, thereby 
reconnecting us with Heidegger’s understanding of alētheia. As concerns the title, Butler 
states, “We began to think of an Unreliable Narrator not as a character but as a condition . . . 
a condition where some global players gain from maintaining a feeling of permanent 
emergency” (Seymour). The suggestion of unreliability emphasizes a compromised position 
— one that demands an acutely attuned mind. Shifting from the individual to a broader 
condition moves unreliability to discourse and social architectures of power. According to 
the artists, the film is inspired by “the differing global interpretations of events … which 
alerted [them] to the diverging forces of interest involved in situations [such as] this” 
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(Seymour). Butler’s thoughts echo Foucault’s elaboration of discourse as a carefully 
managed series of edits aimed at maintaining existing dominant forces. He states, “There is 
scarcely a society without its major narratives, which are recounted, repeated, and varied; 
formulae, texts, and ritualized sets of discourses which are recited in well-defined 
circumstances; things said once and preserved because it is suspected that behind them there 
is a secret or a treasure” (Young Holocaust Memorials 56). Furthermore, as we analyze the 
film’s careful sequencing, the technologized medium of terror takes center stage, its far-
reaching impact embedded in the individual frames. In Stuart Hall’s estimation, “The process 
of representation has entered into the event itself. In a way, it doesn’t exist meaningfully until 
it has been represented, and representation doesn’t occur after the event; representation is 
constitutive of the event” (Seymour, “The Unreliable Narrator: how should we represent 
terror?”).  
These features of epistemic critique and a movement ‘beyond’ that speaks to the 
imagination are supported by the way in which the film is a balance of truth and fiction. Its 
credibility rests in its use of documents and archives, though these are mingled with clips 
from Bollywood’s feature film “26/11.” The film’s power resides within this mashing up of 
disparate elements, seamlessly constructing new vantage points and interrogating embedded 
discourse. That said, Baudrillard reminds us that, within our current paradigm, truth is fluid 
and reality, whatever the term may mean in a post-modern world, is elusive. Signaling this 
challenge, he states: “Truth but not veracity: it does not help to know whether the images are 
true or false. From now on and forever we will be uncertain about these images. Only their 
impact counts in the way in which they are immersed in the war” (CoA 207). Baudrillard 
questions the nature of truth in a gesture reminiscent of Heidegger’s model of a fluid 
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alētheiac unconcealment. Furthermore, Baudrillard notes the inseparability of the image from 
the protagonists of war as they are united in action and representation. Digital technology 
extinguishes the need for subsequent organized reporting, as it occurs within the moment; it 
closes the gap between event and its representations in the media. The immediacy of digital 
transmission results in a rapid transference of ideas, events and news, moving in and out of 
view. Indeed, the underlying construction of the video essay suspends the application of any 
corresponding, singular truth, dethroning any correspondent or objectivist inclinations. The 
resulting irrelevance of established discourse is important to the plurality Mirza and Butler 
underscore, and to the way their art, following Heidegger, positions the viewer at the clearing 
(Lichtung) where unconcealment happens: “through technē … man discloses something, 
brings it into presence” (Beistegui 108). The act of incorporating live coverage of the event, 
including CCTV footage and cell phone intercepts, accentuates the credibility of their 
narrative. Unconcealment, thus specified, disrupts one’s ability to hold fast to any singular 
discourse and demands a reconsideration of one’s embedded beliefs. To this thought, 
Foucault might add that this disruption of meaning renders the boundaries between what lies 
within discourse and what is excluded more porous. Thus, the film is able to positively 
deconstruct épistèmes, while also disrupting the technological épistèmic strategies enframing 
us. This capacity brings to bear Benjamin’s understanding of film as a collective medium 
able to ‘distract’ its audience, allowing a communal platform for enjoyment. That may be, 
but in this case, we find a ‘distraction’ that effectively includes a Brechtian ‘alienation effect’ 
employed to counteract the kind of distraction that, following Adorno, might hobble critical 
thought. Quite literally, Brecht’s alienation effect interrupts the theatrical moment, returning 
the viewer back to himself—to an awakening from a fictional space. Butler believes his 
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background as a filmmaker enables him to be nimbler with regards to the medium, working 
in service of the artwork’s ability to astound. He explains, “The training in celluloid makes 
my films better . . .  the apparatus makes you think about—not what film does—but what 
it is, fundamentally, the way it works” (Sheerin “A Portable Museum”). In much the same 
way Brecht uses alienation effects in theatre in order to remind his audience of the nature 
of performance, Mirza and Butler weave into their narrative acute moments of dissonance, 
which interrupts the mind’s need to believe in a single truth. Butler specifically refers to 
film’s “authority about frames, about economics—about light and composition and 
structure” (Sheerin “A Portable Museum”). The alienation effect, as we have seen, happens 
at intervals throughout their delivery and collaborates with cinematic elements of color, 
composition, narration, news accounts and external testimonies – all of which form a 
collection of differing perspectives that disrupt fixity and catalyze a profound psychological 
impact. The carefully crafted sequencing of frames moves the viewer’s attention from 
structures of power to scenes of carnage, while joining multiple voices into a single stream of 
consciousness. The action moves quickly and chaotically, shifting from one scene to another, 
highlighting the violent nature of the events. The flow of images carries within it traces of 
South Asia’s historical trajectory, including symbols of religious practice, geopolitical 
tensions and post-colonialist discourse. The artists’ command of the medium thus allows 
them to create a seamless sequencing of emotionally charged moments, integrating disparate 
footage into a credible whole, while simultaneously referencing important historical facts. In 
its own narrative scope, and in its carefully curated scenes, the film self-consciously works 
from within the ‘dangerous’ nature of their chosen subject matter, and their aesthetic 
decisions succeed as a ‘saving’ way to address the topic’s inherent complexities.  
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§ 5:5: CONCLUSION 
 Our study of the way in which layers of theoretical inquiry, social-political 
experience, and a converging genealogy of both come to the fore in an aesthetic event has 
allowed us to examine transhistorical narratives and their impact on global violence, notably 
the Mumbai attacks of 26 November 2008 and the subsequent re-presentation of the events in 
The Unreliable Narrator. I have investigated the ways artists Noor Mirza and Brad Butler 
focus our attention on multi-layered spaces of discourse, truth, power, inequality and political 
justice, and have argued that within their multi-layered narrative the viewer is ultimately 
forced to reckon with himself in the shifting sands of truth and discourse. We have seen how 
the artists’ sophisticated use of digital technologies in response to a highly technologized 
event ultimately disrupts embedded discourse and thereby forces the viewer to reconsider 
truth and its fluid, pluralistic nature. The Unreliable Narrator analyzes the ever-present 
dangers we confront in our daily existence, particularly our relationship with technology, and 
the choices we make in relation to the resulting pervasive global mood of fear. In addition, a 
close reading of Rahila Gupta’s tightly written subtext speaks to a lengthy history of 
colonization and oppression, revealing traces of the past erupting within current political 
actions.  
If, per Heidegger, our emancipation from enframing resides within the danger, Mirza 
and Butler’s work operates from within the technological characteristics of film—along with 
an assemblage of archival and surveillance methods—to expose the core of our enframing 
qua alienation. This is central to my argument: they bring to light the instability of truth 
within the fixed and biased narrative of discourse. The unreliability of embedded beliefs and 
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systems of power leave us altogether unable to manifest a pluralistic, intersubjective global 
community as prescribed by Arendt. The artists’ simultaneous use of and critique of the 
technological machine accentuate the darkest characteristics of its very essence, pointing to 
our addiction to its relentless attachment to established information systems.  
The resulting instability is clear. Arguably, hegemonic depersonalization exhibits 
itself within discourse and an inability to ‘see’ the other for who he is, rather than ‘what’ he 
is. Per Arendt, we have thus lost the capacity to see through the dark lens of totalization as 
we cling to familiar narratives. Spivak tells us, “This rock bottom comfort, with which the 
nation thing conjures, is not a positive affect” (NI 15). This disharmony is most clearly 
expressed in moments of war and terror, having been built on unstable ground. By all 
accounts, putting one’s stake in historical narrative only leads to more of the same. Lévinas 
observed, “The peace of empires issued from war rests on war” (TI 22). Indeed, as the global 
community has moved beyond the 26/11 Mumbai attacks (as well as countless other 
examples of such conflict), with its deep roots in the furies of Partition, one can be sure, as 
Dalrymple asserts “1947 has yet to come to an end” (New Yorker).   
If one is to ask how an artwork might disrupt the indelible marks of the past and 
awaken intersubjective responsibility, one needs only watch the seventeen-minute reel and 
feel astounded, left to question the multiple layers of discourse underpinning its harrowing 
story line. The Unreliable Narrator demands a reconsideration of truth and history. By 
looking at historical forces contributing to the ongoing South Asia conflict, we have seen 
how an artwork can precipitously turn this lengthy dynamic on its head. The re-presentation 
of the forces in play throughout the Mumbai attacks offers a radical pluralistic perspective, 
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one demanding we withhold judgment and exhibit empathy. When asked in an interview how 
such political questions are negotiated, Butler responded, 
As political subjectivity takes a multitude of forms, your 
question is best addressed in the work of art. Over 19 years of 
our unfolding collaboration, we have noticed a shift in our 
work from asking questions, to depicting conditions. 
Conditions of domination, fear and exclusion as well as 
resilience, resistance and potential. . . . This tension is 
important to us, and also reflects our own shifting interest in 
focusing less on art as a set of commodities and signs, and 
focusing more on its ability to point to a lack of connections . . 
. to help us accumulate this intention over time. (Artes Mundi) 
In the space between questioning and representation, Mirza and Butler take on the essence of 
alienation. By bringing the viewer in close proximity with the events and their perpetrators, 
as they unfold in real time, the artists stage inter-subjective encounters that shift fixed truths 
and highlight the acute conditions created by enframing qua alienation. The Lévinasian 
exchange creates confusion, which, in turn, morphs into thought. The very basis for our 
beliefs no longer finds a firm footing. To this fundamental shift, Sallis asserts, 
[T]he alleged pastness of art can be put in question only if there 
is a break with this truth, a decision from and about it that 
displaces it. Only then can the promise of art be renewed. Only 
then will there be grounds for hope that art might prove to be 
still an essential and necessary way in which that truth happens 
that is decisive for our historical Dasein. Yet the truth that may 
thus prove to happen in art will necessarily be other than the 
truth of beings that defines metaphysics. (Trans. 157) 
Truth understood as a fluid pluralistic event of unconcealment is potentially revealed within 
the artwork. The artwork allows an opening for thought to manifest, the space Heidegger 
refers to as Lichtung, which is at once creative and free. This is the opportunity afforded to us 
when confronted with Mirza and Butler’s work, as read from a background of understanding 
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afforded by the interplay of thinkers considered herewith. It does not suffice to interpret the 
artwork through a single lens; the sheer complexity of the narrative demands multiple voices. 
One set of ideas enlarges the field of vision other thinkers provide. How does this 
hermeneutic necessity in regard to the artwork mirror a reflective necessity more broadly?  
Arendt expresses this idea in the prologue to The Human Condition by unassumingly 
saying: “What I’m trying to do here is to simply stop and think what we are doing” (5). At a 
2017 conference addressing The Crisis of Democracy: Thinking in Dark Times, Roger 
Berkowitz explains, “[Arendt] means that we stop, we pause, we take a deep breath, and we 
think . . . we engage in a conversation with ourselves about a question, about what we’re 
thinking about; and this is thinking. It’s a self-reflective form of thinking. It’s what [Arendt] 
calls a two-in-one conversation, where we engage in dialogue with ourselves” (conference 
notes). Arendt believes in our innate desire to ‘do right’ in relation to others; we must live 
with ourselves and the internalized consequence of our actions. She describes the 
interpersonal dynamic: 
If he is a thinking being, rooted in his thoughts and 
remembrances, and hence knowing that he has to live with 
himself, there will be limits to what he can permit himself to 
do, and these limits will not be imposed on him from the 
outside, but will be self-set. These limits can change 
considerably and uncomfortably from person to person, from 
country to country, from century to century; but limitless, 
extreme evil is possible only where these self-grown roots, 
which automatically limit the possibilities, are entirely absent. 
(RJ 101) 
Surely, this gesture of contemplation appears, at first blush, an overly elementary response to 
such enormous global strife, as that represented in Mirza and Butler’s installation. And, yet, 
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questioning, and its incarnation in critical thought, is the force capable of radically disrupting 
discourse. Bhabha expresses this potential in the following: 
What is theoretically innovative, and politically crucial, is the 
need to think beyond narratives of originary and initial 
subjectivities and to focus on those moments or processes that 
are produced in the articulation of cultural differences. These 
‘in between’ spaces provide the terrain for elaborating 
strategies of selfhood—singular or communal—that initiate 
new signs of identity, and innovative sites of collaboration, and 
contestation, in the act of defining the idea of society itself. 
(Harrison and Wood 1111) 
In fact, the respect conferred in distinct beings as unique individuals returns in service of the 
community as a whole. Bhabha encourages us to dwell in the interstitial spaces of experience 
in order to better understand cultural difference. We must listen carefully to the experience of 
others, taking into consideration the complex power structures underpinning these differing 
perspectives.  
Along such lines, in order to re-think and re-structure beliefs and discourses we need, 
says Arendt, “a reconsideration of the human condition from the vantage point of our newest 
experiences and our most recent fears” (HC 5). Arendt offers no formulaic solution, nor has 
this chapter made any such claim. That said, what is most promising is seen in the artwork’s 
manifestation of thought—how film can generate the discomfort of self-reflection and an 
empathetic review of global circumstances. The Unreliable Narrator does this with economy 
and power. Mirza and Butler address these many issues through both the genealogical 
content and the aesthetic experience provided in their editing choices. Through its seamless 
appropriation of archives and live footage, we are placed in the center of an ongoing power 
dynamic. We ‘feel’ the effects of history and ideologies from within the space of power 
dynamics. We are literally forced to rethink, and to do so in a way that enters, with Bhabha, 
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into an urgent predicament: “The borderline engagements of cultural difference may as often 
be consensual as conflictual; they may confound our definitions of tradition and modernity; 
realign the customary boundaries between the private and the public, high and low; and 
challenge normative expectations of development and progress” (Harrson and Wood 1111). 
The challenging of normative discourse has proven to be elusive. Realigning our positions 
demands a fluid and open mood of cooperation. At the time of this writing, these shifts feel 
quite distant, or nearly impossible to achieve.  
Despite all that Arendt witnessed over the course of her own lifetime, she remained 
optimistic. She claims, “The new always happens against the overwhelming odds of 
statistical laws and their probability. . . . The new therefore always appears in the guise of a 
miracle” (HC 178). Perhaps it is this miracle to which Heidegger points when he prescribes 
our salvation within the danger. To his mind, the answers to these complex human challenges 
lie within the realm of art. Sallis reminds us: 
Just as the ontological questioning is directed not simply at 
Being but at the sense of Being, at that from which Being 
comes to be determined, so likewise in the question of art the 
concern is not simply with its essence but with that from which 
the determination of its essence is effected. To the extent that a 
new determination is actually forged, it will be thought from 
out of this anteriority, from the origin. (Sallis 171) 
 The Unreliable Narrator questions, shifts and astounds. If any artwork embodies a response 
to Heidegger’s plea, Mirza and Butler’s powerful video essay does; it offers a path forward. 
 The profound effects of Mirza and Butler’s work notwithstanding, there is still much 
work to be done if we are to address Heidegger’s plea for our emancipation from 
technological enframing qua alienation. As we move forward through history, the increased 
presence and control exercised over human beings by technological forces has magnified. 
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Arendt warns, “[R]ule of neither law nor men but of anonymous offices or computers whose 
entirely depersonalized domination may turn out to be a greater threat to freedom and to that 
minimum of civility, without which no communal life is conceivable, than the most 
outrageous arbitrariness of past tyrannies has ever been” (RJ, 4). The need to question and 
think must take center stage. It begs us to ask whether we have the courage to dispel 
discourse and reconsider our intersubjective responsibility to those around us.  
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CONCLUSION: 
 
Ô mon corps, fait toujours de moi un homme qui s'interroge.  
Frantz Fanon  
 
- 
 
This project began with Martin Heidegger’s call to action, set forth at the end of his 
essay, “The Question Concerning Technology,” a call to action I have interpreted as an 
ethical plea. It is a demand that asks us to think and question, returning Being to its essential 
creative disposition. To borrow from Christopher Yates’ writing, Heidegger implores us to 
overcome “a coercive neglect of Being’s own primordial and determinate agency” (125). For 
Heidegger, it is within this agency that we are able to free ourselves from our enframed 
condition, a freedom we experience within our awareness and angst in relation to Being-
toward-death. In other words, it is within our ability to take stock of and ‘think’ our finitude 
that we may choose to dwell authentically in this life. Whereas much of the literature 
addressing Heidegger’s essay focuses on explaining his critique in relation to his deep 
historical ontology, I have analyzed the possible ways the realm of art might concretely offer 
us the means to resist technological enframing, thereby restoring Dasein’s primordial creative 
bearing. As a reminder, this undertaking was largely motivated by a perceived condition of 
enframing in our post-digital world — a condition I believe is eroding the human capacity for 
questioning and thought. It is a fear that is echoed in Hannah Arendt’s prediction of 
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bureaucratic mindlessness and depersonalizing domination. In the preface to Responsibility 
and Judgment, she states:  
The idea that when the chips were down diversity must be 
sacrificed to the ‘union sacrée’ of the nation, once the greatest 
triumph of the assimilatory power of the dominant ethnic 
group, only now has begun to crumble under the pressure or 
the threatening transformation of all government—the 
government of the United States not excluded—into 
bureaucracies, the rule of neither law nor men but of 
anonymous offices or computers whose entirely depersonalized 
domination may turn out to be a greater threat to freedom and 
to that minimum of civility, without which no communal life is 
conceivable, than the most outrageous arbitrariness of past 
tyrannies has ever been. (RJ 4). 
The dehumanization in the face of “anonymous offices or computers” is a condition with 
which we are reckoning in our current lived-experience—forces so impersonal that we fail to 
fully understand their implications. Arendt’s assertion bears the imprints of Walter 
Benjamin’s epilogue to the Artwork essay, wherein he presages Jean Baudrillard’s ideas and 
the age of Twitter when he says: “Humankind, which in Homer’s time was an object of 
contemplation for the Olympian gods, is now an object of contemplation for itself. Its self-
alienation has reached such a degree that it can experience its own destruction as an aesthetic 
pleasure of the highest order” (IL 242). As a result, “The audience is therefore involved in a 
vast negative countertransference with itself; and once again, this is the source of the 
dizzying attraction of this type of spectacle” (CA 182). While Baudrillard is referring 
specifically to our attachment to televised acts of terrorism, the premise is the same—we are 
mesmerized and complicit, and often do not even realize this. Though rooted in somewhat 
divergent preoccupations, Arendt, Benjamin and Baudrillard warn of our connivance within 
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Heideggerian enframing, leaving us wholly responsible for our own ultimate emancipation 
from its grip.  
From this point of departure and by means of an intertextual analysis of artworks 
alongside a wide range of philosophical texts, each chapter has investigated the ways we 
might overcome enframing and alienation through the realm of art. We saw, in chapter 1, the 
ways Heidegger clarifies our enframed position. This investigation established the 
groundwork for subsequent discussion while emphasizing the fundamental importance of our 
intersubjective care in being-with or Mitsein. The focus throughout is given to Heidegger’s 
ambiguous suggestion that within the ‘danger’ of our enframing coexists the ‘saving power,’ 
that is, the realm of art. Looking for direction within this demand, I have relied on two 
important statements which bear repeating herewith. The first is Heidegger’s comment “For 
questioning is the piety of thought” (Krell 341) The second resonates with the potential for a 
solution. Heidegger asks, “How can this happen? Here and now and in little things, that we 
may foster the saving power in its increase. This includes holding always before our eyes the 
extreme danger” (Krell 338). Both fragments suggest the need for an openness to thinking 
and questioning that restores ‘primordial and determinate agency,’ thereby allowing us to 
live more authentically.  
No doubt, we needed to look to more material discussions of art’s function within 
culture and society. For this turn, chapter 2 focused on the writing of Walter Benjamin with 
particular emphasis on his essay “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.” 
The question underpinning much of this chapter’s work addresses how we might experience 
artworks as technologies alter their presentation, putting into crisis our understanding of an 
original, while also appreciating the reproductions’ democratic, emancipatory potential. 
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Benjamin asserts that our freedom can only come from an ethico-political ‘tendency’ and 
practice, on the part of authors and artists alike. The correct tendency balances skill with its 
revolutionary impulse in a quest to overturn enframing forces. Moreover, we deconstructed 
Benjamin’s understanding of ‘distraction’ in order to identify certain weakness in his overall 
premise, but not to dismiss his case on that account.  
Building on Benjamin’s author qua artist as producer, chapter 3 introduced the work 
and ethico-political tendency of Martha Rosler, most notably her House Beautiful: Bringing 
Home the War, and the Garage Sales series. I argued that Rosler is able, through the use of 
mechanically produced imagery and staged installations, to cut through cultural inertia and 
prompt a determinant agency. I articulated Rosler’s position as artist-producer while also 
offering insight on the reading of reproductions in the age of their ubiquity. For these points 
we turned to Roland Barthes and Susan Sontag, among others. Furthermore, we 
acknowledged a furthering of the democratic involvement of the audience into a more 
immersive, participatory role. This move set the groundwork for the chapters that followed 
with a phenomenological look at the nature of the Garage Sales as sites of intersubjective 
exchange. Rosler’s use of personal effects connected deeply with the works of both Christian 
Boltanski and Krzysztof Wodiczko and anticipated the new ideas presented within the 
intersubjective scope of their varied works.  
In chapter 4 we looked to the works of Boltanski and Wodiczko while analyzing the 
potential for the emergence of a more profound, alētheiac truth through installation art in 
terms of the animation of memory and fearless speech. We established that this fundamental 
life of truth is more readily accessed through constructed narratives and fictional elements. It 
also revealed the ways technologically driven artworks can instigate thought provoking 
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intersubjective dialogues, deepening our bonds to the lives of others. Within this activation, 
Boltanski and Wodiczko bring to bear our intersubjective responsibility for the other. In 
addition, the artists accentuate history’s repetitious nature and manifestations within our 
thoughts and conduct. Both artists required different thinkers to assist with a reading of their 
works. What they ultimately achieve, we determined, is an increase in our thinking and 
questioning, responding thereby to Heidegger’s plea by tuning into our minds and thoughts 
and opening us to truth as alētheia.  
Finally, chapter 5 reached the culmination of many prior points through a discussion 
of Noor Mirza and Brad Bulter’s 17-minute video essay, The Unreliable Narrator— an 
encapsulation of history, memory, and current events as seen through the horrors of the 
Mumbai terror attacks of 26 November 2008. What the artists were able to successfully 
achieve is a criticism ‘on’ technological-material terms ‘of’ the embedded narratives and 
beliefs shaping global perspectives on nationalism and acts of terrorism – a shaping wrought 
through technologies in the form of discourse apparatuses and technological media. This 
process required a consideration of post-colonial thought and the laying bare of historical 
power struggles as South Asia asserted its autonomy from the British Empire. The artists do 
so by seamlessly connecting disparate sources of information and testimony, animating 
memory and undermining the foundations of perceived truths. Their work exposes corrupt 
structures of power, historical sedimentation and archival forces. While created by means of 
advanced technological systems of information gathering and surveillance, The Unreliable 
Narrator undermines enframing and highlights the necessity of thinking and an openness to 
an alētheiac unconcealment of truth. The artwork returns us to our primordial thinking 
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disposition and forcefully demands that we question our position in relation to unfolding 
events. In his book Proust and Signs, Gilles Deleuze explains: 
Thought is nothing without something which forces and does 
violence to it. More important than thought, there is ‘what 
leads to thought’; more important than the philosopher, is the 
poet. Victor Hugo writes philosophy in his first poems because 
he ‘still thinks, instead of being content, like nature, to lead to 
thought.’ But the poet learns that what is essential is outside of 
thought, in what forces us to think. The leitmotif of Time 
regained is the word force: impressions which force us to look, 
encounters which force us to interpret, expressions which force 
us to think. (PS, 160-161) 
Indeed, as we saw, Mirza and Butler spare us no moment of violence, leaving the viewer to 
reckon with the jarring realities of a geo-political entanglement so deep as to send us back 
centuries to find its roots. They carefully create the “encounters which force us to interpret, 
expressions which force us to think.” Our study of their work showed that, ultimately, it is by 
allowing thought the open space to come into presence, out of concealment that we will find 
the freedom of creative expression so fundamental to Dasein. The artists covered across this 
dissertation share a dialogic access to the happening of truth through intersubjective 
exchange. We have seen the ways their artworks, regardless of medium, are provocative, 
compelling a contemplative state in the viewer.  
As is tacitly understood by all of these artists, the industrial and technological 
framings that have shaped much of the last two centuries have broad implications. Moreover, 
their impact on cultural artistic practice has been profound, altering the ways artists must 
respond. Making a point that has become central to this study, Santiago Zabala explains, 
“After the eras of ‘imitation’ and ‘ideology,’ when artists were often commissioned for their 
work, we have now entered the era of the ‘lack of a sense of emergency’; now artists, along 
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with their audience, are called to intervene for the sake of humanity” (8). This statement 
summarizes Heidegger’s plea—to awaken ourselves for the sake of Dasein’s fundamental 
survival. Zabala suggests the need for the kind ethico-political practice we have seen through 
our artworks and emphasizes a countering blow to the pervasive mood of intertia gripping 
societies. Howard Caygill would add that, “Art can offer a place and an occasion for thinking 
resistance if not freedom” (OR 174). Indeed, freedom from enframing originates in thinking 
and questioning. If artists, formally and materially, think resistance as an activating 
motivation, questioning the world in which they dwell, the result carries the potential for 
emancipation. We have seen how each artist selects particular mediums to convey messages. 
Moving from print to performance, their choices challenge preconceptions about the role of 
art and the inclusion of their audience. Writing about performance artworks in times of war, 
Richard Meyer explains, “Performances in real time became the uncommodifiable instances 
of dissent, in which the lines between aesthetics and activism, reflection and real time, were 
purposefully blurred” (Meyer 59). We saw this move in the performative works of Rosler 
and Wodiczko who facilitate human exchange and undermine fixity. Ultimately, the erasure 
of structures that contain and constrain artworks helps move their message to a broader 
audience. As we have seen, our resistance to enframing happens within an intersubjective 
awakening at the site of artistic exchange, within Dasein’s native disposition and 
responsibility for the other.  
That said, we continue to face a crisis in our relationship to technology. We are, to 
reiterate Heidegger’s lament, no longer thinking. Despite clear warnings and generalized 
apathy, enframing persists as the dominant force in our daily existence. Artists are aware of 
the nefarious consequences of our technological addiction and absolutist thinking. Says 
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Meyer, “even in the fog of the present, we must seek to adumbrate its outlines, however 
vague and veiled” (Meyer, 61). We must think and act. If questioning is the piety of thought, 
we must, once more, provide the grounds for such questioning and enact a genuine thinking 
on the basis of a philosophical imagination artistic ability to, following Heidegger, ‘astound.’ 
Artists are tasked with the monumental burden of forcing a cultural awakening—stirring a 
much-needed revolution of thinking. 
There are, within this body of work, certain remaining issues that must be 
acknowledged. First, there is the difficult issue of undertaking an ethics in light of the 
philosophers whose writings I am analyzing. One might say Heidegger is a glaring example 
of this, but Howard Caygill would also advance a problematic tendency in Emmanuel 
Lévinas’s position (otherwise formative for us) with respect to the Palestinian conflict, most 
notably his response to the “massacres in Sabra and Shatila”—a response devoid of any 
empathy for the victims of Israeli attacks. Caygill elaborates: “Totality and Infinity is about 
war and Lévinas’ relationship to war is not a sentimental one . . . . He says, quite strikingly, 
that war is necessary and, in some cases, beneficial” (Gray and Holmburg “Interview”). For 
Caygill this failure calls into question Lévinas’ own position that ethics is first philosophy 
(see Alastair Gray and Philip Holmburg’s interview of Caygill for Studies in Social and 
Political Thought). To these obstacles, I assert that for our purposes here it is the 
philosophical writing, not the individual, that matters. A reading of their ideas, in concert 
with the artworks in question, strengthens our understanding of the connections to 
Heidegger’s plea. Personal conduct notwithstanding, Heidegger’s call to action is profound 
and deeply ethical. It merits a response. 
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Yates’ sense of the underlying problem of humanism also persists—that is, the 
ambiguity regarding individualism in a post-structuralist world in which the self is 
perpetually under erasure. We continue to face the challenge of subjectivity and the need to 
clarify its ontology. In view of the destruction of enlightenment individualism, we must ask 
what this person and community are who are in such need of emancipation? I have located 
the answer within the site of exchange wherein artist and audience multiply their voices, 
thereby extending thinking beyond themselves. To Heidegger’s temporal, historical being, 
we add Arendt’s paradox of our uniqueness within a plural world and Lévinas’ conception of 
how moral responsibility is what first constitutes subjectivity. Arendt explains, “In man, 
otherness, which he shares with everything that is, and distinctness, which he shares with 
everything alive, become uniqueness, and human plurality is the paradoxical plurality of 
unique beings” (HC 176). Arendt honors the uniqueness in all beings while defending the 
fact of difference within a collective. As we continue to grapple with these challenges, 
Charles Bambach offers perhaps the most succinct explanation I have found that summarizes 
a solution:  
[s]ince we are immersed within the frame (Gestell) of a 
technological thinking that defines beings as ‘standing reserve’ 
(Bestand) there for the needs and projects of human beings, we 
fail to think the dynamic temporality of the human being in its 
experiences and practices. Instead, we detach ethics from its 
lived experiential context and produce it as a kind of 
calculative technological measure, a set of rules and principles 
that will set up “standards” (Maßstäbe) for human behavior 
that will be binding in advance. But all of this ethical thinking 
merely winds up detaching us from our specific historical 
situation by attempting to provide a universal set of principles 
that will govern human relations. As with much of the 
technological project of universalizing-calculative thinking, 
ethics fails because it detaches us from our specific historical 
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grounds and uproots us from the earth. Until we can reframe 
the Hölderlinian question of our proper belonging to the earth, 
that is, until we can rethink the question of what it means to be 
human, we will never be able to properly raise the question of 
ethics and its relationship to justice. (Bambach 107) 
The artists I have examined do, in fact, rethink ‘the question of what it means to be human’ 
with a keen eye on events shaping not only the past, but also our futures. If we are 
undertaking an ethical project, it bears understanding how such responses are revealed.  
I will end this project with two final points of emphasis which we must carry forward. 
The first reinforces the ongoing human alienation in the face of emerging technologies—an 
accelerating problem we face with increased uses of, for example, Artificial Intelligence, 
pervasive automation, and extensive programmatic device addiction. As concerns the 
alienation of citizens within sophisticated technological systems, I am reminded of the 1936 
Charlie Chaplin film, Modern Times, in which Chaplin (playing the main character) 
demonstrates the ill-effects of industrial automation and its underlying capitalist greed. 
Perhaps not coincidentally, the film was created at the same time as Walter Benjamin penned 
his Artwork essay. Overall, the film follows a boy-meets-girl plot, ending predictably with 
the couple happily walking into the sunset though not without having endured a poignant 
struggle against technological forces of enframing. Chaplin illustrates the dangers of 
automation: dehumanizing assembly lines, physical twitches, overbearing surveillance 
systems, and the driving forces of progress and greed. The assembly-line machines are driven 
at the whim of the factory owner who disregards the safety and wellbeing of his workers. The 
workers, in turn, cannot keep pace with his demands. Eager inventors propose a feeding 
machine to the factory owner which would enable workers to eat while remaining on the 
assembly line, theoretically streamlining productivity. We watch, in discomfort, as the 
   387 
machine shoves food into Chaplin’s overstuffed mouth while he is strapped wretchedly to his 
seat. Little has changed today. What we are fed is a steady diet of data—created and 
disseminated by corporate entities, for the sole purpose of driving ratings and profits. The 
result is a similar reduction of human beings to what Heidegger called the standing reserve. 
The mindlessness that follows is symptomatic of enframing and a constant threat to our 
essential being. Digital distraction magnifies Chaplin’s message and heightens the need for a 
forceful interruption and prompting of thought as set forth above by Deleuze. By necessity, 
Zabala suggests that, “Rather than points of arrival for consumers’ identification, 
contemplation and realization of beauty, works of art are points of departure to change the 
world, a world that needs new interpretations instead of better descriptions” (Zabala 9). As 
with Benjamin’s author qua artist producer, Zabala diagnoses the need for more attuned 
artistic responses. I certainly agree with this prognosis.  
The second and final point concerns Arendt’s own ideas, particularly regarding 
distinctness in relation to thought and action, as a response to the call to action Heidegger 
sounds at the conclusion of his Technology essay. As we have seen, Arendt exposes the 
structures that emphasize political dominance or difference in their discourse, and she 
strongly encouraging us, her readers, to embrace plurality. Indeed, it is within this 
multiplicity and the conversations one has with oneself that accountability and agency are 
nurtured. The artists we have studied likewise confirm, and urgently so, that we must 
interrogate and think through circumstances and events, confronting the fact of our 
intersubjectivity and responsibility for the other. In essence, per Arendt, we must respect the 
dignity of our inherent distinctiveness and uniqueness among peoples in both words and 
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deeds. We recall her point that “[h]uman plurality, the basic condition of both action and 
speech, has the twofold character of equality and distinction.” (HC 175). She continues: 
Speech and action reveal this unique distinctness. Through 
them, men distinguish themselves instead of being merely 
distinct; they are the modes in which human beings appear to 
each other, not indeed as physical objects, but qua men… A 
life without speech and without action… is literally dead to the 
world; it has ceased to be a human life because it is no longer 
lived among men. (HC 176) 
The statement contains echoes of Heidegger’s concern about technological ‘challenging-
forth,’ of the muted condition of alienated and enframed human beings whose thoughts and 
actions can no longer surface. As ‘dead to the world,’ stands bereft of genuine opportunities 
to practice the interrogation and truth that are its primordial nature. But within this danger, as 
we have seen through the work of these five artists, we might rekindle a life of speech and 
action and reclaim Dasein’s full measure. To do so, the mind must remain open to 
community as strength, to releasing predispositions and fixed beliefs in favor of an 
intersubjective ethos of care and responsibility. The point is to undermine the possibility of 
enframing, not just oppose it. The distinct ‘work-character’ of a work of art can envision and 
execute this task in a way that simultaneously reopens an encounter with self and world. As 
Gadamer observes, “[e]verything familiar is eclipsed. To understand what the work of art 
says to us is therefore a self-encounter” (101). We are thus astounded into returning to 
ourselves and into thinking. Moreover, by allowing plurality, by challenging the embedded 
monological discourses and fixed power structures, artists can overcome enframing, little by 
little, through the representation of multiple truths. To think is to begin anew, to initiate the 
motivation toward action and change. As Brad Butler explains, “our work reflects our own 
shifting interest in focusing less on art as a set of commodities and signs and focusing more 
   389 
on its ability to point to a lack of connections,” or, one might say, a lack of emergency (Art 
Review interview). It is in forcing a revealing, an alētheiac event of truth, that artists are able 
to shift mindsets and re-frame discourse. There is no formula for this, and no assurances, for 
as Arendt holds, “[t]he new always happens against the overwhelming odds of statistical laws 
and probability …. The new therefore always appears in the guise of a miracle” (HC 178). 
Through a shock to our fixed position, art can and must overcome fixity, false pretenses, and 
any denial of truth as event. When it does so it embodies and sets to work the Arendtian 
integration of thought and action. In action, for Arendt, resides the liberating mystery of a 
‘beginning’ that breaks into the scene of other beginnings.    
To act, in its most general sense, means to take an initiative, to 
begin (as the Greek word archein, ‘to begin,’ to lead,’ and 
eventually ‘to rule,’ indicated), to set something into motion 
(which is the original meaning of the Latin agere). Because 
they are initium, newcomers and beginners by virtue of birth, 
men take initiative, are prompted into action. (HC 177)  
An aesthetic of thinking and action can restore the care of our promptings and thus the 
motion of poēisis that is, though forgotten, inscribed within the technē of our worldhood. It is 
within our natural agency to be free, authentically living our Dasein, that we find the 
salvation to which Heidegger and Hölderlin point. Christopher Yates observes: “The time of 
need, in short, needs a truer measure. This in turn means an untwisted production; a 
‘straighter’ poetizing” (Yates 125), and, I might add, an openness to the clearing in which 
one’s primordial and determinant agency can come into full existence. 
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ENDNOTES: 
 
1   Numerous writers have composed essays in exhibition catalogues and anthologies—some treating the artists in relation to philosophical 
inquiry. On this point, Boltanski’s work is perhaps most connected to points of memory and the power of installation.  
2   Hannah Arendt’s relationship is noteworthy in connection with Heidegger’s controversial membership in the National Socialist Party. 
Her support for his scholarship was quite controversial, given his past. Her status as a Jew also made her comments all the more 
substantive since the basis for his diminished status directly correlated to the Shoah and his apparent apathy toward the activities of the 
Nazi party. Her essay “Heidegger at Eighty” (Thinking Without a Bannister, …) is a sensitive yet direct defense of his work — a 
poignant request for his re-inscription to the annals of philosophy’s greatest minds.  
3   Heidegger’s membership in the National Socialist Party (Nazi Party) will be addressed more fully in Chapter 1.  
4   Foucault comes into clearer focus in Chapter 5, with a specific focus on discourse and episteme. These concepts are also deeply 
connected with memory and post-memory, both of which are elaborated in Chapter 4.  
5    As recently as 27 April, 2018, for example, the Korean peninsula has engaged in peace talks after 70 years of conflict. But the threat of 
North Korea’s nuclear program, together with the mercurial nature of current Unites States policy, looms over this possibility. At the 
same time the current presidential administration in the United States has jeopardized the efficacy of prior settlements with Iran’s nuclear 
program. Both Pakistan and India have nuclear capability, and their ongoing strife is well known. To say that the era of nuclear threats is 
behind us is naïve. This point, as we will note in chapter 3, relates to Peter Sloterdijk’s understanding of atmo-terrorism and its 
conditioning of our psyche.  
6    At the time of this writing, the U.S. finds itself embroiled in a critical juncture of misinformation, cyber-attacks, election meddling and 
foreign use of technological tools with the aim of compromising our system of government. Madeleine Albright wrote an Op-Ed for the 
New York Times on April 6, 2018, in which she details the global rise of fascism. She states, “In fact, fascism — and the tendencies that 
lead toward fascism — pose a more serious threat now than at any time since the end of World War II” (NYT, 6 April, 2018).  
7   Most scholarship holds that Heidegger ‘resisted’ being categorized as ethical. This said, the supplication at the end of “The Question 
Concerning Technology” demonstrates a concern for humanity that can only be described as ethically driven regardless of his objection 
to basing morality in knowable, atemporal ethical norms.   
8  I do not deny that modern technology has brought very important advances in quality of life. Instead, the concern here is with the 
‘relationship with technology’ and how it uses human beings as its tool, not the reverse. But does not technology advance thinking? It 
can, and yet contemporary research flags important concerns about (1) the effects of the digital environment on the human brain, and (2) 
the proliferation of digital addiction and the personal and social dysfunction that results.  
 
CHAPTER 1: 
1    As stated in Gelassenheit, 20/52. 
2    There are multiple sources for these translations. Michael Inwood’s Heidegger Dictionary, online glossaries and appendices, all offer the 
same direct interpretation.  
3    Heidegger is neither directly opposing nor extending the prior ethical philosophies but, rather, is showing that we have to derive a kind 
of ethical path (of thought/action) from within the concrete Enframing situation and the ontological Thinking/Freedom apparatus of 
Dasein therein.  
4    It is important to recall that for Phenomenology a crucial step is to ‘bracket’ aside our normal ways of thinking about issues and 
questions, our assumptions of ‘common sense’ (what Husserl calls the Natural Attitude). This is what Heidegger does in Being and Time 
with the modes of Inauthenticity and Theyness that have befallen Dasein. It can be said then that Enframing amounts almost to a kind of 
‘bracketing’ that technological society is doing to us – specifically, to our dwelling and thinking. If that is the case then we can read 
Heidegger’s Technology essay and its culminating stress on art as a counter-bracketing. 
5    Quoted in Charles Bambach, 28, from Hymns and Fragments 88-89. Hölderlin’s poetry inspired much of Heidegger’s writing on the 
subject. Charles Bambach’s volume sheds important light on the nuances of poēisis and the notion of care.  
6    See: The New York Review, October 21, 1971. More on Hannah Arendt’s views: On Arendt’s criticism of Heidegger’s unworldliness, 
see Dana R. Villa, Arendt and Heidegger: The Fate of the Political (Princeton University Press, 1995). Noted in Peter E. Gordon’s 
review of the Black Notebooks.  
7   Babette Babich further explores the exchange between Jaspers and Heidegger, posing an important question: “How might a reading of 
Nietzsche constitute a specifically political resistance?” (Existenz). Babich also elaborates on the finer details surrounding a German 
INTRODUCTION: 
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professor’s life and pay, extending some measure of defense for Heidegger given his position within the Ministry of Culture. What is 
most striking is Heidegger’s admission of ‘guilt,’ however obtuse it may seem, and his surprise that anyone would hold him to account.  
 
CHAPTER 2 
1   To this end, a volume of particular interest is Marx’s Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (EPM) in which he details his 
understanding of the essence of man as a creative force. His view of capitalism as ‘inhuman’ is based in the notion of alienation — or 
man’s estrangement from his own essence and subsequent isolation and unhappiness.  
2   The abbreviations refer to the following works by Marx: EPM: Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, PofP: The Poverty of 
Philosophy, GIP: The German Ideology, Pre-C: Karl Marx/Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations. These are listed in McMurtry’s volume, 
The Structure of Marx’s World-View.  
3   Krell’s preface to “The Origins of the Work of Art” in Basic Writing, is helpful on this point. He explains: “We find help for our efforts 
to understand the notion of ‘world’ when we turn to Heidegger’s analysis of ‘worldliness’ in Being and Time, sections 14-18. There he 
defines ‘world’ as the structural whole of significant relationships that Dasein experiences—with tools, things of nature and other human 
beings—as being-in-the-world. ‘World’ is that already familiar horizon upon which everyday human existence confidently moves; it is 
that in which Dasein always has been and which is somehow co-disclosed in all man’s projects and possibilities. ‘World’ [also] names 
the essential mystery of existence . . . .  Regarding ‘earth’ we can here provide only one hint. During the winter of 1934-1935 Heidegger 
lectured at Freiburg University on two poems by  4rich Hölderlin (1770-1843) . . . . Perhaps the Ursprung of Heidegger’s notion of 
‘earth’ must be sought in poetry, which occupies a special place among the works of art.” (Krell 141-142).  
4   Jacques Derrida elaborates further on this notion in his 1968 essay “The Ends of Man,” included in the collection The Margins of 
Philosophy. 
5   This ‘eradication’ presents itself as a parallel counterweight to Heidegger’s view of technology’s eradication of Dasein’s authenticity / 
poiēsis. In other words, the two form opposite sides of the same coin while in pursuit of the same goal — emancipation and freedom. For 
Heidegger, this freedom emerges in our innate ability to think and question. For Marx, and subsequently Benjamin, this freedom 
overcomes fascist structures — and accesses the potential for authentic, creative expression. In essence, the notion of eradication differs 
while the outcomes hope for facets of the same emancipation.  
6   Incidentally, we continue to see this kind of extreme price driving and cultural status embodied in artworks and at their points of sale. 
Damien Hurst’s Shark is a perfect example of this ongoing display of collector status and endlessly upward spiral of prices. It begs 
important questions about the intrinsic values of artworks, as previously described by Arendt. If Hurst’s Shark is a manifestation of 
man’s creative impulses, the substructure (technologies and the capacities to manufacture) have driven forms of expression to an outer 
extreme of possibility.  
7   When saying Benjamin departs from Heidegger’s ideas, I am implying an intertextual shift rather than a literal, chronological response. 
This is not an historical redirection, rather an analysis of the functions of the different ideas in relation to the realm of art.  
8   Adorno wrote to Benjamin in response to his original, unedited essay. He corrected what he believed were some of Benjamin’s most 
flagrant errors and encouraged him to review his thoughts regarding the autonomous work of art as a dialectical, technical entity in itself. 
In addition, Adorno would have preferred Benjamin address the negative aspects of the film industry, which, in his opinion, Benjamin 
had glossed over entirely in the interest of his essay. Adorno also defended the position of the intellectual class as a guiding service to the 
proletariat who, in turn, serves the intelligentsia by leading the way toward revolution. (Taylor 120, Harrison and Wood 529).  
9   It is important to recall the forces of Fascism Benjamin experienced were those of the Third Reich and Hitler’s Final Solution while also 
commenting upon the established position held by artworks within the culture and society of the time.  
10   The essay describes some of the noteworthy moments in his career as collector.,Each volume has its place on the continuum of his career 
and he valued them immensely. It is said that he discovered his library had been confiscated shortly before he took his life while escaping 
the Nazis in 1939.  
11   We will see this issue in more depth in the forthcoming chapters — as these ideas present an extension of Marx’s ideas and a shift with 
further technological ‘progress.’ Jean Baudrillard’s assessment of American culture, notably institutions such as Disney, indicates we 
have moved further away from reality and are unaware of the state in which we now live.  
12   It’s particularly interesting to note the transitions that were occurring in film during the course of Benjamin’s life. Charlie Chaplin was 
pushing the edges of acting and sound. Leni Riefenstahl’s propaganda productions for the Third Reich were on the cutting edge of 
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technological advances. Her work, its purpose notwithstanding, was revolutionary. A curious moment of warning—one connecting 
directly with Heidegger’s plea, is Chaplin’s film, Modern Times, in which he depicts the mind-numbing effects of modern progress. All 
of this would have been known to Benjamin, certainly, and the implications such films had on contemporary beliefs matters.  
 
 
13   What Adorno does not anticipate is the ‘in between’ time eventually created in the age of artificial intelligence and automation. Leisure 
time, assumed during the Marxian era as the space for meditative thought and contemplation of ideas, has been subsumed by television, 
gaming, social media and other mindless forms of entertainment. The shrinking of thought and meaningful exchange in the face of this 
technological evolution underscores Heidegger’s worst fears of enframing and our forgottenness.  
14   Martel’s comment invokes Heidegger’s understanding of enframing directly. It is in the essence of our relationship with technology that 
we experience the pitfalls of such an exchange. The reversal, and the subsequent reduction of human beings to standing reserve, is a 
crucial factor of this undertaking. Marx’s understanding of homo faber underscores Heidegger’s lament that we have fallen short of our 
authentic potential.  
15   “Let art be created, let the world perish” or otherwise stated “Let art be created, though the world shall perish.” The battle cry of the 
Futurists holds, for Benjamin, clues into the ultimate manifestation of a resistance to progress — or revolution. The grip with which 
Fascism holds onto its property systems while oppressing the proletariat will inevitably result in ultimate destruction.  
16   Of course, this issue may have been carefully delineated in his original version, building into his writing the necessary preparation for 
his final prognosis. In the subsequent extant iterations, however, the apparent suspension of his argument for freedom through the 
reproduction is quite jarring. 
17   An excellent study of the artwork is posted in the ‘smart history’ group on Flickr. The author has carefully annotated the file and 
clarified the identities of the numerous figures. She points out the satire set forth in the use of text and the way Höch overlays female and 
male identities. The tiny presentation of Höch’s own face at the bottom right of the frame would have easily escaped notice had I not 
analyzed this study. (Flickr.com/SmartHistory).  
18   The exhibition ran from 25 March 2017 – 30 July 2017 at the Boston Museum of Fine Arts in collaboration with the Art Gallery of 
Ontario where the 4,000 plus images are normally housed. Both the Boston MFA and the Ontario based museum created websites 
offering an intimate look at Ross’s life and work — as an official propaganda photographer for the Third Reich and in his unofficial 
capacity as a chronicler of daily life in the ghetto. He narrowly escaped death as he remained in Lodz after the evacuation of 70,000 
occupants to death camps. “These images reflect the determination of Henryk Ross, a talented Polish Jewish photojournalist and a rare 
Lodz Ghetto survivor, to document what he called ‘our martyrdom.’ Between 1940 and 1944, Ross took carefully staged fictions of 
ghetto life that served as Nazi propaganda, but he also secretly recorded the grim realities of what truly happened. As the war wound 
down, he buried 6,000 negatives in the ghetto, returning after Germany’s surrender to find half intact. Ross eventually moved to Canada, 
where he died at 81 in 1991. In 2007, the Archive of Modern Conflict donated all of his negatives and contact prints to the Art Gallery of 
Ontario in Toronto, which organized this exhibition” (NYT 15 March 2017).  
19   Though this may simply be for lack of the full, original draft Benjamin sought to publish but was cut back to a large extent by those in 
the Frankfurt School deeming it unwise to express the more Marxist views.  
20   Quoted in Miguel de Besteigui’s volume, The New Heidegger, 107 
21   Technically, it is five individuals if one counts Mirza and Butler as two, but since the work I am considering was created in partnership it 
is clearer to count them as one source.  
 
CHAPTER 3: 
1   Found on page 101 of the volume translated by Christopher Isherwood, published in 1947. 
2   See Heidegger’s elaboration of Dasein’s potential in Being and Time, §53, pp. 249f. In essence, we cannot access that which remains 
closed off to us, either by foreclosing on Gelassenheit or by living inauthentically in relation to the world.  
3   See §41 & 42 in Being and Time, with particular attention to pp. 185-192 in which Heidegger elaborates his position with regards to 
temporality and care. See also page 227 “Care, which forms the totality of the structural whole of Dasein, obviously contradicts a 
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possible being whole of this being according to its ontological sense. The primary factor of care, ‘being ahead of itself,’ however, means 
that Dasein always exists for the sake of itself” (BT 227). 
4   It is also noteworthy that Rosler’s images represent the lost original and, simultaneously, the dissemination of an activist message House 
Beautiful: Bringing Home the War is, in fact, devoid of any discernable original prior to its reconfiguration, foretelling the hyper-reality 
that is our current state. This creates an intriguing paradox which further exposes the tensions in Benjamin’s thoughts—can a work of 
mechanical reproduction be ‘original’ in a way that is not jettisoned by the eclipse of aura? The point would not be to reinstate the 
‘cultic’, but rather to appreciate how originality is plausibly inscribed in artistic reproduction as an act of original critical thinking aimed 
at startling the viewer, thereby prompting action. The inventiveness of the re-presentation shifts the reproduction’s intent and undermines 
its initially focused outcome.  
5   This is particular to the notes reprinted in the Belknap edition of the Artwork essay. 
6   In addition, it could be said that myths, with their careful construction and ideological intent, are an important cornerstone of discourse 
— something we will devote more attention to in chapter 5 as it relates to Foucault, Said, Bhabha and Spivak’s ideas.  
7   Clearly, his interrogation of the visual vocabulary present in both the Panzani ad and the Paris Match cover facilitates an understanding 
of the works presented by Rosler. As she is using magazine reproductions — some advertising while others war footage — she is 
connecting directly to the methods he uses to decipher such codes and myths.  
8   Distraction has a number of potential layers of meaning relevant to this study. In this context we note that there is a fine line between 
distraction as a form of thoughtlessness and distraction as a potential avenue for political advancement and emancipation.  
9   This term was used in a lecture given for MoMA and delivered via Coursera online, produced by Susan Meister. 
10  It also returns us to the current crisis in Syria from which the image of a five-year-old child permeated the web. One single dead child 
can stir moral outrage while millions of other victims are overlooked.  
11   The primary sources for her comments were the Rear Window interview as well as the Creative Time Summit keynote speech.  
12  Marcuse is said to have led a negative campaign against Rosler’s use of the gallery space. This fueled the debate surrounding the function 
of artworks, and the push toward a post-modernist perspective on culture. Rosler references the heated exchange in an interview with 
Benjamin Buchloh in which she responds to his question regarding her “fellow students” who objected to the work. She responded, “It 
was the Marcuse contingent—his students in the philosophy department. The art students understood it well enough! A Marcusan wrote a 
polemic against the work in the university newspaper: how could I have actual objects, such objects, for sale in an art gallery? We wound 
up having a public discussion with Marcuse and a few other people about the role of art, what is an appropriate art object…” (Martha 
Rosler, Positions in the Life World, ed. Catherine de Zegher. MIT, 1998.)  
 
CHAPTER 4: 
1   Hal Foster, “An Archival Impulse,” October 110, Fall 2004: 3-22.  
2   WWI poets remembered their experiences and subsequently recorded these in poems. A poignant example of memory as altered by 
authors can be traced in reading two poems: Wilfred Owen’s Dulce et Decorum Est and John McCrae’s In Flanders Fields, both written 
around 1915 as both men negotiated and lost their lives in the savagery of WWI. Owen’s writing is particularly strong in its connections 
with Sloterdijk’s understanding of modernity’s birth, discussed in chapter 2 of this project.   
3   Museum status, for some thinkers, is not necessarily a ‘good eventuality’ as it partakes in the consumer channeling of artworks as a status 
higher than the common man can appreciate.  
4   Benjamin’s memoir is a case in point.  
5   The Jewish Museum hosted Christian Boltanski on December 15, 2016, for an evening of questions and dialogue with Jens Hoffmann 
and a diverse audience. The evening was held in connection with the exhibition “Take Me I’m Yours,” which ran for several months 
from 2016 into 2017. The conversation covered enormous ground, ranging from the current exhibition to Boltanski’s inspiration for his 
work, life and ongoing preoccupations.  
6  This installation has been interpreted four different ways in separate locations, each creating an individual version of the overall effect. 
For the purpose of this essay, I will be examining the one in the Paris chapel, at the Hôpital de la Salpêtrière, a site that has a 
controversial history of confinement and treatment of the ‘insane’ by such notable doctors as Charcot and Freud. The historical function 
of the hospital was confinement and separation of the indigent citizens. 
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7   The installation ‘Dead Swiss’ is comprised of newspaper clippings of obituaries detailing the passing of various Swiss citizens. During 
one of the exhibitions, it was discovered that one of the subjects in the project was still alive. In response to this, Boltanski stated that 
‘what is not true today will perhaps be true tomorrow’, a testimony to his understanding of our temporal place on earth. 
8   For more on Heidegger’s sense of ‘location’ see Krell 154.  
9   The fact that the audience accepts what Boltanski offers is ‘true’ is part of the effect he is able to achieve. This is also the danger inherent 
in this sort of system whereby truth is understood as manufactured from ‘lies.’ Craig Owens states: “the allegorist does not invent images 
but confiscates them” (1026). This speaks also to the acceptance of appropriated imagery as art, reflecting the context in which the work 
is created.  
10  Other organizations benefitting from Wodiczko’s influence are ‘Electronic Civil Disobedience,’ the Vera List Center for Art and Politics 
in New York City, and MIT’s ‘Interrogative Design Group.’  
11  Foucault, well aware of the later institutionalization of ‘confession,’ is clear in his distinction that parrhésía preceded Christianity’s 
practice in the company of a priest. This distinction, to his mind, seems to add credibility to the truth exchange taking place under such 
conditions. See The Courage of Truth, pages 5-11.  
12  Paul Celan from “Ash Aureole,” in Selected Poems and Prose of Paul Celan, ed. John Felstiner, New York, Norton: 2001. p. 261. It also 
bears noting that Celan made a strong critique of Heidegger after a visit to the latter’s hut in the black forest.  
13  For a brief overview of “Abraham Lincoln: War Veteran Projection,” see the clip from Maria Niro posted on Vimeo. While it does not 
offer the full 27-minute loop, it does illustrate the animated statue and the well-crafted exchange. https://vimeo.com/53446621 
14    Wodiczko spoke of the Lincoln Veterans Projection with More Art: http://moreart.org/projects/krzysztof-wodiczko/. Within the video’s 
short 4-minute duration, a statistic from Nicholas Kristof’s New York Times column asserts: “the United States is now losing more 
soldiers to suicide than to the enemy. Include veterans, and the tragedy is even more sweeping. For every soldier killed in war this year, 
about 25 veterans now take their own lives.” (More Art video, 3:10). The accompanying text reads: “For thirty-two days, their voices and 
gestures animated the silent sculpture that has stood in the park since 1870. The superimposition of moving image, sound and sculpture 
worked to create a complex work of art reflecting the incommensurable distance existing between those who went to war and those who 
didn’t. Speaking through the mouth of Lincoln, the participants made their experiences starkly public thereby asking the audience to face 
the wider implications of war, particularly the fate of traumatized war veterans.” 
15  The video can be accessed here: https://vimeo.com/209815663 and  https://vimeo.com/53446621. 
16  Brecht’s word Verfremdungseffekt is a typically challenging German term to translate. It has been called alienation effect, but also 
defamiliarization effect.  
17  William Milberg was speaking at a UNIS conference on Migration. He offered substantial evidence demonstrating that immigrant groups 
were productive members of society — often more so than their citizen counterparts.  
 
CHAPTER 5: 
1    This statement was made during the 2015 Berlin IDSVA residency as we undertook a close reading of Heidegger’s writing, in particular, 
his essay “Why I choose to not return to the City”  
2    Karen Mirza recently changed her name to Noor Mirza, a change noted in recent articles and interviews.  
3    Mirza and Butler are co-founders of the Museum of Non-Participation, “a portable, conceptual space where [the collaborators] make 
their own films and installations on the go” (Hyperallergic). In addition, Mirza and Butler run a cooperative film studio in London, 
permitting a broader community of artists to create diverse works in a communal setting, thereby extending their own practices of 
questioning to others. 
4    It ought to be noted that the other related side of Levinas’ point regarding totalization is that he’s critiquing Hegel’s Systematizing 
agenda – in other words, ‘totality’ in the sense of the ambitions of thought’s explanatory power.  
5    Lashkar-e-Taiba means “Army of the Pure or Army of the Righteous” and its initial purpose was to protest the Indian acquisition of 
Kashmir. (Stanford University: Mapping Militant Organizations, 30 January 2016)  
6    David Headley is a Pakistan born American citizen whose role facilitated site-specific details. He pled guilty to fifteen counts of 
conspiracy and is in prison for thirty-five years in the United States. He was motivated by the 1971 bombing of his school in Pakistan 
during one of the many conflicts between India and his homeland. He was turned in to authorities by his ‘wives,’ according to IBN live 
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and CNN. Headley was certainly not alone in his efforts, and others have been interrogated and detained, though without subsequent 
sentencing.  
7    Numerous publications have traced Kasab’s journey from the initial hospital interrogation to his final appeals. He was eventually hung in 
2012 while incarcerated in Yerwada prison under a veil of secrecy. The Pakistani government was informed of his death by letter, which 
they apparently refused to accept. The Indian officials then faxed it, again underscoring the ongoing tensions between the two nations. 
Kasab’s family was informed by courier.  
8    Despite Lévinas’ objections to Heidegger’s prioritization of the individual, Heidegger’s fundamental position vis-à-vis Dasein matters. 
Lévinas is shifting from our singularity (authentically living despite the ‘they’ being present in our world) to a dependence on the other 
for self-manifestation.  
9    Kafir is an Arabic term for infidel, or one who does not believe in Allah’s supreme rule. It can also be translated as ‘one who covers the 
truth’ but is typically used to describe an unbeliever. “The Koran says that the Kafir may be deceived, plotted against, hated, enslaved, 
mocked, tortured and worse. The word is usually translated as ‘unbeliever’ but this translation is wrong. The word “unbeliever” is 
logically and emotionally neutral, whereas, Kafir is the most abusive, prejudiced and hateful word in any language.” (Bill Warner, 
Center for the Study of Political Islam, “Sharia Law for Non-Muslims,” Chapter 5: The Kafir. 2010.) 
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§ APPENDIX A: A GENEALOGY OF ETHICS ON THE THRESHOLD OF HEIDEGGER’S “THE 
QUESTION CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY” 
 
 Having explored some of the key terms driving Heidegger’s ideas in chapter 1, we 
can now turn to its second focus—the longstanding ethical tradition resonating within his 
works. To repeat, it would be a mistake to confuse Heidegger’s undercurrents with the 
formative ethical systems preceding him. What should be noted, however, are the threads of 
resemblance motivating an intersubjective responsibility, felt with particular potency at the 
conclusion of the “Question Concerning Technology.” If we are to position Heidegger’s plea 
for our salvation through the realm of art, examining past traditions will clarify the radical 
nature of his thinking while keeping intact some of the conditions making conduct ethical.  
To begin, Aristotle offers two specific lines of thought: he sets a course for an ethics 
of living and lends his Four Causes to Heidegger’s opening thoughts in the “Question 
Concerning Technology”—most notably the causa efficiens which Heidegger uses to 
deconstruct meaning and advance a new understanding of the gathering that takes place 
within the act of creation. Following Aristotle, Mill’s Utilitarianism and Kant’s Groundwork 
for a Metaphysics of Morals will be investigated in light of a brief consideration of ethics, 
noting the threads carried from the past and forward into Heidegger’s own writings. Lévinas 
and Arendt have much to offer in terms of Heidegger’s legacy, both direct and indirect. 
Lévinas protested that Heidegger ignored the other as a constituting force in the shaping of 
our selfhood, placing ethics as first philosophy. In addition, Lévinas offers a fervent critique 
of Heidegger, the man in action, and his involvement with National Socialism—a fact that 
we investigate briefly at the close of chapter 1. Arendt diverges slightly from Levinas’ 
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objections by manifesting an ethics of thinking and action, born within Heidegger’s thoughts 
on non-objective or meditative thinking and the allowance for truths to unfold as events or 
alētheia.  
In sum, the dialogue that exists between this shortlist of philosophers is rich and 
nuanced, shedding much needed light on Heidegger’s ethical undertones. We will see in 
Heidegger’s work, while not extrinsically anchored in normative ethical thinking, traces of 
these past traditions. Where Aristotle values contemplation as virtuous, Heidegger 
demonstrates the need for meditative thinking, or the dwelling in uncertainty that results from 
remaining open to truth as an ever-becoming event. Kant recognizes a drive toward Reason 
while Heidegger exposes dispositions that consider such motivations more holistically. Mill’s 
position reveals an enlightened self-interest and Heidegger, once again, might view this as an 
expression of an inauthentic self-care as it disregards our fundamental dispositions. What is 
clear is the resonance manifesting throughout Heidegger’s writing and reinforces the position 
that his plea is an ethical one.  
 And, yet, the question of an ethics is problematic in current times. The loss of any 
‘solid ground’ or stable values in general makes such a proposition challenging. We fall into 
questions of intent, genealogy and slippage as we interrogate basic normative codes of 
conduct, wondering all the while if such regulations are legitimate in a world wherein 
meaning is constantly shifting. In what follows, I will examine ethical positions that connect, 
whether directly or indirectly, with Heidegger’s undertones specific to the “Question 
Concerning Technology.” What becomes apparent is a trans-historical conversation through 
which many principles that have been deemed appropriate to justice and civil conduct 
endure, transforming quite subtly, as Heidegger would agree, over time with the ongoing 
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flow of history. It remains true, however, that “structures of right and wrong [continue to] 
exist in all known cultures” (Brooks). Regardless of the negation ethics faces in postmodern 
cultural critiques, it can easily be argued that a society lacking such structures falls into rapid 
ruin. To illustrate this, David Brooks wrote these reflections in an Op-Ed for the New York 
Times in October of 2016: 
Moral capital is the set of shared habits, norms, institutions and 
values that make common life possible. Left to our own, we 
human beings have an impressive capacity for selfishness. 
Unadorned, the struggle for power has a tendency to become 
barbaric. So people in decent societies agree on a million 
informal restraints—codes of politeness, humility and mutual 
respect that girdle selfishness and steer us toward 
reconciliation. (Brooks)1 
Brooks is addressing an apparent dissolution of ethical standards as was vividly illustrated in 
the 2016 United States presidential race. In order to clarify his thoughts, he continues with a 
return to justice as a guiding principle, as did Plato when writing the Republic: “[W]hat is 
just is balanced and in harmony with itself” (Plato quoted in Brooks). Brooks is returning to 
the Greeks, as often did Heidegger.  
We know that justice is paramount in Plato’s Republic although, to our 21st century 
minds, the means he suggests to achieve such harmony are often extraordinary. And, yet, the 
fundamental ideas remain. Plato quotes Socrates as saying: 
And in truth, justice is, it seems, something of this sort. Yet it 
is not concerned with someone’s doing his own job on the 
outside. On the contrary, it is concerned with what is inside; 
with himself, really, and the things that are his own. It means 
that he does not allow the elements in him each to do the job of 
some other, or the three sorts of elements in his soul to meddle 
with one another. Instead, he regulates well what is really his 
own, rules himself, puts himself in order, becomes his own 
friend, and harmonizes the three elements together, just as if 
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they were literally the three defining notes of an octave—
lowest, highest, middle—as well as any others that may be in 
between. (Plato 443c 132) 
In other words, it is by means of self-regulation and an aim at harmonious co-existence with 
the ruling forces that one maintains a just disposition among others. Plato maintains that it is 
by means of an innate sense of self-control that one maintains greater political balance. That 
said, the diagnosis of democracy as potentially corrupt as compared to its aristocratic 
counterparts seems to be playing out as our modern world devolves. Democracy’s just 
society is failing to maintain the equalities and freedoms inherent in its original values. It 
may also be observed that our technological means of communication are exacerbating the 
disintegration of ideals by rapidly disseminating unsavory and flatly false commentaries. 
There seems to be no bottom to the depths we are falling. This is precisely the state of Being 
about which Heidegger warns us—the calamitous disintegration of our capacity for thought 
in relation to Gestell.  
 For Aristotle, a philosopher preferring the primacy of experience over dwelling in the 
purity of ideas, our ultimate virtue is to achieve happiness through eudaemonia, or, loosely 
translated, a flourishing spirit. This interpretation of joy differs from our understanding in 
today’s parlance: our current measure might equate joy with gratification in matters of 
personal gain. Eudaemonia is a happiness born in a life of contemplation or in reasoned 
philosophical practice. This particular approach to an ultimately virtuous life forecasts 
Heidegger’s understanding of meditative thinking and Arendt’s ethics of thinking as a 
premise for basic societal order. Aristotle determined:  
For contemplation is both the highest form of activity (since 
the intellect is the highest thing in us, and the objects that it 
apprehends are the highest things that can be known), and also 
it is the most continuous, because we are more capable of 
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continuous contemplation than we are of any practical activity. 
(Barnes 1177a, lines 20-5, NE 270) 
Arendt would agree that our highest vocation is to think and to act from those reflections 
independently. Doing so is beneficial to a more tempered society.  
Aristotle recognizes the multifaceted nature of such an enterprise, understanding that 
the world and its circumstances are in flux. He states,  
Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as 
the subject-matter admits of; for precision is not to be sought 
for alike in all discussions, any more than in all the products of 
the crafts. Now fine and just actions, which political science 
investigates, exhibit much variety and fluctuation, so that they 
may be thought to exist only by convention and not by nature. 
(Barnes 1130)  
Aristotle differentiates between convention (normative rules) and our own human nature 
(innate to us, the will) as able to determine a righteous path. Here, we can see one broad 
connection emerging between Heidegger and Aristotle: neither thinker situates ethics within 
transcendent Truths, choosing rather the structures and the indicative agency of human 
beings. For Aristotle, this manifests itself in seeking our Eudaimonia. For Heidegger, human 
beings express their virtue through the Care-structure. These notions run parallel in some 
ways while being subtly different.  
Aristotle seems to preface the reconfiguration of the Essence issue that we later see in 
Heidegger’s efforts (cf. Truth, Technology, Dasein). There are certain features that merit 
elaboration in relation to Heidegger’s ethical undertones. The first of these is the articulation 
of virtue as an ongoing event spanning the entirety of life and demanding an inclination 
toward thought or contemplation. Virtue becomes a holistic project—rather than isolated 
moments—that result in a life of happiness. We must live this life fully and in accordance 
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with our highest nature. In Aristotle’s words, eudaemonia is “an activity of the soul in 
accordance to excellence” (NE 17, Barnes 1098a16) and is reflective of a fully productive 
life. The ultimate good that comes from our virtue, therefore, benefits society as a whole and 
will contribute to a meaningful and peaceful state. Reason is our guide and thinking is our 
calling. In Heidegger’s words, “the way is one of thinking.” To which he adds, “we would be 
advised, therefore, above all to pay heed to the way, and not to fix our attention on isolated 
sentences and topics” (Krell 311). This echoes Aristotle’s virtuous life as a journey of 
contemplation. 
Aristotle also insists that the obligatory negates good will and virtue, and in order to 
be authentic, virtue must be experienced as an intrinsic motivation that seeks to elevate the 
mind. He elaborates: “Excellence, then, is a state concerned with choice, lying is a mean 
relative to us, this being determined by reason and in the way in which the man of practical 
wisdom would determine it” (NE, ch. II, §6, 1107a, 1148). He distinguishes between 
happiness as derived from selfish pleasures and a more general concern for community as a 
whole. In addition, “some people have thought that the ‘natural law’ of human life is 
ferocious competitive struggle, with little room for altruism and justice” (Blackburn 85) To 
this, Aristotle counters, it is “finer and more godlike to bring about the well-being of a whole 
city than to sustain the happiness of just one person” (NE 1094b7–10). If we are indeed 
intended to be happy, and happiness is derived through virtue, then it follows that we must 
lead lives of virtue in order to be happy with both being a practice or process as opposed to 
simply a cause and effect formula.  
This circular understanding of our worth demonstrates that a person of discipline, 
education and good intentions will inevitably be ethical. Yet there is also the notion that we 
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live among others, which for Heidegger, affects much of our thinking and actions. Aristotle 
insisted, “[T]he wise man, even when by himself, can contemplate truth, and the better the 
wiser he is; he can perhaps do so better if he has fellow-workers, but still he is the most self-
sufficient” (Barnes §1177b1, 1860). We are reminded of the similarity between Aristotle’s 
praise of friendship and Mitsein, as explored in Heidegger’s use of language. We are always 
already amidst others, and while this is a critical feature of our being, it does not determine 
nor elicit our own contemplative life, to borrow Arendt’s nomenclature.2 It simply may drive 
us to better conduct or higher pursuits of intellectual understanding.  
 For Heidegger, our interconnectedness has darker potentials as well. The problematic 
modes of Theyness reflect the social pressures of Vice in Aristotle, wherein our internal 
harmony, needed to remain virtuous, is shifted. This imbalance forces a closing off through 
the influence of others, thus mirroring the impact of theyness as a prerequisite for Gestell. 
This externally imposed influence would signal, for Aristotle, a corruption of the mind, 
thereby constituting vice. Aristotle’s notion of Friendship illustrates this point well. We must 
maintain ourselves in light of our relationships, holding the position that what we wish for 
others must be uniquely for their good. Per Aristotle, “Those who wish good things to their 
friends for the sake of the latter are friends most of all, because they do so because of their 
friends themselves, and not coincidentally” (NE 1156b9–11). It is worth noting, however, 
that while Aristotle is explicit about the Moral nature of these dispositions, Heidegger is 
simply accounting for the Structures of Dasein. The underlying case for Authenticity and 
Care implies a moral charge, thereby carrying traces of Aristotle’s virtue forward in a 
radicalized way.3 
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 Aristotle’s ethical system has an enduring quality. Its rootedness in reason informs 
Immanuel Kant’s 1785 revolution in ethical thinking as expressed in the Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals. In both this volume and the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant sets 
forth the Categorical Imperative,4 a normative ethics based in man’s capacities for intrinsic 
reasoning and moral judgments. Ultimately, the potential for reasoned ethical functioning 
translates to the greater good of humanity. As moral beings, we act in the world in response 
to our duty as a reasoned end in itself and with consciousness fixed on its universal nature. 
Kant explains,   
But what kind of law can that be, the representation of which 
must determine the will, even without regard for the effect 
expected from it, in order for the will to be called good 
absolutely and without limitation? Since I have deprived the 
will of every impulse that could arise for it from obeying some 
law, nothing is left but the conformity of actions as such with 
universal law, which alone is to serve the will as its principle, 
that is, I ought never to act except in such a way that I could 
also will that my maxim should become a universal law. 
(Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 4:402, 17)  
Kant is operating on the assumption that we must live by our duty, creating in so doing a 
universal application of moral conduct in the face of a shared humanity. This communal 
existence underscores a ‘shared capacity to love, and suffer, and hope, and fear, and 
remember’ (Blackburn 124). We reach for a higher plane of conduct through our virtuous a 
priori disposition, namely our capacity for and drive toward reason.  
The attainment of reason presupposes a cultivated desire to be ‘good’ and act in 
concert with the benefit of others while managing the ongoing internal struggle we have with 
the volatility of our desires. Good conduct demands we use Reason to direct our Will toward 
moral goals, for our personal sakes and those of others. For Kant, this discernment is a matter 
 422 
 
of Practical Reason, thereby echoing the Greek notion of ‘praxis.’ His undergirding principle 
mirrors the Golden Rule as found in numerous religious teachings, while endeavoring to 
escape some of their contradictions. He asserts, “Act only on that maxim that you can at the 
same time will that it should become a universal law” (4:21, 34). This oft-cited edict attempts 
to separate itself from religious undertones by deploying reason as its guiding principle. 
While religion relies on metaphysical bases, Kant, in contrast, enthusiastically offers the 
ability to summon ethical conduct from the Self, making it possible for anyone to act from 
duty without dependence on externally imposed ideas. As with Aristotle, the benefit to a 
virtuous life—or, in Kant’s case, a dutiful and rational existence—is the general health of the 
greater population, predicated on justice and harmony, rather than purely on happiness. Kant 
writes, “So act that you use humanity, in your own person as well as in the person of any 
other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means” (4:428, 41). The 
universal application of the Categorical Imperative intimates that what is good for one must 
necessarily be determined as good for all.  
 In order to understand the continued relevance of these ideas, we must return briefly 
to David Brooks. He states, “If somebody is destroying the basic social and moral fabric 
through brutalistic rhetoric and vicious misogynistic behavior, it doesn’t really matter that he 
agrees with you on taxes and the Supreme Court; he has to be renounced or else he will drag 
the whole society to a level of degradation that will make all decent politics impossible” 
(Brooks). Here is a well-suited illustration of the universalization of ethical conduct at work 
in contemporary world events. If we all comported ourselves in the manner of those currently 
striving for power, civility as we know it would cease to exist. This uncivil environment 
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underscores Kant’s understanding of the need for universally acceptable normative structures 
by which we must live.  
Arendt has much to say regarding the free fall associated with the misuse of power 
and denial of will as a potentially corrupting force. In her explorations of totalitarianism and 
its connections with Heidegger’s understanding of theyness, she offers the following insights: 
In an ever-changing, incomprehensible world the masses had 
reached the point where they would, at the same time, believe 
everything and nothing, think that everything was possible and 
nothing was true … The totalitarian mass leaders based their 
propaganda on the correct psychological assumption that, 
under such conditions, one could make people believe the most 
fantastic statements one day, and trust that if the next day they 
were given irrefutable proof of their falsehood, they would take 
refuge in cynicism; instead of deserting the leaders who had 
lied to them, they would protest that they had known all along 
that the statement was a lie and would admire the leaders for 
their superior tactical cleverness. (OoT 499) 
Arendt reveals the insidious ways our modes of thought are appropriated and corrupted. This 
corrupted mode of thinking will become evident as a concretization of Heidegger’s ideas in 
Arendt’s ethics of action in which just action is predicated on the ability to think or to apply 
all of our collaborative faculties in assessing what presents itself to us.  
 Of course, there is far more to Kant’s investigation than I have room to address here. 
What remains important is the undercurrent that structures of conduct are needed in order for 
a well-functioning society to thrive. The defining features of the Categorical Imperative take 
into account civility and appropriate conduct in relation to others, suggesting, however 
subtly, an intersubjectivity that presupposes a need for order. Although conceived on terms 
that Heidegger will not fully endorse, Kant’s longing for such a world is reflected in his 
notion of the kingdom of ends in which our desire for goodness and obedience lies in service 
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of the greater good of humanity. Kant explains, “[E]very rational being must act as if he were 
by his maxims at all times a law-giving member of the universal kingdom of ends” (Kant 
1997a, 45/4:438). Our humanity becomes the ends; the rational being, capable through self-
mastery of moral conduct, is the vehicle by which we coexist in harmony. In such a way, 
each of us gives law to furthering humanity and establishing a righteous order. In addition, 
these structures are motivated not by some means but, instead, for the sake of duty and the 
good in themselves. Kant elaborates, “[M]ere conformity to law as such, without having as 
its basis some law determined for certain actions, is what serves the will as its principle, and 
must so serve it, if duty is not to be everywhere an empty delusion and a chimerical concept” 
(Feinberg 593). Kant begins with subjectivity and then moves outwards to intersubjectivity, 
as an extension of the self’s obligation to moral duty rather than a dependent preexisting 
disposition as Heidegger would imply.  
 Another more calculated ethical formulation is set forth by John Stuart Mill whose 
volume Utilitarianism establishes the credo: “the greatest happiness for the greatest number.” 
He bases ethical value on reason, mathematics and perhaps a kind of enlightened self-interest 
since Mill roots his ideas in the pleasure-pain principle. Though he builds upon an 
Aristotelian premise of happiness as the greater goal of living, he deviates in his 
interpretation of what this means with regards to an ethical system. Mill states,  
The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals ‘utility’ or 
the ‘greatest happiness principle’ holds that actions are right in 
proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they 
tend to produce the reverse of happiness … that pleasure and 
freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends; and 
that all desirable things (which are as numerous in the 
utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desirable either for 
pleasure inherent in themselves or as means to the promotion 
of pleasure and the prevention of pain. (7)  
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Our responsibility to the ‘happiness principle’ holds us accountable to the greater good of our 
fellow human. Clearly, the notion that depriving another of happiness counts as an immoral 
act directly speaks to an intersubjective responsibility. Mill states “that the happiness which 
forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct is not the agent’s own happiness but 
that of all concerned” (17). This notion of harmony recalls Plato’s understanding of a just 
society needing to be in sync with its basic element—the citizen.  
Mill further makes the case that utilitarian systems invoke the golden rule, albeit 
indirectly, and labels it the “complete spirit of the ethics of utility” (17) with its principle of 
the greatest happiness being synonymous with avoidance of pain. In this idea, we find the 
thread that binds together Plato’s injunction to educate children in such a way as to make 
them virtuous, Aristotle’s advancement of a virtuous, happy life and Kant’s Categorical 
Imperative bound in a “social arrangement [that places] the happiness or (as, speaking 
practically, it may be called) the interest of every individual as nearly as possible in harmony 
with the interest of the whole” (Mill 17). Although this premise does carry the vestiges of a 
Kingdom of Ends, Kant considers Happiness a weak premise of ethical conduct. Mill also 
argues that “an act that fails to maximize happiness is called wrong only if ‘we mean to 
imply that a person ought to be punished in some way or other for doing it — if not by law, 
by the opinion of his fellow creatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own 
conscience’” (xi). The greatest number principle is based in feelings of ‘pleasure,’ 
particularly as avoidance of pain rather than a paradigm of Duty as with Kant. In addition, 
Mill’s self-society relation maintains a certain ‘distance’ within its formulation as to how we 
approach moral ideas and practices. Mill explains,  
Those who know anything about the matter are aware that 
every writer, from Epicurus to Bentham, who maintained the 
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theory of utility meant by it, not something to be 
contradistinguished from pleasure, but pleasure itself, together 
with exemption from pain; and instead of opposing the useful 
to the agreeable or the ornamental, have always declared that 
the useful means these, among other things. (Mill 6)  
In his quest to concretize utilitarianism, Mill overlooks what is fundamental to both Aristotle 
and (later) Heidegger—the journey toward wholeness or virtue is an ongoing process. It 
generates a revealing or disclosure of truth as temporal and in motion. The formulaic nature 
of utilitarianism deprives it of this possibility, thus falling short by limiting thinking and 
making ethical decisions somewhat clinical.  
The very premise of the greatest happiness theory deploys an objectifying perspective 
that loses track of the process view of subjectivity and norms found in both Aristotle and 
Heidegger. It could even be posited that Mill’s happiness theory contributes to Heidegger’s 
understanding of enframing in its alienation and extrinsic motivations. While this may be the 
case, it bears noting the ways ethical philosophies structured the need for moral conduct prior 
to a phenomenological hermeneutic approach. Heidegger’s phenomenology of being-in-the-
world transfers virtue to a necessity for authenticity and care while maintaining their process-
based practice. It is within this ever-becoming ethics that “The Question Concerning 
Technology” places humanity’s saving grace.  
 Mill’s inclination toward the greatest happiness principle generates an intention that 
puts into crisis the means of its achievement. Perhaps, to this end, Karl Marx’s investigation 
of the relationship between labor and capital, with the explicit directive to liberate the 
proletariat from his self-alienation, deserves mention, particularly in relation to Heidegger’s 
use of Marx’s term standing reserve (see QCT 321-322). There is a clear relationship 
between Marx’s alienation and Gestell specifically expressed within theyness and the essence 
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of technology. The direct appropriation of the term standing reserve suggests that technology 
carries traces of capitalism in its alienation of man from himself through labor. No longer is 
man in direct contact with his disposition toward ‘making’—a consequence of the industrial 
revolution and assembly line manufacturing. Human beings abandon their natural 
inclinations and participate in organized schemas, belonging as a result to the societal 
systems that come to dominate existence. In making this connection, the relationship between 
capitalism and technology exhibit the same corruptive forces. de Beistegui elaborates on this 
point: 
Man has become his own slave, a working animal that must 
carry on working in order to produce, and to produce in order 
to consume. His will, this very will that constitutes his pride 
and that he erects as an instrument of his domination over the 
whole of the earth, is nothing but the expression of what 
Heidegger calls the ‘will to will.’ Yet this man does not realize 
that his labor and his will spin in a vacuum, moving him ever 
more forcefully away from his essence. (104) 
Again, the sense of alienation—a severe distancing from our life structures—comes to the 
fore. Technology acts in such a way as to render human beings to the ends in themselves, 
negating our humanity in this objectifying move. Heidegger’s explicit warning of the 
imprisoning characteristics of Gestell and theyness appear in the appropriation of human 
dispositions in the greater technological apparatus. Dasein is taken hostage, and authentic, 
poetic dwelling retreats to the shadows of existence.  
 Marx’s understanding of alienation touches upon Kant’s concern for the corrupting 
force of using others as a means to an end. It begs us to wonder how the reductive nature of 
technology has been simultaneously perpetuated and ignored? In addition, it asks how an 
ethics of thinking, per Heidegger and Arendt, might embolden the potential for freedom? This 
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barring of thought and prohibition of authentic dwelling underpins much of Hannah Arendt’s 
ideas; her numerous texts on the subject echo Heidegger’s concerns. In the essay Collective 
Responsibility, Arendt demonstrates her concern for issues shaping moral conduct: 
If we strip moral imperatives of their religious connotations 
and origins, we are left with the Socratic proposition ‘It is 
better to suffer wrong than to do wrong,’ and its strange 
substantiation, ‘For it is better for me to be at odds with the 
whole world than, being one, to be at odds with myself.’ 
However we may interpret this invocation of the axiom of 
noncontradiction in moral matters, as though the one and the 
same imperative, ‘Thou shalt not contradict yourself,’ is 
axiomatic for logic and ethics (which incidentally is still Kant’s 
chief argument for the categorical imperative), one thing seems 
clear: the presupposition is that I live together not only with 
others but also with my self, and that this togetherness, as it 
were, has precedence over all others. (RJ 153) 
 Arendt’s contention is that we cannot help but be members of a community, and perhaps 
this, above all else, shapes our conduct. Arendt formed her career in an attempt to understand 
the conditions needed for ultimate corruption to manifest in both the political sphere and in 
the life of the mind. Her work clearly demonstrates the ways theyness and enframing 
influence larger political movements and bring out, in so doing, the potential for extreme 
corruption. While she is best known for diagnosing the banality of evil in relation to Adolf 
Eichmann’s trial in Jerusalem, what will concern us principally is Arendt’s careful 
consideration of thinking and action as ethical practices in themselves. In addition, Arendt’s 
understanding of freedom as that into which we are born will reflect Heidegger’s assertion 
that we must exercise a responsibility toward choice as we actively seek an authentic 
disposition toward living. Arendt’s requisite ethics carry traces of Aristotle’s practice of 
contemplative virtue in context of the greater communal good, Kant’s sense of active reason 
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and the Kingdom of Ends and Heidegger’s departure from essential normative ethical 
structures. Her ethics is a process of reflective consideration of our world and its events.5  
Arendt is speaking in practical terms about the conditions that make evil manifest. 
She states, “[I]n the center of moral considerations of human conduct stands the self; in the 
center of political considerations of conduct stands the world” (RJ 153). For Arendt, we can 
only achieve an ethical way of being by means of continued practice, similar to Heidegger’s 
view of alētheia as an ongoing revelation. Our singularity remains the expression of our best 
possible self in order that we live a virtuous life—in line with Aristotle’s eudaemonia as a 
consequence of a contemplative disposition. Our ethical conduct emerges from a place of 
self-regulation. Arendt explains, 
If he is a thinking being, rooted in his thoughts and 
remembrances, and hence knowing that he has to live with 
himself, there will be limits to what he can permit himself to 
do, and these limits will not be imposed on him from the 
outside, but will be self-set. These limits can change 
considerably and uncomfortably from person to person, from 
country to country, from century to century; but limitless, 
extreme evil is possible only where these self-grown roots, 
which automatically limit the possibilities, are entirely absent. 
(RJ 101) 
Arendt acknowledges the subtle movement of societal norms but underscores the personal 
responsibility we each possess with regards to our choices and behaviors. If our virtue lies in 
our singularity, we own the responsibility for ethical action. She tempers Kant’s version of 
practical reason by asserting that the rational plays a role in thinking in collaboration with 
our will, as the two are correspondingly intertwined. To Arendt, “[Kant’s view] was 
insufficiently political, because the dutiful agents take no responsibility for the consequences 
of his acts, because Kant’s notion of duty, as Eichmann showed, can be perverted, and 
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because (although of course Kant knew nothing of this) the limitlessness of thoughtless evil 
eludes its conceptual grasp” (RJ xxii). As this statement implies, we are too easily co-opted 
by external forces such as Heidegger’s theyness and forgotteness in relation to being-in-the-
world. This interdependency reflects Heidegger’s assertion that we are indivisible beings 
with dispositions and moods that direct our behavior.  
Arendt further concretizes Heidegger’s ontological concern by recognizing the role 
we play toward ourselves in every interaction. Arendt continues, “Solitude means that though 
alone, I am together with somebody (myself, that is)” (98). Her assertion reflects Aristotle’s 
understanding of friendship as a mirror of self-love. In Responsibility and Judgment, she 
quotes Cato who says, “Never am I more active than when I do nothing, never am I less 
alone than when I am by myself” (99). Thought becomes a preamble to action and, akin with 
Heidegger’s ideas on poēisis, contemplation underpins the manner of the poets. The banality 
of evil exists in the vacuous absence of thought and morphs into an extreme and corrupted 
species of theyness when left unchecked. This represents a missed function of Mitsein and 
collectivity.  
Arendt’s ideas, as discussed above, are critical to this project, particularly as 
reflections of Heidegger’s ethical undertones. As both his student and subsequent defender, 
Arendt expresses in real terms the consequences of ignoring the suppression of self-reflection 
and thought, resulting in a complete negation of Aristotelian contemplation. She illustrates 
such a path in the following description:  
In an ever-changing, incomprehensible world the masses had 
reached the point where they would, at the same time, believe 
everything and nothing, think that everything was possible and 
nothing was true…. The totalitarian mass leaders based their 
propaganda on the correct psychological assumption that, 
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under such conditions, one could make people believe the most 
fantastic statements one day, and trust that if the next day they 
were given irrefutable proof of their falsehood, they would take 
refuge in cynicism; instead of deserting the leaders who had 
lied to them, they would protest that they had known all along 
that the statement was a lie and would admire the leaders for 
their superior tactical cleverness. (OoT 499) 
This scenario (which has repeated itself throughout recent history with unfortunate 
frequency) highlights what might result from an abandonment of thought to external, corrupt 
forces. It is the ultimate expression of Heidegger’s Gestell, demonstrating the mental 
imprisonment hobbling the masses.  
 Also noteworthy is Arendt’s belief in our freedom as an a priori ontological 
disposition, opened to us at birth. In other words, we arrive with a tendency toward action 
and are able to choose our paths accordingly. She states, “[T]he new beginning inherent in 
birth can make itself felt in the world only because the newcomer possesses the capacity of 
beginning something anew, that is, of acting” (HC 9). This freedom echoes Heidegger’s 
understanding of the potential forming the basis of Gelassenheit and the active ‘letting be’ 
also inherent in this characteristic. It is through the work Arendt accomplishes that we begin 
to see manifestations of Heidegger’s philosophy of thinking. He lays the foundation on which 
Arendt carefully builds her ideas, taking his ideas farther than he was able to do himself. She 
continues, “The fact that man is capable of action means that the unexpected can be expected 
from him, that he is able to perform what is infinitely improbable. And this again is possible 
only because each man is unique, so that with each birth something uniquely new comes into 
the world” (HC 177–8). The potential for action, unexpected and unique, is part of the 
solution proposed in Heidegger’s plea and exercises this birthright. To reiterate his words, 
“The relationship will be free if it opens our human existence to the essence of technology. 
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When we can respond to this essence, we shall be able to experience the technological within 
its own bounds” (Krell 313). According to Arendt, the responsibility human beings have 
toward a response is therefore always already present from the start of life and the potential 
for the unexpected is constant. This implies that our obligation toward participation and 
action are within us, yet possibly dormant, as might be the case under the conditions of 
theyness. Arendt touches upon Kantian duty (more so than Heidegger was willing to do) to 
uphold what is morally correct while acknowledging external effects influencing decisions 
each individual must make.  
With Arendt’s ideas, we see the presentation of personal responsibility and culpability 
in relation to our singular choices—something ultimately existential in nature as we have the 
ethical burden of self-direction. We are the bearer of guilt when we face ourselves in such 
culpability. This notion suggests an ultimate responsibility for the greater good of our 
community through appropriate actions and builds on Kant’s assertion that we are 
collectively co-creators of our humanity. While not implicating the other directly, Arendt 
does suggest the need to protect the greater good of the world through conscious choice and 
deliberate action. As we have noted above, Arendt refers to this as our collective 
responsibility.  
Despite this collective responsibility, it bears asking to what extent our self-direction 
is determined by intersubjective exchange? To this query, Emmanuel Lévinas proposes ethics 
as originary of philosophy, rather than as a distinct and separate branch of study, with our 
responsibility and interconnectedness binding us inextricably to the Other. Although Lévinas 
was among Heidegger’s most vociferous critics, he nonetheless carried forward traces of 
Heidegger’s ontological hermeneutics. His ideas do not fall strictly into a traditional ethics, 
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however, and are expressed in terms of relationships. We see this in our encounter with the 
Face, with the recognition that I must, in a sense, account for my existence through the gaze 
that confronts me. He says, “Here the concern for justice is born, which is the basis for the 
theoretical. But it is always starting out from the Face, from the responsibility for the other 
that justice appears, which calls for judgment and comparison, a comparison of what is in 
principle incomparable, for every being is unique; every other is unique” (EN 104). Arendt’s 
singularity is manifested indirectly in these thoughts, although with a move toward our 
collective disposition. Lévinas continues, “One of the most important things for me is that 
asymmetry and that formula: All men are responsible for one another and I more than anyone 
else” (107). In other words, in beholding the Other, I am most accountable for his existence, 
regardless of his actions or disposition. Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, it is 
within this exchange that the Self is grounded.  
Pushing beyond Kant’s formulation of Humanity and Mill’s greater happiness theory, 
Lévinas ultimately radicalizes Mitsein as the shaper of our being. He asks, “Is that the word 
of God? A word that requires me as the one responsible for the Other; and there is an election 
there, because that responsibility is inalienable” (108). The return to responsibility connects 
with Heidegger’s Care and Arendt’s notion of our singularity, but maintains the bonds that 
drive our ethical conduct. From this premise, Lévinas argued that Heidegger’s thinking did 
not consider the Other in any significant way, despite his exploration of Mitsein and 
theyness, and the correlative dispositions that affect our interactions with the world. 
Furthermore, Lévinas observes that it was Bergson, not Heidegger, whose thoughts 
introduced temporality and shifted philosophical focus to human creative intuition, or the 
élan vital (Kearney Dialogues 65). Thus, for Lévinas, the life process of care, in its 
 434 
 
essentially temporal disposition, emerges either directly or indirectly from Bergson. As 
Lévinas moved toward phenomenology as a method, he explains, “The phenomenological 
method permits consciousness to understand its own preoccupations, to reflect upon itself 
and thus discover all the hidden or neglected horizons of its intentionality” (Kearney 
Dialogues 65). (These particular points are increasingly important in the analysis of the 
artists’ works in chapters 3-5.)  
As we have seen through this brief exploration of ethical traditions, enframing has 
been a consistent worry either in its expression through theyness or the manner in which it 
manipulates being into falling prey to greater societal forces imposing structures of thought. 
Freedom, contemplation and living the fullest potential of our humanity connect ethical 
premises, and prescriptive solutions seek to protect what is our highest manifestation. These 
normative structures or decrees have varied throughout the ages, but an enduring concern for 
essential freedom remains. Heidegger’s efforts intended to break free of such norms. As we 
have noted throughout, Heidegger’s shift beyond the normative addresses the more 
foundational need for authenticity and care, dispositions we must incorporate into our 
individual lives. He reassigns new meaning to old premises, exploring the ways Dasein, 
through its structures and dispositions, leads us to freedom. In the introduction to 
Responsibility and Judgment, Kohn explains, “For Arendt the contingency of human freedom 
is the real crisis in which we live today; it cannot be avoided, and the only meaningful 
question that can be asked is whether or not our freedom pleases us, whether or not we are 
willing to pay its price” (RJ xxvi). Arendt is walking a fine line balancing our existential 
reality on the one hand with the necessity for collective responsibility on the other. Herewith, 
we move into our singular position, all the while maintaining the necessity of moral conduct. 
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This returns us to Heidegger’s opening paragraph in the “Question Concerning Technology,” 
in which he implicates our contemplative nature on the quest to ensure our ultimate freedom 
within the event of truth. The suggestion that we might return to our essence by means of 
thinking has prophetic undertones given the current global relationship human beings have 
with technology and the widespread disappearance of contemplation as a source of virtue and 
liberation.   
Through our exploration of themes and a small number of key thinkers in the ethical 
tradition, we are now in a much better position to understand Heidegger’s ethics as an 
ontological practice and disposition—something that may not be directly evident as we read 
his texts. Although only briefly, I have highlighted some systems that resonate within his 
notion of Mitsein, care or solicitude as ongoing practices and structures of our being. In 
addition, we have looked at Heidegger’s continued concern for the salvation of Dasein 
through the authentic expression of our potential. Although traces of each of the 
aforementioned thinkers manifest in Heidegger’s writing thereby coloring his ideas, it is his 
departure from normative ethics toward a phenomenological hermeneutics that is most 
significant. 
 
 
NOTES: 
1    “How to Repair Moral Capital,” NYT, Oct. 20, 2016. Brooks has written extensively about the immoral displays in our government and 
the long-term effects these downgraded ethics will create.  
2    vita contemplativa is something Arendt unpacks in her writings about thinking. This concept also corresponds to her notion of a vita 
activa, which underpins her ethics of action—something that will become increasingly important as this project unfolds.  
3    The premise that only the best men can become virtuous by means of a contemplative life is dangerous. It moves forward into a 
Nietzschean position that very few detach from the herd and achieve the status of über-mensch. In addition, “some people have thought 
that the ‘natural law’ of human life is ferocious competitive struggle, with little room for altruism and justice” (Being Good). He states, 
it is “finer and more godlike” to bring about the well-being of a whole city than to sustain the happiness of just one person (EN 1094b7–
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10). (Stanford Plato site) And Nietzsche is shifting the paradigm away from Morality, which his Genealogy shows to be a kind of 
evolving construct. That’s a kind of blow to what Aristotle otherwise takes for Granted (that Virtue/Vice have some kind of definite 
basis), although both could be said to be doing an ethics of existence. 
4    Kant ultimately abandons the ‘Happiness’ grounding principle after seeing it pass into Bentham’s pre-Mill Utilitarianism. Kant does not 
believe Happiness can be contrived as the basis for Ethics.  
5    If one includes Nietzsche in the above list of influences, then one sees how Arendt goes into the existential plane (immanence) like him 
but without erasing Morality. In a sense, she one-ups Nietzsche. 
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APPENDIX B:  
 
BENJAMIN + HEIDEGGER ON LANGUAGE AS THE ORIGIN OF MEANING 
For Benjamin, language serves both as a style of reasoning and careful attention to 
words and as a conduit for understanding human experience. In her introduction to 
Illuminations, Arendt quotes Benjamin’s words penned in a letter to Hugo Hofmannsthal in 
1924, 
The conviction which guides me in my literary attempts … [is] 
that each truth has its home, its ancestral palace, in language, 
that this palace was built with the oldest logoi, and that to a 
truth thus founded the insights of the sciences will remain 
inferior for as long as they make do here and there in the area 
of language like nomads, as it were, in the conviction of the 
sign character of language which produces the irresponsible 
arbitrariness of their terminology. (IL 47) 
    Arendt draws a parallel between the thoughts expressed herein and Heidegger’s later 
writings — demonstrating the lasting impact of Benjamin’s ideas and the foretelling of 
Heidegger’s objection to science as a dominant purveyor of truth. In addition, traces of 
Heidegger’s ‘language as the house of Being’ such as he presents in his Letter on Humanism 
can be detected in his letter. Thinking is at home within language as it finds its expression 
therein. Heidegger states:  
Such offering consists in the fact that in thinking Being comes 
to language. Language is the house of Being. In its home man 
dwells. Those who think and those who create with words are 
the guardians of this home. Their guardianship accomplishes 
the manifestation of Being insofar as they bring the 
manifestation of Being to language and maintain it in language 
through their speech. Thinking does not become action only 
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because some effect issues from it or because it is applied. 
Thinking acts insofar as it thinks. Such action is presumably 
the simplest and at the same time the highest, because it 
concerns the relation of Being to man (Krell 217).  
His view of Freedom is similar; it is an abstraction that we are unable to ‘hold,’ a presencing 
that comes before us. By the same token, to live within language can both liberate and limit 
expression while manifesting in every facet of existence. If indeed language is the home of 
truth (we might say where truth dwells) above the capabilities of the sciences, and if we are 
to avoid the ‘irresponsible arbitrariness’ of its usage, then a careful examination of the 
terminology deployed in Benjamin’s essay, as well as those expressed in related texts, seems 
paramount. Such an examination allows us to acknowledge Benjamin’s reasoning and careful 
attention to Marxist language while also keeping track of the dangers language faces when 
falling into fixed structures — in essence, becoming enframed. At the very least, unpacking 
Benjamin’s terminology will enable us to set a proper course for a clear understanding of 
what follows, all the while underscoring the trans-historical nature of the foundational ideas. 
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APPENDIX C: 
 
 
GENEALOGY OF SOUTH ASIAN HISTORY:  
THE AMBIGUITY OF TRUTH / NON-TRUTH IN THE WORK OF MIRZA + BUTLER 
 
We turn our attention first to the issues informing the subject matter of the artwork, 
undertaking a genealogical investigation of the ideas and historical events shaping its 
content. To assist with this effort, we will examine the historical narrative with the support of 
colonial and post-colonial thinkers Said, Spivak and Bhabha, while recognizing the 
internalization of colonialism by many who live in its aftermath. In addition, Foucault’s 
discourse and Arendt’s plurality will serve to both question and clarify the enduring 
difficulties expressed in South Asia’s tumultuous story. The profound connections between 
past and present will become vividly clear as we undertake our reading of Mirza and Butler’s 
video essay in section 4 of chapter 5.  
In support of this genealogical approach, Foucault writes, “History . . . is certainly the 
most erudite, the most aware, the most conscious, and possibly the most cluttered area of our 
memory; but it is equally the depths from which all beings emerge into their precarious, 
glittering existence” (OoT 219). History, particularly the violent oppression of a nation by 
external forces, quite literally collapses within each frame of Mirza and Butler’s artwork, 
demonstrating the continuum of a past that, regardless of decades of emotional separation, is 
directing contemporary geo-political actions. There are several overarching questions that 
inform our investigation: How does history actively manifest in present-day events? How 
does an understanding of the past benefit our understanding of ongoing acts of violence? 
Certainly, one must investigate Foucault’s épistèmes as units of an historical a priori 
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anchoring broader knowledge and understanding. Without such an investigation, one risks 
not fully experiencing the emancipatory potential of The Unreliable Narrator.  
At the center of Mirza and Butler’s film is an understanding of colonialism and the 
post-colonial nationalist tensions between Pakistan and India born of centuries of British 
rule. Furthermore, the artwork alludes to the viciously animated hostilities and subsequent 
discourse brought into being by the arbitrary 1947 territorial partitioning of the Indian 
subcontinent. The partition, as delineated by the departing British Raj, along with the elected 
Hindu and Muslim leadership, recklessly accelerated the effort to define national boundaries 
based on the separation of Muslims and Hindus. The division emphasized cultural difference 
over political collaboration. The rushed imposition of externally drawn lines of demarcation 
created a wave of destruction that actively simmers in collective post-memory (or the latent 
spaces feeding current beliefs) decades later.  
The voiceover script underpinning the film speaks of “a Dadaist nightmare framed as 
a moral response to the tortured, humiliated and photographed bodies of the slim men and 
women elsewhere—it is a drama of violent death, a monstrous form of revenge of Bollywood 
proportions” (The Unreliable Narrator). As testimony to this fact, at the time of this writing, 
both nations are celebrating 70 years since they gained their respective ‘freedom’ from 
British rule—and only now are those who survived the subsequent genocidal carnage 
articulating their trauma in various collections of oral and written histories.1 These stories, 
recounted on the pages of various publications, illustrate the lingering pain and trauma 
inflicted upon the South Asian people so many decades ago.  
Also consequential are the strategic considerations imposed upon the subcontinent by 
larger nation states, including the US’s cold war with the former USSR, China vying for both 
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military and economic benefits, and the former USSR pressing down through Afghanistan. In 
his book Deadly Embrace, author Bruce Riedel places a large share of responsibility for the 
turmoil affecting Pakistan on the United States, whose focus on the region shifted in the 
aftermath of the defeat and withdrawal of the “Soviet Fortieth Red Army in Afghanistan, 
which was followed by the collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the cold war” (3). With 
regards to this dynamic, Riedel continues “[the U.S.] then focused its attention elsewhere 
(ironically, much of it on Iraq), leaving Afghanistan to become transformed, not into a stable 
and friendly nation, but a hostile and fanatic foe eager to host al Qaeda and as the base for the 
deadliest attack ever on U.S. soil” (3). The short-term interference of foreign powers 
continues. In the November 10, 2017 issue of The Week, several editorial writers speak of 
recent U.S. overtures favoring India, explicitly denouncing Pakistan and further exacerbating 
festering tensions. Depending on their various interests in India, the outside nations’ 
motivations and actions vary, but the result is the same: a subcontinent in unending 
geopolitical turmoil, which provides fodder for the expansion of jihad and ongoing acts of 
aggression. 
Where did all of this conflict originate? With the dawn of the seventeenth century, the 
British were initially enticed to South Asia by its potential for economic expansion and 
global trade. Their actions paved the way for what is now called globalization. What the 
British encountered, according to the New History of India, was an ensemble of largely 
Muslim Mughal emperors, who ruled with relative tolerance and ethnic respect, adapting 
their own cultural practices to existing local Hindu norms, thereby facilitating a pluralistic 
society. The British joined the stage during a period of relative peace. Queen Elizabeth I 
signed the East India Royal Charter in the year 1600 granting its ambitious stakeholders the 
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right to establish trade in the region to their great economic advantage (Baladouni).2 While 
the East India Company’s intention was material gain rather than territorial acquisition, the 
weakening Mughal Empire offered an opening for further strategic control; the Brits’ 
increased jurisdiction was largely taken by force and coercion (Dalrymple).3 Some regional 
leaders bowed to the expanding British presence, willingly cooperating with demands, while 
other regional leaders fought aggressively to maintain their dominion. The Mughal Emperor 
Nuruddin Salim Jahangir (r. 1605-1627), in a gesture of cooperation, wrote a letter 
responding to the 1612 invitation from James I to sign a reciprocal trade treaty giving the 
East India Company exclusivity and property rights in exchange for European goods and 
“rarities.”4 Other local rulers were not so welcoming. By the end of the seventeenth century, 
with trade open to other British interests, the field of competitors for the available economic 
opportunities grew along with the stakes involved in such commercial ventures.5  
The British struggled all the while with other external commercial forces competing 
for trade advantages. In these early stages of commerce, other nation states were finding 
trade routes lucrative. Piracy abounded as ships began their voyages laden with materials 
headed for Europe with subsequent violent conflicts fought on Indian soil and waters. The 
Dutch, Danes, Portuguese and French were among these other nationalities fighting for a 
stake in the wealth generated through South Asia’s trading routes and natural resources. 
Despite these monetary interests, while establishing deeper alliances with British, the 
Portuguese ceded their control over Goa, Bombay and Chittagong in 1662 as “part of the 
dowry of Catherine of Braganza” (Tyacke 39).6 Though there were multiple challenges to its 
advancing control, the East India Company, using growing military strength and pervasive 
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force, eventually monopolized the Indian Subcontinent, profiting from its total occupation 
while systematically repressing local cultures and mores.  
This measure of control was achieved by means of private armies, deployed by the 
East India Company and its directors. In Dalrymple’s words, “It was not the British 
government that seized India at the end of the 18th century, but a dangerously unregulated 
private company headquartered in one small office, five windows wide, in London, and 
managed in India by an unstable sociopath—[Robert] Clive.”7 The ruthless profiteering 
initiated in the early seventeenth century set up structures of dominance and established 
longstanding hierarchies of power administered by foreigners who cared little about South 
Asia’s rich cultural heritage. Nor were the British interested in perpetuating the pluralistic 
social norms hitherto enjoyed by the Indian people.  
These activities and proclivities to force a submission of the other, the native as it 
were, mirror Foucault’s understanding of dominance and control, as laid out in Discipline 
and Punish. In addition, the imbalance of power toward the colonialist forces nurtured an 
undercurrent of resistance as described by Caygill. Indeed, the progressive overtaking of 
India’s territories planted the seeds for later resistance, seeds that would lay dormant for 
many decades. Edward Said explains,  
The relationship between Occident and Orient is a relationship 
of power, of domination, of varying degrees of a complex 
hegemony … The Orient was Orientalized not only because it 
was discovered to be ‘Oriental’ in all those ways considered 
commonplace by an average nineteenth-century European, but 
also because it could be—that is, submitted to being—made 
Oriental. There is very little consent to be found. (Harrison and 
Wood 1007-1008).  
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Said understands the nature of colonization and domination, and the resignation of vast 
populations under such structures. Under British rule, cultural characteristics were 
sublimated and replaced, thus creating an alienation of heritage, along with a pervasive mood 
of shame for one’s own identity and alleged inferiority. The suppression (manifesting in the 
replacement of the dominant language, the introduction and imposition of new religious 
mores, the wholesale replacement of educational systems, shifting the measure of a 
successful society, etc.) created a tide of resentment and resistance. In Mirza and Butler’s 
work, this chasm exists in the space between the Eton exam and brutal realities unfolding in 
Mumbai, a space of cultural dissonance and inequity surfacing today.  
In the “Order of Discourse,” Foucault asserts, “Any system of education is a political 
way of maintaining or modifying the appropriation of discourses [that is, the transference of 
discourse(s) from one person/social group to another], along with knowledges and powers 
which they carry” (222). These ideas echo Heidegger’s understanding of Being as historical, 
embedded within Heritage and life among others. By imposing British educational systems 
and enforcing the belief in its superiority, millions of South Asian children were raised into 
this ideological position. Said elaborates, “[W]hat we must respect and try to grasp is the 
sheer knitted-together strength of Orientalist discourse, its very close ties to the enabling 
socio-economic and political institutions, and its redoubtable durability” (Harrison and Wood 
1008). Over centuries, South Asia’s consciousness shifted; it simultaneously bowed to the 
prevailing discourse and sowed seeds of resistance.  
The profound marginalization created insurrections, among them the Rebellion of 
1857. “In 1857, Indians rose in revolt against the high-handed and oppressive [East India] 
Company rule—particularly its insensitivity toward their religions—and it took excessively 
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brutal action by the Company’s army to regain control of its possessions” (Parliament.uk). 
The violence and atrocity evidenced in this conflict prompted the British Crown to intervene, 
ultimately passing the Government of India Act of 1858; the Crown assumed control, making 
Victoria Queen and Empress of India. This act did not ameliorate levels of oppression nor 
end the stronghold over India’s populace. Quite the contrary, the remaining economic ties 
held the firmly imposed structures wholly in place, with British interests well ahead of 
India’s. Mirza and Butler’s artwork carries the traces of this historical reality, one in which 
visitors to South Asia retain the privileges and wealth denied to the vast majority of its 
native-born citizenry. The disparity is evidenced as the young jihadist recruits express awe 
over luxuries and opulence they have never before witnessed, riches so startling as to shift 
their attention from their mission to destroy it. Their role reveals the historical divide and 
reinforces the inequities created through centuries of colonization and oppression.  
 We will see clearly how the acceleration of technologies and events made possible 
with the industrial revolution magnified the challenges faced by India’s people, regardless of 
faith or economic status. The 20th century brought with it increased global violence, and as 
discussed in prior chapters, unspeakable atrocities and genocide. The British Raj, and its 
subjects, fought in both World Wars, with substantial losses of life and economic prosperity. 
World War II, though ostensibly ‘won’ by the Allied forces, left Britain in economic ruin. 
The long narrative of imperialism that had come to define British identity began to falter.  
During the decades between World Wars, several key figures grew into Indian 
political power, emerging from British educations as attorneys, practicing law to the extent 
the British Raj permitted. Three key figures—Mahātmā Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, 
Pandit Jawaharial Nehru and Mohammed Ali Jinnah—orchestrated an Indian independence 
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movement. They formed the Hindu Congress and Muslim League, gathering enormous 
momentum in support of their respective campaigns. Their efforts and the upheaval that 
ensued were not welcome by the British Raj; they were imprisoned and, physically abused. 
Gandhi’s personal experience with racial inequity in South Africa galvanized his principled 
approach of non-violent resistance, living his ideals through his actions and an outright 
rejection of his own position within the Hindu caste system, choosing instead to live among 
the ‘untouchable caste,’ Hinduism’s lowest rung in society.  
At the risk of grossly oversimplifying a long and arduous historical trajectory, what 
emerged from British imperialist rule was a focus on difference; disparate religions and 
identity politics existed within Western structures. Arendt warns against such strategies of 
oppression, as they negate the distinctive characteristics of unique beings, thus setting up a 
foundation of discord. Notions of superiority (already built into the Hindu caste system) were 
exacerbated by long-standing oppression. Alex von Tunzelmann explains, in her volume 
Indian Summer, when “the British started to define ‘communities’ based on religious identity 
and attach political representation to them, many Indians stopped accepting the diversity of 
their own thoughts and began to ask themselves in which of the boxes they belonged” 
(Dalrymple “Great Divide”).  
The categorization of human beings reflected the well-trodden discourse of racial 
superiority that satisfied the imperialist need to hold onto power. This discourse is also 
reminiscent of Kristeva’s understanding of the Abject as an ‘othered’ impurity, used to 
constitute a social system of identity and structure. Such efforts reinforce Foucault’s notion 
of discourse’s exclusion of the other as a means of control. Foucault states,  
But when we view things on a different scale, when we ask the 
question of what this will to truth has been and constantly is, 
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across other discourses, this will to truth which has crossed so 
many centuries of our history; what is, in its very general form, 
the type of division which governs our will to know (notre 
volonté de savoir), then what we see taking shape is perhaps 
something like a system of exclusion, a historical, modifiable, 
and institutionally constraining system. (Young 54) 
Jinnah capitalized on the mounting tensions, pressing for an independent Muslim state, so as 
to avoid further marginalization and oppression by the larger Hindu governance. Eventually, 
through extensive deliberation and complex political negotiations, Britain was ready to 
relinquish control of her ‘crown jewel’ to its rightful people, the 400 plus million Indians 
preparing for freedom, whatever that freedom might represent. While both the British and the 
Hindu Congress were vehemently opposed to any division of the sub-continent, Jinnah and 
other members of the Muslim League believed it to be the only acceptable direction, if their 
voices were ever to have any consequence.  
Amid increasing levels of inter-sectarian violence, the ultimate decision to divide 
India and a newly founded Pakistan fell to Louis Mountbatten, the last Vice Roy to oversee 
the British Raj. Sir Cyril Radcliffe, the chairman of the Border Commission who held little 
prior demographic understanding of the region, drew the divisions. Pakistan’s projected lands 
would be separated by a stretch of Indian soil, thereby creating East and West wings of a 
nation whose largely Muslim populations had little else in common other than their 
fundamental religious beliefs. The Mountbatten Plan, crafted from conversations with 
individual political leaders and an urgently felt presentiment that India would imminently 
dissolve into civil war, yielded Pakistan to Jinnah, while endeavoring to keep its 
landholdings as small as possible so as to satisfy the Hindu Congress. Furthermore, 
Mountbatten advised the ‘princely states’ to accede to their choice of either Pakistan or India.  
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When warned by Abul Kalam Azad of potential outbursts of violence, Mountbatten 
responded,  
At least on this question I shall give you complete assurance. I 
shall see to it that there is no bloodshed and riot. I am a soldier 
and not a civilian. Once partition is accepted in principle, I 
shall issue orders to see that there are no communal 
disturbances anywhere in the country. If there should be the 
slightest agitation, I shall adopt the sternest measures to nip the 
trouble in the bud. (Jagmohan 49) 
The illusion of control as stated in these comments expresses the Orientalist power 
position—without recognizing the social strife underway. The British simply assumed that 
through their sovereignty and domination they would maintain civility throughout the period 
of transition. Caygill carefully notes the outcomes from any such displacements of power 
when unmet with an equilibrium of polity. When explaining Arendt’s position with regards 
to the suppression of disparate populations, he explains, “Total domination seeks to reduce 
human diversity to a biopolitical essence, an animal species, except that Arendt went even 
further in saying that this ‘animal life’ is itself further reduced to a ‘thing’ that can be shaped 
and controlled” (Resistance 154). What becomes clear, through a genealogy of India’s past, 
is such external control has disastrous consequences.  
Indeed, Mountbatten’s assurances were met with an unfathomable wave of brutality, 
reaching such depths of depravity that Margaret Bourke White, on photographic assignment 
for Life Magazine at the time, described the ensuing events as on par with those she 
witnessed at Buchenwald only two years prior. An estimated one to two million civilians 
perished in the weeks after India and Pakistan won their independence from British rule, 
leaving indelible scars on both sides of the newly established border. William Dalrymple 
writes for the New Yorker, “Across the Indian subcontinent, communities that had coexisted 
 449 
 
for almost a millennium attacked each other in a terrifying outbreak of sectarian violence, 
with Hindus and Sikhs on one side and Muslims on the other—a mutual genocide as 
unexpected as it was unprecedented” (Dalrymple 2015).  
Ayesha Jalal states “the Partition is the central historical event in twentieth century 
South Asia. . . . A defining moment that is neither beginning nor end, partition continues to 
influence how the peoples and states of postcolonial South Asia envisage their past, present 
and future” (qtd. in Dalrymple). Indeed, accounts of the atrocities continue to haunt current 
generations through a pervasive infusion of post-memory and discourse. The radical 
displacement of entire communities coupled with extreme animosity emanating from the 
highest levels of leadership set course for an unstable future. This outcome was well 
anticipated by Gandhi who understood that even the smallest measures of violence would 
escalate (Caygill Resistance 76). Dalrymple concludes, “Today, both India and Pakistan 
remain crippled by the narratives built around memories of the crimes of Partition, as 
politicians (particularly in India) and the military (particularly in Pakistan) continue to stoke 
the hatreds of 1947 for their own ends” (Dalrymple “Great Divide”).  
How does the sum of violence and strife manifest in current South Asian socio-
political dynamics and discourse? We have noted centuries of foreign oppression and a 
constant undercurrent of corrupt commercial enterprise with vast segments of India’s 
population placed in service of capitalist interests. It is not surprising, given these conditions, 
that resistance and force should marry in an effort to subvert political discourse and self-
interest. Yasmin Khan, author of The Great Partition, judges that Partition “stands testament 
to the follies of empire, which ruptures community evolution, distorts historical trajectories 
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and forces violent state formation from societies that would otherwise have taken different—
and unknowable—paths” (Dalrymple “Great Divide”).  
The power vacuum created when the British Raj vacated its authority left an entire 
population at odds with itself. While the nature of South Asian (read Orientalist) discourse 
was indeed shifting, there continued to be embedded traditions of thought creating ever 
deeper divides. Spivak tells us, “Any extended discussion of remaking history in 
decolonization must take into account the dangerous fragility and tenacity of those concept 
metaphors” (Harrison and Wood 1095). Those concepts refer to nationalism, secularism, 
internationalism and culturalism (Harrison and Wood 1095). The improbable freedom 
achieved by both the Hindu Congress and Muslim League proved to be tenuous. Arguably, 
the two nations have yet to experience the unhindered independence they fought so hard to 
gain. With regards to this post-colonial condition and its implicit fragility, Homi Bhabha 
explains,  
It is in the emergence of the interstices—the overlap and 
displacement of domains of difference—that the intersubjective 
and collective experiences of nationness, community interest, 
or cultural value are negotiated. How are subjects formed ‘in-
between,’ or in excess of, the sum of the ‘parts’ of difference 
(usually intoned as race/class/gender, etc.)? How do strategies 
of representation or empowerment come to be formulated in 
the competing claims of communities where, despite shared 
histories of deprivation and discrimination, the exchange of 
values, meanings and priorities may not always be 
collaborative and dialogical, but may be profoundly 
antagonistic, conflictual and even incommensurable? (Bhabha, 
Harrison and Wood 1111) 
It is the absence of dialogical collaboration—though this common value had existed for 
centuries—that drove South Asia into chaos. Without a mutual vision of what freedom and 
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independence might look like to the whole (despite its pluralistic nature), the vacuum filled 
with bottomless rage, and perhaps the fear of further future repression. Whatever the cause of 
the mass killings and mutual genocide, decolonization left Pakistan and India in a perpetual 
state of war.  
The idea that freedom is a liberating force is deceptive. Mirza and Butler’s video 
essay makes our understanding of these currents indispensable to our apprehending of their 
message. Within each of the film’s choreographed frames, we encounter a repetition of this 
brutal past complete in all its graphic details and urgency. To this notion, Spivak writes,  
For the moment let us hold onto the fact that the de-
colonization does quite seriously represent a rupture for the 
colonized. It is counterintuitive to point at its repetitive 
negotiations. But it is precisely these counterintuitive 
imaginings that must be grasped when history is said to be 
remade, and a rupture is too easily declared because of the 
intuition of freedom that a merely political independence 
brings for a certain class. Such graspings will allow us to 
perceive that neocolonialism is a displaced repetition of many 
of the old lines laid down by colonialism. (Harrison and Wood 
1094).  
Spivak notes the repetition of well-entrenched systems of control and ongoing violence to the 
other. Thus, the power grabs originating in India’s independence movement led to self-
interested manipulation. Jinnah’s immovable desire for an independent Muslim state, while 
initially moderate and secular in intent, continues to nurture ongoing acts of violence.  
Neither India nor Pakistan will relinquish desired ownership of Kashmir. The first 
war over the disputed territories broke out in October 1947, just weeks after independence. In 
1949, The United Nations imposed a cease-fire and a fragile (and brief) state of order marked 
the northernmost region of India. Over the past seven decades, a number of other conflicts 
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have arisen, usually provoked by the ongoing dispute over Kashmir. These conflicts have 
included the 1965 War, the 1971 War, the 1989 Kashmir Insurgency, the 1999 Kargil 
Conflict and the active proliferation of nuclear weapons on both sides of the border. 
Following the devastation of 9/11, 2001 found the region, once again, on the brink of war, 
with Pakistan attempting to ease tensions by cooperating with the United States with regards 
to the capture of Osama bin Laden. All the while, global strategic interests continue to invite 
the attention of other nation states, whose respective stakes in the region include natural 
resources, strategic military operations and the sale and provision of arms.  
In his narrative history titled Midnight’s Furies, Nisid Hajari concludes the conflict is 
“getting more, rather than less, dangerous: the two countries’ nuclear arsenals are growing, 
militant groups are becoming more capable, and rabid media outlets on both sides are 
shrinking the scope for moderate voices. . . . It is well past time that the heirs to Nehru and 
Jinnah finally put 1947’s furies to rest” (Hajari 261). Hajari introduces the media’s 
complicity in advancing prevailing beliefs, foretelling Baudrillard’s assertion of its ultimate 
complicity with human action. Needless to say, the unrelenting production of discourse 
continues to limit human consciousness to a single story, precluding cooperation and possible 
relief from violence.  
 As though speaking through Arendt’s understanding of plurality and equality, Spivak 
addresses the difficulties of moving past political manipulations of discourse: 
Briefly, it seems possible to say that an alternative and perhaps 
equally fragile mode of resistance to them can only come 
through a strategic acceptance of the centrifugal potential of 
the plurality and heterogeneity native to the subcontinent. Yet, 
heterogeneity is an elusive and ambivalent resource (except in 
metropolitan ‘parliamentary’ or academic space) as the recent 
past in India, and indeed on the globe, have shown. Its direct 
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manipulation for electoral or diplomatic results constitutes 
devastation. (Harrison and Wood 1095) 
Arendt speaks to the “paradoxical plurality of unique beings” (HC 176) as the fundamental 
premise underpinning the “basic condition of both action and speech” (HC 175). In much the 
same way that Arendt encourages the acceptance of plurality and political difference as 
expressed in cooperation, Spivak concisely summarizes the South Asian conflict, 
acknowledging the political jockeying and manipulations, which have resulted in widespread, 
ongoing devastation. Mirza and Butler underscore both Arendt’s and Spivak’s thoughts, 
expressed in the numerous references to geopolitical complexities manifesting in constant 
fear and violent outbreaks. To this point of view, Dalrymple adds, “1947 has yet to come to 
an end” (“Great Divide”).  
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